

E-BOOK

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Southeast Europe:
History, Culture, Politics,
and Economy**

"St. Cyril and St. Methodius"
University of Veliko Tarnovo
June, 20th 2020

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Editorial Board

**Dimitar Dimitrov, Marie-Hélène Blanchet, Milenko Bodin, Milko Palangurski,
Nadezhda Hristova, Veneta Hristova, Vihren Bouzov**



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FOREWORD

This volume is a collection of articles presented at the Third online international conference under the title: “Southeast Europe: history, culture, politics, and economy”. The conference took place online on 19th of June 2020. We managed so far to develop a growing society of scientists focusing their research on a broad area stretching from ancient and medieval history to modern times, from anthropology to politics and economy of the countries situated in the region of Southeast Europe. Since the second year of this initiative, taking into consideration how strongly connected we are in the modern world, we put our efforts into involving researchers and investigating different types of connections between Southeast European countries and the wider regions of Europe and Eurasia. Our main goal is to lay down the foundations of a growing scientific network, which will unite persons, colleagues and hopefully future friends, adherents to the idea that science has no limits in the world of increased and increasing limits. We are proud with our 58 published studies from our first three conferences, from altogether 11 countries from Europe and Asia. In the present volume we are pleased to welcome newcomers to the “Southeast Europe family” from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Turkey.

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PLENARY SECTION

Formation of the Bulgarian Parliament (1879-1911)

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Abstract

The formation of the Bulgarian Parliament is the underlying basis of the political process in the country. This process is influenced by the number of voters, the type of electoral system, the activity of the citizens, the leadership of the electoral administration, the administrative potential of the state administration and the society. For three decades, the country has been building a sustainable system and tradition of choice by the citizens, and the process is not only stable, but there is also a slow, gradual, and fully visible improvement in the electoral process.

Keywords: constitution, parliament, electoral process, voter turnout

After the end of the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1879, the Principality of Bulgaria appeared on the political map of Europe. According to the decisions of the Berlin Congress, the new state must have a constitutional government, drafted by an assembly of Bulgarian notables. Adopted on April 16, 1879, in the medieval capital Tarnovo, the constitution states that the country should be built and developed as a constitutional monarchy, with national representation. The entire sovereignty of the people is concentrated in the National Assembly, which is divided in two: Grand and Ordinary. The Grand National Assembly (GNA) can be convened only in strictly defined cases – election of a ruler, election of regents, change of the constitution and change of the territory of the country. The Ordinary National Assembly (NA) is the main legislative body of the country and a source of real power. Both types of assemblies assume legislative, constituent and control functions, thus becoming one of the most important state institutions, which can largely determine the direction of the state development of the Principality. Therefore, the formation of the different types of parliament becomes a special process that dominates and determines the directions of the whole political process. At first glance, a routine and administrative activity turns out to be the most political issue in the historical development of the country. The purpose of this article is to show the process of forming the parliament until the Principality acquires full national sovereignty internationally and domestically [1].

The Tarnovo constitution introduces universal suffrage for all “citizens”. This places Bulgaria in the forefront of the democratic countries worldwide. Male persons over the age of 21 who have civil rights and are registered in the voter lists have the right to vote. The Tarnovo Constitution does not differentiate between the sexes, but the political practice allowed the Bulgarian woman to the ballot box only in 1937, or in other words 58 years later. This is not a feature of Bulgarian politics, but a world practice. Between 22-24% of the country’s population has the right to participate in the elections, which is completely logical as a population structure and European practice [2]. The slow growth of the electorate can be seen below from Table 1.

Table 1. Ratio between population and voters

№	Parliament-year	Population	Voters	%
1	V-1887	2.950,599	610.000	20.67
2	VI-1890	3.154,375	650.000	20.60
3	VII-1893	3.154,375	695.000	22.03
4	VIII-1894	3.310,713	735.000	22.20
5	IX-1896	3.310,713	750.000	22.65
6	X-1899	3.310,713	766.455	23.15
7	XI-1901	3.744,283	806.679	21.54
8	XII-1902	3.744,283	812.296	21.70
9	XIII-1903	3.744,283	839.605	22.42
10	XIV-1908	4.035,575	931.614	23.08
11	XV-1911	4.337,516	1.068,614	24.64

The voters can elect MPs who must be at least 30 years old and literate. The parliament is floating in size, as a slightly strange rule of choice is being introduced – one deputy is elected per 10,000 inhabitants, and in 1893, during the constitutional change, the ratio changed to 1 per 20,000. Thus, the increase in the number of MPs is at the expense of the natural increase of the population. Purely mathematical analysis shows, however, that the representatives are always 2 to 4 people less than the theoretical number of representatives. The reduction made in 1893 is completely logical, as the First National Assembly consists of 172 deputies, and after the merge between the Principality and Eastern Rumelia in 1885, the fifth NA reaches a record of 293 deputies, which complicates both the activities of parliament and its maintenance. In fact, there is no session of any parliament in which the representatives are 100% of the theoretical number.

There is a variety of reasons for that – taking up a role in a public office, resignation for personal reasons, death, etc. For 30 years, the actual composition of parliament ranged from 76.92% to 99.64%. Only in one session, in 1900, the parliament filled 100% of its composition.

Originally the National Assembly had a three-year term, which in 1893 was increased to five years. The constitutional text provides for a mandatory annual session. But it is rarely for a parliament to serve its constitutionally defined term. Only the meetings dominated by the People's Liberal Party of Stefan Stambolov – V and VI (1887-1893), as well as the XIII NA (1903-1908) – only 20% of the possible cases can boast of such an achievement. The tradition dates to the First National Assembly, which lasted only a month and three days. For thirty-two years, the citizens went to the polls quite often. From 1879 to 1911, voters were convened 19 times – 14 for the National Assembly and 5 times for the Grand National Assembly. And this does not include the double turnout of most voters for the first four ONS. Thus, going to the polls became a routine phenomenon, as parliamentary elections were held on average every year and nine months, and to these we must add the elections for village and city municipal councils, district councils, school boards, jurors and chambers of commerce. Opportunity for choice and education of the population in civil rights and freedoms is in abundance, but there is still the problem of the activity and behaviour of the electorate and its readiness to take such a sip of freedom and undoubted responsibility. This strongly confirms the fact that out of all the institutions, the parliament turned out to be one of the most unstable organs of power, which depends extremely on the monarch, the executive and public opinion therefore opening the way for permanent elections [3].

Throughout this period, the main problem is how to fence and guarantee the election process with effective leadership. There is almost no parliament meeting without a debate that does not cover this task. Despite the great difficulties the improvement is a fact. Increasingly and steadily, the election administration is beginning to have a positive influence and fulfilling its main goals.

It is up to the election administration to ensure that the election process is legally correct, to ensure freedom of vote, to prevent fraud and to ensure order, silence and peace. From 1879 onwards, voters were considered as a group gathered in one place, at the same time and as an “electoral assembly” which must be made up of literate voters. Thus, from the dawn of Bulgarian parliamentarism, voters are seen as a collective core that has a common will and functions in a unified direction, and not as an individual participant, with its own views, understandings, desires and moods and respectively with a different approach to choosing one or another candidate or list.

Therefore, the convening of the voters and the way of voting are both considered as a collective activity.

From 1887 a new system for the management of the electoral process was introduced. The members of the bureau are nominated by the elected bodies of the local government. All members are elected by lot ten days before the vote. Consequently, the bureau does not derive from the desire of the electoral assembly, but derives from local, municipal and district bodies in other elections. Since 1897, the supervision of each section has been entrusted to a judge elected by a complex procedure by the judiciary. With this, the country became the fourth in Europe, after Belgium, Italy and Greece, where judges are entrusted with the leadership of the vote. Judges appointed as presidents shall not be a subject to transfer or dismissal, and they shall be granted immunity from office. The other members are nominated by the local elected bodies. But there is no permanent election administration. Due to the increasing number of sections from 1901 and the shortage of judges, it becomes possible for candidates for judicial positions and court secretaries to be included, which is practically the entire judicial system. It is also imperative that at least two teachers must be elected. The involvement of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Education aims to involve, as far as possible, more intelligent staff and independent individuals.

Practically the entire regional elite are involved. Moreover, in case of legal changes the first thing to do is to see how many people and from which categories is available in order to ensure a proper election process.

However, the population did not show much activity during the elections. In the first years, the bare minimum of voters casted their ballots. For example, in 1893, during the elections for the VII NA, only 19% of those eligible voted. The minimum activity is explained by several factors. First, the lack of a previous democratic tradition must be highlighted. The transition from complete absence to full civil liberty has proved difficult for many. With the accumulation of experience and the development of democratic institutions, the population is increasingly involved in the electoral process. It should not be forgotten that a large number do not participate in the elections for reasons such as the imperfections in the electoral laws, since the imposed requirements are unrealistic. Until 1885, those who received the votes of at least 25% of all voters on the list were declared elected, and in the event of a shortage at this level, the election was repeated after seven days in order to activate the simple majority rule. Electoral violence is also a factor for the political indifference of voters. There is no parliamentary election that is not marred by at least one scandal, beating and even a murder.

An even more important particularity lies in the fact that all voters in the district vote in one polling station. This means gathering 10-15,000 voters in one place. The electoral groups coincide with the territory of the administrative districts and the election takes place in the district centre.

Given the existing communications and the need to move voters over a huge distance, the activity is directly related to the state’s readiness to provide fast, easy and unobstructed access to the ballot boxes. The territorial scope of a district ranges between 900 to 3000 sq. km. and very often, individual villages are located 15 to 25 kilometres from the central city, which in the mountainous and semi-mountainous regions makes the appearance of voters a logistical success.

This last for more than two decades, and it was not until 1899 that a drastic change took place.

In the first five years after the liberation, the polling stations were 59. After the union of the Principality and Eastern Rumelia in 1885 the number became 85 so that in 1899 during the elections for X NA all 775.777 voters could vote in 250 sections. In 1903 they were 373, and in 1908-399. This was a turning point in the turnout and the percentage of voters stabilized just fewer than 50% of those eligible to vote [4]. See Table 2.

Table 2. Percentage of voters and voters

№	Parliament-year	Voted	% of voters	% of population
1	V-1887	134.453	22.00	4.56
2	VI-1890	182.395	28.00	5.78
3	VII-1893	141 460	20.35	4.48
4	VIII-1894	197.303	26.00	5.96
5	IX-1896	227.291	30.00	6.86
6	X-1899	379 077	49.46	11.45
7	XI-1901	344 787	42.74	9.21
8	XII-1902	404.497	49.79	10.80
9	XIII-1903	345 682	41.17	9.23
10	XIV-1908	467.607	50.19	11.59
11	XV-1911	504.438	47.20	11.63

The verification of the legality of the vote is an extremely important element of the process, because it is made by the assembly itself, which makes the approval of the deputies an event with political nerve. The verification of legality takes up to 1/3 of the time of the first session of each parliament lasts for months, inquiry commissions are formed and there are situations when it is never decided on a given case. During this process every parliament had removed deputies.

Removing political opponents is a way to secure a majority, but in most cases the main motive is to allow the re-election of those who have lost the general vote. The electoral process is carried out according to the majority system. Depending on the number of the population living on the territory of each electoral assembly, a different number of representatives shall be elected by most of the votes. Its main advantage is the creation of stable majorities in parliament and, consequently, secures and guarantees support of the executive branch regarding the difficult path towards a modern society. However, this advantage is accompanied by a serious disadvantage. When comparing the votes received for the elected representatives with those of the unsuccessful ones, it becomes clear that usually most of the voters do not have representatives in the parliament. But this shortcoming is also observed in other democratic societies in Europe, America and the British Empire, although there are different requirements for the way that the majority is determined.

During this period the multi-party-political system of the country was built, and up to ten parties had a parliamentary presence at different times. This fragmentation of political formations leads to marginal results for the smaller ones. And instead of looking for problems in the socio-political moods of voters and their motivation, they begin to stare at the electoral system. Consequently, began the slow denial of the majority system and accusations that it was at the root of party failures. In opposition, both the radical and the more conservative subjects of political life came to the idea that under a proportional system they would be better represented in the plenary.

Therefore, any manifestation of the proportional electoral system, which is slowly making its way into politics, is being touted as a vital panacea to protect political life from further degradation and cure for its shortcomings. Over time, all political parties adopt the proportional system in their programs, and with it comes its inevitable adoption. In 1911, with the end of the Principality, the transition to the proportional electoral system began. After Belgium, part of the Swiss cantons,

Serbia and Finland (as part of the Russian Empire), Bulgaria ranks among the first and most modern countries in the European democratic space.

Three decades of parliamentarism is a short time to educate the electorate and for the creation of traditional and responsible practices of political behaviour. Without giving its full results, a system is accused of being vicious, although to this day it functions wonderfully in some of the most stable democracies in the world. No one gives an answer to a very important question – how ready is the Bulgarian society that has went from living in the Ottoman decay and patriarchal society to modern times and civil self-government. Silence ensues any question as to whether the voter is willing to take on his or her long-term responsibility and stoically defend his or her rights and individual and collective views and motivation. Populism prevails and its exploitation does not change the political climate in the country. In the following decades there is no significant change. Each and every government takes steps to modernize the electoral system and shield the entire process from the intervention of external factors. In the first years, there was a lack of legal as well as political capacity, administrative will and civic conviction that everything related to the most political act in the country should be guided by democratic principles. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, there was nothing more to do. Each addition leads to new difficulties, but also overcoming old negatives. Slow turnout is slowly increasing, voting is becoming freer and more accessible, major and bloody clashes and violations of the law are becoming more incidental and insignificant, and parliament is functioning as a key element of the political system.

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Southeast Europe at the Crossroads of Globalism

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Abstract

In the paper, we discuss the impact of Western European perceptions of Southeast Europe that have created a negative stereotype of valuation. The continuity of such conceptions was pointed out, from the universalist pretensions of the Roman Catholic Church through totalitarian ideologies to the neo-liberal performance of globalism in the Balkans. Analyses deals with the way of affirmation of neo-liberalism that encourages multiculturalism as a value of globalization but at the expense of national identity cultures. It turns out that this is a threat to national identity as the basis of national security in the light of derogation of the principle of sovereignty of peoples and states by applying the strategy of a “new reality” politics.

The concluding part of the paper shows that the experience of the countries of Southeast Europe should be articulated by a civilizational framework for the development of national security that can be aimed by crossing the principles of a democratic society and the sovereignty of peoples and states. This can be a significant contribution to rethinking the future of Europe as a non-globalist community of nations.

Keywords: Southeast, neoliberalism, sovereignty, democracy, globalism, identity

Introduction

It is generally known that nations and states without a favourable geopolitical situation and position will be more exposed to the influence and even endangering their entity existence compared with those who have a more favourable position. So it is, and perhaps more so, with their security culture or national security.

Both of these dimensions require a commitment to the state and social relations that reflect either one or another sphere of ideas (social consciousness) and values that strengthen the disintegration or relations of national cohesion. However, that is not the end of the matter.

The ideologically articulated cohesion of society through fascism (Nazism) or communism seemingly affirmed a state security organization that was reminiscent of national security.

However, it was the primary provider of power to the ideological system and its values.

National values have been historically either “revalued” (fascism, Nazism) or rejected (communism).

Liberalism is presented, at the same time, as an ideology that is neutral towards national values because it is based on the primary importance of individual freedoms and rights. It follows that all inhabitants of the state are legally equal, even in terms of national values, because the values of the legal order are those that define national values, which establishes the so-called constitutional patriotism. More about the “liberal dilemma” I wrote in *Multiculturalism and (Neo) Liberalism*, Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 2020 [1].

All those values that originate from tradition and which identify a part of society or the whole of society or “people”, according to that ideology, belongs to the ethnic rather than national values.

All appearances of liberalism as a seemingly non-totalitarian ideology refer to the neutralization of national identity, which arises (in part, at least) from ethnic identity. “Partly” because in Southeast European cultural and civilizational context, several more constitutive factors are involved in shaping the national identity.

It will be shown that in addition to earlier civilization values, this part of Europe inspires the idea of sovereignty, which is almost “history” in the rest of Europe.

Dominant Discourse about Southeast of Europe

What is historically, sociologically, and even politically interesting is the first layer of narratives about this part of Europe, and these are historically already created and tested stereotypes. What is inherited, above all, from the history of relations with the Southeast in Germany, Austria, England, and especially the Vatican, is only being modernized and put into operation as needed. Stereotypes grow into public discourse and directed propaganda based on notions that stand in the perception of a hemisphere from the East that is by nature prone to violence and uncivilized behaviour.

This mainly means the formation of public opinion in Western countries, primarily in arousing suspicion, fear, and generally negative feelings that have already been “prepared” in the mentioned stereotypes. It is a broader civilizational context of creating prejudices about Slavs or Balkans in general. In France, the linguistic expression of “balkanize” became to be an almost technical term referring to the phenomenon of confusion and strife.

The dynamic of prejudices in the occasional function of propaganda “coincided” with the period after the so-called winning the Cold War and creating an uncritical image of one’s omnipotence and creating a unipolar world. From the position of imaginary supremacy in all forms of life, it was not difficult to create a narrative about “bad guys” from the Balkans.

At this point, we will only point out that the “deep tone” of historical continuity was given to such a narrative by the Vatican in cooperation with political ideologies. Of course, the notion of nationalism includes a negative meaning that is contained mainly through the meaning of chauvinism. Historically based, the Vatican’s hostile attitude towards Orthodox-Christian countries and peoples thus gained political concretization in support of neo-liberal globalism (universalism) in modern times. That means the process of hybridization of roman-catholic universalism with atheistic universalism of western ideologies in the perspective of neo-liberal (neo-communist) globalism.

If famous Carl Schmitt’s paradigm of politics [2] as the practice of establishing friends or enemy criteria relies on inherited stereotypes and functions for propaganda purposes, we get the already known (Nazi, anti-Jewish and anti-Slavic) consequences. The philosophical standpoint of Carl Schmitt about politics is open not only for discussion about one ideology but about all totalitarian ideologies.

On that basis, a narrative and a general (and certainly perverted) image emerged at the time of the disintegration of Yugoslavia 1990-es and the bombing of Serbia as the central country of Southeast Europe. Thus, in western media, Croats, and Slovenes represents friends. Notions of civilization, democracy, or Europeanism are predominantly associated with them in publicity.

Even for Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are positive connotations in the descriptions, so they have largely secularized and bearers of the defence of multi-ethnic ideas and even multiculturalism.

Everything that “follows” the enemy is reserved for the Serbs. Barbarism, non-European orientation, communism, nationalism ... Serbs are irrational, prone to Byzantine mysticism and reluctance, traditionalists prone to a directed economy, and generally part of a primitive Eastern European identity. I wrote about this in recent paper *Strategic and Security culture* on the conference “National and Corporative security”, Veliko Tarnovo, 2019 [3].

Of course, not everything is reduced to this lever. Through negative stereotypes, media policy of double standards is promoted at the big door, as well as the use of fake news, trigger events to justify political and even military interventionism. Such attitudes are not a feature of just one way of thinking or one ideology.

This is evidenced by the agreement of the founders of the communist ideology, Carl Marx and Friedrich Engels, with the dominant English (liberal) policy towards the so-called *eastern issue* during the 19th century. It is about giving priority to the Ottoman Empire over the aspirations of the people of Southeast Europe to get rid of the Turkish occupation, that is, to become sovereign states. The founders of this totalitarian ideology not only considered the Slavs enemies but also promoted the view that national values and identity were the greatest obstacles to achieving a universal communist society.

The peoples of Southeast Europe are represented in Marx’s and Engels’ ideas as primitive, backward, and hopelessly conservative. They see the naturalness of their resistance to the revolution in the spirit of the materialist setting of history and human society in general, which they share with liberal ideology. Their enthusiasm for Darwinism served as the first element of the founding of the so-called social Darwinism before it became an influential sociological theory.

Significantly before the Nazis’ similar enthusiasm for social Darwinism and the resulting racial theory of society.

In numerous situations, in newspapers, feuilletons, letters, Marx, and Engels as “progressive thinkers” consistently express an anti-Slavic attitude, dividing peoples into civilized and apostate.

These assessments can be heard in our time from neoliberal ideologues of the global order, and they could also be heard from the Nazis. They explained their contempt for these peoples by saying that they were overwhelmed by history in the struggle for survival, and as such we have no role in the advanced ideology of communism. According to the instinct reactions that belong to such, primitive species, they feel that they are being annulled by the history of progress and what else will they do – they are protesting.

At this point, we will list only one of the most important quotations of Marx’s views, which he shared with his companion Engels throughout his life. “Peoples who are not civilized are destined to disappear in the storm of the world revolution. For that reason, they are now counter-revolutionary” [4].

Anyway, after the victory of Serbian and Russian troops over the Hungarian revolutionaries in 1848, Carl and Friedrich promised a “war of extermination” to the peoples who opposed the advance of communism. “There should be an inexorable struggle with the Slavs (Russians and Serbs above all), to the point of life and death, until extermination ... and that fight implies the use of ruthless terrorism”. If the reader would think if these were the words of Adolf Hitler – he would be mistaken. These are the words of Friedrich Engels in the texts “Hungarian Struggle” and “Democratic Pan-Slavism” in Marx’s newspaper – New Rhine Newspaper, 1849 [5].

Neoliberal Globalism and the Cultural Identity of the People

The neoliberal concept of globalism has been put into question especially by the great migrant crisis and the latest pandemic crisis. Both pointed out in different ways the connection between

the security of societies and the cultural and political tradition. Also, the importance of national security in global processes that lead to crises. The whole of Europe, including its southeast, is facing the problem of multiculturalism, political, and security globalism. How is the issue of minority and majority identity articulated within the institutions of liberal-democratic countries?

How to understand the connection between the issues of security and culture within liberalism not only as a political doctrine but also as a dominant discourse on philosophical issues of human rights, the state, and identity in the practice of social life.

On the one hand, they are advocates of the theoretical model of multiculturalism and, on the other, of coherent liberalism. While the former believe that the rights of minority communities are an “extension” of the rights of individuals on which liberalism rests and that the institutional protection of minority rights only contributes to the overall affirmation of liberal societies, the latter believe that the primacy of individual rights is incompatible with institutional (legal) status.

Moreover, the incoherent representation of liberalism, according to them, leads to destructive consequences for the liberal-democratic order, which has been put in focus by the mentioned migrant problem.

The analysis of the political discourse of liberalism shows an expanded conceptual basis of liberalism in general, which seeks to affirm minority cultural identities (similar to multiculturalists) in practice (empirical expression of liberalism) but at the expense of traditional and majority identities to relativize group identities in general. Analyses of speech acts by J. R.

Searle help understand different meanings of Discourse about liberalism [6].

Thus, the initial position (similar to coherent liberalism) on the exclusive relevance (primacy) of individual rights would be confirmed. I refer to such an extended concept of liberalism as a political neo-liberalism or globalism.

For these reasons, I consider the position of neo-liberalism to be negative for the national identity based on the tradition of society and thus for the national security of peoples and states.

Neoliberalism, Security, and Multiculturalism

The logical level of the relationship between liberalism and the contemporary concept of multiculturalism is such that it seems to be contradictory because liberalism represents cultural-value neutralism, while multiculturalism represents the recognition of the diversity and equalitarianism of many cultural traditions.

Yet, the philosophical relationship of liberalism and multiculturalism that overcomes the context of the logic of syntax as well as the logic of semantics can be considered in the context of the logic of the language pragmatics. It means that in the focus of the conceptual thinking attention is placed on the sentence substance and not on its meaning or function.

One can say that the pragmatic relationship between liberalism and multiculturalism is a strategic approach of liberalism as a doctrine of neoliberalism. This means that the language pragmatics reflects the whole context. More precisely, the functional effect on changes in reality and further on, to the advocacy of proto-revolutionary matrices of legitimacy by creating “new realities”. The creation of new realities is enabled by relativizing national security, due to relativize of national identity. I wrote about this issue in *Neoliberalism versus Philosophy of National Identity*, 2018 [7].

One of the most famous cases of confusion between state-territorial and ethnic-cultural identity, which still causes political and institutional dilemmas, is a Macedonian one. Under the authority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as a consequence of the policy of creation of new, revolutionary entities, becomes Nation as “a new reality”.

The Macedonian nation does not fulfil either the state-territorial or the cultural-ethical, or the Eastern-Christian origin model of national identity. More about the constitution of Nations in H. Schulze, *State, Nation and Nationalism*, 1998 (2002) [8].

However, it was not the end of the process. The newest reality is called Republic of Northern Macedonia. The new reality implies a new identity but based on an existing one, so they combine State-territorial, Ethnic-cultural, and Multicultural identity.

The principle of the new reality is a negation of the principle of sovereignty. This is shown in Northern Macedonia case; while it remains open the question of how the people of that newly named state will be identified. It was almost the same case as the state called Yugoslavia.

Neo-liberalism, Sovereignty, Democracy

In the case of Serbia or the former Yugoslavia in 1999, it is an annihilation of sovereignty over the territory occupied by NATO forces and over which there is no real sovereignty of Serbia.

In addition to this external action (aggression) on sovereignty, perhaps more interesting is the neo-liberal performance action concerning the internal dimension of sovereignty, social and institutional integrity. The central issue of organized life in a society is the established social trust based on self-recognition in terms of belonging to the historical existence, common values, and in the contemporary context, common understanding, and evaluating important events.

One of the important effects of neo-liberal performance action is the disintegration of social trust through the creation of false alternatives to the identity of society. They are supported as global or at least, “European” forms of social organization that does not have democratic legitimacy but affect the “emptying” of a traditional pattern of identity. We have seen from the mentioned historical examples that neoliberalism is a hybrid ideology that also included neo-communist contents from the life of the Balkan countries.

This also refers to the culture of identity as the basis of the culture of security.

On Hybrid Ideological Globalism

Within the hybridization of ideologies, some children of communism did not end up in resentment but resorted to a “different” *International*. That is left-liberal one (branch of neoliberalism), the conceptual basis of the ideology of globalism.

Common (hybrid) idea of a “new man” (new human) and the negation of the culture of identity are directed against the sovereignty of peoples and states. Of course, this term also conceals the process of initiating the globalization of ideologies to overcome the “traditional” perception of man. Also, the conditions for self-destruction of the traditional meaning of the state itself. The phenomena of national masochism rise from the self-denial of national identity in the name of ideological contents.

“Memorial culture” became part of the social engineering of creating a new man of communism based on a culture of oblivion. It is an anti-culture practice which nullifies the meaning of culture as the development of the identity of the person as well as of society. In Serbia, for example, exists influence of NGO-es which proclaim neo-liberal “cultural decontamination” and other left-wing organizations advocating for so-called Another Serbia concept. They suggest completely different identity and so they continue the spirit of their predecessors – ethnocide over Serbia.

Also, in the institutional sense, the neo-liberal performance affects the derogation of the liberal-democratic parliamentary system itself, which seems contradictory if viewed from the prism of ideological or at least theoretical coherence. This is perhaps the clearest point of distinguishing

between performance action and declarative legitimacy of neoliberalism and the liberal-democracy system as well.

It is about the state of affairs that needs to be established by the mechanisms of the parliamentary order, that is, the establishment of real power in the direction of destroying integrity, in fact, the living ties between the country's sovereignty and democracy. The point is to establish, unlike the former communist system and the tyranny of the minority – the tyranny of the majority.

The meaning or spirit of parliamentary that formally exists is instrumental because of the power relations that correspond to the interests of those who promote the so-called stability as a norm that goes beyond real parliamentary life and the democratic needs of society.

Southeast Europe and the Security Dilemma of Globalism

The attempted deconstruction of the influence of neoliberalism inevitably moves in the direction of the deconstruction of a global world System called the world's liberal order or abbreviated the universal aspirations of liberal democracy. In the relationship between liberalism and democracy, there must be changes. Hereby it would be useful to reflect two principles, of a sovereign country and democratic society.

Democracy as an authentic political concept is not a servant of ideology but rather is the pragmatics of culture of sovereignty. That is the basis of political reflection on national identity values which create an idea of national security. It is denoted by, on the one hand, the distribution of authority unlike the authoritarian practice of power, and on the other hand, communication within the dynamic and changeable structure of society itself and also with other cultures.

Liberalism in the context of democratic authority should have a position corresponding to its character of the analytical, negative determination.

In other words, it has the function of a corrective model of democracy. The main function is testing democratic practice in terms of suppression of rights and freedoms and the other one is preserving the democratic conquest of freedom. In the light of the Security Dilemma of Globalism, the sovereignty of the countries of Southeast Europe depends on the compatibility of democratic values which encourages national security in the direction of building regional security based on the culture of identity (similarity).

This means building security arrangements based on common core values. Reaching that point, one should look for the civilizational foundations of sovereignty. It should be the result of the development of national cultural identities, as opposed to their denial by the hybrid ideology of globalization.

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SECTION 1
Medieval and Modern History

Life between the Two States of the Serbian Princess and the Bulgarian Empress Ana

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Abstract

This paper will provide a short overview of the original material and literature which deals with the life and political accomplishments of a notable 14th century Bulgarian Empress. Ana was born as a Serbian princess from the marriage of King Milutin (1282-1321) and Elisabeth of Hungary.

By wedding to Michael III Asen, who later became the Emperor of united Bulgaria, she became an unavoidable link in the dynamic relationship between two states in the first half of the 14th century. Recently, a few specialized studies have been devoted to her biography, while numerous researchers have worked to shed light on certain aspects of her life. Sources that testify to her life in Serbia and Bulgaria are of Serbian, Bulgarian, Byzantine, Western European origin.

Keywords: Ana, King Milutin, Michael Asen III, Serbian-Bulgarian relations in the 14th century

Introduction

During the medieval period, one of the most noticeable forms of cooperation between the states or the nation were political monarch's marriages. An excellent example of this phenomenon is the exciting story of Ana (born between 1293 and 1298 – died after 1346). This paper will give a summary of sources and, mostly, the latest critical literature, which shed new light on her life.

Additionally, significant attention will be paid to political factors, which affected her destiny.

Also, the goal is to show a short overview of previous investigation results and encourage new researches. Numerous questions about her life are still open, and they are subject to discussion in studies of the medieval era. The name of this sovereign is one of those problems. In sources originating from Serbia and Dubrovnik, she is mentioned exclusively as Ana. She has been called Neda only in a document from 1497, which has been lost in the meantime and cannot be scientifically evaluated anymore¹ [1]. Additionally, the famous historian from Dubrovnik, Mavro Orbin, calls her Dominika [2]. Thus, in this paper, we tend to use only the form which has higher historical authenticity.

She was born in the royal family Nemanjić, as the daughter of the Serbian King Milutin (1282-1321) [3]. The chronology of his numerous marriages is often interpreted differently. It turned out that the discovery of the origin of Ana depends on the progress in studying the complex alliance policy of King Milutin. Initially, Milutin was married to a Serbian noblewoman, presumably named Hellen (Jelena in Serbian), whom fresco-portrait has been painted in the monastery of

¹ This paper is a result of research conducted within the project *Settlements and Population in the Medieval Serbian Lands (14th and 15th century)*, (No. 177010), supported by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia. This paper is devoted to the innocent victims of the concentration camp Sajmište in Belgrade from 1941-1944.

Durđevi Stupovi [4]. She was most likely divorced from the Serbian King in 1282 due to his match to the daughter of the ruler of Thessaly, John I Doukas (1268-1289). Changing the course of Serbian foreign policy influenced the decision of King Milutin to return the Thessalian princess to her father and marry once again, this time with a Bulgarian princess Ana Terter in 1284. This marriage had lost its political purpose after the fall from power of Ana's father, George I Terter (1280-1292). Most probably in the same year, the restless Serbian monarch married the Hungarian princess Elisabeth, with whom he will have two daughters, which will be discussed below. The last marriage of the Serbian King was arranged in 1299 with Simonida, the daughter of the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos (1282-1328) [5].

The research of Aleksandar Uzelac gave an exceptional contribution to resolving the issue of the identity of Ana's mother. Based on the letters of the King of Naples, Robert the Wise (1309-1343), to his cousin Ana, whom he addressed with the word *consobrina*, he concluded that they must have been related through the mother's family line. Namely, Robert's mother was Mary of Hungary, the daughter of Hungarian King Stephan V (1270-1272), and sister of the above-mentioned Princess Elisabeth [6]. This realization implies that the latter must have been Ana's mother. The alliance with the Hungarian Kingdom made it possible for Milutin to launch several campaigns, which resulted in the conquest of the Danube region of Braničevo and Kučevo and the severance of the alliance with the semi-independent region in western Bulgaria. If the position that the marriage was concluded after just described military campaigns, is accepted, it indicates that Ana was born in 1293 at the earliest. The connection with Elisabeth of Hungary was severed in 1298, and that would be the *terminus ante quem* [7]. Ana's sister Carica/Zorica also originated from this marriage [8]. It is worth mentioning that the historians belonging to the older historiography school strongly believed that Ana was born during the first marriage of King Milutin with the noblewoman Hellen. It would imply that she was not the sister of Stephan Dečanski (1322-1331) only from the father's side [9]. Furthermore, the descent from the morganatic relation of his father would negatively affect her life, since in the middle ages, the relationship between members of two different social groups, in this case, between a prince (Milutin) and noblewoman (Hellen), was stigmatized. Still, the account deriving from a well-informed Nicephorus Gregoras makes no doubt that Ana's background was spotless².

The above-described combat activities in Braničevo and Kučevo directed Ana's further destiny toward Bulgaria. Namely, it is a well-known fact that she was married to Michael III Asen (1323-1330), commonly called Michael Shishman [10]. However, due to the progress in the studies of political history and state development in the region of South-east Europe, more is known about the general circumstances in which the marriage took place. The consequence of Milutin's war with Michael's father Shishman in 1293 is that the Serbian ruler became a supreme lord of the autonomous Vidin principality. The peace was confirmed by the marriage of Shishman and the daughter of the Serbian prince Dragoš. It was an essential and sometimes necessary form of bonding a vassal to a master. However, it is much less emphasized that the Serbian court had a long-lasting influence in the principality of Vidin. More precisely, it had the right to impose its position on the question to which wife the local ruler was to get married [11]. The year of the marriage of Ana and Shishman's son Michael is the subject of controversy in historiography, although it was presumably arranged during Shishman's lifetime. The Venetian address book from 1313 mentions Michael as the ruler of Vidin, the son-in-law of the Serbian King Uroš (King Milutin). However, the match was concluded a little earlier. Namely, in the negotiations between the just mentioned Serbian King and Charles of Valois, in 1308, on arranging a marriage between

² Vizantijski izvori za istoriju naroda Jugoslavije 6, 207 (VIINJ 6 in the further text).

Charles' son and Carica/Zarica, she is mentioned as Milutin's only daughter. This information indicates that Ana was already in Bulgaria at that time. Therefore, the general agreement is that the marriage took place in the first decade of the 14th century³ [12]. It implies that Ana was most probably born closer to the beginning of the Milutin's marriage with Elisabeth and that she was around 15 years old when she left her parents' home. Many exceptions aside, this theory is following the established medieval idea about the proper age when the sons and daughters were considered old enough to be married. Furthermore, this conclusion indicates that the political supremacy of the Serbian court over the Principality of Vidin was firm at that time. The foreign policy of her father, King Stephan Milutin, aimed at restoring good relations with the neighbour on the east, was the backbone for the marriage between Ana and this prominent member of the ancient Asen dynasty. In this way, King Milutin achieved the main political goals in the Eastern Balkans without exercising costly and risky military action. He extended the period of his domination over the western parts of Bulgaria, which was hit by internal conflicts at that time, as a consequence of the lack of stable central government and unfavourable vassal position towards the Tatars [13] Danilo's successors briefly inform that good neighbourly relation lasted as long as the Serbian King was alive, until the end of 1321⁴.

Due to the mentioned marriage, Ana was able to shape the most critical events and political processes of the Bulgarian Empire on at least two occasions, although only for a short period. The first time she did it as a short-lasting Bulgarian empress. Namely, in 1323, Michael Shishman was crowned in Tervovo as the Emperor of the United Bulgarian lands. However, it is questionable to what extent Stephan Dečanski could interfere in the Bulgarian internal affairs after he took over the throne from his brother Constantine just a year ago. Regardless of the answer to this question, Ana became the Bulgarian Empress and their oldest son the heir to the throne [14].

Michael and Ana had at least three sons: John (Ivan) Stephan, Shishman, and Ludovico. There is a possibility that they also had a fourth son, Michael, who might have been painted in the founder's fresco-composition in the church in the village of Donja Kamenica (Serbia) [15]. The most important contemporary or closely related, in terms of the creation date, historical sources that testify to this period of life and activity are of the Byzantine origin. Their authors are famous historians of the late Empire, such as Nicephorus Gregoras (died around 1360) and John Kantakouzenos (1292-1383). The focus of their attention is Ana's stay in Bulgaria since the two countries had intensive diplomatic and military relations in the first half of the 14th century.

The first year of Michael's Shishman's rule was marked by the invasion of the Bulgarian ruler deep into the territory of the Byzantine Empire, then affected by the civil war between the two Andronikos. However, the advance of the Bulgarian army was suddenly interrupted by the beginning of the peace talks. The Bulgarian Emperor insisted on marrying the Byzantine princess Theodora, sister of Andronikos III (1328-1341), and granddaughter of Andronikos II (1282-1328) [16]. With the change of the political climate, Ana abruptly turned from a strong bond between the two countries into a subject for conflict and disputes. Only a year after receiving the title of Empress of Bulgaria, Ana was dethroned. Stephan's biographer briefly informs only about the great injustice done to him by the Bulgarian ruler, which has been resolved entirely or partially through the diplomatic mission [17]. According to some assumptions, she was most likely forced to leave the capital with her children and move to Vidin. Unfortunately, due to the lack of Bulgarian written historical sources, not a single report from this country does not give a domestic insight into her life situations at that time [see 14]. Given that, until these events, there was an

³ Earlier, it was simply pointed out that the marriage was concluded after or around 1290. cf. comments of Nicephorus Gregoras and John Kantakouzenos in: VIINJ 6, 169 n. 40, 198 n. 83, 207 n. 104, 349 n. 106.

⁴ Danilo II, 180.

around the three-decades-long vassal relationship between the Bulgarian ruler's family and the Serbian Realm, it can be assumed that this link between two states has now been forcibly broken.

Political reasons must have been the primary cause of the growing hostility between the Serbian King Stephan Dečanski, who was Ana's brother, and Michael Shishman. Private reasons concerning Ana's performance as a mother and Empress played only a secondary role if they were of any importance at all. However, this political shift significantly contributed to the creation of a Byzantine-Bulgarian alliance directed against the neighbouring Serbian Kingdom [18]. The chain of events led to the famous Battle of Velbuzhd on 28 July 1330, in which the Bulgarian Tsar Michael Shishman was killed [19].

After the great defeat of their troops, the most prominent Bulgarian nobles offered Stephan Dečanski the option to become their ruler, which was, in fact, a proposal of personal union between two states. Like his father, who was in a similar situation at the end of the 13th century, he rejected a seemingly very advantageous proposal. Two of them knew very well that multiple political problems would follow the acceptance of the Bulgarian crown since the Empire was a politically volatile realm [20]. Instead, he ordered his most trusty court people to inform Ana and her sons of the new development⁵. Consequently, he placed Ana's oldest son, Ivan Stephan, on the throne of Bulgaria. This time, Ana found herself at the head of state as the co-ruler along with her son. It is conceivable that this was the culmination of her political influence in Bulgaria. Her authority among the local aristocracy and participation in political events was testified by her contemporary, John Kantakouzenos⁶. Still, the short-lived rule of mother and son was marked by foreign policy and military failures, which contributed to the strengthening of the Bulgarian nobility, which was predominately unhappy by the firm Serbian political control. The most influential among them was Ivan Alexander (1331-1371), son of Stratzimir Kranski, and the sister of Michael III Shishman [21]. It should be noted that the new ruler of Bulgaria soon regulated relations with Stephan Dušan (1331-1355) and that in the following period, the two of them sustain good relationships and closely cooperate politically [22].

One may imagine that the status of Dušan's aunt was discussed during the initial negotiations, which led to the establishment of the permanent alliance. Although one may agree with the statement that her sons were significant threats to the new Bulgarian regime, it is hard to believe that Ivan Alexander could govern Ana's and Dušan's decisions⁷ [see 9, p. 52]. When one considers the newly-created political landscape among the two states, it is obvious why Ana's days in Bulgaria were numbered, and she and her children became an exile in Serbia. However, a statement that they remained within the borders of Bulgaria in Vidin for some time after the deposition from the power is still present. It was there where Belaur, who was her husband's brother, actively resisted Ivan Alexander and even shortly became an independent territorial landlord [see 14, pp. 622-623]. However, the whole construction does not follow Kantakouzeno's explicit explanation that Ana took refuge in Serbia with her children immediately after they have been violently forced to give up the fight for the throne. Additionally, it is based on the view that Ana lived in the city of Niš at the end of 1336. However, double-checked archive data from Dubrovnik undoubtedly refers to the actions of Ivan Alexander's wife in the town of Nestos (al Nest), and it has nothing to do with the biography of here examined person⁸. Unfortunately, it remains unknown what Ana's life at the beginning of her stay in Serbia was like. Eventually, she found her refuge in Dubrovnik or its close Serbian surroundings, the latest in the second half of

⁵ Danilo II, 192-196.

⁶ Georgieva 2010, 132.

⁷ All recent research undoubtedly shows that the Bulgarian ruler could not exert such pressure on his western neighbor.

⁸ VIINJ 6, 349 n. 106.

1337. A handful of vivid archive data deriving from the Naples's royal office and Adriatic commune testify about this stage of her life. For instance, as early as next year starts the significant initial donation from Robert the Wise and his close relatives. The ruling family of Naples and exiled Bulgarian Empress, as stated earlier, in all likelihood, were related. Thanks to Ana's multiple diplomatic interventions, her courtesan, as well as the commune of Dubrovnik, benefited a lot. Ana left Dubrovnik two years later (1340) when she joined her son Ludovico in the Kingdom of Naples. How long the ambitious women stayed in the Apennines, has not been determined yet.

Still, the local authorities spent a significant amount of money to make her stay in Dubrovnik comfortable in July 1343. Data on her activity deriving from the Archive of Dubrovnik stop coming in 1346, which suggests that she passed away sometimes after that year⁹ [see 14, pp. 621-626].

Interestingly, Ana is often present in the works of Dubrovnik chronicles. The works of Marvo Orbin, Jakov Lukarević, and Junij Restić stand out. However, the data they provide is often fairytale-like and unreliable or cannot be verified by credible historical sources. However, it is fascinating that this woman is attributed to the first-class role in numerous political events [23]. It also suggests that she was a capable person who actively and with great success fought for her place in the unforgiving medieval society. Ana is also mentioned in the Chronicle of George Branković [see 14, p. 617]. All that clearly shows that her actions left a more profound mark in collective memory on the population of the Balkan Peninsula that it has been presumed or it is visible in the historical pieces of evidence. Thus, the significance of Ana should not be seen exclusively in the lenses of the Serbian-Bulgarian relationship in the first half of the 14th century.

In the light of noticeable historiographical tradition which follows the examined person, fresco-portrait in the church of St. Ascension in the village of Gornji Matejevac near Niš, should be interpreted. It, according to some scholars, depicts Ana after becoming a none called Hellen. The temple was painted by the masters of the famous Zoograf painting school around 1870, almost five centuries after her descend from the historical scene (Fig. 1).



Fig. 1. An artistic depiction of Ana as a none Hellen in the Church of the Ascension in the village of Gornji Matejevac near Niš (Author: *Nina Stojiljković*)

⁹ Her fugitive servant was mentioned in Dubrovnik in 1366. It does not mean her mistress was still alive, although one should not exclude this option having in mind the time when she was born.

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Legendary Journey of Aeneas in Search of New Homeland: From Troy to Rome

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Abstract

Aeneas is regarded as one of the most important figures in Greek and Roman legend and history. Aeneas is a character in many epic poems, epos, dramas and others. The journey of Aeneas from Troy to Italy is narrated in the Roman historian and poet Virgil's (Vergil) Aeneid, describing the journey of Aeneas and other survivors of the Trojan War to find and establish a new homeland.

Aeneas's legendary journey continues to inspire today's researchers, administrators and tourism professionals in Europe's cultural cooperation efforts. In Vergil's epic work Aeneid and in other ancient sources, it is emphasized that Rome was founded by the descendants of Aeneas, and even the British Kingdom is based on Aeneas, is an important indicator of the ancient history of Anatolian-European relations and unity. To this end, cultural routes have started to be created to represent the route of Aeneas that followed during his journey from Troy to Rome.

In this sense, the first part of the study underlines the journey of Aeneas and his companions, and establishing new homeland. In the second part of the study, "Troy Culture Route", "Anatolia-Europe Mythological Historical Connection Antandros-Castro", "Antandros Archaeological Park", "Park Antica Lavinium and the Tenuta di Pratica Di Mare" projects are mentioned. These projects support the Council of Europe's principles for developing a European identity on common values. It is believed that the realization and development of these and similar projects will contribute to the recognition of different societies and cultures and to the development of intercultural understanding, cooperation and common values.

Keywords: Journey of Aeneas, Troy Culture Route, Aeneid, Foundation of Rome, Cultural Routes, Myths and Legends

Introduction

Aeneas is considered as one of the most important figures in Greek and Roman legend and history. He was a Trojan hero, the son of the goddess Aphrodite (Venus) and the Dardanian prince Anchises. The Dardans were allies of the Trojans. Anchises was also the second cousin of King Priam of Troy. Aeneas is a character in many epic poems, epos, dramas and others. In the works of two Greek writers Hellanicus of Lesbos and Damastes of Sigeum, both say that Aeneas founded Rome. In *The Origins*, Marcus Porcius Cato says that Aeneas married Lavionia, daughter of King Latinus of Latium, and founded Alba Longa. In Quintus Smyrnaeus' *Posthomerica*, Aeneas is depicted as a complex character but also with the founder of the Roman Empire, and with Rome itself. In Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*, Aeneas acts as a herald between Hector and the Greeks. He is captured by Ajax in the last battle, but escapes. He becomes one of the few to escape Troy, and later finds Rome. In the epic poem *Iliad* of Homer, Aeneas is the leader of the Dardans, and a principal lieutenant of Hector Aeneas's mother Aphrodite frequently comes to his aid on the battlefield [1, 2, 3, 4].

The journey of Aeneas from the East to the West to find a new homeland, and build a “new Troy” is narrated in the Roman historian and poet Virgil’s (Vergil) *Aeneid*. Virgil’s full name was Publius Vergilius Maro, lived in 70-19 BCE. Latin epic poem *Aeneid* written between around 30 to 19 BCE, during the reign of the Emperor Augustus [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Aeneas’ journey to heroism begins with his departure from Troy and finalizes with the foundation of Rome, from the ashes of Troy. Therefore, The *Aeneid* is accepted as a classical foundation narrative [2, 5, 8].

According to experts, The *Aeneid* is a mythical work in twelve books, describing the voyage of the hero Aeneas, with his aged father Anchises on his shoulders, leading his young son Ascanius by the hand, and accompanied by about one thousand survivors of Trojans to find a new homeland after the fall of Troy. The group, collectively known as the Aeneads. During their migration, Aeneas realized that his wife was missing. She was lost in turmoil, most likely killed. When he went back to look for her, he found her shade who told him to leave without her. She told him a new wife and city awaited him elsewhere. Virgil’s first book demonstrated that the Trojan War was real, but what about Aeneas’s journey? The truth and the legend seem to be intertwined. The truth is stranger than fantasy! A detailed historical and geographical record of the journey was left to posterity and has survived to these days. If the confidential information of that era can be analysed and geographical traces can be followed, the journey can be revealed completely again [4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12]!

The Journey of Aeneas

Aeneas’s journey lasted about seven years [9] (see Fig. 1). The story of the journey starts in ancient times that scholars believe to be roughly 1250 BCE. Escaping from the catastrophic burning of Troy, Aeneas headed towards the city of Antandros, in the safety of Mount Ida, with his father Anchises, his son Ascanius and other survivors [4, 6, 13, 14]. Antandros is an ancient city established at the slopes of the Mount Ida, situated on the northwest of modern Altınoluk, in the district of Balıkesir Province. Antandros was famous for its dockyards and had two harbours and two shipyards. Mount Ida, covered with forests was a supplier of the timber for ships. Aeneas and his Trojan companions built a fleet of twenty ships and sailed to seek a new homeland throughout the Mediterranean Sea in the early spring [13, 14].




Fig. 1. Legendary Journey of Aeneas

Source: <https://www.slideserve.com/juniper/virgil-reading-the-aeneid-to-augustus-and-octavia-jean-joseph-taillasson-1745-1809>. Accessed 25 July 2020.

Aeneas and his followers initially sailed to the shores of Thrace and there, they started establishing a city called Aenos (modern name Enez). Soon after, they discovered that Polydorus, one of King Priam's sons, was murdered there by Thracian King, who sided with the Greeks after Troy's fell. The shadow of his cousin Polydorus, warned Aeneas of his murder by the treacherous Thracian king named Polynestor and stimulated them to leave the cursed territory immediately, to search for another homeland [4, 6, 12, 14].

Aeneas and his twenty shiploads of people sailed southward where they arrived at the island of Delos to consult the oracle of Apollon. Here, Apollo sent Aeneas a message telling him to seek the land of his ancestors and to establish a city there. Anchises told him this was a reference to Crete, the birthplace of their ancestor Teucer. Aeneas and his men next sailed to Crete on Anchises's advice. After arriving at Crete, they began to build a new city called Pergama.

Although this turned out to be another mistake. They faced hard times in Crete, their efforts were thwarted by pestilence and famine. After consultation with his father, they understood that Crete was not the land that was destined to Aeneas. Meanwhile, Apollon appeared to Aeneas in his dream and told him to go to Hisperia, afterwards renamed as Italy, because Dardanus, another ancestor of the Trojans, originally came from Hisperia, and therefore his true homeland was Italy.

Anchises agreed that Italy was the right answer, not Crete. Aeneas and his people set sailed once again, heading for Italy with the hope of finding their homeland, leaving a few Trojans in Crete. Aeneas and followers sailed to Epirus and Buthrotum, where his cousin, the Trojan king Priam's son Helenus, had built a city modelled on Troy. He gave them directions on how to safely reach Italy, and advised Aeneas that he would need to visit Scylla and Charybdis, the Cyclops's island, and the Underworld. Relying on Helenus' advice, Aeneas and his followers passed by numerous places, and sailed without incident to Sicily. While staying in Sicily, Aeneas's father Anchises died of natural causes was buried there [6, 10, 12, 14, 15].

When they sailed north towards Italy from Sicily, goddess Juno bribed Aeolus with a nymph into releasing a storm upon Aeneas. Juno was still angry at the Trojans, because of the insult she received when Paris awarded to Aphrodite. The huge storm drove the Trojan fleet southward, sinking one of Aeneas's ships and scatters the others along an unknown coast of Africa.

Fortunately, Neptune was awoken by the storm and calmed the winds which were disturbing his sea. Aeneas and his ships were allowed to sail to the shores of Africa. Exploring the unfamiliar surroundings, they came upon the bustling city of Carthage, and were received by Dido, the widowed queen of Carthage [1, 6, 15]. Like Aeneas, she had to flee her country, because of violent treachery of her brother Pygmalion, who killed her husband Sychaeus and stole his Phoenician throne. Aeneas observed that Dido had succeeded what he still hopes to do, she had established a new and thriving city. [1, 10]. Aeneas and his followers stayed in Carthage for months. They all believed that this would be their new home. Aeneas was often seen at Dido's side, and it seemed that Dido has already given up her right to rule the city. Aeneas seemed willing to stay in Carthage and become Dido's husband. But the king of gods Jupiter (Zeus) finally decided to take hand of the situation, and sent his messenger Mercury (Hermes). Mercury warned Aeneas fiercely that Rome was their main target and, asked them to leave Carthage immediately. Dido, who had fallen in love with Aeneas, was heartbroken by his departure and committed suicide [1, 4, 6, 10].

About seven years into their journey, the Trojans sailed away from Africa to return to Sicily again to visit Acestes, whose mother was Trojan, and he had built a city there. Acestes helped Aeneas to prepare a great funeral games in honour of Anchises, who had died at Drepanum [4, 10].

Some of Aeneas's people insisted on to settle down in Sicily. Aeneas, decided to allow the aged ones, the sea keepers, the weak ones, and those who are tired of adventure to remain in Sicily. He even helped them to build new homes, and he commended them to Acestes all with heartfelt words.

Aeneas's next stop was the Underworld, where like Odysseus, he searched of information about the future [10].

Family and Legendary Descendants

Aeneas and his entourage eventually reached the mouth of the Tiber river in Italy [1]. Aeneas announced as "Here is our home, here is our native land!", and Trojans started building their new walled city. Aeneas was well received by Latinus, the king of Latium, who had no male heir. He described Aeneas as the stranger whom prophecy has foretold would marry his daughter Lavinia and recognize him as a king. However, Turnus, the leader of Rutuli, who aimed to take over the country by marrying Lavinia, was very angry. A violent war broke out between the Trojans and their allies and the Latin forces led by Turnus. The Trojans won, and Turnus was killed. Aeneas then married Lavinia and founded Lavinium. It was his fate to found a new homeland city with a glorious destiny in the West. Aeneas died three years later. Ascanius became king of Lavinium, and founded Alba Longa, the mother city of Rome [1, 4, 6, 10, 16].

Aeneas had an extensive family tree. However, Roman historian Livy claims that Ascanius was the son of Aeneas and Lavinia and was born after the founding of Lavinium [16]. Ascanius was also called Iulus. The Julian family of Rome, whose most important member was Julius Caesar, was his descendant [3, 16]. For twelve generations the throne was passed peacefully down until the thirteenth king Numitor, King of Alba Longa, and grandfather of Romulus and Remus. Aeneas was the ancestor of Romulus, the legendary founder of Rome [10]. Thus, Aeneas was responsible for founding Rome. Aeneas became progenitors of the Romans [3, 4, 9, 11].

The legendary kings of Britain also traced their family through a grandson of Aeneas, Brutus [3]. The Britons were thus called from Brutus. Brutus was the son of Hisicion, Hisicion was the son of Alanus, Alanus was the son of Rhea Silvia, Rhea Silvia was the daughter of Numa Pompilius, Numa was the son of Ascanius, Ascanius was the son of Aeneas, Aeneas of Anchises, Anchises of Troius, Troius of Dardanus ... [17].

Reflection of Aeneas's Legendary Journey on Today's Cultural Routes and Theme Parks

Aeneas's legendary journey continues to inspire today's researchers, institutions and tourism professionals in Europe's cultural cooperation efforts. To this end, cultural routes have started to be created to represent the route of Aeneas that followed during his journey from Troy to Rome.

One project of the route is "Troy Culture Route". The route starts in front of the museum in Troy antique city which is immortalized by the epic of Iliad of Homer, where Paris missed Helen, Troya Wars took place, renowned with Priam's invaluable treasures, and now on the World Cultural Heritage List. The project will last to Antandros antique city near Antandros where Aeneas and his companions built a fleet of twenty ships and sailed to seek a new homeland.

The first part of the route has been completed in 2018, and extends to the Ancient Port of Assos.

It is about 120 kilometers, passes through Achilles Tumulus, Alexandria Troas, Apollon Smintheus, Rome Bridge, Rome roads, and more. The Troy Culture Route Project is created and projected by Prof. Mustafa Boz (the Autor), is carried out by the Canakkale History and Culture Foundation and the Governorship of Çanakkale. By the project, it is aimed to preserve the cultural identity and heritage of the region, while strengthening the relationship among visitors and the

community. Troy Culture Route Project is supported by “Future is in Tourism” programme which is established with the partnership of Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Anadolu Efes. The second part of the Troy Culture Route from Assos to Antandros is at the project planning stage.

Other project of the route is an EU Project titled “Anatolia-Europe Mythological Historical Connection Antandros-Castro”. The project emphasizes interpenetration of Anatolia-Europe relationship through the identity of Aeneas, which is known and studied as a lesson within curriculum in several European countries while paying attention to mythological and historical togetherness. Moreover, it makes a contribution to the introduction of Mount Ida that hosts many mythoi known by everybody and named as “Mount with a thousand fount” in antique sources, regional cultural values, and Edremit Gulf. Another objective of the project is to bring about a bigger project by which to arrive at Rome again with the antique ships that would be built in Antandros with timbers of Mount Ida, similar as Aeneas and the Trojans realized. In order to introduce project to a wider public audience, photography exhibitions, conferences and panels were held in Altınoluk, Ege University – İzmir, Castro, and Catania. In these activities, the importance of Anatolia-Europe togetherness and the necessity of the use of mythoi and Antandros and Castro antique cities in regional presentation were emphasized. The project is implemented within the context of Turkey & European Union Civil Society Dialogue II, Culture and Art Grant Program in partnership of “Association of Saving, Protecting, and Perpetuating Altınoluk Ancient Antandros City” with “Pro Loco Castro” [18, 19].

One another project is establishing an “archaeological park”. The Antandros Association (OSC), the Municipality of Edremit, and the University of Aegean have been engaged since 2011 on it. This park can promote international relations and common cultural values strengthening with other Mediterranean countries, and above all with Turkey, Italy, and Europe. The City of Edremit and the Antandros Association hosted the first International Forum on the Aeneas Route, with the cooperation of several universities and institutional representatives on May 4-7, 2017 [13].

Lavinium in 2016, the Superintendence of the Metropolitan Area of Rome opened to the public the restored areas of the Heroon of Aeneas and the Thirteen Altars. Heroon, “Aeneas’ grave”. The project of “the Park Antica Lavinium and the Tenuta di Pratica Di Mare” saw the light in early 2017 that is 400 years after the intervention of Scipione Borghese (in 1617) who commissioned to Gianlorenzo Bernini the sculptural masterpiece of Aeneas, Anchises and Ascanius, (Borghese Gallery in Rome). The Ratio agendi adopted has been the dissemination of the cultural heritage linked to Aeneas as the pater and central figure of the common European roots. The project includes the following goals: creating new tourist destination of European and International rank (Castello and Borgo of Pratica di Mare); involving young people in a project of cultural memory; promoting archaeology as a living discipline of high social value (summer school archaeology and restoration workshops); disseminating artisan and artistic productions related to Aeneas’ journey; promoting archaeological landscape and the “Nature of Aeneas”; organizing events, contemporary art production. For the historical and cultural meaning of Aeneas’ journey and the Diaspora followed by the Trojan fires, Lavinium is a symbol of travelling and of a Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, under the new concept of cultural diplomacy and in view of the 2018 European Year of Culture. This iconic message is fully intertwined with the cultural paradigm of ancient Rome, resumed over the centuries by different populations (Gauls, Britons, Franks and Carolingians) and European houses (Habsburg) [13].

Conclusion

European Commission accepts culture as a driver for EU unity. As an EU policy and regulatory framework, the European Agenda for Culture has fostered cooperation at EU level for intercultural dialogues and cultural actions in EU external relations through yearly work plans since 2007.

Within this framework, The Culture Programme supports cross-border cooperation projects, cultural networks, European Capitals of Culture and a series of prizes [20]. Besides, Chair of Governing Board, Enlarged Partial Agreement on Cultural Routes, Council of Europe M.B. Marjanovic states that “the Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe have promoted the transnational dimension of European heritage, cultural cooperation and tourism since 1987.

Cultural Routes remind us of the fundamental role of shared European values, cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. Preserving and enhancing the shared cultural heritage of Europe is essential to understand who we are and where we come from, in order to face our common future” [21].

Projects such as “Troy Culture Route”, “Anatolia-Europe Mythological Historical Connection Antandros-Castro”, “the Park Antica Lavinium and the Tenuta di Pratica Di Mare” symbolize the legendary journey of Aeneas and Trojan war survivors to find a new homeland. These projects are important tools, in line with the objectives of the Council of Europe, to contribute mutual understanding and tolerance among people and countries through tourism and other activities.

On the other hand, today many tourists wish to explore different cultures, lives and visit cultural, and historical sites. There has been a significant growth in cultural, spiritual, legend tourism in recent years. Besides other strategies, host destinations are increasingly creating and offering cultural routes and theme parks as tourism products. They contribute to the branding of destinations because of their uniqueness and foster socio-economic development of host communities, promoting awareness of the historical, cultural, traditional, and artistic heritage values of the destination.

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The Goths in the Balkans in Late Antiquity: New Approach to the Sources and the Historical Tradition

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Abstract

Based on source analysis as well as on the achievements of the modern historiography, the article offers a new approach on the topics connected with the Gothic migrations inside and outside the Balkans. Until the last ten years there was a widespread opinion held among the historians and ethnologists who dealt with the Late antique and early Byzantine history as well as with the problems of the Germanic migrations between the 3rd and the 6th centuries that there were two huge Gothic conglomerates – the *Visigoths* and the *Ostrogoths*, who, pressed by the Huns, passed Danube as already formed ethno-political entities and after a period of migrations and wars with the Roman Empire they finally settled and made their states in Spain and Italy respectively. Those *Visigoths* and *Ostrogoths* were by rule identified with the *Tervingi* and *Greuthungi*, mentioned by the historian Ammianus Marcellinus.

Some new research-works in the last decade tried to change the dominating outlook through a new approach to the source material. My intention was to present the new trend in *Gothic studies* and through my own re-evaluation of the sources to reach to some conclusions. Firstly, the Goths and the other tribes in the 4th and 5th century were not clearly defined tribes, but a mixture of people with tribal and military alliance who were in a situation of constant move and mixing.

Secondly, the very names of the *Visigoths* and the *Ostrogoths* should be treated differently, not as “western” and “eastern” Goths. They were rather military and tribal alliances formed in the Balkans and finally constructing their identity in Gaul, Spain, and Italy, becoming “nations” with their political mythology and re-thinking of the past.

Keywords: The Great Migration Period, Later Roman Empire, Goths, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, identity

Introduction

Until the last decades there was a widespread opinion held among the historians and ethnologists who dealt with the Late antique and early Byzantine history as well as with the problems of the Germanic migrations between the 3rd and the 6th centuries that there were two huge Gothic conglomerates – the *Visigoths* and the *Ostrogoths*, who, pressed by the Huns, passed Danube as already formed ethno-political entities and after a period of migrations and wars with the Roman Empire they finally settled down and made their states in Spain and Italy respectively.

Those *Visigoths* and *Ostrogoths* were by rule identified with the *Tervingi* and *Greuthungi*, mentioned by the historian Ammianus Marcellinus.

This idea, based on the academic opinions of the 19th century, was generally shared by many well-known specialists on the Great Migration Period, among them Schmidt, Demougeot and Thompson [1]. According to them, the *Visigoths* and the *Ostrogoths* were identical with the

previous *Tervingi* and *Greuthungi*. This approach was shared, too, by G. Ostrogorski in the first volume of the Cambridge Medieval History from 1967 (chapters seven, eight and nine). Wolfram continued with the same concept, however, with some important elaborations: according to the scholar, the Gothic groups of the 4th and 5th centuries were rather armies, than tribes or some ethnic entities [2]. In the recent times scholars like Matthews, Liebeschuetz and Heather posed under certain doubts the info from the sources, changing in a way the existent conceptual cliché [3].

According to Heather, for example, we should radically change the traditional view of the tribes and peoples moving here and thither like pool balls, pushing each other from one space to another when practically remaining unchanged [4]. Thus, the new research-works in the last decade tried to change the dominating outlook through a new approach to the source material. My intention is to present and recapitulate in a short framework the new trend in *Gothic studies* and through my own re-evaluation of the sources to reach to certain conclusions.

There are some questions to be posed and presumably answered, although partially. Firstly, was there any continuity, and to what extent, between the *Tervingi* and *Greuthungi* from the middle of the 4th century and the later military and political formations of both Visigoths and the Ostrogoths? Who passed Danube in the 370-s and the 380-s? Who took part in the federation of Alaric? What we, the historians, have to deal with: tribal conglomerates or rather unstable military formations? How the Gothic statehood and national safe-awareness appeared out of the tribal and military groups?

The whole traditional concept concerning the Gothic migrations in Late Antiquity was based on two main sources: The *Gothic History (Getica)* of Jordanes and the *History (Res Gestae)* of Ammianus Marcellinus. Jordanes, a Goth himself and a loyal subject of Justinian the Great, wrote his history in the middle of the 6th century. His main goal was to follow and reveal the historical fate of the Gothic people, explaining moreover the division between Visigoths and Ostrogoths.

His final aim, however, was to praise the deeds and personality of Justinian and the union achieved in the historical development of both Romans and Goths. After explaining in brief the origins of the Gothic nation from the “Scandinavian island” and their movements towards the south, Jordanes continues with the division of the people in the lands north of Danube (approximately modern Ukraine) into two main groups – the *Vesegothae* (sic!), ruled by the Balt dynasty, and the *Ostrogothae*, under the Amals (Jor. 42). Based on the historian Ablabius, Jordanes wrote about the chieftain Ostrogotha somewhere in “Scythia” (Jor. 82). The name of the chieftain was obviously to be accepted as eponymous, although Jordanes did not exclude the possibility that Ostrogoths had been named like that being situated in the east of the Visigoths, thus accepting them as Eastern and Western Goths. We have to note that the scholarly re-evaluation of the denominations as originating from the Gothic linguistic roots austr- (shining, sparkling) and wise-(wise) were missing in Jordanes. Moreover, the author of the 6th century wrote that this.

Ostrogotha (quite probably a legendary personality) ruled over both the Ostrogoths and the Visigoths (*utriusque eiusdem gentes populi*, 98). We could hardly derive from Jordanes any information about when and why the two branches of the Gothic people were separated and the only clear fact is that at the time of the Hunnic invasion, in the 370s, they were already two existing entities, or rather conglomerations (*a quorum societate iam Vesegothae quadam inter se intentione seiuncti habebantur*, 130). The scholars in the past two centuries usually identified the Visigoths with the Tervingi of Athanaric (*Athanaricus Tervingorum iudex*), a tribal conglomerate, inhabiting approximately the modern Romania (Amm.Marc. XXVII, 5, 6-9). Jordanes himself decided to divide his history into two parts after chapter 131 – the first one, related to the Visigoths and their move across Danube, into the Eastern Roman lands after 376 (up to chapter 245) and the second

one, describing the Ostrogoths, their kingdom in Italy and the wars with the Romans, contemporary to Jordanes.

What about the picture designed by Jordanes? Should we follow it uncritically? The history of Jordanes is anyway full with errors, inaccuracies and obvious anachronisms, like the mixing of Goths with the ancient Getae. Many facts, concerning the ancient Dacians, Moesians, Thracians, Scythians and Cimmerians were included in the narrative, making it a kind of anachronistic hotch-potch. Goths were, moreover, Zalmoxis, the Scythian queen Tomiris, the Dacian leaders Burebista and Decebalus, even the legendary Amazons. The genealogies should be also put under very serious doubts. As a matter of fact, the historical narrative of Jordanes was loaded into the political texture of the Christian Empire.

Ammianus Marcellinus is another important source of information concerning the relations between the Goths and the Romans up to the disastrous imperial defeat near Adrianople (378).

Being contemporary and an active participant in the events narrated, Ammianus has won the glory of a relatively trustworthy source, often critical to the imperial policy and its frequent failures [5]. His story, combined with that of Jordanes and many other authors from the 5th up to the 7th century (Claudian, Orosius, Socrates, Sozomenes, Olympiodorus, Priscus, Malchus, Zosimus, Agathias, Isidore of Seville) made relevant the identification between the Tervingi and the Visigoths as well as between the Greuthungi and the Ostrogoths.

Procopius in his *History of the Gothic war* used the general denomination Goths for the Ostrogoths, the main “heroes” of his story. When writing about the events in Southern Gaul and Spain, he refers to the Goths there as Visigoths, as they had been already known then, with the intent to differentiate them from the Goths in Italy (V, 12: 12, 20-22, 33, 35, 43; 13:13; VIII, 5: 6, 10).

What kind of conclusions could be made on the basis of the sources? Firstly, most of them, including the most detailed information in Paul Orosius, Zosimus and Isidore of Seville, use the general ethnical denomination Goths, sometimes archaically also Getae or Scythians, without paying attention on the tribal divisions among them. Important then, on the second place, is to precise sources, which stress on that division. Along with being late (6th century), the abovementioned Jordanes is also quite an unreliable source. Procopius used Visigoths for the Goths in Gaul and Spain, avoiding the use of the name Ostrogoths for those in Italy. The generally trustworthy Ammianus wrote about the division between the Greuthungi (in what is generally modern Ukraine) and the Tervingi (approximately modern Romania). The main question remaining, thus, is the possible identification, or not, of the Greuthungi with the Ostrogoths and the Tervingi with the Visigoths.

Historia Augusta, for example, mentions how during the reign of the Roman Emperor Claudius II (known as Gothicus, 268-270) different “Scythian” tribes, listed as *Grutungi*, *Austrogoti*, *Tervingi*, and *Visi*, invaded and devastated the Roman territories in the Balkans (*Claudius*, 6.1).

In *Notitia dignitatum*, a list of the later Roman military units and administrative divisions, composed ca. 400, we are able to discern the auxiliary forces of both *Visi* and *Tervingi*, obviously constituted by two different tribes (*ND*, V. 61, VI. 61). In the political poems of Claudian the *Gruthungi* were mentioned separately from the *Ostrogothi* (*In Eutropium* II, 153). The same is the situation in the poems and epistles of Sidonius Apollinarius (*Carm.* II, 377; *Ep.* VII, 9). The tribal name of the Ostrogoths had been, however, superimposed over the others with the time going.

Theodoric Amal named Ostrogotho one of his extramarital daughters, born in the Balkans (*Jor.* 297). Even the ruling family of the Gepids, another Germanic tribe, somehow connected historically with the Goths, used the name Ustrigoth in the 6th century for the son of their king Elemund (*Procopius*, VIII, 27).

Who were, then, the Goths who crossed over Danube in the year 376? After the hard blow, inflicted on the Greuthungi by the newly appeared Huns, and the death (or suicide) of the Gothic leader Ermenric (or Ermanaric) the tribal conglomerate failed down into ruins. Signs of shock and disintegration were to be noticed in the union of the Tervingi, too. Ammianus wrote that the greater part of the people, lacking the necessary food supplies for survival, abandoned Athanaric (the leader of the Tervingi) in a search for salvation, far from the furious newcomers, that is, the Huns” (XXXI, 3, 8:..*populi pars maior, quae Athanaricum attenuata necessariorum paenuria deseruerat, quaeritabat domicilium remotum ab omni notitia barbarorum*). Thus, Danube was crossed over by:

1. Part of the Tervingi, led by the chieftains Alaviv and Fritigern (Ammianus XXXI, 4, 1-9).
2. Against the Roman will, the river was crossed also by people from the former Greuthungi “empire”, led by Alateus and Saphrac (or Saphrax in Ammianus XXXI, 3, 3; 4, 12-13; 12, 12-17; see also Jor. 134-140). The latter were presented by Ammianus as important persons, the actual leaders of the Greuthungi after the death of Ermeric, who took the power in the name of the king (*regum vice*). They took important role in the victory over the Romans near Adrianople. Jordanes defined them rather as chieftains (*duces*) along with Fritigern, without clarifying somehow their appurtenance to either the Greuthungi, or the Ostrogoths. The reader, moreover, could remain with the impression that they were part of the Tervingi. Zosimus (VI, 34, 2-3) called them “hegemons of the two parts (*duo moirai*) of the Germanic tribes”. According to him, Aloteus (sic!) and Saphrac were side by side with Fritigern in the overthrow and expulsion of Athanaric, who had to search salvation at the court of Theodosius I in Constantinople. It is clear that for the later authors, like Jordanes and Zosimus, Alateus and Saphrac were rather part of the Tervingi, not of the Greuthungi. Thus, the Greuthungi past was somehow forgotten. There is a proposition that Alateus and Saphrac, united with the Alans, a people of Iranian stock, moved later to Pannonia and concluded a treaty with the Western Roman Emperor Gratian. This *foedus* in Pannonia was put under doubt by some scholars who, following the data from Themistius (orations 14-16), insisted that Theodosius, the Eastern Emperor, had concluded treaties with both the Tervingi of Fritigern and the Greuthungi of Alateus and Saphrac [6].
3. Thirdly, there were Goths under Farnobius, probably also from the Greuthungi conglomerate, with the assistance of a group of Taifals, another Germanic tribe (Ammianus XXXI, 4, 12, 9, 3-4).
4. Furthermore, the Goths led by Sverid and Collia, *Gothorum optimates*, who had been accepted by the Romans even before the other groups crossed Danube (*longe ante suscepti*). Later on, the two leaders allied with the revolting Goths of Fritigern (Ammianus XXXI, 6, 1-3).
5. Finally, the Tervingi of Athanaric, who accompanied him as early as the year 380, during his visit in Constantinople, and remained there in the service of the Empire, becoming a unit in the Roman army (Jor. 145; Ammianus XXVII, 5, 10).

To the aforementioned groups we should add (6), moreover, the so-called *Small Goths* (*alli Gothi, qui dicuntur minores*, Jor. 267), who used to live in the region of Nicopolis and Istrum in what is nowadays Northern Bulgaria. Following Philostorgius (*Hist. eccl.* II, 5) and Socrates (*Hist. eccl.* IV, 33), many scholars came to believe that this group had consisted of Christian Goths, who moved there under the leadership of their bishop Wulfila (or Ulfilas), the inventor of the Gothic script. Those Goths were expelled from the lands north of Danube due to persecutions of Christians in the realm of Athanaric sometimes in the middle of the 4th century [7]. An attentive analysis of

the History of Isidore of Seville led other scholars to the opinion that we should divide the Arian Goths of Wulfila from the runaway Goths who were adepts of the Orthodox Christianity of the time (Isidore: “non solum perseveraverunt Christiani catholici, sed etiam in concordia Romanorum” in *Historia Gothorum, Wandalorum, Sueborum* 10). It is more than probable that those Goths were persecuted because of their Orthodoxy, connected with their loyalty to the Roman Empire. However, there is a question still remaining about the date of that move. It should be by all means before 380, but then the Eastern Roman Empire was ruled by non-Orthodox Emperors, like Constantius II and Valens! Or it happened during the reign of Julian (361-363, quite improbably due to his pagan predilections) or during the short reign of Jovian (364)? The question remains without a definite answer. If we rate those Goths, anyway, then they will be a separated, seventh group.

What we see is a mixture of different Gothic military and tribal groups, originating from both the Tervingi and the Greuthingi, not to speak about the other Germanic and non-Germanic (Iranian and Hunnic) groups. Among them there were obviously also Visi and Ostrogoths as tribes inside the Gothic “sea” (*Historia Augusta, Notita dignitatum*, Claudian).

There is a traditional opinion existing that the Visigoths had left the Balkans, led by Alaric, in order to finally settle down in Southern Gaul, later Spain, where to create its own state. Perhaps it should be out of doubt that the Goths of Alaric and his successors became the nucleus of the later Visigothic kingdom. What we need, however, is a more detailed survey in order to answer properly to the question: were the Goths of Alaric identical with the Tervingi of Athanaric and Fritigern, with the ancient Visi, or were they a new military and tribal formation?

According to Jordanes, the Goths, unsatisfied with the rule of the sons of Theodosius I, that is, with Arcadius (395-408) and Honorius (395-423), went on to choose Alaric as their king (*ordinato super se rege Halarico*). The same Alaric descended from the Balts, the second most important clan after that of the Amals, and was to become the main hero of the story of the “Alaric wars”, not quite correctly presented by Jordanes (146-147). The 6th century author, related by kin to a family with Gothic and Alan roots and by family ties to the Amals, was predisposed to the Ostrogoths, whose leaders he considered as more noble and illustrious. Following Orosius, furthermore, Jordanes also styled Alaric as a king. Orosius had defined him as Roman comes, too (Orosius, II 3.3). After Jordanes, Isidore of Seville would point out that the Goths had thrown off the Roman yoke and had installed Alaric to be their king (*Alaricum regem sibi constituent*, *Historia Gothorum* 6). It seems, however, that Zosimus, a Greek author from the late 5th or the early 6th century, and a pagan, too, was closer to the truth, following Eunapius, another pagan author, who was a contemporary of Alaric. Thus, the activity of Alaric was divided into two main periods – in the Balkans and in Italy after 407-408. According to Zosimus, Alaric was unhappy with his position of a commander of sole “barbarians” and wanted no less than a high military and administrative post in the Eastern Roman empire (V, 5, 4-6). Olympiodorus called him “phylarch of the Goths” (fragment 3). Alaric’s activity witnessed his clear intention to reach some high military position and to ensure for his soldiers’ better income from taxes and takings in kind. The nucleus of the Balkan Goths of Alaric consisted of soldiers, who were either *de facto* part of the Roma army, or were subdued to the Roma command according to the *foedus* of 382 and the later agreements. Were they originating from the old Tervingi conglomerate or were they Visi in the strict sense is difficult, not to say, impossible to answer? We don’t know either was there any link between Alaric and the Goths of Gaina, who tried to make a coup in Constantinople in 400 [8].

Quite unsure, too, was the affiliation of Alaric to the ancient ruling family of the Tervingi. The sources don’t make any connection between him and Athanaric, for example, and therefore we have only the statement of Jordanes about the appurtenance of Alaric to the ruling Balt family.

Concerning the army of Alaric, it was a real tribal and ethnic mixture. Who were, then, the “Goths” of Alaric?

1. The Balkan “nucleus”. It is difficult to define them categorically as Tervingi, Visi or a conglomerate of Gothic mercenaries and federates from the Balkan Roman territories.
2. The Goths of Ataulf who allied with Alaric in Italy in 408 along with a detachment of Huns (Zosimus V, 37, 1-3; Olymp. fragment 10).
3. The Goths of Radagais and other “barbarians”, who left the Roman army in Italy after the execution of Stilicho (Zosimus V, 35, 6).
4. Slaves joining Alaric in Italy in 409-410 (Zosimus V, 42, 3).
5. The Alans mentioned by Paulinus of Pella [9].

Here we witness again this remarkable mixture of different ethnic, tribal and military entities.

Nucleus was formed by the soldiers of Alaric, with or without their wives and children (the question still stays open), and with the addition of a civil population from the Balkans and later from the Northern Italy. Thus, a *people*, or a *nation*, was to be formed, identifying itself as *Visigothic*. This Visigothic (nothing to do with *Western Goths*!) identity was filtered and matured in the early decades of the 5th century with Alaric and his descendants, creating its own mythology, searching for its own past. Not very different, besides, from the identifying *memory of the past*, created in the circles around Theodoric Amal in the late 5th and the early 6th century, thus creating the Ostrogothic identity and heroic past, presented to us by Jordanes himself.

I would like to summarize few main points. Firstly, based on the new approach towards the many and sometimes contradictory sources, we could with a strong justification overthrow the older concept of the two huge ethnical masses of Visigoths and Ostrogoths, who crossed over Danube, sojourned for a certain period of time in the boundaries of the Eastern Roman Empire and later moved to the West where to create their own kingdoms. What we notice is rather a cluster of military and/or tribal groups in fluid relations between themselves and also with the Roman authorities. The question is still open and a more complex one: were those Gothic groups in the Balkans tribes in the proper sense of the word, or were they military groups of mercenaries and *foederati* who became a nucleus of new larger ethno-political entities with specific goals and political ideology, not to say political mythology? There is a very tricky boundary between a tribe and a military group with families and civilians including. In the second case usually, we deal with a mixture of different ethnise and social groups, led by a certain military and/or tribal core. We know the names of Greuthungi (or Gruthungi), Tervingi, Ostrogoths, and Visi (or Visigoths), but we can't clearly define what happened with them in the Balkans. The results from the archaeological excavations in modern Northern Bulgaria, including the region of Nicopolis and Istrum, demonstrate the trend towards the militarization of the urban and village settlements in the 5th century, but we are still far of any radical answer [10]. The memory of those tribal names remained, however, just to be reiterated with the formation of the new identity of the people in the kingdoms, formed in the West. Along with the Goths, moreover, we have in addition the local population, free or slave, from the Balkan provinces and Northern Italy as well as other Germanic and non-Germanic tribes, like Peuci, Carpi, the Alans, Taifals, Gepids, and Huns.

Secondly, the older notion of the Visigoths and Ostrogoths as Western and Eastern Goths should be abandoned. The origin of the names comes from tribes inside the greater conglomerates of the Greuthungi and the Tervingi.

We know many names of the Gothic chieftains and military leaders, known in the sources as *duces*, *primates*, *reges*. We have, moreover, all the reasons to argue that the military and tribal groups, mercenaries and *foederati* in the Roman army mixed *ad hoc* in different enterprises in order to reach a certain goal and to ensure survival. Because of that, many native inhabitants joined

them out of a sheer insecurity. Quite an illustrative example is that with the followers of Alaric, semi-nomads of a kind, who acquired new methods of waging war and new ways to make a living.

They did not allowed, however, to be Romanized to the extent of a complete acculturation and thus, fighting with the Empire itself, they developed, although being a heterogeneous mixture, a feeling of appurtenance to a whole, finding the way to the new identity, be it Visigothic, or Ostrogothic in the case of Theodoric Amal. Concerning the Visigoths, we have to add that Vidimer, the uncle of Theodoric Amal, joined them too (Jor. 284). Hardly there could be a better demonstration for the fact that even in the second half of the 5th century the Visigoths and the Ostrogoths were still far from giving a very strict meaning to their division as two clearly separated ethnical and political traditions. They were still, according to the expression of Heather, people and elites in a process of formation. What unified them for a long time, nevertheless, was the memory of the old Gothic past reinforced with the Christianity in its Arian form, destined to become the “national” confession of the Gothic people.

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WAR PEST. A Statistical Strategic Analysis of the 15th Century Balkan Campaigns of John Hunyadi

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Abstract

The campaigns of John Hunyadi in the middle of the 15th century continue to remain not only one of the milestones of the centuries long anti-ottoman fight of nations in South Eastern Europe but also a marvel of military strategic and tactical thinking which, technology apart, may hold true for their manoeuvre technique even for modern warfare. In the meantime, the preservation of a certain number of documents allow us to make a good statistical analysis of these campaigns thus describing in a quantified manner the effort employed for the campaigns, the majority of which are offensive wars whereby movement and rapid deployment of forces are essential for success as well as of the effects other various factors which are commonly associated with the movement of masses of population are associated, i.e.: in this case epidemics. This careful analysis allows us also to check for the plausibility of the more than one narrative preserved up to date and on these campaigns thus enabling us to embrace, eventually, a novel vision of South East Europe history, closer to historical reality. To this final avail our analysis will delve more in depth on two particular letter dictated by John Hunyadi himself, namely the 12th of December 1443 letter written from somewhere in the vicinity of Sofia-Bulgaria and the 6th of January 1444 letter written and expedited from Prokuplje-Serbia, both addressed to the magistrate of the city of Brasov-Romania and both remaining amongst the masterpieces of medieval Latin epistolary prose.

Keywords: John Hunyadi, the long campaign of 1443, the letters to the city council and the magistrate of Brasov, quantification and plausibility checking of the recounted details, reliability and plausibility of the original medieval document

“Most wise and cautious gentlemen, our close and most honoured friends. First of all, let me send you my warmest and most sincere greetings and salutations. Our flags are victorious and our armies have first triumphed against Ezebegh, the against Turakhan (Turkhan), third against the unfortunate Basa who is second in their hierarchy to the Sultan and the in the mountains around the city of Nis (Nis in SR today) against the said Basa, Turkhan and Ezebegh and other leaders and commanders of the Turkish armies, and these happened in the Sunday after the day of all Saints (Day of all Saints = 1st of November, so possibly the 7th of November¹ at the latest) and with the help of the God almighty we have given to the name of Christian and eternal glory as we have been clearly and without doubt victorious.”

It is thus that one of the most beautifully and vividly written documents of the South Eastern Europe medieval history begins. Out of the countless of documents originating from the chancellery of Joan Hunyadi this is amongst the few having indeed a documentary or purely

¹ As it happens to be, the birthday of the author of these lines!

historical value as the great crusader of the 15th century and first governor or regent of Hungary, recounts to the “... Most wise and cautious gentlemen, our close and most honoured friends” which are none others than the magistrates of the wealthy German or Saxon in those times emporium of Brasov (Kronstadt/Brasso/ Civita Brassoviensis, today in Romania 180 km N of Bucharest²) the final exploits of what is known in history as the long campaign of 1443-1444, one of the first major winter campaigns in the history of wars.

While for sure the future governor of Hungary and at the time of the writing captain general and woiwode of Transylvania – thus one of the prime “nobles of sword” (i.e.: military aristocracy/FR: noblesse d’epée) of the medieval realm of Hungary did not write the letter himself (in those times nobility of sword scarcely did it!) it for surely dictated it himself as the dynamism and excitement of the narrative is something rarely matched in tern medieval documents and for surely finds no parallel in the correspondence of John Hunyadi the almost totality of which is made of boring administrative and judicial, heavy of cumbersome medieval Latin formulae. However here it is different, the document is vivid, catches your breath even after many hundreds of years with its short phrasing, its vivacity and its factual richness. To a certain extent one has the impression of reading a preview of the Napoleonic recite of Arcole or Marengo. A Napoleonic letter of victory indeed – the letter of a victorious general clamouring his glory and revelling in the booty taken to the defeated enemy.

Nevertheless, not for the analysis of the style of this letter we are enterprising this analysis but for its precision. As Napoleon more than three centuries and a half later, John Hunyadi pushes accuracy to the heights. The continuation of the letter thus reads: “*After this triumph and going over the lands of the Romans (i.e.: to be understood as the former Byzantine possessions) we have multiplied our fighting endeavours against the pagan Turks expecting now to give battle against the whole of the armies of Omurath their Sultan (it is about sultan Murad 2nd) and the whole of his damned hosts and armies. We therefore arrived five days before the holiday of St. Lucia (St Lucia’s holiday is on Dec. 12th so it must be around Dec. 7th 1443) at the pass of Zlatita (BG today) in the middle of heavily forested mountains. On Christmas Eve (Dec. 24th 1443) we started our return to the fatherland (i.e.: to Hungary, in its medieval borders).*” Henceforth we are informed with a great deal of precision on the distance the army has covered throughout a definite time-span, its speed of marching and its military exploits. This precision and detail are remarkable for a period when instruments of measuring and quantifying were at best primitive and at worst simply non-existent. Hunyadi had no means to account for the duration of a certain events except for the moments of sunrise and sunset and as for the directions and places on the word of mouth, skill and goodwill (sometimes doubtful), of local guides. The calendar is entirely reliant on the religious holidays of the time. In the case of John Hunyadi, a fervent Roman-Catholic, we are of course dealing with the holidays of the time as they were established and observed by the Roman Church. Even the time of the new year is hard to be distinguished for the modern eyes as we are not dealing with the New Year’s Eve (a concept at the time not only alien but which would have looked like pure “heresy”) but with the holiday of St. Sylvester. It has to be accounted also for the fact that while the holidays give us the calendar days with a remarkable accuracy (e.g.: “... five days before the feast of St Lucia”; which would mean five days before Dec. 12th, thus meaning actually Dec. 7th or one day after the feast of St. Nicholas) the calendar which Hunyadi was using at the time was the Julian calendar or the one established at the end of the 1st century B.C. by none

² Actually, the population was a mixture of German speaking – these not being entirely ethnic German but various ethnic elements assimilated into the German speaking community, Romanians and Hungarians with some Jewish of course and Gypsies amongst them like in any town of Central and South East Europe. Nevertheless, the German speaking elements were making for the ruling elite of the city.

other than Julius Caesar. Till the 16th century when the great reform of the calendar occurred this was the calendar commonly used in the entire of Europe. And for its Eastern part it remained the official calendar until sometimes after WW-1, which makes it no more than 100 years ago the calendar is still used as the official calendar for religious purposes in Russia, Serbia and in other countries³ of the region even today. This calendar has a difference of 13 days as against our so-called “new style” or Gregorian calendar. This gives an “advance” of 13 days to our calendar as compared to the one used by Hunyadi (we will agree to call our hero as such for the purposes of this paper, as this goes well for all languages given that his Christian name is plagued with problems of spelling in EN while in Latin the Romanian Jancu/Iancu has no particular equivalent other than Joannes or the EN John)⁴. Therefore, the 7th of December about which Hunyadi tells us is actually in our terms farther in winter, being the date of Dec. 21st and therefore only four days before Christmas and on the day of the Winter Solstice the moment of the longest night of the year. As such we are not talking only about a battle fought in the dead of winter but of a battle fought with the shortest possible duration of day time. Quite a performance for any medieval army and we haven’t seen anything yet!

Before flashing back on the 1443 campaign, the purpose of this paper should be clear to the reader. This is to peel off the small medieval document (a mere 2 pages in the current A4 format!) and make a thorough check of the account made by Hunyadi thus determining if the document is plausible and, furthermore, if what looks like a Napoleonic “*bulletin de la victoire*” is really such a thing. That is, if the battles fought especially in December of 1443 and very early of January 1444 are truly a successful rear-guard winter battle after a rather facile advance in the autumn of 1443 or they are merely a well-organized but still hasty retreat. In analysing this we will deploy several metrics relying on elements of medieval military technique and tactics. We will then finally compare these achievements with the other campaigns of Hunyadi most of which actually took place on roughly the same terrain of the Central Balkans, a landscape of hills, valleys, mountains and gorges dotted with rapids and over which our hero has campaigned between 1442 and 1456 thus for a total of 15 long years. Acknowledging the seminal work done in quantified medieval history of this type performed by Haagensen and Lincoln (2000) [1], as well as the magisterial work of Maja Philippi (1986) [2] and the quasi-forgotten older work of Anastasiu (1928) [3] we will take good account of the comprehensive works on the period of John Hunyadi, his son Matthias Corvinus as well as the long reign of Sigismund of Luxemburg and its heirs written by Muresan (1968), Tanner (2008) and Dvorakova (2017). We will also refer the reader to our modest works on the period (Ghinararu, 2017, 2018). Thus we will try to unfurl this small story of winter warfare in the middle ages, a sort of “Walpurgische Nacht” where the ghosts stemming out ferociously “... like hungry wolves” to cite Hunyadi himself in the same letter, from the blasts of snow and ice are the very Ottoman invading armies Hunyadi and his fellow crusaders were trying to halt the advance.

What we call the long campaign begun in the autumn of 1443, after apparently much wrangling about its necessity and purposes as the realm of Hungary was bitterly split between the faction of

³ Not however Romania and Bulgaria which use even for religious purposes the Gregorian calendar.

⁴ The Romanian history acknowledges our hero as Iancu de Hunedoara/John of Hunedoara after the name of the family’s main feudal possession in Romania today, where also the beautiful early renaissance castle, remodeled by Iancu’s son the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus, still stands and maybe visited making for the landmark of the former steel-mills city of Hunedoara. Most unfortunately however the castle has lost all of its original inventory so only the walls and the architectural elements speak of the glorious days of the 15th century. It maybe, although there is no historical confirmation that the famous Vlad Tepes, the historic/i.e.; real personage behind Dracula may have spent here some days while arrested by Matthias Corvinus in 1462.

the local gentry grouped around Hunyadi himself and the more than young King Wladislaw Jagello of Poland and Hungary (Wladislaw the 1st in Hungarian history, Wladislaw 3rd in the Polish history) and the party of the high and more cosmopolitan nobility grouped around the powerful family of the counts of Cilly (the stronghold of which falls currently in Slovenia) supporting the hereditary, Western monarchical style rights to the throne of the child King Ladislas the 5th, also known in history as the “Posthumous” due to its birth after the death of his father Albrecht of Habsburg, the son-in-law of Sigismund of Luxemburg. When the campaign has been finally decided it was already the autumn of 1443, somewhere around the date Sep. 20th after all documentary evidence we possess. We cannot tell that the moment in time was a later one, as the 20th of September if this should be the date after the Gregorian calendar we use today, then the crusading army should have quite some time before it, of fair and golden Balkan Autumn (this is the rule for most of the years but in some years winter weather may descend earlier as it happened for example four hundred years later during the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78⁵). If it would be nevertheless after the Julian calendar and we have to agree that for purposes of consistency we have to take all indications given by Hunyadi in his letter(s)⁶ after the Julian calendar, then this 20th of September is far deeper into autumn, and we reach to the date of Oct. 2nd or Oct. 3rd of 1443 as the date when the armies of the Kingdom of Hungary, to which we have to add a small number of Polish Knights coming with the King himself as well as some token troops furnished in rage by George Brankovic, the Serbian despot (i.e.: equivalent to a sort of sovereign or semi-sovereign duke) of the time, keen to re-conquer its lands, crossed the Danube at Kubin. If a small number of troops from the still then allied Vlad Dracul (or Vlad the Dragon from the German translation of the term dragon, i.e.: drakken), the father of the historic Dracula (Vlad Tepes – Vlad the “Impaler”) is debatable but given the fact that they took part in the from the onset ill-fated expedition in Varna in the autumn of 1444, then it is more than probable that they took part in an expedition which was beginning under far more auspicious terms. All in all, the armies of Hunyadi did not number more than 35 thousand men. It has to be said that most of historians have credited this campaign as one being unusual precisely as it has been fought in late autumn and into the dead of winter. Yes, indeed it has been unusual the winter episode but, if we were to take a closer look to all of the campaigns of Hunyadi then we would notice that all of them have been carried out in autumn (1443, 1444, 1448). It was actually a custom to do like that as it allowed for the harvesting generally to pass and thus accumulate supplies for the marching troops. Also, going to war at that time of the year allowed for the easy crossing of the various water courses as in autumn the waters of the Balkan region are at their ebb. Particularly this eased the crossing of the Danube which at the time was not done by the building of a bridge but simply by employing vessels of various kinds. Lower waters meant lower dangers. Higher waters of the mightiest river of Europe (safe for the Volga of course) as several generals have witnessed throughout the time, including amongst them Jan Sobieski at the Vienna siege in 1683 and even Napoleon four centuries after Hunyadi, at Aspern and Wagram in 1809, proved a difficult enterprise if at high waters and with the means of what were pre-industrial revolution times. From here on the choice made in 1443 as well as in

⁵ Romanian historiography calls this war the Independence War as it led to the full and complete independence of Romania from the Ottoman rule (Independence proclaimed on May 10th 1877 and recognized by the Congress in Berlin in 1878). However more generally the war is practically the last in the long series of Russian-Turkish Wars unfolding from 1711 to 1878, of course if we do not count the WW-1 which has seen again Russia and Turkey (i.e.: the Ottoman Empire) pitted against each other for a last time as members of the Entente and of the Triple Alliance. The war also consecrated the independence of Serbia and Montenegro and the re-emergence of the Bulgarian state after almost five hundred years of Ottoman rule.

⁶ We will look not only at one letter, i.e.: the one of Jan 6th 1444 but also at the much shorter but closely related one of Dec. 4th 1443.

1444 (both campaigns started in late of September of the respective years) and in 1448 (a campaign started in October) – all of which are offensive campaigns that carried the armies of Hungary across the mighty river, to start in autumnal season of the year. The only exception to this apparent rule is 1456 at Belgrade, a defensive campaign fought into the middle of summer (July) but which did not entail for the army the crossing of the Danube but only that of its tributary the Sava and, the only one for which a naval component is employed, as the waters of the rivers were high after the rains of May and June. Therefore and for a variety of military reasons, pertinent for the time when building a bridge over the river was a daunting if not impossible enterprise for the small army the kingdom of Hungary was able to assemble and which lacked completely any kind of specialist technical component (i.e.: it could not possibly lay bridges over such a course of water nor over actually any course of water so all waters had to be wade through; this made autumnal campaigns an obvious choice⁷). If the crossing took place on Sep. 20th or around that date as we know that King Wladislaw is signing a document from Slankamen on Sep. 23rd so on the banks of the Danube, it would mean in the terms of the Gregorian calendar we are using today, somewhere around the 1st and the 3rd of October. It is around this date that usually the waters of Danube are at their ebb after the drought of August and September.

Coming back to our text we will see that Hunyadi claims that “... *Our flags are victorious and our armies have first triumphed against Ezebagh, the against Turakhan (Turkhan), third against the unfortunate Basa who is second in their hierarchy to the Sultan and the in the mountains around the city of Nis (Nis in SR today) against the said Basa, Turkhan and Ezebegh and other leaders and commanders of the Turkish armies, and these happened in the Sunday after the day of All Saints*”. Which in other words means that around the 1st of November or by our today’s Gregorian calendar actually the 13th-14th of November he had passed slightly the city of Nis. This would imply that within the span of practically 30 days he had managed to make through a hilly and badly provisioned with roads and bridges region around 210 km. It would thus imply a speed of marching of around 7 km per day. This would be remarkable consistent with what practically a host of military historians ascertain as the speed of marching of the Hungarian army (in 1467 in his ill-fated campaign against the prince of Moldovan Stephen the Great and the Saint the armies of King Matthias Corvinus, Hunyadi’s youngest son, covered 180 km in 18 days which puts them roughly at the around the same speed, of somewhat higher, with 10 km per day⁸). So up until here nothing which would appear as strange or hard to believe. The letter marks the truth.

⁷ The impossibility of laying any sort of bridge over major courses of water, such as the Danube as well as the lack of any naval capabilities frequently led small armies such as the ones of the Romanian principalities for example and even the Hungarian army to wintetr campaigns as sometimes the Danube gets frozen in winter and it allows its crossing on the ice. Examples to that are the winter raids of 1461-62 of Vlad Tepes (the historical Dracula), of Michael the Brave in 1594/95. In 1445, the Hungarian army led also by Hunyadi with the help of the Wallachian prince Vlad Dracul (Tepes’s/Dracula’s father) mount a summer-early autumn campaign on the Danube in search of King Wladislaw Jagello who was still thought as having survived Varna. The possibility of running such a campaign was provided this year by the presence of Burgundian fleet of Wallerand de Wavrin (who left us also a very interesting historical account!) and thereby of a naval component which the Turks could not match at the time. The campaign ended when the fleet considered that operations had become dangerous due to the approaching winter season. Thereby the 1445 Danube campaign is a notable exception only made possible due to an intervention from outside of the South East Europe area.

⁸ According to the first half of 20th century RO military historian Radu Rosetti (1947) but also according to more modern sources in military history, the Tatars were the fastest of the armies of the middle ages covering roughly 40 km per day and in some cases even more but true to be said they had mostly light cavalry and they did not carry supplies, at least while in advancing. Their speed was however slowed down markedly when returning from their looting raids which greatly diminished their speed to less than half of their advance one. The Turkish or rather

Let us see however where does it take us from here on. Hunyadi in another letter written from around the city of Sofia as he claims and dated four days after the feast of St. Andrew (so Dec. 4th 1443) says plainly that “... *I am thereby informing you that I do believe that in six or at the maximum eight days I will be with the armies in the city of Drenapoli (Adrianople). Written while marching with our armies from the vicinities of the city of Sophia towards Drenapole, at four days after the feast of the Apostle Andrew*”. Now the distance between the city of Nis in Serbia of today and the approaches of Sofia, where actually the armies of Hunyadi did not probably enter, is of around 160 km, all of them through hard terrain and deep into autumn which at that time would have turned into winter, although we have to say that at no time Hunyadi is mentioning in his letters the harshness of the weather which may lead us to suppose autumn lasted quite long in 1443. This should have been true as the Hungarian army would have had to march at a speed double the one from the Danube to Nis and through a terrain including only hills and mountains although possibly making use of the former Roman and Byzantine road from Constantinople to Belgrade which at the time may have still been in use here and there as many Roman roads which have survived well into the Middle Ages owing to their solid construction. Nevertheless, the speed should have been the double of the Hungarian army’s average, reaching around 16 km/day of marching which includes some days of combat in and around the city of Nis. That would have been a match for the average speed of the medieval Turkish armies which were far more adept with their professional troops at marching than the token parties of war of the Hungarian magnates.

The feat accomplished by Hunyadi proves that indeed he kept hard on pursuit of his enemies not allowing them any quarters, which in the military terms of all centuries is sensible tactics. Still something remains unclear as Hunyadi claims in his letter that in around 8 days he will be around the city of Drenapoli – which is the corruption of Adrianople, now and then in Turkey and in those times still serving as the capital city of the Ottoman sultans⁹. In between the vicinities of Sofia from where he was writing around the beginning of December and the city of Adrianopole the distance is of around 300 km (more exactly 290). At the speed we have seen as consistent with the performance of the Hungarian armies of the time, of roughly 7-10 km per day, the distance would have been covered in actually 38 days of marching. And this would have been of course if the Ottomans would have desisted from any resistance which would have been hard to imagine given that they were defending the capital city of their empire. So, could this be a classical piece of medieval boasting? To reach actually Drenapoli as Hunyadi was calling what the Turks today call Edirne, in the number of days boasted by the letter of Dec. 4nd 1443, it would have taken the armies of Hunyadi an average of more than 30 km per days which looks like hard to achieve. Or could it have been achieved in the right circumstances? We will attempt further on to prove that it may have been possible under the right circumstances for Hunyadi. That those circumstances failed to materialize is another matter but it helps shed a new light upon the case of this campaign and the reasons behind its still only very partly known developments.

The journey however continues and gets more dramatic as the armies of the crusade mounted by King of Hungary and his faithful and loyal subject Hunyadi approaches the wall of the Balkans at the passes of Sredna Planina where it was expected already that the Ottomans will make for their main stand against the advancing Christian armies so as to stop them from flowing into the Maritsa plain and thus directly menace the capital of Adrianopole. The armies will therefore meet each other East of Zlatita (Bulgaria today, going E of the capital city of Sofia as one ascends the valley of the river Isker, a tributary of the Danube from the right bank). The letter as such

Ottoman armies, were marching probably at a speed of roughly 15-17 km per day. This is proven by the campaign in Varna in 1444.

⁹ Constantinople still had some 10 years of Byzantine rule ahead of its fatal siege of the spring of 1453.

continues, “... *After this triumph and going over the lands of the Romans¹⁰ we have multiplied our fighting endeavours against the pagan Turks expecting now to give battle against the whole of the armies of Omurath their Sultan (it is about sultan Murad IInd) and the whole of his damned hosts and armies. We therefore arrived five days before the holiday of St. Lucia (St Lucia’s holiday is on Dec. 12th so it must be around Dec. 7th 1443) at the pass of Zlatita in the middle of heavily forested mountains.*” Again, very precise dating as we may see and henceforth the armies arrived around the mid of December 1443 in front of the main Balkan position re-enforced by the Ottomans and which the latter were determined to defend at any cost. From its last station around Sofia where we had left it immediately after the holiday of St. Andrew, it had covered around 77-80 km in very rough terrain practically only mountains, in something like 10 days. So again, around 7-8 km per day which confirms that this was practically the average speed of advance of the armies of Hunyadi. It may be therefore that the distance from Nis to Sofia had been a speedy pursuit which Hunyadi made by using only his cavalry forces and leaving the supply columns an infantry behind as he probably thought that he may either defeat the remaining forces he had encountered in battle at Nis or even through a rapid movement seize a passage through the Balkans before the main body of the Sultan’s armies arrived. This may be true as he stationed nearby Sofia long enough apparently to dictate letters such as we have analysed before and it has been here that he probably realized that his vanguard party was far from sufficient to forge a passage through the Balkans and therefore he had to wait for the main body of his armies as well for his supply columns. The Battle of Zlatita is not described in the letter but it is clear that it lasted quite some while as: “*We therefore arrived five days before the holiday of St. Lucia at the pass of Zlatita in the middle of heavily forested mountains and ...*”, “*On Christmas Eve (Dec. 24th 1443) we started our return to the fatherland*”. So, the battle as other sources confirm lasted for quite a while in between December the 7th and December the 24th when the retreat or the return to Hungary began.

In spite of its ferociousness the battle however did not end on favourable note for the Hungarian armies as they were unable to break through the Ottoman defences and make their way down south into the plain of the river Maritsa. The choice of the passage has been shown itself wrong as situated in the middle of the Balkan range it was far too easy to defend and far too difficult to penetrate for an advancing army, especially when exhausted by 450 km (!) of marching and fighting accomplished in around 50 days which would give us an average of 9 km per day; thus this confirms that this was indeed the average speed of the medieval army of Hungary when at full complement. This could explain the choice of autumn 1444 when Hunyadi decided to circumvent the barrier of the Balkans and fall south of the mountains through the mild valley of Provadia in the low ranges close to the Black Sea. For the moment however the advance has been for the 12-13 days spent in attempting to break through “*the middle of heavily forested mountains*” of just 32 km from Zlatita where for surely the army established some sort of base camp for the assault of the passage, basically a frontal one, whereby the defences established have to be outfought one by one. Altogether the advance slowed to a crawl of 2.67 km per day. It is probably that losses were not too high up to this moment in time as the army did arrive in front of the mountainous range having behind it just the few days of fighting around Nis, almost one month before. Therefore, we may assume that no more than around 15% of its strength had been affected by that moment taking into account data regarding other battles fought in Western Europe at the time with similar

¹⁰ To be understood through the erstwhile lands of the Byzantine Empire, the Eastern Rome. To be noticed that Hunyadi is making use of the correct title of the Byzantine Empire which to the end called itself Roman. This is in contrast with some Western medieval sources which were calling the Byzantine emperor the emperor of the Greek, in a gesture of ill-concealed bitterness after the loss by the Western Christendom of the Latin Empire of the East in 1261.

weapons and tactics. Given the estimated initial total of 35,000 men, it may be that even after the heavy fighting at Zlatita and up to Dervent/Klissura which may have been the point of maximum advance around Christmas Eve of 1443 or in terms of our current Gregorian calendar already 7th of January 1444, the army of Hunyadi was still numbering around 25-27 thousand men. However the season was late and the forces of the Sultan overwhelming as Hunyadi confirms this in the letter with the words “... *we have multiplied our fighting endeavours against the pagan Turks expecting now to give battle against the whole of the armies of Omurath their Sultan and the whole of his damned hosts and armies.*” It is thus confirmed that our hypothesis according to which the speedy pursuit between Nis and the approaches has been an attempt to capture a passage through the Balkans before the arrival of the main body of Ottoman armies, is correct. However, the attempt failed. But it has to be noted in the meanwhile that if the armies reached as it is generally considered, up to the settlement known as Dervent (or passage in Turkish/in Bulgarian today Klisura, having exactly the same meaning) then the armies of the crusade had actually managed to force their passage through the Balkan massive of Sredna Planina and pass the watershed situated at around 1,000 metres which separates the waters flowing North to the lower Danube (such as mainly the Isker valley which Hunyadi had followed after Sofia) from the waters flowing South to the Maritsa river such as the Stryama the course of which if followed, would have led Hunyadi straight on the city of Philippopole (Plovdiv today in Bulgaria) and thus in the middle of the Maritsa valley. Head on to Adrianople! An important part of Hunyadi’s plan had been achieved and a tactical victory had been won as from Dervent, the plains of the Stryama were kind of in sight. However, also in sight were most probably for the King and Hunyadi, the fresh forces brought by the Sultan from Anatolia and which were assembling right behind the last lines of Ottoman defence for the counter-offensive. The calculation was simple: the Hungarian lines of supply and retreat stretched from Belgrade to Zlatita over a rough and unsure country for more than 450 km. The lines of supply of the Turks only stretched over mostly easier terrain and safe country for only 220 km, therefore half the distance! The tactical success may have been achieved by the Crusaders of Hunyadi, but the strategic one belonged to the Sultan and that alone called the day. A hasty retreat was ordered as the only way to prevent total disaster. Most of the historians say, basing solely on the time of the year and the altitude of the passage through what is the central massive of the Balkans, that it has been the harsh weather which favoured the Ottoman defenders and contributed decisively at the defeat of the Crusading armies. First of all it has not been in tactical terms a defeat as the armies of Hunyadi had managed to cross over the highest point of the Zlatita pass and practically went on the other side of the watershed between the basins of the Isker and the Stryama, poised to get into the lowlands opening up to Adrianopole. At no time whatsoever in his detailed letter makes Hunyadi any reference to snow or harsh weather. The only mentioning is “... *in the middle of heavily forested mountains*”. Given the vivid account which he gives of the campaign in the letter we are analysing at length and the multitude of details some of them selected to enhance his image as a brave warrior or sometimes to justify retreat, we would hardly imagine that he would have neglected snow or heavy weather conditions as this would have added to the drama and played into the justification of the retreat. It is of course possible that snow had been present given the altitude but probably only on the Northern slopes and not in high quantity.

Moreover, as the Soviet marshal Jukov used to say “... weather plays equal for the parties at war” [4]. And we have no reason to think that for the Southerner Ottomans it was playing better than for the soldiers of the Hungarian army which, supposedly, should have been far more accustomed with the harshness of the white stuff given the conditions at home. Therefore, it was clearly not weather. No, it was something different and far more important for the campaign and which can be discerned from the letter once again; i.e.: it was MI or military intelligence! The

Ottomans had excellent military intelligence during this campaign as well as during the one in Varna and at Kossovopolje in 1448 (apparently less in 1456 at Belgrade). Both in terms of what is called today signal intelligence or SIGINT to use the military jargon as well as in terms of HUMINT or human intelligence. In terms of SIGINT they had everything they wanted to know about the advancing line and state of readiness of the troops from the retreating parties of light cavalry of the likes of Turkhan pasha and his fellow border pashas which maintained a very close contact with their enemy and thus were able to pass to the Sultan all of the info he needed in order to ascertain the moves of his enemy and thus prepare his defences at the right place and in the right time. He knew thus from the border pasha like Turkhan, whose role by the way has been crucial for the strategic success of the campaign and thus the more mysterious and puzzling his fall into disgrace when the strategic success was at hand, that the Christian army with reduced forces was about to engage into the crossing of the Balkans at Zlatita as this was the shortest route of pursuit down into the valley of Maritsa and head-on into the plain of Adrianopole. The Sultan decided therefore quickly that it was no time to wait and concentrate his forces from Europe with the ones from Anatolia around their natural concentration point which is under the walls of Adrianopole. It therefore moved and pushed the bulk of his European forces into the pass at Zlatita with the order to resist step by step. In the meantime his forces from Asia would pass over the Dardanelles (the passage of the Bosphor was not yet an option as there was still holding on the last remnant of the old Roman Empire of the East) and negotiate their way straight up on the Maritsa and the Stryama behind the forces that would step by step fight in the passes of Sredna Planina. When the battle worn forces of the Hungarian army would have managed to get through, they would find itself in front of fresh and numerous forces and its end will be thus nigh. Hunyadi, on the contrary did not apparently manage to penetrate through the screen of light cavalry of the border pashas and thus thought that the Sultan will wait for its forces from Anatolia to come and concentrate around Adrianopole or between Adrianopole and Philippopole, which would explain his optimism in the letter dated Dec. 4th 1443. He was therefore expecting that the grand battle would be thought not in the mountains, but somewhere in the plain South of the Balkans where the classical engagement for which all Western type armies of the time were vying would take place and, with luck, render victory. This was not the case. The sight on Christmas Eve was that of the fresh Ottoman forces concentrated right behind the lines of defensive at the Zlatita pass, poised to counter attack the battle-weary crusaders. There was one single way to take: backwards and fast!

The Ottoman pursuit did not make itself awaited, as Hunyadi himself recounts “*On Christmas Eve (Dec. 24th 1443) we started our return to the fatherland. In a place called Melstica, in the land of the Romans, taking the same way as we have been coming, we faced the renewed attacks of the Turks, especially of the said Basa and Turkhan. Following that encounter, in the day of the circumcision of our Lord (the day of the Judaic baptism of Jesus Christ the Saviour, therefore January 2nd of 1444), in a narrow place between forests and mountains, called Kalwanicza (it is Kunovica, today in Serbia), while we remained in the rear-guard, we had to defend ourselves and our hosts like shepherds defending their sheep from hungry wolves.*” Therefore, something like no more than 9-10 days from the day the retreat started, the vanguard of the Ottoman armies consisting of the same border’s commanders Hunyadi had defeated so humiliatingly in his advance and which probably now were plotting their revanche, attacked! Bold was the attack but fierce the defence. True to his unremitting courage, Hunyadi had placed himself in the rear-guard of the retreating armies the point he correctly spotted as the most endangered as the army slowly retreated on the same route it had followed during his advance. The localities given with the name of Kalnawicza or Kalwanicza is identified today as Kunovica in Serbia nearby the mountain of Suva Planina so close to Nis, as Hunyadi again says “*taking the same way as we have been coming*”.

This would mean that between the 24th of December 1443 when Hunyadi himself writes that retreat had started from the Zlatita pass (Derwent/Klisura) up until the 1st of January so in the span of something like 8-9 days, the army would have covered no less than 270 km, which would give an average of 30 km per day of march! Three times its usual average! Would that have been possible? Is it a mistake or what actually happened? Again, all is in the letter. Hunyadi says plainly providing us with the clue after half a millennium: “...*taking the same way as we have been coming...*” Therefore, by engaging back on their own footsteps and thus on a track they well knew the troops have marched both during the day as well as during the night. More precisely they had made use of both the “*first watch*” and the “*fourth watch*” of the night¹¹ or of the hours of dusk of the day passing and of the hours of dawn of the day coming. Therefore the marching continued well into the darkness of the January night till probably 8 p.m. and started well before the dawn of the short January day, with the troops starting their marching at around 4 a.m. therefore well before sunrise and gaining something like eight hours of marching while enjoying only a few hours of rest possibly without the fires of the camp lit so as to give the pursuing Turks as little indication as possible on their whereabouts. This means that troops were in battle formation practically round the clock and thus ready to confront the enemy at almost any time. This must have added to their battle weariness but it contributed decisively to the success of the retreat as we will see. The possibility made good by Hunyadi and here comes yet another of his contributions to the development of the art of war in the medieval times, of marching and battling by night (or by stealth we would say today as darkness remains a might ally in all times both for a defending as well as for an attacking party) did not increase its speed of marching but, it increased its daily duration and thus made it possible to cover longer distances which for this particular case was of the essence. It made it possible for the Hungarian army to distance itself from the Ottomans quite significantly. Taking into account that the first major encounter took place on the valley of the Nikava and thus in today’s Serbia, almost 270 km N-NW from Zlatita shows that the distance accumulated has been significant. The Hungarian army had reached close enough to its bases in Belgrade and Golubac. These night marching considerations spread a new light on the letter written by Hunyadi on Dec. 4th of 1443 from nearby Sofia and where he was apparently boasting to reach Adrianople in no more than eight days. It is now clear that at least after the crossing of the mountains he was planning to extend the marching time with the hours of dusk and dawn and thus be in the plains of Maritsa for the great field battle with the Sultan’s armies somewhere around the middle of December. This while pointing out to his prowess as tactician also reveals his complete lack of military intelligence. He supposed to Sultan’s armies to be still far away, maybe just concentrating in the lowlands around Adrianopole. Therefore, he probably did not expect much resistance into the mountain passes as he supposed that the retreating Ottoman forces in Europe would have been falling back towards their main base camp of Adrianopole so as to join with the forces from Anatolia and deliver there the grand battle. As such the letter does not look like boasting any longer, as if in retreat the army was able to make 30 km per day, for surely it would have been able to make 30 in advance and in far much easier terrain after it would have crossed the Balkans. So actually no boasting, just sheer lack of MI on the side of the crusaders and plenty of it (to the SIGINT provided by the screen of light cavalry of the border pashas we may

¹¹ All those of the readers having at least some modicum of military experience, such as also the undersigned, remember well the night watches and especially this last one as the most difficult. Not only that the human organism has to battle its best hours of sleep and keep awake, but it also has to battle the coldest hours of any day. For a January day or actually night, and this comes from first had experience of the “fourth watch of the night”, it is mighty cruel even in peacetimes and in modernity. So just imagine the ordeal through which the knights and foot soldiers of Hunyadi’s army had to endure!

for sure add the HUMINT streaming to the Sultan from the many spies he had in Brankovic's body of troops, including perhaps the Despot himself) on the Ottoman side.

The battle of Kunovica spelled by Hunyadi as Kalnowicza or Kalwanicza took place on January the 1st of 1444. Of this there is no doubt and it cannot be, as Hunyadi himself gives us the date into his letter and we have no way to doubt him. It is the day of the Judaic baptism of Our Lord Jesus Christ, or the feast of the Circumcision as it is called rightly by Hunyadi, and which then and now for all Christendom falls on January 1st. This means clearly no more than a maximum of 9 nine days from the day indicated by Hunyadi himself as the moment when the retreat from Zlatita commenced, that is Christmas Eve (Dec. 24th). Accordingly, around 30 km per day of marching, using dusk and dawn hours to increase the distance from the pursuing Ottomans. Moreover, before even Kunovica occurred, somewhere possibly also around the passes of Suva Planina, another tactical engagement took place. Hunyadi himself says that during this preliminary battle he confronted the "... *the renewed attacks of the Turks, especially of the said Basa and Turkhan*".

The light cavalry forces which had acted as a screen in front of the advancing Crusaders in autumn and in December of 1443 were now placed by the Sultan as a vanguard in order to keep close contact with the retreating Christian armies and thus feed vital SIGINT on their moves to the main body of armies which was following probably at a distance of no more than a day of marching. Therefore, both adversaries were moving at night in full battle formation. As Hunyadi puts it the attacks were "*renewed*" which clearly shows that starting from Zlatita, Turkhan and his fellows were engaged in what is called now aggressive patrolling constantly probing the battle readiness of the Christian armies and thus providing the main body of army with the info on the best moment of attack. Apparently this has been chosen by the Ottomans as January the 1st of 1444 in the narrow passes of Suva Planina, the last passage before the armies of Hungary would reach the plain of the Morava and thus be within no more than 200 km from their departure base, making it possible for them to receive possible re-enforcements. Accordingly the decision was made by the Ottoman commanders not because of the whims of Turkhan, who has been dismissed afterwards in an unfortunate twist of fate specific to despotic courts where intrigue looms behind every corner and curtain, but because it was literally the last chance to deliver a fatal blow to the retreating crusading army or at least, like at Rocenvaux in 778, to its rear-guard, where the true war leader of the Crusaders, Hunyadi, had been spotted already.

"*Following that encounter, in the day of the Circumcision of our Lord (January 1st of 1444), in a narrow place between forests and mountains, called Kalwanicza, while we remained in the rear-guard, we had to defend ourselves and our hosts like shepherds defending their sheep from hungry wolves.*" Therefore, the letter clarifies yet another aspect: first there has been a fight before Kunovica where the rear-guard of the army had been attacked by the advanced forces of Turkhan and his fellow border pashas. "*Following that encounter*" as Hunyadi says it himself, which means for surely immediately (i.e.: this makes a preliminary battle possible if not quite sure on Dec. 31st of 1443), the main tactical engagement at Kunovica occurred. It is probable that if Hunyadi marched with the King in front of the armies it was at this prelude of Kunovica on Dec. 31st of 1443 that he returned to the menaced rear-guard. It was then that he had been spotted by the border pashas like Turkhan, and it has been this spotting and this preliminary fight that prompted the Jan. 1st of 1444 main assault. Hunyadi as again himself says it "*remained in the rear-guard.*" His decision to remain was therefore an additional reason for the Ottomans to decide upon an all-out attack of the rear-guard of the Hungarian armies, as these formations were actually attacked with overwhelming force on January 1st 1444. As Hunyadi again puts it "... *in a narrow place between forests and mountains, called Kalwanicza, while we remained in the rear-guard, we had to defend ourselves and our hosts like shepherds defending their sheep from hungry wolves. And in this*

place, we had to face not only the attacks of the said Bassa and Turkhan which were now re-enforced by fresh troops from Anatolia but also the attacks of fresh Anatolian troops headed by Mehmet de Brusa, the brother of the Sultan of the Turks. And by fighting we defeated them!"

Leaving aside that it was not about the brother but possibly about the son in law of the Sultan, it is clear that Hunyadi following the fight on Dec. 31st 1443 had decided to remain with the rear-guard as he correctly spotted the danger incoming. His decision to remain prompted however the attack on January the 1st of 1444. It is here that Turkhan misjudged. He thought that the attack on Dec. 31st had weakened the rear-guard Hungarian formations and that they will make an easy prey.

With Hunyadi amongst them they may had even stood the chance of capturing the captain general of the crusade.

However, and as *"This fight lasted until the fourth quarter of the night (i.e.: this means until the dawn of January 2nd of 1444 but starting on Jan 1st 1444, the day of Circumcision!) and in the end we managed to defeat them after heavy fighting. As we were ourselves in danger, we give praise to Lord that we escaped safe and sound"* it makes it clear that the practise of Hunyadi of marching and keeping battle formations throughout the night paid off fully at this crucial juncture.

The rear-guard of the Hungarian army not only managed to defeat a probing attack of the border pashas but also managed to inflict defeat in a night engagement to the main body of armies consisting of fresh troops from Anatolia which have tried repeated assaults. It was clear also that the objective of the attack was Hunyadi himself also and not only the rear-guard. Therefore, this confirms that indeed the mistake of Turkhan pasha, which otherwise was instrumental for the strategic success on the Ottoman side was to overstate the result of the battle on Dec. 31st 1443 when possibly until the arrival of Hunyadi the Crusaders performed rather poorly. He has also underestimated the leadership prowess of Hunyadi himself which managed to rally the troops and deliver in a night battle a stunning tactical success which practically ended the Ottoman pursuit.

This enables Hunyadi to write from Prokuplje (today in Serbia) the letter we have analysed so far, *"... on the feast of the Epiphany of our Lord (i.e.: Jan 6th), the year 1444."* Therefore, and apparently, he was feeling safe enough to give praise and write letters to give notice home a mere 5 days after the battle fought and within a distance of no more than 40 km from the place of the last engagement! The rest of it is all known including the peace of Seghedin and the 1444 disaster in Varna where the young King Wladislaw, known for this final and tragic episode in his native's kingdom of Poland as "Warnenski", found his death, his body never to be found after a fierce field battle as he had dreamed but did not manage to get during the long campaign of 1443. And long indeed it has been for in 1443, the armies of Hungary had been on the march and fight for 103 days and covered back and forth more than 1000 km (actually 1003!). At Varna in the autumn of 1444, the duration was of 47 days and 879 km. Indeed, shorter but how disastrous and tragic! The shorter and easier route proved the most dangerous! In 1448 at Kossovopolje, the distance covered was of 680 km and the number of days of 51. Finally, in 1456, at Belgrade (a purely defensive battle fought on what was then Hungarian soil) the total number of days was of 20-25 with the km covered including the movements of the army to and forth around Belgrade of a maximum of 75.

If we add at this the small campaign of 1442 fought entirely in Transylvania and the principality of Wallachia (now both in Romania), there the total number of km covered was of 456 in 26 days but we have to include in these days also the marches in Transylvania for the concentration of the troops. The average number of km per day is of: 17.54 in 1442 but Hunyadi makes practically use of basically cavalry troops, 9.74 during the long campaign of 1443, 18.70 in 1444 when again the party was small – quit a quick march to sure death! 13.3 in 1448 when part of the infantry has been embarked into horse drawn carts after the tactic of the Hussites in Czechia, observed by Hunyadi during his early years when on the retinue of King Sigismund of Luxemburg and finally

only 3.75 km per day in 1456 when then troops had to mount a static and fierce defence of a citadel's ramparts and die on them if necessary. Table no.1 below displays these comparative characteristics in a nutshell:

Table 1. The campaigns of John Hunyadi in South East Europe (1442-1456), comparative figures

Campaign of Hunyadi by year	Loss per km	Loss per day	LdC	Total loss	TCDays	EoCRes	No of days	No of km	km per day	Total forces
1442	11,51	201,92	201,92	10208	50,55	0,49	26	456	17,54	20000
1443 the long campaign	14,96	145,63	145,63	10698	73,46	0,69	103	1003	9,74	35000
1444 Varna	13,65	255,32	240,35	14331	56,10	0,10	47,00	879,00	18,70	16000
1448 Kossovopolje	25,00	333,00	333	17000	81,00	0,00	51,00	680,00	13,33	24000
1456 Belgrade	200,00	750,00	750	15000	18,34	0,51	20,00	75,00	3,75	28000

Notes:

Ldc = loss per day of combat

TCDays – Total Combat days

EoCRes = End of Campaign residual fighting capacity

Total forces are an approximation after various secondary sources.

Calculations compiled by the author basing on documentary and bibliographical sources.

Table no.2 presents more detailed data, some of which have been discussed in the text for “The Long campaign of 1443”:

Table 2. The “Long campaign” of 1443-144 in figures

Origin of stage	Destination of stage	Origin date	Destination date	No of days	No of km	Km per day	Nature or terrain	Loss per stage (as per number of days)	Los per stage (as of no. of km)	Loss per stage (as loss per day of combat in km/day)	Days of combat	Cumulative loss	Residual combat capacity
Kubin	Nis	Sep 20 th	Nov 8 th	30	210	7,00	Plain and hills	4368,9	3141,6	1019,41	7,00	1019,41	0,97
Nis	Sofia	Nov 20 th	Nov 30 th	10	161	16,10	Hills and Mountains	1456,3	2408,56	2344,643	16,10	3364,053	0,90
Sofia	Zlatita	Dec 3 rd	Dec 12 th	10	77	7,70	Mountains	1456,3	1151,92	1121,351	7,70	4485,404	0,87
Zlatita	Derbent/Klissura	Dec 12 th	Dec 24 th	12	32	2,67	Mountains	1747,56	478,72	388,34667	2,67	4873,7507	0,86
Derbent/Melstica	Prokupje	Dec 24 th	Jan 6 th	12	277	23,08	Mountains and hills	1747,56	4143,92	3361,6258	23,08	8235,3765	0,76
Prokupje	Jagodina	Jan 6 th	Jan 20 th	14	107	7,64	Hills and plain	2038,82	1600,72	1113,0293	7,64	9348,4058	0,73
Jagodina	Belgrade	Jan 10 th	Jan 25 th	15	139	9,27	Plain	2184,45	2079,44	1349,5047	9,27	10697,91	0,69
				103	1003	9,74		14999,89	15004,88	10697,91	73,46		

Calculations of the author basing on documentary and bibliographical sources

Finally, there is one more pressing question: Why all the time in autumn? The 1442 campaign is an exception but it is a defensive one strategically and only by the late tactical development becomes an offensive one. Thereby the dates were actually “chosen” by the Ottoman enemy. The apparent preference for autumns is or rather was also motivated by the high incidence of pest or the black plague. Pest had devastated Europe and killed almost half of the European population between 1346 and 1352 thus also facilitating the advance of the Ottomans a fact which is often kind of neglected. In the era of Hunyadi, the torment and fear of the plague or pest were omnipresent and military leaders were well aware of the fact that the common squalor of the age combined with the masses of men marching and fighting plus the heat of the summer made for the perfect environment for pest to spread. War in summer and pest were going hand in hand. During the cooler part of the year however the danger was somehow abating. In the single instance when he fought a major campaign in summer, which is at Belgrade in 1456, War Pest brought in the wagons of the Ottoman armies killed Hunyadi himself. He died of the pest brought by the war in the camp of Zemun (near Belgrade, now a suburb of the SR capital) on the 11th of August 1456!

Therefore, it only remains for us “... to call the name of the Lord most humbly and thanking for his everlasting grace. May he shed his grace over you also, trusting in the meanwhile that our future endeavours will be successful and fortunate for Christendom” – end of Hunyadi’s letter of Jan. 6th 1444, and of our humble article of July 26th 2020!

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ANNEX No. 1 – TEXT (translation into EN) of the letters of John Hunyadi

Document no. 2469 – Letter from John Hunyadi to the magistrates of Brasov, dated Dec. 2nd 1443, between Sofia and Adrianople (spelled by the original author wrongly as Drenopoli); Original language = LATIN (medieval); translation into EN: C. Ghinararu, as of Apr. 5th 2020

Most wise, cautions and noble gentlemen. May the all-seeing God dispense its mercy upon the Christians who are marching victorious and imposing their might over the pagan Turks and their emperor (sultan, i.e.). This and his armies are now running towards the sea and are pursued by us. Therefore, I command you to make it so and ring the bells and make prayers in all churches and altars so that God the Almighty may provide the armies of Christ with victory against the pagan Turks. I am thereby informing you that I do believe that in six or at the maximum eight days I will be with the armies in the city of Drenapoli (Adrianople). Written while marching with our armies from the vicinities of the city of Sophia (Sofia, today capital of BG) towards Adrianople (today in TR), at four days after the feast of the Apostle Andrew (the feast of St. Andrew – Nov. 30th, so for days after is Dec. 4th, 1443), in the year of the Lord 1443.

Document no. 2472 – Letter from John Hunyadi to the magistrates and the council of the city of Brasov dated January the 6th of 1444, near the city of Prokoplje (today in SR); Language = LATIN (medieval), translated into EN by C. Ghinararu (Apr. 4th 2020)

John Hunyadi (Iancu de/of Hunedoara), woywoda of Transylvania

Most wise and cautious gentlemen, our close and most honoured friends. First of all, let me send you my warmest and most sincere greetings and salutations. Our flags are victorious and our armies have first triumphed against Ezebagh, the against Turakhan (Turkhan), third against the unfortunate Basa who is second in their hierarchy to the Sultan and the in the mountains around the city of Nis (Nis in SR today) against the said Basa, Turkhan and Ezebegh and other leaders and commanders of the Turkish armies, and these happened in the Sunday after the day of all Saints (Day of all Saints = 1st of November, so possibly the 7th of November) and with the help of the God almighty we have given to the name of Christian and eternal glory as we have been clearly and without doubt victorious. After this triumph and going over the lands of Romania (not today Romania but the name of the Byzantine Empire former lands, today practically NW Bulgaria) we have multiplied our fighting endeavours against the pagan Turks expecting now to give battle against the whole of the armies of Omurath their Sultan (it is about sultan Murad 2nd) and the whole of his damned hosts and armies. We therefore arrived five days before the holiday of St. Lucia (St. Lucia's holiday is on Dec. 12th so it must be around Dec. 7th 1443) at the pass of Zlatita (BG today) in the middle of heavily forested mountains. On Christmas Eve (Dec. 24th 1443) we started our return to the fatherland (i.e.: to Hungary). In a place called Melstica, in the land of the Romans (Romania, i.e.; the Byzantine Empire's former possessions, today in BG), taking the same way as we have been coming, we faced the renewed attacks of the Turks, especially of the said Basa and Turkhan. Following that encounter, in the day of the circumcision of our Lord (the day of the Judaic baptism of Jesus Christ the Saviour, therefore January 1st of 1444), in a narrow place between forests and mountains, called Kalwanicza (today Kunovica in SR), while we remained in the rear-guard, we had to defend ourselves and our hosts like shepherds defending their sheep from hungry wolves. And in this place, we had to face not only the attacks of the said Bassa and

Turkhan which were now re-enforced by fresh troops from Anatolia but also the attacks of fresh Anatolian troops headed by Mehmet de Brusa, the brother of the Sultan of the Turks. And by fighting we defeated them (*lots of adjectives to suggest the violence of the fight, not however in need of translation*). This fight lasted until the fourth quarter of the night (this means until at dawn of the following day, Jan 2nd 1444) and in the end we managed to defeat them after heavy fighting.

As we were ourselves in danger, we give praise to Lord that we escaped safe and sound – May the Lord's name be hallowed for ever after! For which fact we are asking you also to give grace to God in our name. We are thus calling the name of the Lord most humbly and thanking for his everlasting grace. May he shed his grace over you also, trusting in the meanwhile that our future endeavours will be successful and fortunate to Christendom.

Written in the city of Procopia (Prokuplje today in SR), on the feast of the Epiphany of our Lord (would be Jan. 6th 1444, thus a mere 3 days after the battle described), the year 1444.

On the back it is written: To the immensely sagacious and industrious judges, senators and members of the Council of the city of Brasov (RO today) and of the whole of the land of Barsa (the central part of the current county of Brasov, in Romania), our forever honoured friends.

Hristo Todorov Stoyanov – The Fate of a Bulgarian Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire

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Abstract

The present article is based on archival sources. It traces the life and activity of Hristo Todorov Stoyanov – one of the worthy representatives of the modern Bulgarian intellectual elite in the Ottoman Empire who were little known to their contemporaries. The paper outlines the general trends in the development of the intelligentsia of the then Bulgarian society and points out the factors that have played a crucial role in shaping its goals and aspirations. With a thorough education for that time period and driven by the strong desire to promote the cultural and educational development, church independence and political liberation of the Bulgarian nation, Hristo Stoyanov took active part in sorting out the most topical issues of his time and left his mark on the pre-liberation history of Bulgaria.

Keywords: Hristo Stoyanov, intellectual elite of the Revival Period, education, Russia, Ottoman Empire, struggle for church independence, publicist activity

The Crimean War (1853-1856) was followed by an aggravation of the crisis in the Ottoman Empire, whereas the Eastern Question entered a new phase. The Western countries, mostly France and the United Kingdom, took advantage of the new state of affairs to strengthen their industrial, political and cultural influence in the Balkan Peninsula. In fulfilling their plans, they set the beginning of a continuous cultural intervention among the Balkan nations by using the intellectual potential of European culture and civilisation. Russia's failure prevented it from interfering in the fate of the nations in the Ottoman Empire directly, and, compelled to comply with the balance of power in Europe, it sought opportunities to retain the positions it had gained so far. The cultural and political infiltration in the Balkans became Russia's primary goal.

In 1856, the Russian government developed a unified system for selecting and training South Slavs in the country in order to facilitate their access to the educational institutions. The aim was to curb their interest in the West on the one hand, and to bring up the future Bulgarian intellectual elite in Russian spirit and devotion to Orthodox Christianity. The implementation of this large-scale cultural and political programme brought into play the activity of the Russian diplomacy, the Bulgarian migrant charity organisations, as well as the Bulgarian municipalities in Russia. The Slavic committees in Saint Petersburg, Moscow and Odessa also dedicated a considerable deal of its activity thereto.

Due to the new and relatively more favourable situation for the enslaved nations in the Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarian national movement marked significant progress in every field of social life after the proclamation of the Ottoman Reform Edict in 1856. The spiritual awakening of the Bulgarian society, which was determined to achieve total emancipation in the Modern World and to set itself apart as a cultural and national community, found expression in the rapidly developing

movement for new education and culture and the persistent struggles for church independence during the 1860s and 1870s. The latter became a subject of international politics and a constituent of the Eastern Question [1].

In this complex combination of political interests, international agreements and national aspirations, the emerging modern Bulgarian intellectual elite became the mainspring of the renewal processes in Bulgarian society. It took active part in shaping the national self-awareness of the Bulgarians and in consolidating the Bulgarian nation [2]. One of the prominent representatives of this elite was Hristo Todorov Stoyanov who was little known to his contemporaries. He made a significant contribution to Bulgaria's education, struggle for church independence and political life on the eve of the Liberation in 1878 and immediately after it. He had been elected as a parliamentarian at the Bulgarian Constituent Assembly, the First Grand National Assembly, as well as the First and Second Ordinary National Assembly. He was also one of the authors of the first constitution project, Minister of Justice in the governments of Dragan Tsankov (1880) and General Sobolev (1883), Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Metropolitan Bishop Clement (1886), a member of the Sofia municipal government, a university lecturer and long-term chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation. His whole life revolved around the following motto: 'Bulgarian, serve your fatherland selflessly, most loyally and to the best of your ability'.

The information in historical records about the period of Stoyanov's life being referred to is scarce and fragmented, and in some of them too contradictory. A valuable source are his letters and personal documents which are preserved in his archive. Facts about his life can be found in a series of articles, published in the 1930s in the periodical press, and in monographs on Sofia's history.

Hristo Todorov (Todorinov) Stoyanov was born on 6 January 1845 in Sofia [3] in the family of Todorin Stoyanov and Ekaterina (Katina) Buhuranova. In most sources it is stated that he descended from a Sofia family with a long history, and that 'he was fond of faith and the native church since he was a child' [4]. He received his lower secondary education at the Sofia Class School [5] which was built in close vicinity to the St. Kral Church. The funds for its construction were raised by Sofia merchants and craftsmen and through a generous donation by Ivan Nikolaevich Denkoglu (1781-1861). The latter was a renowned patriot and a patron of education in Bulgaria who was born in the Sofia village of Balsha.

Stoyanov's teacher was Sava Filaretov (1825-1863) who had graduated from the Imperial Moscow University as a scholarship student of Denkoglu. The latter brought him to Sofia personally. Filaretov was one of the pioneers of modern Bulgarian education. As a result of the innovations he introduced at the Sofia school, students received a thorough education for that time period. He was one of the teachers who were true spiritual mentors of their students [6]. He played a decisive role in shaping the character, ideas and views of Hristo Stoyanov who followed his guidance throughout his entire life, i.e., to serve his people and homeland.

In the summer of 1860, Stoyanov graduated from school and was making preparations to leave for Odessa. He was persistent, hard-working and ambitious, and even though he was only 15 years old, he had clearly defined his goals. His aspiration to educate himself was unquestionable. Due to the fact that there were no high schools, vocational schools and universities in Bulgaria at that time, the only alternative to the sharp-witted and clever children was for them to continue their education in Russian, Greek or Western European educational institutions [7]. Under the strong influence of Sava Filaretov, Stoyanov's choice to carry on with his education in Russia was quite logical.

In the late 1850s and early 1860s, a well-functioning ‘network’ was established between the representatives of the Bulgarian National Revival elite. The aim was to prevent the Turkish administration from thwarting the departure of young Bulgarians to Russia to study. The network relied on the local intelligentsia, the Russian political and diplomatic representatives in some Bulgarian provinces, and the wealthy Bulgarian merchants and public figures in Constantinople and Odessa. All of them provided aid to those young people and, in most cases, they continued to do so during their education at Russian schools.

Hristo Stoyanov’s departure for Russia was enabled through the assistance of Nayden Gerov (a Russian vice-consul in Plovdiv) and Nikola Tapchileshtov (a Bulgarian tradesman in Constantinople). His maintenance was borne by Denkoglu [8]. Stoyanov studied at the Second Odessa High School and was planning to leave for Moscow after graduating from it, where he would continue his education at the Imperial University as a scholarship student of Denkoglu [9].

Being far away from his homeland, Stoyanov was following the events there with a keen interest. He was keeping himself up to date about the situation of the Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire and the events in Sofia through letters sent by close friends of his, and through the newspapers. He set forth his opinion and impressions with regard to the ongoing events in an extensive article entitled ‘Жалостни известия изъ новоруската страна за преселниците’ (*Sad News for the People displaced in Russia*). It was published on 21 November 1861 in the *Dunavski Lebed* (*Danube Swan*) newspaper by Georgi Rakovski [10].

In May 1862, Hristo Stoyanov returned to Sofia on account of serious health problems requiring treatment. Many young Bulgarians who were studying in the Russian Empire often got seriously ill and sometimes even perished as a result of the harsh climate and the poverty in which they lived.

After several months of teaching at the St. Cyril and St. Methodius School in Sofia (from November 1863 to February 1864), Stoyanov left for Moscow to continue his education. [11] He was admitted at the Faculty of Law to the Moscow Imperial University [12] which was the oldest and most prestigious Russian university. Among its alumni were some of the most distinguished Bulgarian public figures of the Revival Period, including Marin Drinov, Nayden Gerov, Sava Filaretov, Rayko Zhinzifov, Nesho Bonchev, etc.

During his 4-year course of study, Hristo Stoyanov received excellent humanitarian and professional training. Apart from all branches of jurisprudence, his education included theology, church history and church legislation. This prepared him to participate in resolving the Bulgarian Church Question and to become a successful lawmaker and jurist in free Bulgaria. After passing his exams and defending a thesis with flying colours, he received a certificate for higher education in the field of Law [13].

Most Bulgarians who studied abroad retained their national self-awareness and returned to their homeland although the socio-political reality there lagged behind modern civilisation with centuries and provided limited opportunities to develop their potential. The teaching profession was the only alternative for most of the educated young people. The emerging intellectual elite of the Revival Period bore the brunt of the arbitrary acts of power and the infringement of its self-confidence and dignity both by friends and foes. For the most part it was oppositionally inclined. It was in a constant state of confrontation with power. It embraced and strongly propagated the national cause, driven by a strong desire to contribute to the cultural and educational development, church independence and political liberation of the Bulgarian people [see 7, pp. 8-29].

Hristo Stoyanov was no exception. He shared the common fate of the representatives of the aforementioned intelligentsia. The things that set him apart from his peers were his strong character, firmly asserted views, unbreakable spirit and aspiration to help his people and fatherland.

Stoyanov left Moscow right after his graduation and in October 1868 he set out for Constantinople instead of Sofia [14]. There he attracted the attention of the Ottoman authorities although his Russian citizenship gave him protection to a certain extent. At that time Bulgarians who had studied in Russia were regarded as ‘agents and rebels’ who came with revolutionary ideas to incite their compatriots to disobedience and to set up revolutionary committees against the Empire. In addition, they were subjected to prosecution either by the Turkish authorities or by the Greek hierarchs who did everything within their power to prevent them from occupying positions of teachers. In most cases these Bulgarians were compelled to give up their social activities due to the risk of being sent into exile or banished from the Empire. This applied not only to those who had studied in Russia, but also to all Bulgarians who had accepted Russian citizenship [15].

In the capital of the Ottoman Empire, the young jurist took up employment as a ‘secretary of Bulgarian ecclesiastical affairs’ during the most dynamic and decisive phase of the Bulgarian people’s struggle for church independence. This took place at a time when the Bulgarian bishops, who had officially renounced the Ecumenical Patriarchate, were acting as an independent governing body of the Bulgarian Church. With his knowledge and skills, Stoyanov quickly earned the respect of the members of the Temporary Synod of Bishops [16]. He skilfully combined his service to the Synod with intensive publicistic activity in defence of the independent Bulgarian Church cause in the newly released *Pravo (Law)* newspaper in Constantinople. This was a weekly socio-political newspaper on moderate educational topics. The first issue thereof was released on 4 March 1869. Hristo Stoyanov was editor of the newspaper during its first year of existence [17].

This was a disputable fact for some researchers of the Bulgarian periodical press of the Revival Period who claimed that Ivan Naydenov was the editor in question [18].

The situation in Constantinople at that time was unfavourable for the Bulgarian periodicals.

This had to do with the Bulgarian-Greek Church Dispute on the one hand, and the strict censorship of the press imposed by the government and the Greek Patriarchate. Penal measures were taken against editors, publishers and printers depending on the current situation. Sometimes even detentions and imprisonment took place. There was a potential threat of a periodical being put to a halt if its editor had graduated in Russia or was a resident of the same country [19]. These circumstances compelled Stoyanov, who was very familiar with the Ottoman legislature as a jurist, not to make his activity publically known in the newspaper for security reasons and as a measure to protect the edition.

‘Eventually I was given to understand that I am obliged to resign at the request of the Ottoman government ...,’ Hristo Stoyanov wrote in his autobiography. He left Constantinople on 16 June 1869. A month later he filled the vacated position of Headmaster of the St. Cyril and St. Methodius High School in Plovdiv in response to Dr. Stoyan Chomakov’s invitation [see 5]. At the same time, the school was facing the threat of ‘being subjected to surveillance by the Ottoman administration as stipulated in the bill drafted in 1867 by Midhat Pasha in the Danube Vilayet ...’ [20]. The French ambassador in Constantinople proposed the *Bulgarian* school in Plovdiv to be converted to a section of the ‘Sultanie’ Lyceum. To prevent this, the school was declared a ‘Seminary’ on the initiative of Hristo Stoyanov and the members of the Plovdiv Municipality [see 5].

In the summer of 1870, Stoyanov left the Plovdiv school. Driven by the desire to praise his hometown, he accepted the proposal made by the members of the Sofia Municipality. As of 1 August 1870, he became a head teacher at the Sofia Class School and he took over the management of the schools within the Sofia Municipality for a period of three years [21].

Along with teaching, Hristo Stoyanov developed many-sided activities in favour of his people.

In the autumn of 1870, he was elected chairman of the Private Revolutionary Committee in Sofia founded by Vasil Levski. There are no documents referring to its activity, and the events are mainly represented by memories of its members. The Committee ceased to exist after the hanging of Vasil Levski, and a considerable number of those suspected in revolutionary activity against the Sultan were detained and sentenced to hard labour and exile in Diyarbakır. Some sources point out that Hristo Stoyanov was spared thanks to his Russian citizenship [22].

After setting up an autonomous Bulgarian Church under the name Exarchate, the Sublime Porte allowed the National Church Assembly to be convened in Constantinople by virtue of a Sultan's Firman of 27 February 1870 in order to revise and adopt a drafted statute and elect an exarch.

Hadji Mano Stoyanov and Hristo Todorov Stoyanov [23] were elected as representatives of the Sofia diocese. The Assembly was officially opened on 23 February 1871 under the chairmanship of Bishop Ilarion Lovchanski. Its work encompassed 37 sessions which continued until 24 July.

In every debate Hristo Stoyanov took active part and he impressed the other participants with his professional competence. By supporting the positions of the liberally inclined participants at the Assembly and by frequently fulfilling the role of their spokesperson, he defended the principles of a progressive and democratic structure of the Bulgarian Church. Having concluded his work at the Assembly, Stoyanov returned to Sofia.

In 1872, Meletius of Sofia was elected Metropolitan Bishop of the Sofia diocese. However, he did not manage to get along with the eminent local public figures and he set many of them against each other, including the ones who supported his candidacy such as Hristo Stoyanov. Mahzar Pasha, the kaymakam of Sofia, played a crucial role in stirring up the conflicts. At his instigation, Meletius dismissed the head teacher Stoyanov in the autumn of 1873 which forced the latter to resettle to Constantinople [24].

In December 1874, the pasha of Sofia said the following in response to the conflict between Stoyanov and Meletius: 'Stoyanov had better sit tight or I'll have him sent to Diyarbakır,' adding that he had a written order which stated that no teachers educated in Russia would henceforth be employed [25].

During his stay in Constantinople, Stoyanov devoted himself to church affairs again and became co-editor of the *Vek (Century)* newspaper together with Marko Balabanov. In its first issue of 4 January 1875, Stoyanov wrote: '... We are happy to inform our honourable readers that Hristo T. Stoyanov joined our editorial board. A man of firm and reliable knowledge ... who stands out from the crowd with his expertise on all matters pertaining to the life of our people in the Ottoman Empire ...' [26].

The outbreak of the April Uprising in 1876 and the changes it brought about in the political and international state of affairs compelled Hristo Stoyanov to leave Constantinople and go to Russia.

He got in touch with the Moscow Slavic Committee at the behest of which he made his way to the Romanian capital Bucharest. There he developed activities related to forming cheats (armed bands) of Bulgarian volunteers whose sustenance was borne by the Slavic Committee. At the same time, Stoyanov wrote a number of articles in defence of the Bulgarian cause which he published in various newspapers published in Romania during that period. His article *La territoire bulgare* is particularly impressive. It was published in French in issue 37 of the *Stara Planina* newspaper of 22 December 1876, and it drew the attention of foreign diplomats. Later on, the same article was published in Bulgarian as well. In 1877, Hristo Stoyanov published papers of his own in the *Odeski Vestnik (Odessa Newspaper)* under the pen name Zadunaets. They were entitled *Pisma za Balgaria (Letters for Bulgaria)*, *Rumania (Romania)*, *Borbata na yuzhnite slavyani za osvobozhdenie ot tursko igo (The South Slavs' struggle for Liberation from Ottoman Rule)* etc. [27].

On the eve of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Prince Vladimir Cherkaski won Hristo Stoyanov over to his side as a collaborator at the ‘Office of Civil Administration of the Liberated Bulgarians beyond the Lands of the Danube’, which he headed, to the ‘Active Army’. The latter was formed for conducting military operations in the Balkans. Its aim was to lay the foundations of the state institutions of the future Bulgarian state. Hristo Stoyanov, Prof. Marin Drinov, Nayden Gerov, Todor Burmov, Todor Ikonov and other prominent Bulgarians had the task to gather, classify and analyse a large number of ethnographic, statistical, legal and historical documents on the social, economic and political condition of the Bulgarian lands for a short period of time. The *Materiali za izuchavane na Balgaria (Sources for studying Bulgaria)*, collected and published in two volumes, provide sufficient information about the needs of the future administration [28].

‘For his excellent and diligent service as department head of the Office of Civil Administration of Bulgaria and his special merit as an artillery lieutenant during the Russo-Turkish War’, Hristo Stoyanov was awarded an Order of Saint Anna, 3rd Class, by decree of the Russian Emperor of 19 November 1878 [29].

The international state of affairs after the Crimean War, the competition between the Western countries and the Russian Empire for influence in the Ottoman domains, and the sufferings of the enslaved nations (the Bulgarian in particular), were some of the factors that have played a decisive role in shaping the goals and aspirations of an entire generation of Revival intellectuals. The same factors also determined the similarities in their fates. These intellectuals were actively committed to resolving the most topical issues of their time and their actions were subordinated to the national cause. Each of them left his mark on the pre-liberation history of Bulgaria.

In conclusion, Hristo Stoyanov occupied a worthy place among the members of the Bulgarian intellectual elite in the Ottoman Empire. He was motivated by the strong desire to contribute to the cultural and educational development, church independence and political liberation of the Bulgarian people with his diverse activities.

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Contraction of Two and More Consecutive Marriages in the Church Law in Bulgaria and Catholic Europe (the 12th-14th centuries)

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Abstract

By applying the comparative research method, the present paper aims to investigate normative and academic texts on church marriage law written and/or used during the 12th-14th centuries in the Bulgarian and the Catholic churches. The research aims at investigating the common tendencies and the differences in church law in the East and in the West as far as the contraction of two or more consecutive marriages is concerned.

The comparative analysis leads to the conclusion that the attitude towards the second marriage in the Orthodox as well in the Catholic tradition in the 12th-14th centuries was one and the same: although not of equal worth compared to the first one as far as purity and sacredness were concerned, it was declared lawful. As for the contraction of consecutive marriages after the second one, while in the Orthodox tradition third marriage was qualified as legalized fornication and the fourth one was definitely forbidden, in Catholic Europe no such restrictions existed and though the contraction of several consecutive marriages was not encouraged, it was not forbidden either.

Keywords: Syntagma Canonum (Alphabetic Syntagma); Kormchaya Kniga (the Printed Kormchaia); Decretum Gratiani; Decretals of Gregory IX; medieval Canon Law; Christian marriage; consecutive polygamy

The great number of studies on Christian marriage in the Middle Ages is due to the great variety of topics related to the theme as well as to the continued interest to it demonstrated by specialists in various scholarly fields. At the same time, a predominant tendency could be clearly traced out: most of the research works are orientated either towards the Catholic or the Orthodox church law tradition. But the historical sources from the epoch give the opportunity to study in comparison the most varied problems concerning the matrimonial institution in medieval Christian Europe.

Such exactly is the approach applied in the present paper, which aims at a comparative analysis of normative and academic texts on church marriage law written and/or used during the 12th-14th centuries in the Bulgarian and the Catholic churches. The research aims at investigating the common tendencies and the differences in church law in the East and in the West as far as the contraction of two or more consecutive marriages is concerned.

The paper is based on the analysis of information from several historical sources: the Syntagma Canonum (Alphabetic Syntagma) – a canonical collection made in 1335 by the Greek monk Matthew Blastares; the Kormchaya Kniga of 1787 (or the Printed Kormchaia, or the Catherinian issue of the Kormchaya); the Decretum Gratiani – a collection of canon law compiled and written in the 12th century as a legal textbook by the jurist known as Gratian; the Decretals of Gregory IX also known as the Liber extra – an important collection of medieval Canon Law compiled by the Pope’s chaplain and confessor, the Dominican St. Raymond of Penyafort.

Second Marriage

In his *Alphabetic Syntagma*, Matthew Blastares discusses in details the contraction of second marriages basing his arguments on decisions of church councils and views of church authorities on religious issues. Blastares takes his stand on the first rule of the Council in Laodicea (ca. 343) according to which those lawfully joined in a second marriage should be accepted in communion with condescension but after a certain time spent in prayers and fasting. But in case they have secretly had sexual intercourse before the contracting of the marriage they have to do penance as those who have fornicated [1].

On the question of penance that has to be done by those who have remarried Blastares also cites the fourth rule of Basil of Caesarea (Saint Basil the Great), who notices that some for a year and others for two years suspend from communion those who have remarried [1]. According to rule 7 of the Council in Neocaesarea, cited in the *Syntagma*, a priest must not be present at the wedding feast of a twice married person because he must not sit at one and the same table with a man on whom he has to impose penance and excommunication from Holy Communion for a year [2].

Therefore, according to the *Syntagma*, second marriage is allowed to widowed persons, that is to say, second marriage could be contracted only if the first one has been terminated because of the death of one of the marriage partners. There are additional requirements for widows according to the civil laws, included in Blastares' compilation: a widow has to mourn for her deceased husband for a year in order to avoid the "mixing of semen". A widow that has contracted a second marriage before a year from her first husband's death has elapsed is not allowed to transfer or leave by will more than one third of her property to her second husband, of course only if she has no children by her first husband; she herself cannot receive any property neither by inheritance nor by will and all her possessions have to go to the heirs of the legator. Besides by such an act she dishonours herself [3].

Second marriage is also allowed in case the first one has been terminated because of the long absence of a marriage partner. It is written in the *Kormchaya Kniga* that if a person has disappeared without a trace or a husband has not come back home from war, the man or the woman that has lost their marriage partner has to wait for his or her return for five years. And after these five years, no matter whether it is clear or not that the disappeared person is dead or alive, "they can marry again without getting into trouble" [4]. In addition, it is specified that in case merchants, soldiers or people serving in the army disappear their wives have to wait for them until it is found out with certainty that they are dead. But even then, such wives have to postpone the contraction of a second marriage for another year. Every woman that has transgressed against the law has to be considered an adulteress [5].

Dwelling on the same problem, Mathew Blastares cites some of the rules of St. Basil of Caesarea. In rule 31, St. Basil the Great states that if the wife of a missing man dares to contract a second marriage without waiting for him and without investigating whether he is really dead, she is liable to punishment for committing adultery. Blastares also bases his statements on rule 93 of the Sixth Oecumenical Council (680-681), which reads that in case a missing soldier suddenly returns home and wants back his wife who has meanwhile contracted a second marriage, he has the right to have her back and both she and her second husband should be treated with condescension because no one should be punished for ignorance. If a woman refuses to return back to her first husband, a soldier, and to live with him, she should be forbidden to continue to cohabit with her second husband. And if she categorically refuses to leave her second husband she has to be punished as an adulteress and the second marriage should be terminated immediately [6].

The attitude of the western canonists towards the contraction of two or more consecutive marriages is clearly demonstrated in several texts included in the *Decretum Gratiani*. These are passages from the works of some of the greatest church authorities and from rules of the Council in Neocaesarea. As Gratian points out, the participants at the council have decreed that priests must not be present at celebrations of second marriages [7]. He also cites St. John Chrysostom who considers the second marriage a fornication, which, if acted publicly, legally and with God's permission, turns into a decent lechery [8].

Gratian goes on with the position of Saint Jerome who categorically states that a man who has married twice cannot enter the clergy, and reminds the audience that according to the church rules a widow who has had two husbands, though in great need, does not deserve church charity [9]. In conclusion, Saint Jerome notes that second marriages are allowed only to avoid the danger of lapsing into lechery. Second marriages are allowed to widows too because it is better to know one husband and then another one, and a third one after him than to know several men at one and the same time [9].

Considerably more kindly disposed to human fallibility is another Christian authority cited by Gratian – St. Augustine of Hippo who thinks that, in order mankind to multiply, God has joined a man and a woman in conjugal purity and has ruled that second marriages, which are allowed in the New Testament, are legitimate [10].

In the *Decretals* of Pope Gregory IX, none too favourable attitude towards second marriage is demonstrated. The popes Alexander III and Urban III are cited in the compilation. The first of the two has ruled clergymen not to give their blessings to those who contract second marriages. Those priests who dare to break the order have to be punished [11]. Urban III specifies the reason for this prohibition: those who enter into matrimony for the second time have already been blessed and the blessing cannot be repeated [12].

The opinions cited above lead to the conclusion that the western clergymen and canonists, though quite unwillingly assumed that second marriages are lawful. They made efforts to define the cases in which second marriage is allowed and respectively those in which it has to be explicitly forbidden.

In his *Decretum*, Gratian discusses various cases and explains when and why men and women have to be allowed to enter a second marriage. Firstly, those are widowed persons even if, according to Gratian, they are adulterers but only after the death of the first husband of the woman and after a period of penance, and if the second husband has not done anything to cause the death of the first one and has not made a promise to the woman while her husband was still alive [13].

According to a rule of the Synod of Elvira (305-306) cited in the *Decretum*, a widow that has committed adultery could take for husband the man with whom she has sinned but only after a period of penance for five years after which she can be allowed to receive Holy Communion again [14].

A text included in the *Decretals* of Pope Gregory IX specifies that if the husband has died the wife is absolutely free to marry whomever she likes. So, she should not be disgraced even if she has contracted a second marriage while mourning for her first husband, i.e., before a year has elapsed. In this case, the woman avails herself of the power given to her by the apostle though civil laws are not in accordance with church laws [15]. According to another text cited in the *Decretals*, an adulterer also has the right to contract a second marriage after his wife's death if neither he nor the woman he has had sexual intercourse with while his wife was still alive has anything to do with the wife's death [16]. But a man that has married an adulteress while his first lawful wife was still alive has to be separated from his second wife even though his first wife is already dead and he has lived with the other woman for a long time and they have children [17].

Persons whose marriage has been terminated because their marriage partners were not capable to fulfil their conjugal duty are also allowed to contract a second marriage. According to Pope Gregory cited by Gratian, a woman can lawfully marry another man if her first husband's impotence prevents him from knowing her [18]. And according to a text in the Decretals if a woman is not capable of sexual intercourse, and this defect has natural origin and cannot be cured by a doctor, the man is free to take a second wife [19]. But an impotent man has to remain without a wife [20]. Another text in the Decretals states that a husband who has found out that his wife has conspired against his life has the right to banish her from their home and to take a second wife [21].

In the 12th-14th centuries, the Western Church gradually accepted the idea that adultery could not be treated as grounds for divorce. In view of this, the innocent marriage partner no longer got the right to divorce the adulterer and contract a second marriage. Gratian maintains this position and cites church authorities who share it. St. Jerome thinks that a man has to banish his wife for committing fornication but is not allowed to take another [22]. He also reminds the audience that Lord has ordered wives not to be banished by their husbands except for adultery but being banished, the woman has to remain single. What Lord has ordered for men is in force for women as well [23]. Apostle Paul also has decreed that when a husband leaves his wife or a wife leaves her husband because of adultery they should not marry again [24]. And a rule of the Synod of Elvira cited by Gratian reads that a woman that has left her husband because he has committed adultery is not allowed to take a second husband until her first marriage partner closes his days [25].

According to a resolution of the Council of Verberie a wife that has conspired against her husband's life does not have the right to contract a second marriage [26]. And it is decreed in the Decretals of Pope Gregory I that an adulterer and adulteress cannot marry if the latter has anything to do with her first husband's death [27]. But the prohibition of second marriage for a man that has killed his adulterous wife is not so unconditional. According to Gratian those who have committed such a crime give up forever any hope to marry again except if by grace they are allowed to contract a new marriage lest they lapse into youthful immoderacy [28].

Adultery marked with incest also deprives the perpetrators of any hope to contract a marriage to the end of their lives. This according to Gratian should be the destiny of a man that has had sexual intercourse with two sisters one of which being his wife. He cannot have relations with neither of them and is not allowed to enter new marriage [29]. And in Pope Zachary's opinion, the adulteress also should not have any hope for contracting marriage but both have to repent till the end of their lives under the instructions of a priest [30]. The same applies to a woman that has spent the night with her husband's brother as well as to the man with whom she has committed adultery [31].

According to a rule of a council held in Trebur, cited in the Decretum, if it happens so that someone has raped his son's fiancée and the son takes her after that, neither the father is allowed to take a wife, nor the raped woman a husband [32]. It was decided at the same council that a man that has committed adultery with his mother-in-law, with his stepdaughter or with his brother's wife, should not marry but the husbands of those women are not forbidden to contract lawful marriages [33]. And a rule of a council held in Mainz in 813, included in Gratian's Decretum, reads that if someone takes a widow in marriage and after that fornicates with his stepdaughter, or if someone fornicates with two sisters, or if a woman fornicates with two brothers or with father and son, or if a man fornicates with his brother's widow, with his niece, with his mother-in-law, with his daughter-in-law, with a cousin, with a daughter of his uncle or of his mother's brother, all these adulterers have to be separated and are forbidden to contract marriages [34].

In Pope Gregory's Decretals, the same problem is discussed and solved according to a rule of a council held in Mainz, which reads that if someone intentionally fornicates with his stepdaughter, he does not have the right to insist on her mother's paying her conjugal debt, and neither he could have the stepdaughter as a wife nor they both could marry anybody else until the end of their lives [35].

A marriage partner, who has deliberately taken his own son from the baptismal font with the aim to terminate his undesired marriage by creating in this way spiritual relationship between himself and his spouse, should also be forbidden to contract a new marriage until the end of his life. This rule of the council of Metz is to be found in the Decretum of Gratian [36].

According to Gratian who cites St. Augustine a husband who has sent away his childless wife and has taken another one for the sake of getting progeny should also be deprived of the right to get married for the second time [37].

Consecutive Polygamy

The attitude of the Orthodox Church towards consecutive polygamy is extremely negative according to the Alphabetic Syntagma. Matthew Blastares cites the 4th rule of St. Basil the Great (St. Basil of Caesarea) who has ordered those who have contracted third marriages to be excommunicated for five years but their unions not to be dissolved. According to St. Basil such union is not a marriage but rather a punishable fornication. Still the saint emphasizes that the way of such persons to the Church should not be entirely barred but a punishment should be imposed on them equal to that for those who are unworthy of the sacraments [38].

Even more extreme in his opinion of serial monogamy is Gregory of Nazianzus. He qualifies the first marriage as lawful, the second one as unnecessary condescension, the third as lawlessness, and the fourth one as a pig's life [39].

In conclusion, Blastares cites the third rule of the Council in Neocaesarea and some secular laws. The participants at the council have based their decision on the 80th rule of St. Basil who has written that the church fathers have covered the practice of consecutive polygamy with the darkness of silence as an act, which is bestial and alien to human life. According to him, it is a sin even graver than fornication. Blastares continues stating that there is silence about the third marriage because though it is considered lawful, the consecutive contraction of more than three marriages is rejected by both laws and rules. Each union after the third one should be no doubt be called polygamy and it is worse than fornication. The person who has entered a fourth or fifth marriage, has come out of subjection to the divine rules and insults one's own children joining to them illegitimate ones. In view of this, those, who have contracted such marriages, after having abandoned lawlessness and have genuinely repented, should be punished more severely than those who have fornicated: for the first ones an eight years' penance is assigned; for the second ones – a seven years' penance [40]¹.

And according to the law, if someone has dared to proceed to contracting a fourth marriage, which is not a marriage and does not bind, the children born during the cohabitation will not be

¹ As D. Nikolchev has underlined, in the texts of the respective rules of St. Basil the Great, the expressed opinion of the third marriage is exceptionally negative and the punishment for contracting such a marriage is very severe while at the same time there is no punitive regulation for those who enter into a fourth marriage whom the saint defines as "polygamous". Nikolchev assumes that the reason for this is the fact that St. Basil has not envisaged the contracting of fourth marriage even as a hypothetical possibility. – See [42]. In 920, in Constantinople, a council was summoned on the initiative of Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos at which it was promulgated that fourth marriage is unallowed, null and void, forbidden by the Church, and intolerable from Christian point of view. – See [43].

recognized legitimate. Those who have contracted such marriages, after being separated from one another, should be put to punishment equal to that for those who have profaned themselves by fornicating [41].

His opinion on the problem of consecutive polygamy has given Patriarch Euthymius of Tarnovo in his letter to Antim, the metropolitan bishop of Wallachia. Euthymius has written that according to the Scriptures “matrimony should be pure and the nuptial bed – undefiled”. For the Patriarch this applies only to the first marriage because, as Gregory of Nyssa has written, only one helpmate has been given to man and woman is to have only one head. Euthymius also cites St. Gregory of Nazianzus who has defined the first marriage as contracted according to the rules, pure and undefiled. The saint thinks that second marriage should be contracted only of necessity and cites Apostle Paul’s opinion on the problem as well as the rule of the Council in Neocaesarea according to which a priest should not eat at the wedding feast of a man who has got married for the second time.

Euthymius concludes that first marriage is the legitimate one, pure, undefiled and not corrupted by carnal passions. That is why it is blessed by priesthood. The second marriage, though allowed, is under ban. It is not deserving of crowning and is not blessed; it is neither contracted nor absolved by a priest until the ban imposed by the latter is over. But after the absolution those that have contracted second marriage could be blessed as at nuptials. As for the contracting of third or more consecutive marriages, Euthymius thinks that the third marriage is an infringement of the rules and is against the message of the gospels; and the fourth and next matrimony is equal to joining into marriage of fornicators [44]. But as M. Hristodulova has noted, though Euthymius in principle speaks in reproof of the third and the fourth marriage, he still considers the already contracted such marriages as the lesser evil compared to the possibility the cohabiting couples to live without church blessing. That is why he warns Antim not to believe that the Church of Bulgaria does not allow nuptials for those contracting third and fourth marriage and lets them live unblessed as fornicators. Hristodulova finds the reason for Euthymius’ position in the situation in Bulgaria at that time: social degradation and despair caused by the Ottoman invasion, heretical teachings, which proclaimed new ideas about marriage and morals and contributed to the growing of the political chaos. That is why the Patriarch, by actually allowing third and fourth marriage was trying to consolidate the moral principles of Christian marriage and family [45].

In the West, the only texts devoted to serial monogamy are to be found in the *Decretum Gratiani*.

Gratian cites St. Jerome who discusses the problem and its moral aspect. The church father allows second and third marriages because it is impossible to deprecate them without deprecating marriage itself. St. Jerome states that he does not blame those who have married twice, neither those who have contracted three consecutive marriages, nor even those who have got married eight times. He thinks that it is as much lawful to marry a fifth, sixth and et cetera husband as it is lawful to marry a second one [46].

Basing his position on the Gospel by Matthew, Gratian formulates the statement that since Jesus did not blame the woman who had got married seven times and did not declare that she would not be present at the Resurrection, he in his heart could not speak in reproof of any number of consecutive lawful marriages [47]. Still after citing the opinion of another church authority – Martin of Braga², Gratian advises those who have married many times to repent [48].

² Martin of Braga (ca. 520-580) was an archbishop of Braga, Portugal.

Conclusion

The attitude towards second marriage in the Orthodox as well as in the Catholic tradition in the 12th-14th centuries was one and the same: although not of equal worth compared to the first one as far as purity and sacredness were concerned, it was declared lawful. As for the contraction of consecutive marriages after the second one, the opinions of Eastern and Western canonists radically differed. While in the Orthodox tradition third marriage was qualified as legalized fornication and the fourth one was definitely forbidden, in Catholic Europe no such restrictions existed and though the contraction of several consecutive marriages was not encouraged, it was not forbidden either. The attitude of the clergy towards second marriage was transferred to every one lawfully contracted marriage following it.

In other words, while in the East, there was a restriction over the number of marriages allowed to Christians, in the West, it was the opportunity to achieve divorce that was restricted but an unlimited number of marriages after the first one was permitted provided that each preceding marriage had been legally dissolved.

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Imagining Byzantium: Southern Lands, Seas, Towns and People in Snorri Sturluson's Heimskringla

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Abstract

The paper focuses on the image of the Byzantine Empire and of the Greeks in two sagas from Snorri Sturluson's Heimskringla (Saga of Harald Hardrade and Saga of Sigurd the Crusader and his brothers.), which provide examples of contacts between the Scandinavian and Byzantine world in the period 11th-12th c. The author applies a quantitative analysis, exploring names as Grikkland (Greece), Miklagarð (Constantinople), Grikkjakonung (Emperor), Grikk(j)ar (Greek), Grikklandshaf (Greek archipelago, Greek sea), etc. Thus, separating the objective from the legendary information, the author seeks to answer the question: To what extent the image of the Empire, the Emperor, and the capital in the two sagas are reliable from a historical point of view?

Keywords: Snorri Sturluson, Heimskringla, imagology, Byzantine Empire

Traditionally, Bulgarian historical research refers quite rarely to the imagology as a methodological approach in revealing the medieval epoch [1], [2], [3]. I would point out that along with the traditional historical and linguistic methods in studying images (incl. the image of the others), the quantitative method, which was not widely used in the humanities research in Bulgaria in the past, has been introduced in recent years. These two approaches are fundamental to the present study of the image of Byzantium and the Byzantines in Snorri Sturluson's sagas¹ [4]. I would emphasize that more detailed information about the image of Byzantium and the Byzantines can be found in two sagas – *Saga of Harald Hardrade* and *Saga of Sigurd the Crusader and his brothers*. In both sagas, the image of the Byzantine Empire can be found in the descriptions of the life and deeds of these Norwegian rulers. Keeping in mind that the sagas of Heimskringla were written in the 13th century and that they reflect information from older Scandinavian manuscripts in prose and poetic speech, their analysis requires a careful and critical approach.

First, I would focus on the image of Greece and the Greeks (Grikkland, Grikklandseyjar, Grikk(j)ar, Grikkir, Grikkjum) in the sagas in question. Not surprisingly, the image of Byzantium (the Byzantine Empire) is mainly associated with names such as Greece and the Greeks. The quantitative analysis shows that Greece and the Greeks are among the most common geographical names in *Saga of Harald Hardrade* and *Saga of Sigurd the Crusader and his brothers*. In particular, they are mentioned not so often in the text, but the Greeks (Grikk(j)ar) being the predominant name in describing the Byzantine population. At the same time, we can find more often related terms such as Grikklandshaf (the Greek archipelago, the Greek Sea) and Grikkland (the Greek Land).

¹ *Snorri Sturluson* (1179-1241) is an Icelandic historian, poet, politician and alleged author of a cycle of sagas known as *Heimskringla*.

In the *Saga of Harald Hardrade*, Snorri Sturluson portrays the Greeks in stories that describe Harald's military service as a leader of the Varangian Guard of the Byzantine Emperor. Describing the campaigns led by young Harald, Snorri also presents the Greek detachment that fought alongside the Varangian Guard. These descriptions also represent the rivalry between the Varangians and the Greeks, which even reached conflicting in search of a convenient place to camp during the military campaigns in southern Italy and Sicily. The saga also describes the Greek commander Gyrger (Georgios) as an incompetent and ineffective leader whose authority paled in comparison to that of the victorious and mighty Harald [5].

Another aspect in the image of the Greeks in the two sagas is related to the description of some of their customs and traditions, which obviously aroused curiosity and strongly impressed the Scandinavians. Such descriptions can be found in the *Saga of Sigurd the Crusader and his brothers*. Presenting the games organized in honour of King Sigurd in the Hippodrome (Padreim) in the capital city of Constantinople, Snorri points out that, according to the Greeks, if the ruler's teams, players and warriors were successful in the games and battles of the competition, it would herald victory and success for the Emperor in actual wars and battles [6]. This statement raises doubts about the truth of the customs described and is probably legendary. But it certainly reflects the Scandinavian Icelandic and Norwegian ideas about the ruler and the war, which were intertwined with the descriptions of the distant and mighty Byzantine Empire².

Next, I would point out the geographical information about Greece and the roads to the Greek land. In the *Saga of Harald Hardrade*, Snorri points out that Harald initially spent several years in Russia leading long military campaigns in the eastern Eistland (contemporary Estonia). It was from Russia that he travelled to Greece (Grikkland), reaching Miklagard (Constantinople) [7].

Analysing the use of names such as Grikkland (Greek Land) and Grikklandshaf (the Greek archipelago, the Greek sea), I can note that they are used correctly in both sagas. In presenting King Sigurd, the Crusader's voyage from the Holy Land to the Byzantine capital, Snorri Sturluson demonstrated relatively accurate knowledge of the Eastern Mediterranean. According to Snorri, King Sigurd sailed from Palestine north to the island of Cyprus, and after a short stay continued to Greek land [8].

The Grikklandshaf (Greek Sea, Greek Archipelago) can also be found in the text of the two sagas. In the *Saga of Harald Hardrade*, Snorri Sturluson points out that shortly after starting to serve Empress Zoya, Harald was sent with ships and troops to the Grikklandshaf [9]. In the *Saga of Sigurd, the Crusader and his brothers*, it is noted that the king reached Palestine, sailing through the Grikklandshaf (the Sea of Greece) [10]. These and some other examples lead to the conclusion that after the name of the Greek Sea (the Sea of Greece, the Greek archipelago) the sagas in question refer to the Ionian Sea, the Aegean Sea, and, sometimes, to larger parts of the Eastern Mediterranean. All this testifies to a relatively good knowledge of southern seas and islands off the Scandinavia and North Atlantic.

Next, I would focus on the information about the Byzantine capital of Constantinople (Miklagard) and the image of this city in the studied sagas. The quantitative analysis shows that the Byzantine capital is quite often present in the texts studied – a total of 27 mentions in the two sagas, and definitely more common than Grikkland, Grikklandseyjar, Grikk (j) ar, Grikkir, Grikkjum, and Grikklandshaf. This is evident in the *Saga of Harald Hardrade*, where a significant

² The sagas often testify to the organization of games and competitions in the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish rulers' courts, where these war games were quite popular. Next, one of the most striking episodes is a description of a battle between prominent warriors or leaders of the opposing armies, the outcome of which is to decide the end of the military conflict. The Byzantine practice, thus described by Snorri Sturluson does not correspond to the historical reality, but was close and understandable to the Scandinavians.

part of the description of Harald's military service in Byzantium relates to the capital of the Byzantine Empire. An interesting detail is present, which can be also found in other sagas. Very often, the travel to Constantinople is associated with a pilgrimage to the Holy Land and Jerusalem.

According to Snorri, Harald Hardrade went to Constantinople after a pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

Also, upon learning that Magnus Olafsson had taken the Danish and Norwegian throne³, Harald decided to remain in military service in Byzantium [11].

Also, I would focus my attention on the image of the Byzantine capital as a source of untold riches. In presenting Harald Hardrodes's treasures, Snorri Sturluson points out that Harald made use of the *poluta-svarf* custom – an opportunity to access the imperial personal treasury at the death of the emperor [12].⁴ According to the author of *Heiskrimgla*, the Varangian mercenaries were entitled to take as much of the imperial treasury as they could carry with them. The author of the saga suggests that it was for this reason that Harald accumulated impressive personal treasure, which was the largest in the entire northern world [13]. The image of the Byzantine capital stands out with particular vividness in the *Saga of Sigurd the Crusader and his brothers*.

Already in the first chapter of the saga, Snorri describes Constantinople as a well-known place with untold riches, where well-paid military service and other opportunities of enrichment can be found, and for this reason many Norwegians responded to Sigurd's call for an expedition to the Holy Places and Constantinople [14]. In the same saga, there is also a description of a port that was opened to Norwegian ships by order of the Byzantine emperor. Besides, Snorri Sturluson describes the Golden Horn and the Golden Gate (the Golden Tower) through which the Emperor entered the city after a long absence or after a great victory, but he is mistaken and shows poor knowledge and few details of the Byzantine capital [15]. Snorri also mentions the Laktjarna (the Imperial Palace) and Padreim (the Hippodrome) [16]. While the description of the Emperor's Palace is concise and simple, the Hippodrome is presented in detail. Most probably, it is Snorri Sturluson's retelling by descriptions of eyewitnesses who visited Constantinople. They were no doubt impressed by the architecture, and the games and spectacles held within the Byzantine capital. According to the saga, the Hippodrome was surrounded by high walls that could be compared to a Scandinavian thing-place. Also, according to Snorri, several ancient creatures and legendary heroes, such as the Asas, Volsungs, and others, were represented in bronze and iron statues in the Hippodrome. Next, according to the famous Icelander, the games were accompanied by fiery spectacles and musical performances of various instruments [17]. In the same saga, descriptions of another topos in Constantinople can be found. Snorri writes that, after preparing to leave Constantinople for Norway, King Sigurd the Crusader donated all his ships to the Emperor, and the bow figures and ornaments from these ships were donated to "St. Peter" church, where they could still have been seen at the time of recording the saga – the middle of the thirteenth century [18].

I would summarise that the two sagas present a picturesque and relatively credible image of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople, in which some of the city's most notable popular toposes stand out, such as the defended port of the Golden Horn, the imperial palace of Lactarnaya, the Hippodrome and "St. Peter" cathedral. Also, the two sagas present the capital as an extremely crowded, colourful, and rich city. It is in the latter statement, however, that romantic and legendary motives can be found. The legendary privilege of *poluta-svarf* and the belief that the city offers

³ The Norwegian King Magnus Olafsson (1035-1047).

⁴ The authors analyze the theory that *poluta-svarf* was a privilege of Varangian mercenaries to benefit from the Imperial Treasury at the death of the Emperor. According to the authors, it is probably an indication of another way of further benefiting of assistance in collecting fees and taxes, privileges for the accommodation and use of food and shelter, booty, etc., presented in a legendary form.

opportunities for enrichment through military service and other possibilities unknown in other lands and cities can be also noted.

Next, I would focus my analysis on the yzantine ruler, which is $\pi\epsilon\chi\eta\sigma\delta\chi\epsilon\alpha$ in the text over forty times – far more common than the ethnonym Greeks, geographical names Greek land, Greek sea, and more often than the mentions of the capital Constantinople. In some of the sagas, he is simply Grikkjakonung, Kirjalax keisari, Kirjalax konungi, Kirjalax Miklagarðskeisara (the emperor, the Greek Konung, Lord Caesar, the Caesar of Constantinople). In other descriptions, the Emperor is given a specific name – Michael, Zoya, Constantine Monomachos, or just Kirjalax (the Lord) [19]. Also, individuals directly related to the imperial family, such as Maria, the niece of Empress Zoya, appear in the two sagas. Besides, according to the *Saga of Harald Hardrade*, Harald himself dethroned and blinded Emperor Constantine Monomachos [20]. This piece of information is not in line with historical reality and can be counted among legendary descriptions in the two sagas.

Of particular interest is also the genealogy of the emperors. Snorri Sturluson presents a long line of Western rulers in kinship with the Byzantine emperors that ends with Sicilian King Roger II, whose daughter was married to Emperor Manuel, and whose son met King Sigurd the Crusader in Constantinople [21]. The author of the two sagas is obviously wrong since King Sigurd the Crusader passed through Constantinople during the reign of Alexios I Comnenus (1087-1118) but not in the rule of Alexios II Comnenus (1180-1183). Moreover, the statement that Roger II's daughter was wife of Emperor Manuel is far from the truth. In summary, these descriptions of a part of the lineage of the Byzantine emperors (Kirjalax keisari, Kirjalax Miklagarðskeisara) are beyond all credibility but aimed at conveying the historicity of the events and personalities described. I would point out that, like the before mentioned accounts of the Greeks, Byzantium, and the capital of Constantinople, Snorri mixed some reliable information and legendary stories.

Indeed, Emperor Constantine Monomachos acquired the crown by marrying Empress Zoya, but he died of natural death and was not captured and blinded by the Varangians led by Harald Hardrade, as Snorri claims. Analysing the image of the Byzantine emperor in the two sagas, I would emphasize the description of the meeting and the agreement between the contenders for the Norwegian throne – Magnus and Harald. Here, Snorri Sturluson describes how Harald gifted Magnus with part of the wealth he had accumulated during his stay and service in Byzantium.

Snorri also describes rumours that the Emperor's treasures included entire houses full of gold – no doubt close to reality but exaggerated in the stories of Scandinavians who visited the Byzantine capital [22]. In summary, I would emphasize that the image of the Byzantine emperor is partly historical, with some legendary details and biased statements also present. The sagas in question create a generalized, ideal image of the ruler of the East, highlighting his close ties to the Varangian corpse in Constantinople and its leader – Harold, as well as the legendary stories about the imperial treasures. Comparing this image with the meagre information of other rulers in the sagas in question, the Byzantine emperor's one is undoubtedly central, but is nonetheless semi-legendary rather than objective and historical in nature.

Finally, I would like to highlight two pieces of information about Bulgaria and the Bulgarian lands in the sagas. First, I would point to the *Saga of Harald Hardrade* in which Snorri quotes a skaldic poem describing Harald as *Bolgara brennir* [23]. Next is *Saga of Sigurd the Crusader and his brothers*, according to which, after his stay in Constantinople on his return from Jerusalem, King Sigurd the Crusader travelled by land to Norway, passing through Bulgaria, Pannonia, Swabia, and Bavaria [24]. Being too scarce, this information does not allow for a clearer image of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians in the sagas. The only precise information is the geographical determination of the Bulgarian lands on the road from Constantinople to Central and North-

Western Europe, and the exact year of King Sigurd's passage through Bulgaria – 1110, probably in the summer.

To summarize all of the above, I would formulate the following conclusions. First of all, the sagas provide interesting information about the image of Greece, the Greeks, Byzantium, and the Byzantine emperor. Some of this information is credible, but it is mainly related to large areas and general geographical directions. Particularly prominent are geographical definitions such as the Eastern Lands, the Greek Sea, and the Greek Islands – vast terrestrial, maritime, and waterways that were known to Scandinavian seafarers. The same applies to the general descriptions of the Byzantine territories and neighbouring lands such as Palestine, Bulgaria, and others. As for the image of the Greeks, it is too schematic. The only emotional descriptions and assessments related to the relationships and rivalries between Greeks and Varangians in the Byzantine army.

The image of the emperor stands out next. The main conclusion is that the image of the Byzantine ruler in the *Saga of Harald Hardrade* is more credible than in the *Saga of Sigurd the Crusader and his brothers*. Both sagas, however, create a semi-legendary and romantic image of a ruler who possesses innumerable treasures but is dependent on, or in compliance with, Varangian mercenaries, and Norwegian rulers. The latter, of course, is the product of the author's imagination and patriotism and does not reflect historical and political facts. Lastly, I would point out that the image of the imperial capital of Constantinople is rich with some details, which testifies to numerous stories of eyewitnesses, and provides a relatively realistic idea of the architectural landmarks of the Byzantine capital.

All that can be concluded from the extant evidence is that, despite the seemingly numerous descriptions of the Eastern Empire, the analysed sagas present cursory, idealized, and legendary information that builds up a general image of an empire-city. However, these images are valuable source of information about the image of the Byzantine world in Scandinavian societies in the High and Late Middle Ages.

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Concerning One Important Aspect for the Motivation of the Byzantine Emperor Leo III to Start with the Iconoclastic Policy

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Abstract

The article is devoted to the question of the possible motivation of Emperor Leo III, or Leo the Syrian (717-741) to start with his Iconoclastic policy. The main thesis, defended in the present article, is that for Leo III Iconoclasm was an ideal opportunity to recover the prestige of the imperial power as well as an attempt to remake again the old theocratic concept of the Emperor as the head of both the secular state and the Church. The Emperor was envisaged as both *imperator* and *ecclesiastical* in the spirit of the ancient doctrine of Eusebius of Caesarea at the time of Constantine the Great.

Keywords: Byzantine Empire, Iconoclasm, veneration of icons, Leo III the Syrian, Caesaropapism, imperial power, the Christian Church

Introduction

There is a pile of scholarly writings concerning the Iconoclast Period as well as the Iconoclasm itself as a religious, cultural, social and political phenomenon. Many questions and topics, however, continue to be open and debatable. Just one thing is to be sure: Iconoclasm was one of the main watersheds in Byzantine history along with the history of Christianity in general [1].

It used to be a controversial phenomenon evaluated in different ways, with different approaches [2]. As it has been stated by D. Y. Dimitrov, one of the main researchers in the field in the last decades, the Iconoclastic dispute used to play the role of probably the last avatar of the great religious, confessional and ecclesiastic concussions of the Late Antiquity. Iconoclasm was viewed, moreover, as a movement with the main goal of finding the true formula for the survival, existence and predestination of the Christian society and the Empire in general [3].

Iconoclasm was, furthermore, a polyvalent phenomenon, dominating the Byzantine VIII and IX centuries, and spreading, by all means beyond the imperial borders, in the vast area from the Middle East to early medieval Western Europe. Any attempt to specify and close the phenomenon in certain restricted framework, be that the strictly theological or ecclesiastical field, or as a struggle between the imperial power and the Church, or as a social movement against the ecclesiastical and monastic property, is doomed to failure. The dispute will then lose its composite character with the many facets and nuances at stake. The attempts for systematization of the sources, made by L. Brubacker and J. Haldon some time ago, returned the discussion back to its starting position [4].

The present article is a short review, without ambitions to scrutinize all the aspects of this controversial movement, the reasons for its appearance and the various opinions expressed in the rich literature on the subject. I will mention just some important statements concerning the very

focus of my investigation. It is important to point out, for example, that for scholars as L. Barnard and J. Haldon, the Iconoclast policy of the Emperors Leo III and Constantine V was an attempt to obtain back and elevate the prestige of the imperial power and the level of popularity in difficult times. These statements are in an accord with E. Kitzinger's observation that after Justinian the Great the official Roman imperial cult was substituted by the image of the "faithful in Christ" Emperor (*basileus*) of the Romans. This came to be the official title of the Byzantine Emperors since the times of Heraclius (610-641) [5]. Surely, it was one of the many aspects associated with the motivation of the Iconoclastic policy promoters. The key element here is the possible theocratic base for the imperial power of the Late Roman Empire, and especially the times of the Heracleian and Syrian (Isaurian) dynasties. There was an attempt for the acceptance of the figure of the Emperor not just as the guarantee of the Christian faith and its Church, but also as secular sovereign and ipso facto a sublime, although external, ecclesiastic (*iereus*) of the Church, a commander in both secular and religious fields.

We know that since the time of Constantine the Great and because of his policy towards Christianity and Christianization, there was a special place for the Emperor not only in society, but also in the Church, in a sense of being an external, secular bishop. He was, moreover, a deputy of God on earth, leader of the world (*oikoumene*), and thus a secular sovereign of the Church and arbiter in ecclesiastical matters. For Constantine it was, even personally, the Christian prolongation of the old Roman office, and function, of *pontifex maximus*. For the Christian Church it was obviously a normal development, as well as for the society, of being in a full symbiosis with the highest imperial institution for reaching the main ends of constituting Christianity as the only religion of the Roman state. The Emperors in Late Antiquity could not divide their prerogatives from those of the Church and being already, after Constantine, Divine deputies in the world, they had the right to resume axiomatically their power covered the Church and the ecclesiastical order, too. Thus, when the power stretched over the Church, it could explain further the vision of the Late Roman Emperors as both secular rulers and external, but also sublime, ecclesiastics.

We could define, therefore, the imperial power at that period as theocratic, legitimizing in a sense the notion of *Caesaropapism*, invented by the historiography of the past. *Caesaropapism* presupposed the domination of the imperial factor in the relations with the Church during the long periods of the Byzantine history. Being installed by God as the leader of the *oikoumene*, the Emperor has been thus civil and ecclesiastic at the same time, without the need of it to be repeat it again by any of his subjects. This theocratic power, however, has been submitted to erosion because of many factors, including the multiple theological, dogmatic and juridical collisions tearing apart the unity of the Christian Empire in the period from the IV up to the VII century.

There were struggles, too, among the leading centers of the Church for pre-eminence and that is why the concept of *Pentarchy* appeared at that period, presupposing a hierarchy of the most prominent bishops, or patriarchs, as they came to be known, with Rome at the top and after that Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. Alexandria, for example, was very unhappy of being pushed from the second place by Constantinople, considered to be a kind of parvenu.

Some of the great centers of Christianity were becoming more and more independent from the imperial power, like the Roman Holy See, because of the impossibility of the Emperors to control the situation in Italy at the time of the Ostrogothic kingdom. Later, when already under Roman rule, Italy was too far from the imperial hinterland and thus with a high level of independence.

The great ecclesiastical leaders in the East were also thriving for certain independence, especially in Egypt. The schism in the East after 451 contributed much for the confusion in ecclesiastical matters, making the Emperor responsible for the unity of the Empire through measures ensuring the possible union of different confessional groups in the East. Leaders of the

Church like the Pope of Rome or the patriarch of Alexandria challenged critically the theocratic rights of the Emperor.

The imperial power, moreover, was to head frontally the catastrophic effects of the great wars with the Persians, the Avars, the Slavs, the Arabs and the Bulgars from the late VI century onwards, which put under question the very existence of the Empire. Those wars and incursions had a negative impact in the social and demographic development, reorganizing the huge Mediterranean Empire from the previous period into an early medieval state with less opportunities and ambitions, than the many problems to solve. Already in the VII century such a rupture between the imperial power and the ecclesiastical leader, aside from the patriarch of Constantinople, was more than visible. The question of Monotheism clarified openly the division line between the Emperors in Constantinople, prone to promote the new theological experiment, and the Popes of Rome, who were not ready to give up on such a crucial issue. Especially indicative was the case of Pope Martin I, who along with the famous theologian Maximus the Confessor were the main defendants of the Orthodox faith against Monotheism. Their confrontation with the Emperor Constans II led to them being tortured and the Pope died in exile in Crimea.

Besides the short, although spectacular, recovery of the positions and authority of the imperial power during the reign of Constantine IV, connected with the Sixth Ecumenical Council and the perfect relations of the Emperor with the Roman Pontiffs, new difficult times were to come afterwards. There was a political chaos with few reigning for short terms in a time, when the Arabs were menacing the very capital of the Empire and the Bulgars were the new serious threat in the Balkans. Especially critical was the siege of Constantinople of 717-718. All those unfavourable developments led to the inevitable decay of the imperial authority and questioned the indisputable role of the Emperor as Divinely elected ruler, external bishop and sovereign of the Church. Thus, at the beginning of the VIII century we could witness a serious shaking of the dominant position of the Emperor in his relations with the Church and even doubts concerning the existing model, which could be tentatively defined as *Caesaropapism*. There were obvious signs of both distancing and also independence in some of the main centers of Christianity, starting from the Roman Popes with their pretensions to be heads of Christianity and finishing with the eastern ecclesiastics, differentiated from Constantinople through non-Chalcedonian confessions professed by them. The religious and confessional differentiation could, moreover, lead to political and territorial disrapture, which could explain the attempts of the Emperors to stop it and to heal the wounds, provoked by the schisms.

The Byzantine Empire had a serious rival in the East in the face of the Arabs and Islam. This rival was not just military and political, it was also a strong religious and spiritual opponent, giving a new version for the “chosen people” and the true religion. For the people in the East the intersection of political and religious aspects of power and everyday life had been part of their mentality since very ancient times. The division between both powers, secular and religious had been always viewed with certain suspicion. Important source of that kind of thinking was the Old Testament with all the examples of how to proceed in a society with strong religious commitment.

In that sense the Arab Khalifate, the new great enemy of Byzantium, demonstrated quite well how the secular and religious power could be combined in a unity un-existing since the times of the Old Testament, and to give new model to be followed and new impetus for the Middle East population. The Khalif, as a deputy ruler in the name of the prophet Muhammad, was secular ruler and religious leader at the same time, without any contradiction. At the same time, the Emperors in Constantinople promoted a policy full of restrictions against Monophysites and Monothelism in their eastern provinces, reaching incidentally to the status of an open war against the

abovementioned denominations. The sequel of all that was the opening gap between the imperial power and the non-Chalcedonian Christian communities in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. The loss of the Byzantine Middle East in the VII century was the final blow, depriving to a great extent the Emperor from the opportunity and privilege to be considered both secular and ecclesiastical sovereign in the eyes of his subjects, especially the non-Chalcedonians. This could prevent any opportunity for reconquest of the East at the time, when the imperial government still considered its losses to be temporary.

As it was pointed out above, the Emperor was going to lose his double role of secular and ecclesiastical ruler at the early VIII century. The theocratic character of the rule in the Christian Roman world was already under erosion. This is the context where we should post the beginning of the Iconoclastic policy by Leo III and the motivation for that.

The disputes between the supporters and the opponents of the veneration of icons and holy relics had its long history since the Late Antiquity and long ago before the beginning of what we know as the Iconoclastic period. The Iconoclasm as an official policy of the Emperors started after 726, when Emperor Leo III (717-741) took side with the Iconoclasts in the context of the ongoing discussion. Leo originated from the East and for him the theses of the Iconoclasts were obviously quite familiar. We should remind, however, that both the leaders of the Iconoclasts and those, supporting the veneration of icons, were staunch and devoted Christians, but with different views on how to deal with the sacred images and relics and how to construct their Christian society.

The influence of the East on Iconoclasm was often mentioned by the scholars. J. Meyendorff outlined three main elements in the Iconoclastic movement, namely, the religious culture of the Christians from Semitic or Armenian origin, the reaction against Islam, and also the Hellenistic spiritualism preserved in a Christian form by the Origenist trend in the Christian theology. For L. Brehier and E. Martin it was the eastern influence that characterized Iconoclasm, being to a great extent a dispute between the Orientalism and the Hellenism in Christianity [6]. Iconoclasm was considered by P. Lemerle, moreover, as installed by the circumstances retreat towards the mental schemes of the Asian East, following the Semitic Christian spirit [7]. G. Ostrogorski supported the thesis of the eastern, both Monophysite and Armenian, influence over Iconoclasm. The differences in mentality of the people from the East and West were explained by him through the two main types of thinking – the substantial and the consubstantial, symbolic and non-symbolic.

These were the division lines between the supporters of the veneration of icons and the Iconoclasts. The topic, concerning the two main modes of thinking was further developed by A. Avenarius. According to the latter, the symbolic, or substantial, way of thinking was typical for the ancient Greco-Roman tradition, clearly distinguishing between the image and its archetype, while the non-Symbolic, or consubstantial, thinking, oriental by default, was magical and ritualistic, completely identifying the symbol with its prototype. As it was defined clearly by D. Dimitrov, this stream of thinking, creating conceptual models, typical for both the ancient and the oriental mentality, was to a great extent a continuation and extension of the abovementioned theses of Brehier, Martin and also supported by the reasoning of Lemerle [8; see also 2, p. 140].

Conclusion

Thus, it was not an accident that the Emperor Leo III, originating from the East and bred with the non-symbolic thinking and the arguments against the veneration of the holy images, after the triumphal save of the Empire and its capital from the Arab siege, became a prominent promoter of Iconoclasm. Politically it was also important vis-à-vis the impetus of the Arabs and the new religious doctrine – Islam, which was also reared in the un-iconic traditions. Furthermore,

Iconoclastic reform was considered of being the way for recovery of the gloomy image of the imperial power, pretending still to combine in one the secular and the ecclesiastical sphere of life in the Empire. For Leo III was important to remind again the axiomatic principle of the acceptance of the Byzantine Emperor as the head of both powers in the spirit of the theocracy and *Caesaropapism*, as it was envisaged in the doctrine of Eusebius of Caesarea at the time of Constantine the Great [see also 2, pp. 151-152]. Iconoclasm could be the proper instrument for that in order to be averted the possibility that the Church became an opponent of the imperial power and will. In that context we should accept, moreover, the argument of Leo III in his correspondence with Pope Gregory II. The Pope was against the interference of the Emperor in the fields of theology and the prerogatives of the Church. Leo III, however, answered with the argument, a kind of reminder, that he was both Emperor and ecclesiastical, his power stretching over the Church, too, by nothing else than the Divine Will [9, pp. 161-162; see also 2, p. 152 and note 359].

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Between the Christianity and Islam on the Balkans: Islamization and Identity in Ottoman Documents from the 16th Century

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Abstract

In the focus of this study is not the politics of Islamization, but rather the main characters in the Islamization process – the “converts” – and their complex existence within the “Islamic religious community”. The difficult task of the author is to trace in some legal sources – mainly in the 16th-century *fetvas* of the Ottoman *Seyhülislâms* – the hesitations, accompanying the inclusion of “new Muslims” into “the other religion”, as well as the too “blurred” boundaries of what is allowed and forbidden in the religious practices of the “new Muslims” and in their contact with “their former Christian co-believers”.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire, Balkans, Christianity, Islam, islamization, identity, non-Muslim, fetvas

The question of the religious identity, which is sharply raised during the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans in the 14th-15th centuries, is not less vital when Bulgarians and other Balkan peoples become subjects of the Ottoman state. Religion is a defining separator in the social and legal space of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century. Emblematically associated with its most glamorous successes and territorial expansion, the 16th c. is also a century of religious tension in the public atmosphere, of the increasing role of Islam and Islamic religious institutions in socio-political life.

The Islamization¹ – a phenomenon that has deeply shaken all Balkan peoples – is one of the topics with the most lasting perimeter in Bulgarian, Balkan and foreign historiography. But perhaps, precisely within this issue most clearly are manifested the complexes of the Balkan historiographies, which for decades have offered very contradictory theses and hypotheses, with a strong biased attitude towards the phenomenon both as a process and as goals, means, forms and methods of implementation. However, I will note that in the recent years in Bulgarian and foreign historiography there is a tendency to evaluate and re-evaluate the studies on Islamization, the presumption of the opinions, the applied methodology, approaches, etc. [1]

The subject of this statement is not the politics of Islamization within the framework of the standard scheme – outlining the spread and imposition of Islam upon the infidel population by clarifying the factors that directly influenced the methods, forms and ways of implementing this policy. I would rather draw my attention to the main actors in this process – the “converts” and their complex existence within the “Islamic religious community” – not less controversially

¹ The correct use of the term **Islamization** implies taking into account at least a few of its main meanings in the context of the socio-economic and political situation, religious and social atmosphere in the Ottoman Empire: as a policy of spreading and imposing Islam on infidels in the Ottoman state; to mark the process of real integration of the new Muslims into the “other religion”, which has replaced their previous religious beliefs; for the process of Islamization of the Ottoman society itself – the imposition of classical Islamic principles, traditions and norms in all spheres of the society and the state.

presented in the historiography. The difficult task I have set myself is to trace in some legal sources – mainly in the 16th-century *fetvas* of the Ottoman *Seyhülislâms* – the hesitations, accompanying the inclusion of “new Muslims” into “the other religion”, the too “blurred” boundaries of what is allowed and forbidden in the religious practices of the “new Muslims” and in their contact with “their former Christian co-believers”.

The conversion to Islam is undoubtedly one of the signs of the history of the Balkans under Ottoman rule. Even within the border period for the Balkan peoples between the 14th and 15th centuries, the question of defending the original religious identity in the extreme conditions of the conquest has its irreversible alternative – its change. Historians’ assessment to this day varies from “renegade” and “betrayal” to “manifestation of adaptability”. Behind these theoretically derived formulations and emotional qualifications, stay the life destinies and dramatic circumstances that have led to the irreversible choice.

Whatever the reasons for the act of change of religion, according to the testimonies of both the Ottoman and Byzantine and Balkan authors, the so-called religious conversion became an integral part of the everyday life of the Balkans during the Ottoman conquest. The issue of religious identity is no less important in the 16th century, when the struggle for the man’s soul becomes a fundamental imperative of both Christianity and Islam. The manifestation of the whole complexity of the conflict-contact Islam-Christianity during this period in **the group of the newly converted to Islam**. A “group” exclusively diverse in terms of social, ethnic and religious background, united under the common denominator of conversion, between the drastically broad boundaries of violence – voluntariness. The way it is defined in the so-called Bulgarian sources reveals not only the emphasized variability but also the an almost obligatory pejorative shade. Almost all known names – *pomaks*, *ahryans*, *ruptsis*, *torbeshis*, *apovtsis*, *marvatsis*, *pogantsis*, *dilsisies*, *chechens*, *erum charaklis*, *erul dinglis*, etc. [2] – are of unknown etymology and origin, a subject to unsolved to this day discussions about the emergence and relation to any events [3]

In the modern historiography (Bulgarian and foreign), the term **convertible/converted**, has spread out respectively the term **religious conversion** – directly reflecting the act of change.

Behind this conditionally derived terminology is the constant doubt of the “right choice”, the hesitations, the fear of a denial of the expected forgiveness at death hour, that had put a lot of drama in the personal choice and the fate of the converted one.

Although not always defined in a clearly identifiable manner, the new converts to Islam are recognizable in the Ottoman documents – both in the various types of tax registers and in documents of state-legal and financial-administrative nature, and especially in single documents – *arzuahals* (personal pleas) and *mahzars* (collective pleas), who have put the general imperial reality and the conversion, through the prism of respective life destinies and fateful with its consequences choice of the infidel subjects of the sultan. The most numerous, but also the most obscure in terms of the events that have led to the final turn, is the group of converts recorded in the Ottoman registers² – from Christian *spahis* to ordinary urban and rural population.

The adaptation to the requirements imposed by the newly accepted religion appears to be a long and complicated process. The new religious framework poses hard-to-solve problems not only for the converts but also, as the Ottoman sources indicate, for their “new co-believers” the Muslims, as well as for the Ottoman authorities themselves. And if in the Bulgarian sources dominates the clearly manifested confrontation, the Ottoman sources and especially the *fetvas*, the main source

² For the ways in which the newly Islamized ones are registered in the Ottoman tax inventories, see more in K. Mutafova [1].

of my research, reveal a very different type of relationship between the “new Muslims” and their former Christian counterparts.

I will note that the *fetva* – a legal opinion on more controversial issues, composed by *Seyhülislâm* – the highest ecclesiastical authority in Islamic countries – plays a decisive role in the development of Islamic law. But while in some Islamic societies, the *fetvas* are largely theoretical, in the Ottoman Empire, the increased role of the muftis in the 16th c. provides the claimants with legal opinions that are applied in the courts³. That is particularly relevant for the *fetvas* issued by Ebussuud Efendi, one of the most respected *Seyhülislâms* in Ottoman and Islamic law, closely related to the legislative activities of Sultan Suleiman I (1520-1566).

In some of them, clearly is evident the intention of complete distinction between the subjects according to their religious affiliation and the consolidation of traditional Islamic postulates to the *zimmis* – the non-Muslim subjects in the Empire. It is significant that among the 1400 *fetvas*, included in the collection of “Maruzat” (Opinions) by Ebussuud Efendi [5], a whole section is about the non-Muslims (*gayri müslim*) and many of them are raising questions directly related to the “Conversion to Islam”. They address the full range of issues affecting the relationship of the non-Muslims with the Muslims, the restrictions in lifestyle and daily routine, their social and legal status and specific tax obligations, as well as issues related to their religion [5]. The compromises, prohibitions and conflicts, the inability to set proper boundaries and acceptable limits of “penetration” of the religious traditions and customs in everyday contact are refracted through the prism of the legal case.

Crucial for the Christians certainly are the issues related to the “change of religion”. In a considerable part of the *fetvas* issued by *Seyhülislâm* Ebussuud Efendi, are registered some of the “techniques” used in everyday life for incorporation of the infidels into Islam. Inconvertible consequences for them, as revealed by some of the questions raised, could be the unconscious pronouncing of the *şehada* (the witness formula – “*I testify that Allah is one and Muhammad is his prophet*”)⁴, as well as different types of “pledge” in the presence of Muslims.

It should be noted that, unlike later *fetvas* issued on a similar occasion (for example, the *fetvas* of Abdurrahim Efendi, *Seyhülislâm* from 1715 to 1716), in some of the *fetvas* by Ebussuud the validity of all these techniques is not confirmed.

In one of them, for example, to the question: “*If the infidel (zimmi) Zeid, going somewhere, says, ‘If I don’t come for a while, let’s become a Muslim’ and if during this time he doesn’t come, did he become a Muslim?*” and the answer is: “*He did not.*” [5]. However, according to Abdurrahim Efendi the “infidel” is considered to be Muslim even if he has only uttered the *şehada*, no matter if later he confirms that he denies the “infidelity” [7].

It is important to note that in a comparative analysis of the *fetvas* from the 16th c. with those of the later period, is quite evident the comparatively limited “arsenal” of methods for consolidating the infidels into Islam, presented in them, compared with the far more diverse practice, registered in the 17th and 18th centuries [7]. No matter the fact that in some cases Islamization is even considered, at least at the official level, to be invalid if the procedure for joining the “true religion” does not meet all Shariah requirements.

A few *fetvas*, too provocative in terms of both allowed and forbidden for both religions, deserve special attention. For example, one of the *fetvas* of Ebussuud Efendi literally states: “If a Muslim leads his minor child to the church to baptize him”, to require “a renewal of faith to become a

³ In his study on Ottoman law and the place of the *fetva* in it, H. Gerber emphasizes that the *sicills* (record books of *kadıs*) in the Ottoman courts reveal the wide application of the *fetvas* in them [4].

⁴ The so-called Witness formula (*şehada*) is one of the pillars of the Islamic religion [6].

Muslim again”. [5] It is hardly necessary to comment the fact to which extent such an act would fit into the behaviour of a “Muslim true believer”.

Within this set of minds, it could be considered that the *fetvas* concerning “the uprooting pre-Muslim beliefs” or the various manifestations of infidelity (küfr) and apostasy. They should all be distinguished into at least two groups:

- The first includes all cases of consciously following the “old” religious-ritual practice;
- In the second one, the *fetvas*, in which in one way or another is testified the ignorance of the “new” religion by those who have adopted Islam.

Beyond this conditional distinction, they, as stated in an article by deceased S. Dimitrov, testify to the long and tortuous path that passes the person from the formal act of pronouncing the *şahada* to the actual adaptation to the “new” religion [8]. A process that goes on too dramatically over two or sometimes more generations.

Several *fetvas* of a similar nature clearly define the dimensions of this process from the perspective of how Islam is adopted. Symptomatic of “voluntariness”, for example, is the case in one of them: “If, when the *müezzin* Amr calls for prayer, Zeid says, “Even if you call us a thousand times, no one will come to us, what should be done ...” [5].

Similarly could be conceived the deviations from Islamic norms by a whole community (*tâife*), which: “Does not make *namaz*, does not recognize religious obligations during the Ramadan ... together with their women continue to drink wine, when the day (holiday) of the infidel community (*keferenin cemiyeti*) comes, the mentioned ... honour these days like the infidels, ...” [5].

Too ambiguous from a religious and legal point of view, I would also add “extensible” remains the scope of the “allowed” and “forbidden” in the relationship of the new Muslims with their parents, close relatives, friends, as well as the acceptable limits of contact between them. Bearing in mind that a large part of the issues in *fetvas* are on behalf of the converts, they are largely a manifestation of both the level of knowledge of Islam and the “learned” mandatory norms of behaviour of a “true Muslim believer”. Rather paradoxically sound questions such as, “Is it allowed to read the great Koran for the soul of the mother and father of Muslim Zeid, who are infidels?” [5]

A lot of the questions are related to the religious customs and rituals that new Muslims continue to practice together with their Christian relatives. The legal cases do not generally require a ban on contacts between them, but the religious element is urged to be ignored. Typical in this regard is the answer to the question of “the meat of the kurban and alms” that a Muslim would like to give to “his infidel brother”. It is stated that it is generally allowed, but “if it is not a *zekât* (alms) and if it is not made as a vow” [5].

Not always, as the *fetvas* reveal, these orders were strictly followed. Several *fetvas* regarding the right of a “infidel to slaughter a Muslim Kurban” according to the Islamic ritual, show that this practice, despite its prohibitions, still keeps its continuity [5] – up to nowadays. During my field studies in the town of Provadia and Provadia region in June 1993, for example, it turned out that even today, the question of who has the right to slaughter a Muslim Kurban and who actually does it – Muslims and Christians, respectively – sometimes is decided too freely. “It should be a *hoca* when it comes to a Muslim, but it can be also a priest”, was the reply of our interviewed informant – the *hoca* of Provadia.

Although within the daily contacts, at least theoretically, the doubts about deviation from the Shariah norms give rise to even a “greetings to infidels”, etc. [5], the realities of confrontation and coexistence are quite different. The question posed in one of the *fetvas* addresses these realities: “Whose name can you swear on to a Muslim?” [5]

Typical for the confessional relations is the situation concerning the one of the greatest Christian holidays, identically attested in the 16th and the subsequent centuries: “If during the infidel Bayram (Easter), the infidel Zeid gives the Muslim Amr a bun (börek) and a red egg, and he accepts it, according to the Shariah, what should be done to Amr?”. The answer to the question in the *fetva* is: “There are no obstacles, if this is done not to magnify this day, but to observe the laws of the neighbourhood” [5].

Conclusions

Finally, I would like to emphasize that all of the above does not diminish or ignore the degree of religious pressure and tension in the public atmosphere, but raises the question of the nature and specificity of their manifestations, as well as the reasons that have led to a significant increase in the number of Muslims in the Ottoman empire during the 16th c. and the intensity of the Islamization process.

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Varna and the Silk Road

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Abstract

The article presents some basic historical data evidencing the long, almost continuous participation of Varna in the trade between the East and the West that has been known as the ‘Silk Road’ for centuries (from the Antiquity till the beginning of the Modern Age). The main purpose of the article is to prove that Varna has always had great, central significance not only for the trade within the Black Sea Basin, but also in the economic processes of a larger region connecting the East and the West.

Keywords: Varna, Silk Road, the Italian city republics, Black sea Basin, history of the trade

Introduction

In the history of Eurasia, the movement of people, goods and cultural influences over several periods – Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Modern Age (from the 2nd century BC to the 18th-19th centuries AD) is associated with a large-scale, even according to today’s notions, communication system, known as the ‘Silk Road’. This route included a chain of cities, caravanserais and markets across more than 13,000 km and connected China by land and sea with the Italian city republics, and subsequently with the whole of Central and Western Europe.

What is the participation of the Bulgarian lands, and of Varna, in particular, in the commercial and cultural exchange along the Silk Road over the centuries?

Varna Between the Main Routes of the Silk Road

As is generally known, the Silk Road had two main routes – south and north. Until the 7th century, the main traffic passed through Persia (the southern route), but the wars with the Arabs led to its duplication by a new northern route to the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, Khazaria (Khazar Khaganate), the Crimean Peninsula and the northern Black Sea coast. Over the centuries, important points along the Way have been the territories of Persia, Mesopotamia, Byzantium, Russia, and the entire Mediterranean. The lands of modern-day Bulgaria were locked between the southern and northern routes and, due to their favourable geographical location, they were actively involved in the commercial traffic between the East and the West. The influx of eastern goods (silk, spices, etc.) in Bulgaria during the Middle Ages was carried out with the mediation of Russia (from the north) and especially of Byzantium (from the south). Very soon after the establishment of the Bulgarian state (681), it concluded a trade treaty with Byzantium (716) – historians claim that this was the first international treaty with commercial content in medieval Europe [1]. The most direct connection between the two routes of the Road in the Balkans, a connection that led

to and from the Byzantine capital Constantinople, passed along the Western Black Sea coast, and the largest city in this area for centuries was Varna, the successor of ancient Odessos.

Varna and the Trade with the Italian City Republics

Varna's participation in trade and communications along the Silk Road is confirmed most definitely by the interest shown in this Black Sea market by the Italian city republics – Venice, Genoa, Florence, Dubrovnik. In Varna, they imported luxury goods (Eastern and European production), fabrics, jewellery, glass, the majolica vessels (mostly jugs) produced by the art workshops of Florence and Venice, and exported from the port of Varna relatively cheap and high-quality Bulgarian agricultural goods – wheat, barley, hides, honey and wax [2]. In the Italian documents from the 13th-15th century (nautical charts and trade guides), Varna was pointed out as the main port of Zagora (*porto del Zagora*) [3]. Politically, 'Zagora' was considered identical to Medieval Bulgaria, and, geographically, it referred to the lands between the Danube, the Balkan Range, the Black Sea and the Iron Gates gorge on the Danube River [4]. In the trade of the Mediterranean Basin, the term '*wheat of Varna*' became established as a synonym for quality grain exported from 'Zagora'. A local gold coin was minted in Varna, and the Italians and Romans (Byzantines) inevitably must have known and used it [5].

The earliest record of Varna's trade links with the Italian cities dates back to 1278, when the Venetian Pietro Grisono brought '*wheat from Varna*' to Constantinople. These links became much more intensive in the 14th and 15th centuries, and Venice and Genoa began to compete more and more seriously for positions at the port of Varna. In 1347, the Bulgarian Tsar John Alexander (1331-1371) concluded a treaty with Venice, under which guarantees were given for the life and property of foreign merchants, and regulated customs tariffs and port charges were introduced.

The actual result of this treaty was the Venetian consulate that was established in Varna – the only one on the Western Black Sea coast at that time. In 1352, there was already a Venetian consul, named Marco Leonardo, assigned in this Black Sea town [6]. Despite the difficult times for trade that came with the Ottoman invasions of the Balkans, a Venetian colony was established in Varna and it existed in the city until the middle of the following, 15th century [7].

Varna's links to the Italian centres of commerce – the Silk Road's destination to the west, were restored in the following centuries. The record of the most active export of raw materials from Varna to Italy through the ships of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) dates back to the middle and the second half of the 16th century. From Varna and the region, cowhides ('*hides of the Varna sort*' – '*sortis Varniae*'), high quality buffalo hides, Dobrudzha wool and the famous well-purified '*Zagora*' wax ('*cera Zaura*') were exported to Venice, Ancona and Senigallia, to Messina, Naples and Livorno, and manufactured fabrics and luxury items were imported from Italy to Varna [8]. The most active in this trade were Ancona and Venice. A colony of foreign, mostly Italian, merchants permanently residing there was established once again in the Black Sea town [9].

What do Archaeological Artifacts and the Local Memory Prove?

A large part of the archaeological exhibits preserved today at the Regional Museum of History – Varna, are the visual evidence that items of the type that were traditionally traded along the Silk Road were delivered and used in the town. These are high-quality goods with rich multicoloured decoration, vessels of various use – items made of Turkish faience (jugs, plates, dishes and cups), produced in the cities of Asia Minor – Iznik, Kütahya and Çanakkale, dating from the late 15th to the early 19th century; porcelain cups produced in China and Saxony; glassware produced by the

Turkish and the European glass manufacturing industry from the 17th-18th centuries; vessels for theriac (a mixture of opium and a large number of herbs) bearing the brands of the Italian pharmacies producing it, etc. [10]

And here is yet another proof of Varna's links with the Silk Road. In the 17th century, an Armenian colony settled permanently in the town. Among the Armenians of Varna, there were the so-called '*acems*'. The '*acem tücars*' were Armenians, large merchants who practiced long-distance trade throughout the Ottoman Empire, and traded abroad as well. According to the historians, they serviced the Silk Road in its less popular branches via Constantinople, to the north by land to Poland, Russia and Central Europe. They enjoyed special privileges to form their own community. The documents from the 17th and 18th centuries testify to the presence of '*acems*' in Varna, referred to as Persian subjects (the word '*acem*' was derived from '*Persian*'), and this is yet another evidence of the city's links with the Road. An indirect proof of the existence of '*acem tücars*' among the Armenians of Varna is the former name of the small town of Aksakovo – Adzhamler, located only 1 km northwest of Varna [11].

The Restored Positions of an Important Trade Centre in the 18th-19th Centuries

After a difficult period of protracted wars in the Black Sea Basin (mostly Russian-Turkish) and internal unrest and separatism in the Ottoman Empire, spanning the 18th and early 19th centuries, Varna once again became a centre of trade in the region. The first foreign consulates were established in the town, precisely in order to support the activities of European merchants. The first attempts in this respect were made by Russia in the 80s of the 18th century and by France in 1802-1814, and the better conditions for the realization of foreign consular projects came with the commencement of reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the 40s of the 19th century, when Austria, France, Greece, Russia, Belgium, Prussia (Germany) and others built their consular offices in the Black Sea town within a very short time. Varna regained its central importance for the trade on the Western Black Sea coast and for the trade routes crossing the region and connecting the East and the West [12].

Conclusion

The data presented here categorically prove the participation of Varna and the merchants of Varna in the centuries-long trade along the Silk Road. Obviously, the city has always been important and central not only to the commerce in the Black Sea Basin, but also in the economic life of a wider region connecting the East and the West. Future historical research will bring additional clarity to the topic. For this purpose, it is necessary to seek new evidence, both from the Turkish archives and from those of European countries such as Italy, France, Great Britain, which, in addition to their trade with the Balkans and the Orient, had specific trade interests in Varna.

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The Place of Cyril and Methodius in Russian National Consciousness in Riga at the Period 1860-1910s

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Abstract

The article refers to the celebration of the memory of St. Cyril and St. Methodius in Riga in the second half of the 19th-early 20th century. The author shows the connection of this phenomenon with the peculiarities of the state ideology in Russia of that period and the attitudes of the public consciousness of the rapidly growing Russian ethnic population of Riga.

Keywords: St. Cyril and St. Methodius, Orthodox Christians, Russian population, era of modernization

General Social and Cultural Context of Memorializing the Memory of St. Cyril and Methodius in Riga in the Second Half of the 19th-Early 20th Century

In modern Latvia with St. Cyril and Methodius are directly related to the day of Slavic writing and culture – the May, 24. But the celebration is completely depoliticized; there are services, concerts of folk groups, presentations of art works, history books, etc. [1]. The Latvian Orthodox Church welcomes the close connection of the names of St. Cyril and St. Methodius with Russian culture in Latvia, which was initiated by the activities of the Latvian Orthodox in 1925 [2]. The emblem of the Days of Russian culture in Latvia reproduces the faces of St. Cyril and St. Methodius [3]. In the 19th and early 20th century, the religious and cultural component of the attitude of the Russian population of the Baltic provinces to St. Cyril and St. Methodius were not limited.



Photo 1. Emblem of the Days of Russian culture in Latvia

Both in the intellectual tradition of the Russian Empire and in the Soviet period, coverage of the activities of St. Cyril and St. Methodius were accompanied by an indication of the three most important moments of their activity in the formation:

1. The Christian national Church among the Slavs in contrast to the Catholic clergy,
2. In the historically first experience of creating a common Slavic written and religious cultural tradition,
3. In spreading the Imperial cultural Byzantine influence [4].

All these three aspects of St. Cyril and St. Methodius were in tune with the official position of the tsarist administration in the Baltic provinces, as well as a significant part of the public consciousness of the Russian Orthodox population of this region during the period of bourgeois modernization in the 1860-1910s.

It is characteristic that the veneration of the memory of St. Cyril and St. Methodius in the Russian Empire, including the Baltic provinces, falls during the period of the first bourgeois modernization. First of all, the state authorities were interested in using these names. Russia at that time needed an ideology that could provide political and ideological consolidation and mobilization of the country, gradually freed from the feudal class system and also gradually sought support among the economically, morally and politically strengthened new strata and classes – entrepreneurs, free peasant population, rapidly growing population of cities. Traditionally the era of modernization in historiography is considered as a period of the rise of nations and nationalism [5]. This is also true for Russia, with an important clarification. In the vast multicultural and multi-religious Russian Empire, there were active processes of consolidation of the Russian nation, as well as the processes of growth of national consciousness and the formation of many other national and ethnic groups. In such circumstances, state power relied on a model of the national state system, which would have accorded priority to the establishment of a unified Russian nation with maximum emphasis values in the socio-political and cultural life of the country of the autocratic regime, Orthodoxy, the absolute dominance of the Russian language in administrative and public life of all ethnic groups, and underlined the unified Russian identity to the vast population consisting of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Orthodoxy was a very important element of the content of the Russian national identity in the era of modernization of the country. Even if we take the most important representatives of Russian literature – A. Pushkin, M. Lermontov, N. Gogol, F. Dostoevsky – Orthodox values are the most important in their artistic creativity [6]. To this list of ideological attitudes related to internal life, the foreign policy aspect was added – the cultivation of the idea of Russia as a leader, defender and liberator of the Slavic world. For such important components of the sought – for national-state ideology of the modernizing Russia as the protection of the Orthodox faith, the Slavic language and literary tradition, and the common Slavic unity, one could find cultural prototypes in the historical mission of St. Cyril and Methodius.

In 1862, the 1000th anniversary of national statehood was widely celebrated in Russia. And since 1863, the Russian Holy governing Synod has established an annual celebration of St. Nicholas. Cyril and Methodius May, 11 (24) on the Julian calendar [7]. Words and music in honour of St. Cyril and Methodius are composed by great Russian composers – Pyotr Tchaikovsky (1840-1893) and Alexander Borodin (1833-1887) and poems are dedicated to Vasily Zhukovsky (1783-1852), Fyodor Tyutchev (1803-1873) [8]. Sculptural images of St. Cyril and St. Methodius are depicted on the monument “Millennium of Russia” (1862) in Novgorod.

But it is not only the state power that seeks to develop a modernist type of ideology. The Russian population of the Baltic States, and especially of such a dynamically developing and extremely ethno-culturally diverse city as Riga, needed ideological guidelines. Russian citizens of Riga experienced the challenges of centuries-old strong cultural and Protestant traditions of the

Baltic Germans, the rising national consciousness of the rapidly increasing Latvian population of Riga, as well as the Jewish population, a significant part of which, especially during and after the revolution of 1905-1907, joined the all-Russian intellectual life, forming its own meanings in it.

The need for a unified system of values for the Russian population of Riga was dictated by the peculiarities of the ethno-demographic structure of this largest city in the Baltic provinces. Only 5 thousand Russians lived in Riga at the beginning of the 19th century, which was 15.0% of the total urban population, but by the beginning of the reforms of the reign of Alexander II by the middle of the century, the number of Russians increased to 25.8 thousand (25% of the population), and before the First world war, this number was 107.9 thousand (22.4%). Bourgeois modernization in the Baltic States was accompanied by a policy of unification of this region with the rest of the Empire, which, first of all, was expressed in the mandatory use of the Russian language in office work (until 1867, German was used). In 1868, the first men's gymnasium was opened in Riga, where all academic subjects are taught in Russian. Russian social, economic and cultural organizations have also been rapidly established in Riga since the mid-19th century: the Russian club (1863), the Bayan (*Баян*) and Lado (*Ладо*) singing societies, the Hive (*Улей*) joint-stock company (all in 1864), the first Russian Bank, the Third mutual credit society (*Третье общество взаимного кредита*), as well as the Riga Herald (*Рижский вестник*) newspaper (1869), The Russian literary circle (1876), the Russian theatre (1883), that still exist today, and many others [9].

Memorializing of St. Cyril and Methodius in Riga

In 1871, for the first time in the history of Riga, there was a celebration dedicated to the memory of the enlighteners of the Slavs, which was both religious and secular in nature. Services were held in the Church of the Annunciation, which was performed by the right Reverend Veniamin, Bishop of Riga and Mitava¹. Then a solemn ceremony was held at the Riga theological Seminary, where speeches were made by the teachers and two students who were recognized as the best of the 16 written for this day. These speeches reported the biography of Cyril and Methodius, described the features of the Slavic alphabet compared to the Greek alphabet, noted the internal connection of acts with the meaning of the gospel of John (“*In the beginning was the Word*”), as well as information about Methodius' baptism of the Bulgarian Tsar Boris. After this speech, the Seminary's rector Mikhail Drexler (*Михаил Дрекслер*)² spoke, who included the spiritual legacy of Cyril and Methodius in the contemporary ideological and political context of the inclusion of the Baltic peoples in the Russian nation. Drexler said that the Russian nation is built on different principles than it is in Western Europe, which is characterized by “a complete division of the human race into different peoples who do not understand each other”. Russians, according to him, form their own nation as a “brotherhood of members of the Slavic family” on a Christian basis, laid down by Cyril and Methodius. And in this Drexler saw the basis of the Latvian attraction to the Russian people [10].

¹ Vasily Karelin (1822-1874).

² son of a Latvian peasant Mikhail Drexler (1840-1885).



Photo 2. The Church of the Annunciation, where in 1871 the first service in memory of St. Cyril and St. Methodius was held in Riga

In 1885, the 1000th anniversary of the death of St. Methodius was widely celebrated throughout the Russian Empire. This event was a continuation of the tradition of commemoration of St. Cyril and St. Methodius in 1863 (the Millennium of the Moravian mission) and 1869 (the Millennium of the death of St. Cyril). Some modern researchers at the same time note that the state authorities needed to show that despite the unsuccessful Berlin Congress (1878), Russia “continues to claim the status of the Imperial center of Slavic civilization” [11]. In this year, by the decree of the Emperor Alexander the Third, St. The Synod ordered the Orthodox Church to hold an all-night vigil on the eve of April 6, and on the very day to hold the divine Liturgy with a solemn moleben “to the Slavic first Teachers St. Methodius and Cyril”. It was prescribed that during the celebrations, the life, works and merits of the Slavic first teachers should be shown for the benefit of the entire Slavic world, including the Russian people. On this day, students of all spiritual scientific institutions were released from classes, and solemn acts with speeches and readings were arranged in them. The distribution of biographies and images of the first teachers Methodius and Cyril was allowed in churches [12].

“Riga Herald” publishes articles by Russian historians about St. Cyril and Methodius in this year. For example, the article of Professor Alexander Kochubinsky (1845-1907) “The Millennium of Slavic self-consciousness” [13] was reprinted from the “Istoricheskiy Vestnik” (*Исторический Вестник*). This historian, philologist, and archaeologist has repeatedly visited Slavic countries.

He advocated cultural rapprochement of the Slavs, but without subjugation of some Slavic peoples by others. Sharply negative attitude to the role of Catholicism in the life of the Slavs [14].

For the Russian society of Riga, as well as for the majority of the subjects of the Empire, the names of St. Cyril and St. Methodius were not included in the list of the most important historical figures for their consciousness. Therefore, the press connects the most relevant topics for the Russian national consciousness with them. Such a major topic in the Baltic States was the strengthening of the position of the Russian language in administrative life. The Russian language was considered as the most important means of state unity and unification of the Baltic States with the rest of Russia. From “Sovremenniye Izvestia” (*Современные Известия*) reprinted in the “Riga Herald” article “The Meaning of St. Cyril and St. Methodius for Russian society”. It stated: “They are the founders of our national and state unity”. Without the Slavic alphabet, according to the author of the article, Russians could not have become Orthodox Christians: “The fate of the

Lithuanians and Czechs could have befallen us)”. Moreover, some provisions of the article extremely modernized the merit of St. Cyril and St. Methodius, treating it in the context of the 19th century as the era of the rise of Nations and nationalism. And the authority of the Solun Brothers is used to emphasize the role of the national language in nation building that unites the country: “Language is the first Foundation of national unity. All the greater is the language in writing. Only through writing does a tribe grow into a people. His self-awareness, his creativity, does not freeze in the air with his speech... it is not subject to distortion like an oral tradition, it does not remain silent like architectural monuments.” [15].

The 1000th anniversary of the death of St. Methodius was celebrated widely and solemnly in Riga. From St. Petersburg to Riga, the Slavic society sent to the headquarters of the 3rd army corps about 2 thousand copies of a pamphlet about Cyril and Methodius for free distribution to the lower members of the troops. 400 icons of St. Cyril and St. Methodius, works of academician Mikhail Mikeschin (1835-1896), 400 biographies of Cyril and Methodius in Russian, 150 in Church Slavonic, and 1500 in Latvian were sent to all Orthodox schools in the Baltic region [16]. In educational institutions of the Ministry of national education and military educational institutions, studies are cancelled. Hosted a Liturgy for the students and the governors of the parties in Riga.

During the divine Liturgy, the students took part in the singing of the troparion of St. Cyril and St. Methodius. During the Liturgy the sermon speaks about the merits of these saints [17].

Religious processions were held in churches [18]. Russian Literary circle in the hall of the Russian public house “the Hive” held a reading of speeches by teachers of the theological Seminary and theological school, the Alexander men’s gymnasium and the Lomonosov women’s gymnasium dedicated to St. Cyril and Methodius, as well as the performance of hymns by Leonid Malashkin, Wojciech Glavac (*Vojtěch Hlaváč*), Pyotr Tchaikovsky and Vasily Starorussky.

Connected chorus of about 300 participants was connected to the choir of the Episcopal choir, choirs, societies “Bayan” and “Lado”, pupils of the Riga schools, Seminary and religious school gymnasiums of Riga, the Baltic teachers’ Seminary, the Catherine school, Junker Infantry school [19]. As the Riga Herald wrote, it was “a Church and social celebration never seen before in Riga.

The Hive contains the entire flower of Russian society – about 1,500 people”. The teacher of the Alexander gymnasium, later a famous Russian statesman in the field of public education Nil Tikhomirov (1857 – after 1917) “pointed to the great cultural future of the Slavic world, designed to create a new civilization, which, combining the warring civilizations of the East and West, will perhaps establish on earth a Kingdom of peace and brotherly love” [20]. In general, the use of the memory of St. Cyril and Methodius for the political mobilization of the subjects of the Empire was characteristic of official speeches on days of celebrations. So, for example, in the Baltic teachers’ Seminary K Voskresensky made a speech about the “politically oppressive character of Roman Christianity”, “adopted by the German people, who, therefore, sending their preachers of the gospel to other peoples, also had in mind to denationalize them and politically secure them for themselves. The Greek universal Christian Church acts on all peoples in a developing way, causing them to strive for the original development of self-consciousness, and at the same time to form a politically whole and independent unit” [21].




Photo 3. Icon of St. Cyril and St. Methodius by the drawing of academician Mikhail Mikeshin

The relevant question is, who is the main customer of the veneration of the memory of St. Cyril and Methodius in the modernisation era in Riga in the 1860s-1910s – state power or Russian civil society? Russian national values in the socio-political consciousness of the modern era should be rejected as a purely “official nationality” policy, the embodiment of the formula of the Minister of national education Sergey Uvarov (1786-1855) “Orthodoxy. Autocracy. Nationality”, or in orientation to the “anti-Western ideal of development”, “resentment” [22]. For example, the daily newspaper “Riga Vestnik”, when it was edited by the famous historian of the Baltic region Yevgraf Cheshikhin (1824-1888), published the work of one of the largest Slavophil thinkers Yuri Samarin (1819-1876), who reproached the government for not paying enough attention to strengthening Russian elements in the administrative and social life of the Baltic States. Russian society and the Governor – General of the Livonia province Mikhail Zinoviev (1838-1895) even had a conflict over the issue of the Russian public's excessive independence, as the Governor believed [9].

Russian Slavophiles and their followers-traditionalists (*pochvenniki*), publishing the works of Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886), Mikhail Pogodin (1800-1875), Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), especially noting that it was the Slavophiles raised the question of strengthening the Russian beginning in Russian people [23]. Slavophile worldview is also closely connected with the Orthodox tradition [24], without which it is absolutely impossible to understand the formation of Russian civil national consciousness in the era of modernization [9]. The sympathy of the Riga Russian public for Slavophilism as a view of a special way of development of Russia, different from the one-sided orientation to Western European civilization [25], was the ideological and moral ground that accepted the veneration of the memory of St. Cyril and St. Methodius, as historically the most ancient defenders of Slavic identity.

Riga’s Russian press discussions in the period of the revolution of 1905-1907 and after it do not show any mention of St. Cyril and St. Methodius as important historical figures, the appeal to whose memory would help Russian citizens to emphasize their positions in the constant political discussions between adherents of various political positions in the Russian environment, as well as in no less acute ethnopolitical debates with other national groups of Riga residents. There is an

explanation for this. Commemoration of St. Cyril and St. Methodius in the second half of the 19th century came from the need to combine the religious, state-political and civil-national components of their historical mission. During the revolution in Baltic provinces and after it, the Russian public is politically divided between adherents of the traditional monarchical Imperial state, supporters of constitutional and democratic reforms and socialist transformations. In this situation, the value of unity of the Orthodox, state-political and civil components was realized mainly among the adherents of the moderate right-wing party “Union of October 17” (*Octobrists*). While the most popular among the Russian intelligentsia, the Constitutional democratic party (*Kadets*), and especially the socialists, distanced themselves from the orientation to the official interpretation of the unity of national, religious and state values [9]. Therefore, the revival of interest in the memory of St. Cyril and St. Methodius takes place in the other state system.

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SECTION 2
Socio-political, Economic and Cultural Studies

New Social Risks as a Challenge for Social Security

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Abstract

Industrial welfare states were built with one key objective: to protect people from the consequences of losing their ability to achieve an income from the labour market; now deindustrialisation and the tertiarization of employment, the massive entry of women into the labour force, increased instability of family structures and the de-standardisation of employment.

These trends have altered structures of social risk in western societies. Structures of social risk, however, have changed then, so that current social risks also include, precarious employment, long term unemployment, being a working poor, single parenthood, or inability to reconcile work and family life. The aim of this paper is to describe and presentation the concept of the ‘new social risks’ and its consequences for the social cohesion and financial stability of the post-industrial society.

Keywords: social policy, social protection, social security, social risk, new social risks

New Social Risks as a Consequence of Socio-Economic Changes

Social security systems have been created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as the state’s response to threats concerning a social group’s existence, generated through the development of a capitalist industrial economy. For that reason, the list of threats, later named as social risks (which initially the workers and later other social groups were protected from), is strongly related with distortion concerning the ability to achieve income in terms of employment.

Nowadays the main goal of the social policy of a modern state is to ensure a high level of social security for citizens. The social security system deals with the implementation of tasks resulting from this goal. It is designed to guarantee social security through actions aimed at reducing and compensating the consequences of the occurrence of social risk (events that cause loss or reduction of income). In accordance with international recommendations, social security is treated as one of the basic social rights of every human being [Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, European Social Charter of 1961 and Revised European Social Charter of 1996, European Code of Social Security of 1964, Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization, 1952].

The concept of social risk is related to the objective aspect of the social security system [1].

Social risk understood in traditional terms concerns the risk of lack of income from work, which results in the loss of the current social position, marginalization, exclusion, as well as other negative consequences of poverty [2]. The universality of risk understood in such way results in that its protection is obligatory, legally defined, carried out by public and legal institutions, as well as state authorities. Social risk can also be characterized as a threat of an event which occurrence causes loss in terms of owned or expected household resources [3]. This idea refers to the income

security logic expressed in the recommendation of the International Labour Organization of 1944 [4, 5].

The following types of social risk are distinguished in source literature:

1. reaching retirement age,
2. permanent or temporary inability to work,
3. death of the provider,
4. incapacity or inability to work,
5. accident at work and occupational disease [6].

All of the above-mentioned social risks refer to a situation which results in the inability to achieve income from work.

In Poland, as in other EU countries, citizens have the right to social security, guaranteed by the Constitution, due to the occurrence of any of the risks listed above. However, it is limited to risk of an insurance nature, characteristic for industrial countries, that is, incapacity to work due to illness or disability, as well as reaching retirement age [Article 67 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland]. Social assistance (care) designed for those who require outside help, regardless of the cause behind the deprivation, remains outside this field [7]. The Constitution also includes the risk of unemployment by limiting the right for social security to a situation of being out of work involuntarily and not possessing other means of subsistence.

Social security institutions and the subject scope of their activity have been designed in reference to a situation of employment forms characterized by a long period of employment and general character, being dominant on the labour market. This allowed for the dominance of the insurance technique-basing the financing of benefits on regular contributions of system participants. Whereas, contemporary employment forms are ad hoc and the tendencies on labour markets in highly developed countries are worrying: risk of unemployment, growing inequalities, injustice, or a strong contrast between the earnings in many countries, as well as tendencies for a growing polarization of society. What is worse, working is more and more often interrupted by periods of non-employment, meaning periodic breaks in paying contributions, which results in problems related to the financial liquidity of the social insurance system and a need for permanent subsidies from the state budget, lowering the competitiveness of the economy. This situation has a negative impact also on the amount of future capital benefits or PAYG-capital retirement systems. Reforms of retirement systems undertaken in many countries (especially in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe) and mainly consisting in lowering the amount of future benefits result in that future retirement pensions are not sufficient to meet the needs of people receiving the benefits and their own existence [8]. Therefore, there is a growing risk that they will become the clients of social assistance which is going to result in increasing the load on working people. Even more so, because not only the nature of employment changed, but also the entire structure of the economy.

The share of industrial production decreased at an increase of the services sector which is not characterized by such a high increase in labour productivity as industrial production. As a result, the wage growth rate also decreased. Employment of men decreased at an increase of employing women and a significant reduction of the need for low qualified workers with the remuneration within that category also becoming lower. Paradoxically, thanks to the development of computer and telecommunications technologies, the demand for traditional 'white collar' professions, meaning office workers, accountants, lawyers and officials, also decreased. The salaries within professional groups characteristic for the slowly disappearing middle class also decreased [9].

Due to the rapid technological changes and the changing structure of demand, it is currently necessary to constantly adjust professional qualifications to the requirements of the labour market

by learning throughout life as well as the inability to sustain employment in one place throughout the entire period of professional activity.

The demographic structure also changes primarily due to the phenomenon of population aging (decline of fertility and extending the duration of human life) and through changes in the structure and functions of a family [10, 11]. The traditional nuclear family, proper in terms of the industrial society, is no longer needed. The number of marriages is decreasing, the number of divorces is growing, and it is more and more difficult to find balance between professional activity and family obligations (a particularly urgent problem in terms of a family's function of care) [12, 13].

The aforementioned changes resulted in increased pressure on social security systems while limiting their possibilities. New social risks, unknown in the industrial society, also came into life.

Following Zofia Czepulis-Rutkowska, it is possible to indicate three categories in which new risks are manifest. These are:

1. Balance between paid work and caring for children and the elderly within the family.
2. Lack of qualifications (or the possibility of obtaining them) for getting a properly paid and permanent job. No possibility to adapt to the flexible labour market.
3. Loss of a proper amount of benefits due to the need to adjust them to the state's financial capabilities [14].

According to Peter Taylor-Gooby new social risks may be included in the following groups:

1. Group A. Change of social roles in the family and its structure. New risks include difficulties in combining professional work with the need to take care of children and the elderly – it is a risk of inadequate care when it is necessary.
2. Group B. In reference to changes on the labour market, new risks are connected with the lack of appropriate skills and education, which are necessary to obtain a stable, well-paid job. It is also a risk of downgrading possessed qualifications at not having access to further education.
3. Group C. In reference to changes in the model of the welfare state, extending the scope of private services results in a risk of making incorrect choices (from the point of view of a citizen-consumer's business) and regulating standards in terms of providing private services turns out to be ineffective [15].

The currently existing social security systems generally lack solutions designed for the specifics of the current situation which allow to compensate the results of new social risks. An exception consists in social security systems operating in the Nordic countries [16].

Typically, a social security model based heavily on the insurance technique turns out to be ineffective and too costly in reference to new challenges. A significant feature of new social risks consists in their predictability and possibility to experience their consequences at various stages of life. They cannot be reduced solely to the inability to obtain income from employment and the need to obtain compensation for this. The state of the inability to independently overcome their consequences without the help of the state, and the fact that their consequences cannot be dealt with by means of free market mechanisms is more important for defining and identifying them.

On the contrary, the functioning of the free market results in an intensification of their consequences. Hence, the growing role of state and over-state social policy entities such as the EU in reference to the issue of new social risks and ways of overcoming or mitigating their consequences. Social risk and benefits due to its occurrence in international and European regulations.

In international and European regulations, the basic act determining the list of social risks resulting in the right for social security consists in Recommendation number ILO of 1944

concerning securing income, in which the following have been listed as social risks (in reference to the possibility of achieving income):

1. disease,
2. motherhood,
3. disability,
4. old age,
5. death of a provider,
6. unemployment,
7. extraordinary expenses related to increased needs due to random events,
8. injury (disability and illness resulting from employment).

The ILO Convention 102 regarding the minimum social security standards from 1952 links social risks with specific benefits treated as a type of response to the occurrence of a given type of risk, i.e., with the objective scope of social security. This convention includes the following risks:

1. diseases – health benefits, sickness benefits,
2. unemployment – benefits mitigating the effects of unemployment,
3. old age – old-age benefits,
4. accident at work and occupational disease – benefits in terms of a work accident and occupational disease,
5. motherhood – maternity benefits,
6. disability – disability benefits,
7. death of the provider – benefits for the death of the provider.

No recommendations have been included in Convention No. 102, thus pointing to the timeless validity of the principles contained in Recommendation 67 of 1944 [17]. Later acts of ILO do not introduce any new types of social risk. The scope of protection expands if one of the risk categories occurs.

Similarly, the European Code of Social Security of the Council of Europe of 1964 does not introduce new categories of social risks but distinguishes the same ‘industrial’ types of risks that are included in the ILO Convention No. 102 [18]. The case is similar in terms of the revised European Social Security Code from 1990 [19]. Therefore, it can be said that in terms of community regulations, the various categories of social risks were described similarly, and a similar subject scope of social security has been established as the one set out in ILO Convention No. 102 [Regulation No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, self-employed persons and their families moving within the Community, OJ L 145, p. L 28, 30.1.1997]. It covers benefits regulated by the Member States’ provisions listed in Article 4 section 1 of this Regulation. Individual types of risks are not explicitly listed there; they can be derived only from the name and type of benefits provided in the event of their occurrence.

These are illness and maternity, disability, old age, death of the breadwinner, accident at work and occupational disease, unemployment and family burdens [17].

On 29 April 2004, the European Parliament adopted Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32009R0987> (3/10/2019)]. On 1 May 2010, it replaced Regulation No. 1408/71. Regulation 883/2004, similarly as in the previous acts, did not enumerate the types of risk, so determining them is possible only on the basis of names and types of benefits. Compared to Regulation 1408/71, the following modifications are worth noting.

As a result of the case law of the European Court of Justice, services related to long-term care (LTC) were classified as benefits related to the occurrence of a risk concerning a disease in the absence of a separate risk consisting in the necessity to consider the help of others, meaning the risk of dependability [Court of Justice of the European Union, decision C-212/06; C-208/07].

Long-term care was therefore coordinated by qualifying cash benefits for long-term care as sickness and benefits in kind (art. 34 of Regulation No. 883/2004). The risks of illness and motherhood were separated, in relation to which the subject of protection was extended also to fathers. Therefore, in countries of the EU maternity benefits can be taken advantage of by both the mother and father (it concerns maternity benefits granted in the first months of a child's life; not about educational benefits provided later in a child's life). This does not mean that a new social risk category will be formed in relation to paternity, but only establishing legal protection of a situation equated with maternity and granting the father with entitlements similar to maternity benefits. Regulations concerning family benefits have been included in Chapter 8 of Regulation 883/2004, point Family benefits. They have been arranged in a significant manner. No distinction has been made between benefits for children of professionally active people and those being taken care of by retirees and pensioners, as well as orphans. The concept of family benefits set out in the discussed regulation includes all cash and in-kind benefits for covering the maintenance costs of a family, with the exception of alimony and special childbirth or adoption allowances.

It is a novelty to include pre-retirement benefits in the scope of the regulation in question, because they have not been coordinated so far. In the context of issues related to social risk, a question arises what kind of risk we face in the case of pre-retirement benefits. Regulation 883/2004 clearly differentiates entitlements to old-age benefits from entitlements and unemployment-related benefits. Pre-retirement benefits do not fall into any of these categories.

Therefore, it can be assumed that they are related to the new category of social risk, meaning the risk of limiting or halting professional activity during the pre-retirement period [16, 17]. It is a risk related to a situation on the labour market, unknown in terms of the traditional (industrial) social security model.

Summary

The current socio-economic changes, which are accompanied by an increasing coverage of the risk of dependence in the legislations of EU member states and the necessity to develop various forms of long-term care, may significantly affect the extension of the catalogue of social risks in EU law. They also call for the need to redefine the goals and tasks of social policy, and reflect on the role of market mechanisms in meeting social needs. There is also a need to adjust the subject area of social supply to new realities. This means the necessity to gradually withdraw from the situation of social insurance domination in the sphere of social security. In view of new challenges related to the development of the post-industrial economy, first of all, the organization and method of financing social security systems should be changed. Social policy faces the challenge of relocating resources and changing the social security instruments and techniques used in order to protect society from the adverse effects of socio-economic changes, while at the same time guaranteeing everyone access to the effects of economic development. It is a condition of social development understood as a constantly better implementation of various social needs. The institutions of the European Union have a great role to play in this regard.

Some changes in the adopted catalogue of social risks take place in terms of community regulations. These changes more and more often take into account the currently occurring economic and social changes (demography, globalization, and deindustrialization). The protection

is extended over various situations related to the functioning of the labour market, motherhood, or the aging of societies. It remains an open question to what extent will the catalogue of social risks be extended in EU regulations. This is a matter of prominence and essentially means a reform of the European social model. The key to making changes in this respect may be the EU policy on the effective implementation of the right to social security for EU citizens taking advantage of the freedom of movement. The right to move freely within the Union would practically have no significance if not for additional guarantees in the field of social security. These guarantees are created due to the coordination of social security systems and provisions on the coordination of social security [20]. These provisions are superior over the national regulations of the European Union countries, and therefore their effective implementation may constitute a gateway to achieving an ever-higher level of social cohesion in all EU countries.

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Southeast European Countries and the Forced Migration Flows – Security Perspectives

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Abstract

At present the Southeast European countries are facing a historic challenge of developing migration management policies to survive as peoples and states. The topical question is how to eliminate the security threats from the flows of illegal migration and to look for benefits from its integration. The prospect of returning the economically active population, lost for the last 20 years in the search for a better life, by changing the conditions in the countries of Southeast Europe seems far more meaningful.

Keywords: migration policies, security

Forced Migration as a Challenge

In recent decades the Southeast European countries have experienced two flows of forced migration – one being their own population to Western Europe and the other being illegal migration in the same direction as a result of the wars in the Middle East and North Africa. The first one was caused by the economic and social destruction in the age of post-communism. At present the Southeast European countries are facing a historic challenge of developing migration management policies to survive as peoples and states. The topical question is how to eliminate the security threats from the flows of illegal migration and to look for benefits from its integration.

The prospect of returning the economically active population, lost for the last 20 years in the search for a better life, by changing the conditions in the countries of Southeast Europe seems far more meaningful.

Migration has taken a strategic place at the center stage in the policy and security debates in Europe today. There is no doubt that at present there is shake in the EU and it is caused by the forced migration flows in 2015-2016. It was the worst crisis of this scale since the World War II.

In 2015 and 2016 more than 2,3 million illegal crossings were detected by Frontex, the EU border surveillance agency. [1] This crisis could be compared only with the impact created by the coronavirus lockdown restrictive measures in the spring of 2020. The difference is that the first was caused by the wars, the military business and the influx of workers for low-prestige activities, which had to move the economy, and the second led to the closure and destruction of small and medium-sized businesses.

After the end of The Cold War the world did not become a safer place to live in, altogether.

Geopolitical confrontation and intensive fight for natural resources and control over main trade roads and markets are now widespread and the number of regional conflicts keeps on growing, too. The system of international security inherited from that Cold war era is unable to overcome regional conflicts and to parry off new threats to mankind. The situation in the world continues to

be imbalanced, with conflicts of long standing in it and unprecedented huge differences in wealth distribution.

One could rightfully say that the present-day capitalism could not provide normal living conditions to humankind at least at the level of elites and people of the rich countries. The world today is increasingly divided by regional and civil war and violent conflict redistribution of resources bringing huge misery to people, state destruction and forced migration flows. Global injustice, wars and poverty force millions of people to search better living conditions, work and better life chances in rich countries. This migration is stimulated by the criminal business of traffickers of human beings, weapons and drugs. It is also a mechanism for returning fighters after their crimes in Syria and other countries.

It could well be said that this chaotic process of displacement of huge masses of people looks like a rematch of people from peripheral countries for the inverted structure of our imbalanced and confused world.

The illegal migration crisis exposes real shortcomings of the EU migration system and of integration capacity. This is a crisis of administrative capacities for border protection, for migrant's registration, timely consideration of their applications and a crisis of efforts to build an effective system for their integration. In the period 2015-2016 more than 2,5 million applied for the asylum in the EU. The EU tries to combat this by reforming the EU asylum rules and creating a fairer system of distributing asylum seekers among the EU-countries, as well as strengthening the EU-border control and managing controlling irregular immigration. The respectable bureaucratic building of the EU migration legislation has literally collapsed, along with its strongholds as the Dayton agreement and the globalist dogma of free movement of people.

This is also an unprecedented crisis of security and of the idea for European solidarity and common values. There is a discussion about the collapse of the liberal cosmopolitanism as a result of illegal migration flows [2]. The aggressive neoliberal elites of the rich West and especially the leaders of the dominating EU-countries are assigned to the Southeast European countries (Greece, Bulgaria and Albania) as a 'sanitary cordon' against refugee flows. This is done through the quotas policy imposed by Germany and the maintenance of regional conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. The liberal extremism, which opened Europe's door for the migrants, is one of the reasons for the growth of terrorist attacks. Citizens of many European countries have fallen victims to them.

The crisis will not be solved without a critical analysis of the determinant factors. In this paper we will try to find answers to two questions of crucial importance for our countries. How would it be possible to manage illegal migration from the poor countries effectively – to break the road of migrants by force, to allocate them through quotas or to create conditions for their returning home? This means stopping the fiery conflicts and the relentless attempts of the superpowers to conquer the sources of energy. All former Eastern European countries had a positive experience of integration of migrants from developing countries, but with a better start – after graduating from higher education as doctors, engineers, and legal professionals.

The present-day countries in the West remember the hard-working Turkish workers who contributed to the construction of many cities. But the situation in 2014-2015 was different. The false hope of the current EU elite that this invasion of cheap workers will reduce the labour costs is about to fail. It leads to budget and security problems and creates Islamophobia, political and ethnic conflicts.

The second issue concerns the perspectives for overcoming some negative demographic trends in the South-Eastern countries by managing the return of their own migrants from the West. The data are very disturbing: during the past 25 years, nearly 20 million people (5,5% of the whole

population of Central and Eastern Europe) are estimated to have left the region! It is a real demographic catastrophe! By the end of 2012, South-eastern Europe “had experienced the largest outflows, amounting to about 16% of the early 1990’s population”. At the same time this emigration lowered the population growth in sending countries, in the majority of cases worsening the already negative demographic trends. [3] For the period 1990-2020 due to migration the population of Bulgaria decreased by 21,4%, Romania by 18,1%, Bosnia and Herzegovina – 26,5%, Ukraine – 15% [4]. These emigrants generally have been younger and better qualified than the populations they left behind. Many active people were driven to the West, after the forced suspension of the process of modernization in Eastern Europe and the transition of our countries to a peripheral capitalism. Some leaders of rich countries in the EU are aggressive populists (Macron) and do not want our workers on their labour market.

The two aspects of management of migration are very important in the context of the social security – the ability of society to withstand threats and to survive in a complex security environment. We need to define priority for our countries! Is it possible to integrate illiterate and aggressive illegal migrants, searching for good life in the rich countries, or to develop new effective return policies to attract our active and young people back to our countries? To search for the impossible integration of 2,5 million new illegal migrants or to make efforts to attract more than 20 million active and well qualified people to return home? The negative demographic trends in our countries cannot be compensated by a false integration of the illegal migrants. These are the two most important security aspects of the effective management of migration and we need to give a priority to the latter. Successful solution of migration issues in the first context is only possible with the collective efforts of the rich countries and especially the superpowers. It is necessary to end the military conflicts and all ‘humanitarian’ interventions that generate forced migration.

Forced Migration and Security Perspectives

In this situation of a global crisis we are faced up with a process of securitization and economization of forced migration caused by the collective fear of global terrorism – to mention here the terrorist attacks in the U.S., France, Belgium, England, Spain, and Russia. Another determining factor in this context is the existing global social and economic crisis in the wake of which the number of nationalist and anti-immigrant political parties in Europe is nowadays growing dramatically. The organization of measures to overcome the coronavirus has led to further differentiation of countries and the growth of national selfishness. It is an empirical fact that only big business benefits from stabilization measures.

The response of the rich West is a politicization of migration as a threat to security on the basis of inventing a connection with global terrorism and organized crime. It is only part of the truth – there are corporate agents and aggressive countries supporting terrorism and searching for benefits from the control of the migration flows.

Especially in its nationalist expression this response becomes more and more hysterical in the period of the deepening social and economic crisis of the ‘welfare state’. The Western nationalism as a degenerate successor of the Western imperialism from the first ages of the capitalist expansion imperceptibly become a very influential trend in the developed countries defining their policy as regards the rest of the world. A good symbol of this policy is the ‘Schengen barriers’ still impregnable for Romania and Bulgaria and the statements of some Western leaders (Merkel, Sarkozy) for the failure of the multiculturalism

Nationalism could not be a coherent ideology and policy. [5] People from the host countries need a new culture of peace and tolerance in treatment of refugees. The global corporate media are enemies of the peace culture. They spread monstrous lies: the refugees seek to get to the rich countries to benefit from their social system and describe them as terrorists and criminals.

There are real facts to justify the thesis that the EU policy on refugees and asylum seekers focuses on measures for their rejection of the territory of the rich countries. The aggressive elites of the rich West are assigned to the Balkans as a sanitary cordon against refugee flows. The EU is becoming now a fortress against the refugees with the help of the activity of the organization Frontex strictly guarding its borders and a common system for registration of refugee prints (Eurodac). According to the Dublin Convention (2004) each member-country which detects an immigrant with a legal status received in another country is obliged to return him to the first country. Following this corrupted mechanism, the Balkan countries become a concierge or a “cordon sanitaire” of the EU! The rich countries of the EU require us to accept the refugee flow from the Arab countries and Africa without restrictions on the basis of quotas. This is hypocrisy in action!

The deal of the EU and Turkey from March 2016 could be considered as positive. It is a good example of an effective policy because the migratory pressure has been successfully reduced. In Turkey there are about 2,5 million migrants, but their efforts to get to the rich countries across the Balkans have been limited.

We can conclude that the EU investments in security and border protection do not produce a desired result. This is due to a lack of political will to protect the sovereignty of European countries and their citizens. With the migrant flows these countries are entered by terrorists and fighters who sometimes are accountable for crimes back in Syria and Iraq. They are trained by the secret services and are potential terrorist attackers.

The integration of the majority of forced migrants turns out to be impossible. They come with the attitude of enjoying the social system and do not make efforts to get training and work. The model of multiculturalism established in the rich EU-countries is flawed by a fundamental error.

Immigrants cannot be integrated without building a culture of respect for the host culture and abiding by the law and order in the host country (values, norms). Migrants are left to live in ghettos and are subjected to a socially excluded system of social life.

It is important and relevant here to make some recommendations aiming to improve the management of the illegal migration crisis and its accompanying threats – terrorism, social exclusion, organized crime, racism and ethnic tensions.

The first recommendation is focused on the limitation of the duration of the temporary status of illegal migrants and refugees until the end of military conflicts in their countries and their rapid readmission on the basis of legal agreements with Syria, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. There are many peaceful regions in these countries, where the refugees from these wars can return to. The process of rebuilding the conflict-shaken and war-torn countries needs the support of all-powerful countries and international organizations. The establishment of new accommodation places in Africa with the EU support is also a good project.

The second recommendation relates to the need to continue the deal with Turkey and to fulfil the EU commitments. It is therefore necessary to settle the disputes with Greece and the use of natural resources in the waters of Cyprus.

The EU countries need to clarify the standards for acceptance of refugees and to settle selection and deprivation of humanitarian status of the illegal migrants by real refugees. An important condition for this is the investigation and punishment for the crimes of all returning jihadist fighters from Syria, Iraq and other conflict zones: they are an army ready for terrorist attacks. We

could add also limitations of the funding for the illegal migration, terrorism and radicalization agents in the European cities.

South-Eastern Europe in Searching for Return Policies

Our countries need to find new development policies – alternative to neoliberal models. Our lost intellectual and social potential expelled in the West must be attracted and used for the growth.

This great social change can only happen in the context of the present collapse of the neoliberal globalism and creation of a multi-polar world. The neoliberal globalism has turned our countries into dependent second-class food markets deprived of promising high-yielding productions. They need policies of re-industrialization and stopping the flow of profits in the hands of foreign corporations. Ordinary people should benefit from the advantages of the process of globalization.

The latter is a source of crises, striving for attainment of unlimited power of the global elite. Crises augment the wealth of certain people and widen the gap of global poverty.

It is necessary to reject the egoism of our own subterranean capitalism. It is not able to generate economic growth on the basis of financial speculations. If our managers do not want to pay decent wages to our skilled workers, they could expect fines and nationalization for breaches of privatization contracts.

Our countries need to develop new policies to look for investments in priority areas – high technologies, energy and transport projects, new trade roads. The integration to the EU could be considered as complementary to cooperation with the new players – the BRIC-S countries, Asian countries and our neighbours. It is time to propose to increase the cross-border cooperation within the Balkan region. Countries like Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, Albania, Greece and Turkey have more common interests to meet the threats than controversies and conflicts.

Our migrants in the West are rather driven by bad material conditions in our countries in the period of the violent suspension of the modernization process at the beginning of the 90s. The improvement of living conditions requires the eradication of corruption, building of a state of law and creation of a fair labor market on the basis of strong state regulation and gender equality [6].

A rational policy of economic and social growth could be based on some successful world models with a state regulation – China, Vietnam. We need to use the full potential of the state as an instrument for growth and new policies for promising investments. Our migrants in the West must be engaged in initiatives to revive our plundered countries.

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Potential Contributions of Grief Tourism to Cultural Convergence of the Balkan Countries

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Abstract

In addition to the economic benefits of tourism to the host countries, one of the most important benefits is to provide cultural convergence as a result of the interaction of tourists and local people.

In recent years, more and more people have been wondering about foreign cultures, the history of other countries, and what happened in history. Cultural forms of tourism are developing more than other types of tourism. Grief tourism is one of them. Grief tourism also called as dark tourism, black tourism, or than tourism is a form of tourism that involves travel to sites such as battlefields, martyrdoms, former concentration camps, old cult prisons, former concentration camps, genocide museums, war museums, monuments etc. associated with death, tragedy, sorrow, and mourning.

Balkan region has a long and rich history. In Balkan countries peoples who come from different cultural and ethical backgrounds have lived together and still live. Today, the grandchildren of people who have to migrate from the land they live in, want to visit the places where their ancestors lived, the martyrs they died in wars, and the cemeteries where they were buried. Besides this, many tourists wish to visit grief tourism sites to be able to understand the historical events better and to show their respect to the fallen, and victims.

In this paper, first of all, concept, development and importance of grief tourism in cultural convergence is emphasized. Secondly, as the case study, grief tourism sites; Gallipoli-Turkey, Regional Museum of History, Plovdiv-Bulgaria, Thessaloniki Balkan Wars Museum-Greece, Bosnia Herzigova-Sarajevo and Monster are examined. It is believed that development of grief tourism among Balkan countries will help to increase mutual understanding, to improve cultural convergence, and to understand each other better.

Keywords: Grief tourism, cultural convergence, Balkan countries, Gallipoli battlefields, Regional Museum of History-Plovdiv, Thessaloniki Balkan Wars Museum, The Bosnian War

Introduction

The Balkan region was home to great civilizations throughout history. From the old ages to the present, the Balkans have witnessed countless wars and turned into a region full of conflicts, dynamic developments, lifestyles, and cultural diversity. Perhaps the most comprehensive of these conflicts in the region occurred in the Balkan war that took place at the beginning of the 20th century during the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and all of the Balkan states became involved in this fighting [1]. During this time, all of the Balkan states achieved victories and all suffered defeats. Due to these wars, there are many monuments, martyrs and museums in today's Balkan societies. Regional Museum of History, Plovdiv, Thessaloniki Balkan Wars Museum, and Museum of Macedonia hold examples of these memories.

Wars that took place throughout history have had long term effects on the socio-cultural structure of societies. These effects are separated before, during and after the war [2]. This also applies to Balkan region. The socio-cultural diversity that existed before the Balkan wars continues within the present Balkan states. It is seen that the Balkan wars' effects have started to be evaluated by the countries in the region for tourism purposes. Buildings and areas where the Balkan wars took place still have an important position in terms of national culture in the eyes of related societies. Besides the conflicts among the communities living in the Balkans region, one can see worldwide greater conflicts in the region which left their mark in history as Gallipoli campaign of the First World War.

Cultural tourism is developing more than any other types of tourism. In recent years, more and more people have been wondering about foreign cultures, the history of other countries, and what happened in history. Grief tourism is an important part that constitutes cultural tourism. Grief tourism also called as dark tourism, black tourism, or Thana tourism is a form of tourism that involves travel to sites such as battlefields, martyrdoms, former concentration camps, old cult prisons, genocide museums, war museums, monuments etc. associated with death, tragedy, sorrow, and mourning. Mainly, grief tourism is a form of tourism that involves travel to sites associated with death and tragedy. This term created in the mid-1990s, which is the attraction for places associated with death. However, the importance of these places is not due to associations related to death and suffering, but mainly to historical value. From this perspective, the interest in the Balkan region war remaining can be a good example of grief tourism. This book chapter represents an important contribution to the domain literature and tourism practitioners as it analyses a large geographic space that was less studied in grief tourism. The study also aimed to share the suggestions developed in order to make the necessary investments in the grief tourism destinations in the Balkans and to develop cultural convergence of the countries to provide more income in the region [3, 4].

The Concept of Grief Tourism

Changes in the tourism sector in recent years have increased the trend towards alternative tourism types. Grief tourism as an alternative tourism has a very different orientation from the classical tourism concept's sea-sand and sun understanding. Tragic events such as wars, deaths, accidents, natural disasters such as earthquakes in the past have an extremely important effect on the transfer of social memory to the next generations. Those who participate in grief tourism activities remember these events by visiting these important areas and their belonging to the society become socially and culturally stronger. The concept of grief tourism was mentioned in the academic studies of Lennon and Foley (1999) for the first time [5]. Academicians who studied the grief tourism state that visitors have experiences of this tourism within the framework of five main travel purposes. These five travel purposes are also named as grief tourism typologies in the literature [6]. These travels:

- Travels to watch the death moment (These travels are now done in very few countries);
- Travels made after collective or individual deaths;
- Travels to see the symbolic ruins;
- Travels to see areas where the symbolic persons and Martyrs are buried (An example of this type is the Atatürk Museum Thessaloniki-Greece which is the birthplace of the founder of modern Turkey);
- Travels to see representative death zones.

Grief tourism is accepted as a tourism event that people are interested in the past experiences, learn about the wars their ancestors participated in, and the regions where terrorist events took place, to see the traces of their cultures in different societies and to visit the cemeteries located there [7].

Case Study: Examples of Grief Tourism Sites in the Balkans

Within the scope of grief tourism Balkan region has a wealth of heritage that can be considered as a potential destination in this regard. In this part of the study, an example of grief tourism destination is given below from each country in the Balkan region.

Gallipoli Battlefield – Turkey

The Gallipoli peninsula is located in the southern part of East Thrace, the European part of Turkey, with the Aegean Sea to the west and the Dardanelles strait to the east. Gallipoli was the scene of one of the great Allied failures of the First World War. French, British, and colonial forces (Australian, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Irish and Indian) fought against Ottoman Empire. The Gallipoli campaign (1915-1916) in and near the peninsula, was seeking to secure a sea route to relieve their eastern ally, Russia. It ended with massive destruction with a total cost of 500,000 casualties that affected many countries. During the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-22, Greek troops occupied Gallipoli on 4 August 1920, and they left the region with the Turkish War of Independence. There are now 31 Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemeteries containing mainly dead from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, India and Newfoundland, and over 50 memorials, grave sites and cemeteries dedicated to the Turkish casualties in the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Gallipoli campaign was a severe experience shared by a number of combatant nations.

Today, it has turned into a grief tourism destination that has historical significance and symbolizes cultural memory for these countries. Especially for Australia and New Zealand (known as ANZAC) the Gallipoli campaign forms roots of cultural nationalism. The current generations of Australia and New Zealand want to retain these roots that symbolize their cultural existence. In this context they organise a national day of remembrance in Australia and New Zealand that broadly commemorates Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) who served in the Gallipoli Campaign observed on 25 April each year. They organize a ritual ceremony in Gallipoli at the dawn of the night, which connects April 24 to April 25 every year. Young people from many nationalities, especially British, Turks, Australians and New Zealanders participated in this ceremony. Visiting these commemoration ceremonies and the Gallipoli peninsula where the war took place also gives young generations the opportunity to learn about each other's cultures and to approach with empathy.

Regional Museum of History, Plovdiv – Bulgaria

Bulgaria left the Ottoman Empire on 22 September 1908, took part in the first and second Balkan wars and fought with many regional states, especially the Ottoman empire and Serbia.

Today, many monuments, buildings and museums that reflect this period of existence of Bulgaria serve the tourism of the country. One of these structures is Regional Museum of History, Plovdiv. Founded in 1951, this museum was designed with a method that follows the historical (from 15th century to present) course of Bulgaria which includes the wars of Bulgarian national

unification. Regional Museum of History also offers an interesting history of the struggle for independence from the Greek Orthodox church for the Bulgarian Orthodox church.

The History Museum manages the expositions of the Unification of Bulgaria which is dedicated to Plovdiv's key role in the events of 6 September 1885, as the capital of Eastern Rumelia. It covers the period from the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which split Bulgarian lands into five parts, to the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885. Regional Museum of History occupies the former building of the Eastern Rumelian Regional Assembly (Parliament) designed by the Savoy architect, Pietro Montani, and built 1883-1885. The Museum holdings keep more than 60,000 exhibits, amongst them unique collections of cold steel and firearms, orders and medals, armament, personal belongings, printed publications, apparel and items from town's everyday life, photos and documents [8].

The exposition about 'The Bulgarian National Revival' was opened in 1985 in The History Museum on the 100th anniversary of the Unification of the Principality of Bulgaria and East Rumelia, an event which has become a national symbol. Five exhibition halls show personal belongings, award tokens, firearms, photos and documents of participants in the unification and the Serbo-Bulgarian War. This museum and similar monuments and buildings provide the opportunity to evaluate the relevant period from the whole perspective of the region [8].

Thessaloniki Balkan Wars Museum – Greece

Thessaloniki (Bulgarian: Solun, Turkish: Selanik) is an ancient city whose origins date back to Alexander the Great. It has been an important port on the Aegean Sea and the natural outlet for the hinterland of the Vardar valley. The Ottoman Empire had controlled Thessaloniki since 1430.

The city was connected to Greece with the Balkan wars [9]. The Balkan Wars Museum is in Gefyra, 25 kilometres from Thessaloniki, the old name of 'Topsin' in the corner of the great farm lord of the Ottoman era Modiano Central Macedonia-Greece. The two-storied building that hosts this museum is of great historical importance for the country. The reason for this is the building which was the home to the negotiations between the Greek army and the Ottoman forces in 1912 before the town surrendered to the Greeks. The museum was founded on 26 October 1999 and dedicated to the Balkan Wars.

There are many materials in the museum that reflect the old cultural values of Balkan countries participating in the Balkan wars and the visual status of their military units. Especially the museum is home to the paintings of Kenan Messare, the son of Hasan Tahsin Pasha, who was an Ottoman commander during that time. This commander surrendered Thessaloniki over to Greeks and afterward declared a traitor by the Ottomans.

The museum is home to very large collection of Greek, Bulgarian, and Turkish war remains.

The main materials in the museum consists of Greek and Bulgarian Mannlicher rifles, a Turkish Mauser, a Greek Mannlicher pistol, Turkish Mauser and Smith and Wesson pistols, and the whole range of swords used by the Greek and the Bulgarian armies and uniforms of the Ottoman, Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian armies are also on display in the Balkan War Museum [10].

The Bosnian War – Sarajevo and Monster

It is the most recent and devastating conflict in which the nations in the Balkans involved after the first world war. The Bosnian war came about as a result of the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the Slovenian and Croatian secessions from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina passed a referendum for

independence on 29 February 1992. Against Bosniaks and Croats, Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum and rejected its outcome [11]. The desire to live together, which has existed since the Ottoman empire, was suddenly replaced by power wars and major events leading up to ethnic cleansing. The war lasted from 1992 to 1995 and left the region in ruins, over two million people displaced and around 100,000 people were killed during the conflict [12].

Bosnia and Herzegovina's characteristically rich ethnic and religious mix. Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and Roman Catholicism are all present, with the three faiths generally corresponding to three major ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, respectively. The capital of the country is Sarajevo; important regional cities include Mostar and Banja Luka. Sarajevo and Mostar were the regions most affected by the conflict. Events such as the Siege of Sarajevo and the Srebrenica massacre later became iconic of the conflict.

Especially Sarajevo still bears many scars from the war. While some of the most damaged buildings (such as the parliament building or the Holiday Inn) have been renovated, some of the iconic buildings (such as The Old People's Home, The former Yugoslav Army barracks, the former Serb HQ positions, Olympic bobsleigh run area and the residential high-rises next to the King Fahd Mosque) still carries the traces of war as it was left during the war.

Mostar city also affected by both the Bosniaks' war against the Serbs and then against the Croats. Situated on both shores of the Neretva River, the city has long been the urban center of the Herzegovina region and was widely held to be one of the most multi-ethnic cities in the former Yugoslavia [13]. The city is known mostly for its famous World Heritage Site of the "Old Bridge" which had connected the west bank with the east for more than 400 years. It was destroyed in the Bosnian War and had a reconstruction of the original real old bridge. There is also an "Old Bridge Museum". Destruction of the city can be seen in the eastern Mostar hillside where there is the Museum of Herzegovina. In addition, "Bulevar", which still forms the dividing line between Muslim and Croatian Mostar, carries sharp traces of the war. In Mostar city, there are areas with deep traces of war continue to exist. Nevertheless, Mostar and Sarajevo cities are the best examples of how massive conflicts separate communities, eliminates tolerance and cause destruction of cultural assets. Development of grief tourism in Bosnia and Herzegovina's will help to increase mutual understanding and will improve cultural convergence of related resident communities.

Conclusion

In the Balkans where serves as a bridge between Asia and Europe, societies with many different languages, religions, traditions and customs have lived together and shared the same lands for centuries. Communities that have been living together for centuries, respecting each other's cultural and religious values and lives, fighting each other for various reasons, having to migrate, leaves deep pain and traces in the soul of people and societies.

Grief tourism, which is a part of cultural tourism, is an important tool for people and nations to understand each other better. Balkans is an important cultural and respectively grief tourism destination thanks to rich and unique cultural heritage that includes battlefields, museums, archaeological sites, historical cities, martyrdoms, monuments etc. associated with death, tragedy, sorrow and mourning.

Visiting battlefields, cemeteries, martyrdoms and museums will help people to understand the difficulties that societies lived, to feel social and cultural intimacy with destination. In addition, new generations' visitation the lands where their ancestors lived, will help them to understand what happened in the history and will enrich their cultural and social life.

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What Prevents Western Balkans Countries to Respond to Contemporary Security Challenges?

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Abstract

We live in a constantly changing world. The scope and diversity of these changes is unprecedented in human history. Technological developments, especially in the field of communications and transport, have fundamentally changed our lives. All this, certainly, had a strong impact on the development of security trends, as well as security threats. In addition to the traditional military threats, which have not disappeared and that we cannot ignore, modern societies are faced with myriad non-military threats. They require rethinking of national security and formulating national strategies that will take into account new realities. The aim of this paper is to ascertain whether the Western Balkans countries are capable of dealing effectively with modern asymmetric threats. More precisely, the research is focused on determining if they are capacitated to provide an adequate national response to the coronavirus pandemic, which hit the whole world, then to the migrant crisis and, finally, how they fight corruption. Objective and subjective problems faced by the Western Balkans countries and the consequences of the inadequate national response on their own societies and beyond are presented in the paper. This is done through the concise and still thorough elaboration of the contemporary security challenges and problems they face. Finally, the paper offers possible solutions to these problems.

Keywords: Western Balkans, security, COVID-19, migrants, corruption

1. Introduction

The world is dramatically changing. That is particularly apparent in the way of living, where we can witness an obvious shift towards a sense of overall insecurity. This is directly related to the appearance of new security challenges, which are multidirectional, interrelated and enlarged in number. However, it doesn't mean that traditional threats vanished, which makes efforts to respond properly much more difficult. Therefore, humankind is really threatened and in persistent anxiety of terrorism, transnational crime, natural and technological disasters, illegal immigration, pandemics, political volatility and many other societal threats, more than ever before. These societal threats, in particular, are very applicable in the region of the Western Balkans.

Consequently, all countries should take them seriously in consideration, and develop adequate national security strategies respectively. Then, the question is what does prevent Western Balkans countries to respond effectively to contemporary security challenges, if anything? Unfortunately, there are many impediments that muddle appropriate national response, some of them common for the entire region, others vary from country to country. These that are specific for each country are often related to the social and political system that is in place in a respective nation.

In the modern thinking, societal security is one of the key elements of national security. This type of security is associated with every part of the social life of citizens, like the economy, religion, ethnicity, education, sports, politics, health care and every other aspect of living that citizens are feeling insecure without. Security is not based only in the perspective of the state and people that lead the state. Today, it is very much about citizens' perception, whether they feel safe or not. Therefore, security is a matter of observation. It is not on the state to tell people that they are safe but to give the people every reason not to feel insecure. The reason for fear could be related to political situation, ethnic and religious tensions, human rights, health care system, crime and corruption, any kind of terror, etc. In this sense, the subject of this paper are dilemmas, which include the legal order of the system, the balance of centralization and decentralization, politicization, coordination, as well as other factors that reflect its efficiency. By elaborating the procedures and measures taken, the intention is to point out the need and initiate possible improvements to the entire system.

2. COVID-19 Pandemic as a Political Tool

The actual COVID-19 pandemic, as a massive health crisis, seems to be a real test for the functioning of the national strategies and entire system of the state. In crisis situations, society inevitably faces security challenges of various natures, such as the current pandemic, which threatens human health. Individuals - citizens are endangered, but the state is also endangered, society is endangered, locally and beyond. So, without reservation, this is an obvious security threat, which utterly implies the inclusion of all segments of the system, and inevitably and to a significant extent, the security subsystem. It has multidirectional impact, including the disruption of lives and vanishing of economy, internationally. No doubt that this crisis makes a humanitarian and development impacts intimidating to cause serious social, political and economic consequences, predominantly for the poor and weak states.

Thus, this very complex challenge certainly requires adequate organization of the entire state system, with efficient and complementary operation of all subsystems. Given the nature of the specific problem, it is understandable that health care organizations are “on the first line of defence”, but no less important role is played by other subsystems, such as political, security, economic, legal, educational, etc. However, the key challenge that arises on a daily basis is the organization and efficient management of the system as a whole, as well as adequate cooperation between subsystems.

Despite statements by officials that countries have responded well to the pandemic, numerous anomalies and inefficiencies have surfaced, which clearly call into question the best possible course of action. It is evident that the World Health Organization (WHO) initially also characterized the measures taken in the region as good, but the main and only parameter, which was taken into account, was the current data on the number of infected, treated and dead. That these figures do not reflect the true situation is confirmed by daily analyses of the functioning of the above-mentioned subsystems, and thus of a state system as a whole. Also, it has been shown by the latest numbers that illustrate dramatic increase of the infected cases in all Western Balkans states. (World Health Organization, Epi Week 27)

If we start from the health, the first thing we see, for instance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), is that there is no single health system, but it is fragmented, with uneven action, both at the level of the entities and ten cantons in the Federation of BiH. This results in serious problems, from the fact that even after months of crisis there are no prescribed protocols for the patient's treatments, evident lack of funds, confusing procurement of equipment, uncoordinated actions of medical

institutions, to various regulations and procedures within administrative units. Undoubtedly, such a setting is the result of a compromise between political elites, based on ethnic matrices and legalized through constitutional and legal solutions. Constitutional determinants, and then legal procedures, instead of sufficiently regulating the system, they created serious restrictions for its efficient functioning, even distorting perception of national security. And until the emergence of crisis situations, such as the current pandemic, these are taboo topics – a constitutional category!

However, if society wants to be progressive, then the only solution is to view every crisis, apart from being a challenge, as an opportunity. That could imply the constant improvement and adjustments of the system as a whole, as well as its subsystems, including the Constitution modification.

Limited capabilities of state institutions are emphasized, at the same time, with obvious efforts by lower administrative units to increase their accountability. In this particular case, this was confirmed through the minor involvement of the Parliament, the Presidency and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which almost have not functioned during the pandemic.

What is particularly worrying is the awareness that some political leaders have used this crisis to further undermine the political system of the state and endanger national security. The most glaring example of the confusing functioning of the system is manifested through totally uncoordinated measures at the state level. Moreover, there was an impression that diametrically different procedures were being deliberately introduced at the lower levels, perhaps, with the aim to demonstrate the autochthonous actions of the entity and cantonal administrations. As a result, citizens suffered different movement time restriction, diverse quarantine compulsions, the introduction of curfews, etc. It is not necessary to elaborate what consequences the mentioned uncoordinated measures caused for the citizens, who, for example, had the need to move from one to another administrative unit. Additional mistrust among citizens was caused by numerous cases of suspicious procurement of medical equipment, which alludes that corruption is a serious obstacle to the functioning of the system in the Western Balkans, especially in crisis situations.

Just in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are number of open criminal cases suspecting politicians, companies and individuals for illegal procurement of medical devices, ventilators, masks, COVID tests, etc. In the recent ‘Srebrena malina’ case Prime Minister of the Federation of BiH was arrested. (Balkan Insight, May 29, 2020: 11)

Current pandemic showed that the established state system was dysfunctional internally, but also at the international stage. This has been proven by the number of confusing requests for assistance that were submitted through unsustainable and unofficial channels, to Serbia, the Russian Federation, and Hungary. Of course, the countries in question also knowingly violated international norms, but more obviously, their actions directly undermined the constitutional order and national security of the state. The accuracy of this statement is confirmed by speeches of the officials of the mentioned countries, starting with President Vučić, who said that no one can prevent Serbia from violating international regulations by helping Kosovo and Republika Srpska! (Kožljak, 2020) In addition, the Republika Srpska entity demonstrated illegal international action through the engagement of members of the Armed forces of the Russian Federation in the disinfection of health care institutions, ignoring the BiH security system. So, COVID-19 crises clearly demonstrated inefficiency of the state system that has been shown by complicated decision-making process, extreme decentralization, political disputes, lack of coordination, all suggesting that change is required.

In contrary to the described decentralized system, Serbia demonstrated an opposite pattern, which has also proven itself as inadequate. Absolutely centralized governing in Serbia has been very often described as last bastion of totalitarian regime in the region, where one man – president

Vucic, decides about all procedures, measures and actions. He used COVID-19 pandemic for day-to-day political gain, often neglecting horrible consequences and wide-ranging dissatisfaction of the population. Recent announcement of the Government to impose strict restriction measures caused very violent demonstration and unrest in few Serbian cities, including the capital Belgrade.

With the aim to control demonstrations, president Vucic engaged all available police resources, including the Special anti-terrorist unit and Gendarmerie, which clashed with protestants, using even a tear gas. (DW. July 8, 2020) This, undoubtedly suggests that COVID-19 crises have been widely politicized, and thus not adequately dealt.

Similar situation has been seen in other Western Balkans countries, where instead of the focusing on the efficiency of the system to cope with pandemic, it has been misused for political purposes, which causes constant dissatisfaction of citizens. Therefore, it is not surprise that European Commission, or some EU countries separately, preventing spread of the COVID-19, imposed a ban for the most of these states citizens to enter the EU.

There are always alternatives for what governments are doing recently. Every crisis is an opportunity for necessary reforms of the system and institutions or adjusting of agencies to better manage challenges. In some cases, even constitutional reforms are needed, in others restructuring, or just introduction of new procedures. Reforms and restructuring, as well as transfer of legal, social and civil service activities online could also make a system more efficient. Innovations like digital transformation is undoubtedly one of examples of the evolving opportunities enabling everyone to continue doing business regardless of the increasing need to isolate.

3. Migrant Crisis and the Inability to Answer Adequately

One of the most serious security threats the Western Balkans countries have been facing is certainly the migrant crisis. Migrants began arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 2017, and according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 29,232 migrants entered the country last year, mainly originating from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The organization also suggests that between 7,000 and 8,000 migrants have been constantly residing in BiH, mostly in Una-Sana Canton, and a very small number in Sarajevo and Tuzla Cantons. (IOM, 2020) Due to its geographical location, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a transit route for migrants aiming for the Western European countries. For this issue, which at the national level has two dimensions – humanitarian and security, to be successfully addressed it is crucial for the BiH Ministry of Security to synchronize and coordinate actions of all the national, entity, and local law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, international character of the migrant crisis in BiH requires intensive coordination and cooperation between Croatian, Serbian, as well as the EU member states' law enforcement agencies.

Unfortunately, the migrant crisis has brought to the surface all the impotence and dysfunction of BiH security system and the inability or rather unwillingness thereof to coordinate activities at the national level. The Migration and Asylum Strategy of the BiH Ministry of Security 2016-2020 expired in March this year, the new one has not been adopted, so there is no longer a national strategic document that could be used as the basis to resolve the migrant crisis. However, the current situation wouldn't have been so difficult if the mentioned Strategy had not remained a dead letter. Some of the key medium-term goals for the period 2016-2020, defined by the Strategy, were: "increasing the efficiency of state border control in BiH; strengthening institutional capacities in BiH in the field of migration; and the establishment of a permanent system of BiH migration policy coordination and implementation". (Strategy 2016-2020) We have witnessed that for more than three years there has been absolutely no coordination in this area and migrants enter

and leave BiH every day virtually without any control. According to the current director of the BiH Border Police, Zoran Galić “for the BiH Border Police to successfully respond to migrant crisis, more than 1000 additional police officers are needed.” (Blic, 2020) This statement would have made more sense if it had been given at the beginning of 2018. Now, it only further accentuates institutional responsibility in the implementation of the 2016-2020 Strategy. Had the strategy been implemented, the migrant problems in BiH could have been significantly reduced.

In addition, the irresponsibility of the government institutions is additionally emphasized by the European Commission’s Opinion on BiH application for membership in the European Union, which emphasizes that “coordination of migration-related measures among competent institutions across all levels of government is poor”. (European Commission, 2019: 15) Unfortunately, almost nothing has been done in this case either. Moreover, the same has been reiterated in the latest report of the European Commission under the visa suspension mechanisms highlights: “The Coordination Body within the Ministry of Security, responsible for monitoring migratory trends, and acting as operational headquarters in case of crises is not functioning effectively, in particular regarding the allocation of suitable premises for reception centres and relocation of asylum seekers and migrants to available accommodation.” (European Commission, 2020: 6)

Luckily, international institutions have not remained silent on the problems of migrants in BiH.

One of the international institutions that have provided immeasurable assistance and support to dysfunctional institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the local communities in resolving the migrant crisis is the International Organization for Migration. IOM has significantly expanded its presence in Una-Sana and Sarajevo Canton to provide migrants with accommodation and basic needs. Supported by the European Union, the Council of Europe Development Bank and the German Federal Civil Protection Agency, the organization has opened six migrant centres and one tent camp in Una-Sana and Sarajevo Canton. However, this is still not enough to accommodate all migrants.

Since the beginning of the migrant crisis, BiH has received over 35 million euros from the European Commission to strengthen and expand migrant management capacity. (EU Delegation to BiH, 2019 and European Parliament, 2019) What the national institutions, in coordination with local communities, should have done was to find appropriate facilities in the wider area of BiH in order to alleviate the migrant pressure suffered by Una-Sana Canton, which has not been done so far. Some local communities have resolutely rejected such a possibility, while BiH Presidency member Milorad Dodik demands “complete sterilization” (N1info, 2020) of Republika Srpska from migrants, in order for RS citizens to be safe and emphasizes that they will not allow any centres for migrants to be open. Dodik has been vocal in rejecting demands coming from some Western institutions to evenly distribute the migrant problem throughout BiH. He also advocates urgent deportation of migrants from BiH and the hermetic closure of borders. (Ibid) Such a rigid attitude additionally complicates already serious situation, but it is also a “symptom of the weak constitutional set-up of BiH, where several levels of government overlap, and increases the possibility of a humanitarian crisis”. (European Parliament, 2019) The fact was corroborated by the UN special rapporteur on migration Felipe González Morales: “the increased flow of migrants has exposed the significant institutional and coordination weakness of relevant authorities at different levels of BiH”. (UN Human Rights, 2019)

As already mentioned, neighbouring Croatia and Serbia are also coping with this burning security problem that threatens to seriously shake the entire security system of the states. However, instead of a coordinated and joint approach to this problem, we read daily media reports about Croatian authorities forcibly sending back to BiH barefoot, hungry and beaten migrants. The Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN) has recorded cases of illegal use of improvised

detention, abuse, inhumane, even brutal treatment of migrants by the Croatian police, and the use of muzzle-free dogs to capture them. There have been frequent cases of serious injuries sustained by migrants from dog bites, as confirmed by medical findings. Dogs are also used by Serbian police to catch migrants, indicating a regular practice of dehumanizing migrants. Numerous cases of violent and inhumane behaviour by Serbian police towards migrants have also been reported. (BVMN, 2019) The situation is further complicated by the fact that in addition to the agreed cooperation between law enforcement agencies of BiH, Croatia and Serbia, practically very little has been done jointly to solve this problem. All that is needed is a little more mutual understanding, respect and good neighbourly relations in order to effectively resolve the migrant crisis, which is becoming more and more a serious security problem, both in the Western Balkans and in the EU countries.

4. Corruption – the Most Serious Opponent of Democracy

Corruption is a malignant disease affecting all segments of society and state, and to which even far more developed countries than BiH are not immune. In scope, corruption can be petty, grand and systemic. According to the Global Corruption Index, of 199 countries, Croatia ranks 46th, BiH 103rd, and Serbia 111th on a scale of 1 to 100, with 1 indicating the lowest level of corruption. (2018) Although BiH is not at the top of the most corrupt countries in the world, monitoring daily situation in the country, we can rightly claim that systemic corruption is effective in BiH, which seriously threatens its democratic development and Euro-Atlantic aspiration. BiH Agency for Prevention of Corruption was established at the end of 2009. However, it does not possess effective mechanisms for the implementation of measures in the fight against corruption, so that in ten years of its existence it failed to achieve recognizable result. It practically remained invisible. At the same time, corruption is ‘flourishing’ and the country is incapable of coping with it. The Anti-Corruption Strategy 2015-2019 (the new one has not yet been adopted) emphasizes: “lack of political will, insufficient harmonization of BiH legislation with international anti-corruption documents, lack of freedom of action in the fight against corruption, the complexity of the political system, and the lack of coordination” as impediments to the successful fight against corruption. (Strategy 2015-2019) The same problems have also been recognized in the in the latest European Commission report: “There are systemic shortcomings in the operational cooperation of law enforcement agencies, due to the lack of harmonisation of criminal legislation in the country, exacerbated by weak institutional coordination, and a very limited exchange of intelligence.” (European Commission, 2020: 7)

BiH citizens constantly witness various acts of corruption. However, the judicial system is so weak and, unfortunately, it has not remained immune to this anomaly, so that no serious corruption case has been prosecuted in BiH since the end of war. The same has been observed in the mentioned European Commission report: “Final convictions in high-level corruption cases are very rare and sanctions do not act as a sufficient deterrent. A proactive approach remains fundamental to countering criminal infiltration of the political, legal and economic systems.” (*Ibid*) Corruption in BiH has become so widespread that most citizens have begun to view corruption as the only way to exercise basic human, social and business rights. “Despite many years of reforms, the engagement of the international community and donor aid, widespread corruption still remains the most significant problem in BiH and undermines any substantive reforms that would lead to the establishment of a functioning and self-sustainable country”. (Transparency International BiH, 2016) However, the situation is not much better in neighbouring Serbia, where corruption is equally prevalent at the national as well as at the local level. Although

the Serbian people view corruption as one of the most serious social problems, they are still reluctant to report corruption cases fearing unpleasant consequences they might face. Therefore, as in the case of BiH, there is no rule of law and no strong judicial institutions to protect victims of corruption and whistle-blowers. On the other hand, Croatia, even though ranked 46th in the Global Corruption Index and a member of the EU and NATO, has not solved the problem of corruption by far. Although Croatia had to adopt numerous of laws and take numerous anti-corruption measures in the process of preparing for EU membership, according to the Transparency International Croatia President Davorka Budimir, “the fight against corruption in Croatia does not exist today”. (Transparency International Croatia)

Even though Croatia is a member of a prestigious club of developed and democratic EU countries, and Serbia and BiH are still not, it seems that they suffer almost equally from a disease called corruption. Whether the cause lies in common traditional, cultural and social values is a question for some further research.

5. Conclusion

For all the countries in the rapidly changing international system to grow and prosper, it is of utmost importance to adjust to the contemporary political, economic, security and every other progress. Unfortunately, most of the Western Balkan countries failed to do so. They failed to keep up the pace with the latest developments, and the consequences are serious. COVID-19 pandemic has been used as an instrument for pursuing political goals, political agenda prevents decisive response to the migrant crises and eradicating corruption which threatens to completely collapse government institutions. In addition, fragmented and uncoordinated health system has seriously jeopardized non-coronavirus patients, while illegal migrants have shaken already weak security system. On the other hand, corruption deters foreign investments, crucial to economic growth and prosperity of the Western Balkan countries; it favours expansion of grey economy; jeopardizes the rule of law; and causes distrust of people in government institutions, which results in their alienation from the state. Plethora reasons for poor response and in general performance of national institutions are mentioned in the paper, some objective, other subjective. Some of these include fragmented and decentralised political system, weak national institutions, overlap of competencies, and political incompetence. Either way, strong EU and particularly NATO membership perspective and determination of the international community would, definitely, help successful addressing these issues.

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Russia's On-Commodity Export Support System for Deliveries to Bulgaria

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Abstract

The article explores the support system for non-oil exports in Russia in the supply of goods to Bulgaria. The most effective mechanisms of state regulation of international entrepreneurship in the Russian Federation are identified. The effectiveness of the application of acceleration to promote Russian non-primary goods to world markets is assessed. The prospects for expanding Russian exports of non-primary goods through the implementation of state programs are determined.

Keywords: Bulgaria, Russia, foreign trade, export, support system, government programs

Introduction

A characteristic feature of the national system of international entrepreneurship in modern-day Russia is the instability of the development of market relations that arises as a result of the implementation of socio-economic reforms, as well as the ongoing geo-economical processes in the global economy.

Owing to its peculiarities, international entrepreneurship turns out to be highly sensitive to changes in the external environment even in the conditions of a stable economy, and since the external environment in modern economic conditions is characterized by exceptional mobility and volatility, it significantly complicates the activities of Russian non-resource commodity exporters.

In this regard, the issues related to increasing the effectiveness of state policy in the field of supporting international entrepreneurship, the need to establish a clear vertical structure capable of effectively resolving the contradictions arising between the exporters and local, regional and federal governments are particularly acute.

Today, the country faces the need to re-evaluate its prospects as part of cooperation with the leading economies of Europe and Asia. At the same time, government authorities keep stating with increasing frequency that Russia intends to take its rightful place not only on the political map of the world, but also in the division of labor system. Therefore, the development of scientific and practical fields of entrepreneurship development on the basis of state support seems to be a relevant research topic.

It should be noted that Bulgaria's share in Russian exports in 2019 amounted to 0.6365% compared to 0.6543% in 2018. According to the share of Russian exports in 2019, Bulgaria took 34th place (in 2018 – also 34th place). At the same time, Russia's export to Bulgaria in 2019 amounted to \$ 2,690,957,966, decreasing by 8.60% (\$ 253,114,044) compared to 2018 [1].

Analysing the structure of Russian exports, it can be noted that in recent years there has been a change in the composition of products supplied to Bulgaria. Although in 2019 the leading positions

were retained by raw materials exports: mineral products (HS codes 25-27) – 76.82% of Russia's total exports to Bulgaria, metals and products from them (HS codes 72-83) – 10, 17% of Russia's total exports to Bulgaria. Nevertheless, one can observe a noticeable increase in non-resource exports, in particular machinery, industrial equipment and vehicles (HS codes 84-90) – in 2019, 6.39% of Russia's total exports to Bulgaria (5.59% in 2018), chemical industry products (HS codes 28-40) – 3.64% of Russia's total exports to Bulgaria (2.50% in 2018).

The biggest growth in Russia's non-oil exports to Bulgaria in 2019 was recorded (in terms of value) with respect to supplies of inorganic chemical products, the volumes of which increased by more than 10 times compared to 2018 and grew by \$ 42,142,730, as well as in ships, boats and floating structures – this category also increased by a factor of two, or by \$ 6,371,668 in monetary terms.

The article substantiates and devises practical recommendations for the development of state support for non-oil exports of the Russian Federation, which has prospects for expansion to international markets, including Bulgaria.

Based on the Strategy for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in Russia for the period up to 2030, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation (No. 1083-r dated June 2, 2016), the development of non-resource exports is considered as a factor of social stability and providing a high level of employment, as well as innovative development and improvement of the national economy's industrial composition. The strategy is aimed at creating a flexible, adaptive and competitive economy, ensuring high speed of technological renewal and stable employment of the population.

With the imposition of anti-Russian sanctions and the ongoing economic crisis in the country, the direction of government policy towards business entities is aimed not only at increasing tax revenues from their activities, but also at reducing tension in the labor market, as well as at finding ways to accelerate the innovative development of the economy, in the light of the state-formulated goal of restructuring the economy by supporting socially significant activities.

Literature Review

Modern aspects of the international trade development, foreign economic policy and the external economic complex of Russia were touched upon in the works of B.N. Burmistrov, I.I. Dyumulen, V.S. Zagashvili, I.D. Ivanov, V.P. Obolensky, V.A. Oreshkin, S.A. Sitaryan, A.N. Spartak, Sh.M. Yamalutdinova and others.

Some practical aspects of state support for exports, as well as an analysis of the support measures adopted by the state for exports in Russia and certain developed and developing countries, were addressed in the works of V.V. Pikhtin, A.V. Ataev, E.G. Shiflinger, A.A. Zharinov, A.G. Pak and others.

So, in our opinion, the topics related to which forms the state support for entrepreneurship should take haven't attracted a sufficient amount of research, and, as a result, when it comes to prerequisites necessary for creating a favorable environment for Russian business in the field of international trade, a lack of understanding exists.

In recent years, there have been certain publications that substantiate the need to develop and improve the effectiveness of state policies of providing support to non-resource exports, as well as analyze the content of separate mechanisms of such policies and their implementation. At the same time, the formation and development of entrepreneurship in the field of foreign economic relations as an independent economic problem still hasn't been sufficiently studied.

Methodology

Factor analysis, the analogue approach, the abstract-logical method, and the expert assessment are used as the main tools for studying the support system for non-resource exports of the Russian Federation to Bulgaria.

In studying the prerequisites for the formation and current conditions of the Russian system of state support for exports and developing recommendations for its improvement, we used methods of historical, comparative, structural and functional analysis, as well as the apparatus of economic statistics.

Results

On July 24, 2007, Federal Law No. 209-FZ On the Development of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in the Russian Federation was adopted. In accordance with the law, the average number of employees for the previous calendar year should not exceed the following limit values for the average number of employees for each category of small and medium-sized enterprises: medium-sized enterprises are allowed to have from 100 to 250 employees; small enterprises could have up to 100 employees; and the numbers of employees working at micro-enterprises (a subsection of small enterprises) should not surpass 15.

Limitations are established in accordance the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 702 “On the limiting values of revenue from the sale of goods for each category of small and medium-sized enterprises” issued on July 13, 2015. For the following categories, revenue limits are set for the previous year excluding VAT:

1. microenterprises – 120 million rubles.
2. small enterprises – 800 million rubles.
3. medium-sized enterprises – 2 billion rubles.

It should be noted that in 2020, instead of sales revenue, the income criterion is used.

Russian legislation places a restriction on the share of foreign companies in the charter capital.

Small and medium-sized organizations with a share of foreign companies of no more than 49% can maintain their small business status. The main condition is that such a foreign organization itself should be small. There is another important limitation – the total share of foreign companies in the charter capital of an LLC is not limited if these companies are not offshore and meet the criteria for medium-sized business in terms of revenue and average number of employees used in the Russian Federation [2].

The economic significance of the development of non-resource exports based on small and medium-sized enterprises is as follows:

- a source of stable budget revenues, since the dominant part of the workforce is employed in this sector of the economy;
- an integrating component, which is manifested in the desire of entrepreneurship to adapt to the situation in the international market;
- development and implementation of technical and technological innovations that contribute to the development of scientific and engineering efforts;
- the formation of competitive relations through the creation of groups of small enterprises, which are characterized by rapid growth and copying of products of leading organizations [3];

- expansion of production through the use of local sources of raw materials, as well as directions considered not appealing to large business, involving part of the funds owned by the general public and previously used for personal consumption, in production.

The international enterprise system, based on the specialization and integration of production, provides a relatively comprehensive and cost-effective use of productive forces. The development of international specialization and integration on the basis of the division of labor allows one to concentrate efforts and specialize in the production of certain types of products. It excludes the possibility of the formation of a single-crop structure of the economy, since it involves the creation of a rational economic complex of interconnected and complementary branches of the national economy.

In the Russian Federation, state support for non-resource exports is implemented through the program-based method that includes the selection of measures for the development of activities of international business entities, industries and territories, which are consistent with the corresponding set of tools, forms and methods of state support and sources of financing for a certain period. Generalized state support mechanisms are presented in Fig. 1.




Fig. 1. Scheme of a model of government regulation and support for exporters

Financial policy key instruments to support non-oil exporters in the Russian Federation include:

- subsidies;
- budget investments;
- state and municipal guarantees for the obligations of business entities and organizations forming the support infrastructure for business entities.

Property support of subjects of international entrepreneurship can be carried out in the following areas:

- assistance in providing modern equipment and technologies to business entities, in the creation of a network of technology parks, leasing firms, business incubators, production and technology centers and other infrastructure facilities;
- placing orders for the production and supply of specialized equipment and other types of products for business entities;
- assistance in the creation and organization of activities of business entities, including the construction of buildings, structures, equipment, industrial and office facilities, other property owned by the state or municipalities.

Information support is a form of support involving collective consumption without any additional restrictions. Consulting support for non-resource exporters can be carried out using the following methods:

1. creation of organizations that form the infrastructure for supporting small and medium-sized businesses and provide consulting services;
2. compensation of costs for the consulting services, incurred by small and medium-sized enterprises, which are properly supported by documents.

The Joint-Stock Company Russian Export Center was established in 2015. The center is organized as a specialized customer service for non-resource exporters with competences in export activities, including export advice, assistance in organizing export activities, support for export procedures [4].

In recent years, the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia has been regulating the mechanism of state support of entrepreneurship in the export sector, developing international cooperation in SMEs, actively participating in activities of the following organizations: EAEU, OECD, BSEC, SCO, APEC, BRICS, Union State, CIS and others. With the support of the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia, an international dialogue in bilateral format has been established and organized, involving number of countries. It is important to note, that this format of support for non-resource exporters was implemented in 2019 with the participation of 142 countries.

Discussion

Focusing on the problem of improving the forms and methods of supporting Russian non-resource exporters, it should be noted that in recent years, targeted support mechanism, that covers different criteria, has been formed.

Particularly, according to the criteria of “influence on international competition”, the following categories of state support of Russian non-resource exporters are distinguished:

1. The provision/leverage of competitive advantages.
2. Limiting/strengthening the influence of the market power of suppliers in a competitive environment.
3. The degree and nature of the impact on the level of competition (estimated).
4. Reduction/increase of market entry barriers.

5. The effect on the mobilization activity of capital.

According to the criteria of “principles of support”, we can distinguish the following categories:

1. Infrastructure support (the creation of specialized structures implementing a set of support measures and/or property complexes as part of the agglomeration infrastructure).
2. Targeted support (a set of support measures is implemented following the needs and (or) interests of entrepreneurs).
3. Comprehensive support (support is provided at the request of entrepreneurs in the complex, regardless of the agency implementing it).
4. Territorial/extraterritorial support (support is provided within the territory of the registration of the enterprise or actual conduct of business/regardless of it/is implemented within the framework of the law at the place of registration, regardless of its location or otherwise withdrawn under local support laws).
5. Industry support (support is provided within the framework of industry affiliation of enterprises)
6. Support for priority activities.

In practice, the implementation of these principles is regionally specific. At the same time, in Moscow, non-resource exporters, along with federal support mechanisms, had the opportunity to receive the necessary assistance in export development through the following institutions: Moscow Department of Science, Industrial Policy and Entrepreneurship; GBU “Small Business of Moscow”.

The state infrastructure for supporting international entrepreneurship in Moscow also includes small business support funds, chambers of commerce, educational organizations, technology parks and business incubators, specialized consulting structures, public organizations, information-analytical and marketing centers, etc.

It is important to note the trend towards an increase in the number of institutions supporting exporters. At the same time, various types of infrastructural organizations often have duplications or mutual additions of functions that are not conducive to effective activities.

The problem areas for evaluating the effectiveness of state support for non-resource exports can be formulated as follows:

- the problem of determining the place of support programs among other programs of socio-economic development of a country, region, territory of state influence methods;
- the problem of multicomponent support programs, which entails difficulties in differentiating its various components for their assessment and key decisions on the allocation or redistribution of available limited resources;
- the problem of determining and choosing indicators, indicators and criteria for the effectiveness and efficiency of the program, since an effective evaluation cannot be an end product, but should help the effective planning and implementation of subsequent programs.

It should be noted that at present, the share of exports of small and medium enterprises in the total export of the Russian Federation, according to the Federal Customs Service, amounted to about 8 percent. According to the results of a study in developed countries, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, this indicator ranges from 25 to 40 percent. In some developing countries, the contribution of small and medium enterprises to export products is even higher – in South Korea – about 40 percent, in China - more than 50 percent.

In order to stimulate demand for the products of small and medium-sized enterprises, it is envisaged to provide conditions for the promotion of export products and improve their quality.

In this regard, it is planned to implement measures in the following areas:

1. Intensification of fan research with the provision of the Russian quality mark at the expense of products manufactured by non-resource exporters.
2. Creation of mechanisms to stimulate the purchase of products of small and medium-sized export enterprises, which received the right to use the Russian quality mark.
3. Implementation of the “Made in Russia” project, including the creation of conditions for the provision of marking of Russian-made goods for international business entities with the “Made in Russia” sign.
4. Creation of a management system to improve the quality and competitiveness of products and services of Russian manufacturers based on the development of voluntary certification systems, regional, exhibition and industry quality marks, and the institution of appellation of places of origin of goods.

In the process of transforming the national economy, it was envisaged to create a set of development institutions that promote the formation of innovative non-resource exports [5]. The institutes created in recent years include: the Fund for the Promotion of the Development of Small Forms of Enterprises in the Scientific and Technical Sphere, also the Russian Venture Company, the Fund for the Development of Internet Initiatives, the Fund for Infrastructure and Educational Programs, the Skolkovo Innovation Center.

At the same time, regional engineering centers, prototyping centers, certification, standardization and testing centers are actively formed and developed, which leads to the increase of technological readiness level of small and medium enterprises ready to participate in the production chains of large businesses, and facilitate licensing, general certification and certification for exporters and suppliers [6].

In modern conditions, additional opportunities for business development in foreign markets can be created through the development of electronic commerce. Therefore, it is necessary to create a system of interaction of exporters with electronic trading floors, settlement services, logistics operators, as well as simplify the basic procedures that accompany the export of products of small and medium enterprises (tax, customs, etc.).

Corporate competitiveness programs are one of the key mechanisms of the national project “International Cooperation and Export”, aimed at supporting the increase in production volumes and the sale of competitive Russian industrial products [7].

Companies that have entered into relevant agreements with the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia under this program, will be able to receive soft loans in a wide range of areas, including investment loans for the creation of export-oriented industries, letters of credit, factoring and loans to foreign buyers of Russian products.

The final list of Corporate Competitiveness Improvement Programs, approved by the interagency commission in October 2019, included 711 applications from companies representing 69 regions. Among them – 69 applications from manufacturers of federal significance (systemically important) and 642 from enterprises of regional significance.

It is important to note that in the framework of the Corporate Competitiveness Improvement Programs all institutions supporting international entrepreneurs are involved (see Fig. 2.)




Fig. 2. Interactions within the framework of Corporate Competitiveness Programs

The total amount of funds planned for investment under the Corporate Competitiveness Improvement Programs following the first selection amounted to about 2.5 trillion rubles. In general, the program is designed to provide industry with soft loans in the amount of 7 trillion rubles. Given the relevance of this program to the industrial business, the second selection took place in the first quarter of 2020.

Conclusions

The study reveals that the state infrastructure for supporting Russian non-resource export companies is represented by a large number of institutions and has a tendency to the creation of new institutions to support exporters. However, these institutions activities often are not structured, the directions of support for exporters are duplicated, there is no centralized single entry point for entrepreneurs. That does not promote effective interaction between the state and non-resource exporters. An important task is to build an affordable, understandable and transparent infrastructure support, which can be used by entrepreneurs at any stage of the company life cycle.

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The Empirical Study on Motivation for Starting a Business by Bulgarian and Polish Students

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Abstract

Entrepreneurial activities developed by young educated people are very important for the initiating and identifying changes in the economy’s and society’s structures. An increasingly important place in this process is taken by higher education institutions, which with their adequate training can “turn” intentions into real entrepreneurial activities or completely lock people with great potential for entrepreneurship. The aim of this article is to highlight some key issues related to the motivation of students through the tools of educational process in universities. They are based on a survey conducted in Bulgaria and Poland among students studying entrepreneurial subjects at the “St. Cyril and St. Methodius” University of Veliko Tarnovo and Maritime University of Szczecin, Poland. On this basis, some conclusions are outlined and recommendations are made to universities in terms of strengthening their role as external motivators for launching various entrepreneurial projects and initiatives by their students launched in business and non-business-oriented organizations.

Keywords: motivation, starting business, factors, students’ business intentions

Introduction¹

Entrepreneurship is one of the key competences nowadays. At the same time, it is a very wide notion. Broadly speaking it is the ability to deal with challenges. However, the most common answer among the students is the willingness to start your own business. The article presents the results of research done in early 2020. The target group was students, who attend Entrepreneurship classes at universities. Two universities were selected i.e., the “St. Cyril and St. Methodius” University of Veliko Tarnovo and the Maritime University of Szczecin. The selection was strictly connected with the authors’ place of employment. Three different groups on each university were selected: two from the bachelor level (1st semester and 4th semester) and one from the Master level.

In mentioned semesters, the students have Entrepreneurship classes. The groups from the first semester were the most numerous i.e., 30 persons, while the groups from higher semesters have consisted of 15 people. There were outlined the following research questions: how the nationality, year and field of study influenced entrepreneurial intentions of the students?

¹ The authors’ participation in the article is as follows: Veneta Hristova – I, II. 2, II, 3, II. 5; Piotr Wołajsza – Introduction, II. 1, II.4 and conclusion are developed by both authors.

I. Motivation for Starting a Business (by Students) – Some Theoretical and Practical Aspects

The educating young and ambitious people with an eye, sense and focus on entrepreneurship are one of the main challenges faced by contemporary education systems, including university education. This challenge is even more pronounced in the context of the behavioural characteristics of Generations Y, Z and the next generation, which we will probably name as A.

These are people who grew up in an environment of rapidly evolving information and communication technologies (ICT), in a world where borders are concepts from the past, creativity and innovative thinking displace traditional competencies. More and more researches related to the development of labor, employment and entrepreneurship indicate that competencies needed for future will be creativity, critical thinking, social intelligence, persuasion, negotiation and ICT expertise [1], [2]. Many of these competencies are closely connected to entrepreneurship, which is based on creativity and thinking outside of the box. This once again draws our attention to adequate entrepreneurship education, which in recent years has taken an increasingly prominent place starting from kindergarten to universities.

In a dynamic but also regionally different environment [3], educational systems will play even brighter role in the ongoing transformation in labor relations. Following the model of companies, modern educational systems have to allow training by observing, including potential competitors, by comparing different solutions, selecting, differentiating, imitating and adding (sharing) their own ideas [4].

But let's say this role is also undergoing a quick modification: lifelong learning comes to the fore with increasing entrepreneurship learning modules [5], including intensifying senior entrepreneurship training [6]. Traditionally, more conservative educational institutions such as universities, will continue to take the leading role and be drivers of this change in our societies, but their model, like the business models of companies, is undergoing serious changes – there is a tendency to shift from group to individual-centered education and training with an increasing set of entrepreneurial competencies.

The issues concerning the entrepreneurial intentions and motives for starting a business are interrelated and dependent – as Kim-Soon, Ahmad & Ibrahim [7] mentioned “the behavioural linkage of entrepreneurship intentions, ideas and action is critical in understanding the entrepreneurial process”. They are often the subject of research, mostly conducted by academics, but research teams of global policy-making organizations also realizing such studies.

Theoretically, main researches on entrepreneurial intentions are based on: Shapero (1984) who worked on the theory of Entrepreneurial Event, where the focus was put on interacting situational and social-cultural factors resulting to entrepreneurial events; Ajzen (1991) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour where it was assumed that the individual behaviour is driven by behaviour intentions and they are a function of three determinants: attitude of the individual toward behaviour, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991); Krueger (1993) and his model of entrepreneurial intentions which implies that perceived feasibility and perceived desirability predict the intentions of a person to become an entrepreneur; and his followers Elfving, Brännback & Carsrud (2009) who worked on contextual entrepreneurial intentions model which illustrates the process structure of forming entrepreneurial intent in order to better understand the entrepreneurial behaviour [8].

Entrepreneurial motivation also is in the focus as there is a direct link between intentions, motivation and behaviour in entrepreneurship. Motivation, including that for entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial career, encourages individuals to actions driven by necessity, striving to achieve some results, satisfy certain desires, inner positions, goals and values that encourage the choice of specific behaviour. In the variety of studies on entrepreneurial motivation can be found a typology

of different entrepreneurial motivations offered by Stephan, Hart & Drews [9], which separates them into three groups: necessity versus opportunity motivation; multi-dimensional typologies of entrepreneurial motivation and motivations to grow a business, or growth ambitions. According to this study there is “a need to go beyond the traditional differentiation of opportunity and necessity motivation” and indicate seven dimensions of entrepreneurial motivation that have consistently been identified across studies, namely: achievement, challenge & learning; independence & autonomy; income security & financial success; recognition & status; family & roles; dissatisfaction; and community & social motivations [9]. The authors pointed out that “growth ambitions are largely treated as a separate type of motivation ... but appear to be most closely linked to wealth-seeking and financial motivation” and taking into account the diversity of motivations amongst entrepreneurs future research should be refocused on when and how entrepreneurs with motivations other than those mentioned develop growth ambitions [9]. In conclusion, they note that knowledge has been gained about the typology of entrepreneurial motivation, but still insufficient research studies are done on individual and contextual drivers of entrepreneurial motivation and its consequences [9]. The authors support the view that more attention in the future should be paid to the role of universities in this complex process of entrepreneurial motivation, especially among young people.

Among the research publications a number of different studies which treat together or separately the entrepreneurial intentions and motives for starting a business by students can recently be discovered. In a cross-cultural study from 2010, including students from Belgium, US, China, India and Spain, in parallel with other developments found, were outlined that students were similarly motivated as well as perceive similar barriers to business creation but indicate different levels of sensitivity to each motivator and/or barrier [10]. The studied motives for starting business by students were 16 as follows: the chance to implement my own ideas; creating something of my own; personal independence; being at the head of an organization; the opportunity to be financially independent; improving my quality of life; creating jobs; managing people; receiving fair compensation; making more money than by working for wages; dissatisfaction in a professional occupation; building personal wealth; having more free time; gaining high social status; the difficulty of finding the right job; following a family tradition [10].

The main attention is on these five factors: the pursuit of profit and social status; desire for independence; creation; personal development; and professional dissatisfaction as among them personal development, creation and desire for independence are top factors for studied students.

An interesting perspective on motivation for starting a business by students is given in Fenech, Baguant, & Ivanov's study from 2018. It was conducted among undergraduate female Emirati students from Dubai and the northern emirates [11]. They concluded that “... in encouraging and training potential entrepreneurs' institutions need to focus on cognitive planning which is a skill that may be learnt. Having these skill individuals who are motivated to become entrepreneurs will be better equipped in the stages of forming more concrete entrepreneurial intentions. The multi-disciplinary teams assisting new entrepreneurs may include specialists in cognitive psychology” [11].

A very recent study (published 2020) on entrepreneurial motivation and entrepreneurial career intentions by Malaysian Public University students also shows clearly that results again support the view that “...those youths who are really serious to start and own a business as would be entrepreneurs” should “be identified and targeted to develop through entrepreneurship interventions initiatives” by universities [12].

In summary, we can point the following key moments:

- Regardless of the methodological framework and tools, as well as sample size, some of the results obtained in different parts of the world, in many different universities, are very similar and correspond to some of the distinctive features of Generation Z;
- Increasingly, scientists are looking to measure the entrepreneurial motivation of students in order to strengthen the presence of entrepreneurial-oriented disciplines in universities;
- The main point in some of the research is to look for whether and if so what, differences between data from students studying in different countries, with different ages, different specialties, gender and race;
- The research points to the fact that the entrepreneurial motivation of students is essential for the future prosperity of young people and the accumulation of more research in the subject is important for taking adequate decisions regarding their training in acquiring competencies for the future.

II. Empirical Study Results

II. 1 Research framework and questionnaire design

The study of motives for starting a business by students studying at universities in Bulgaria and Poland was carried out in the period from January to March 2020. A total of 120 students were questioned, 60 at each university. The questionnaires consist of three sections with closed questions: intentions, motives and barriers to starting a business as for a base for its construction is used a questionnaire developed by Hristova & Vasilka [8]. This article analyses the results of the first two sections. Opinions' analysed are given by students attending Bachelor and Master Degrees with distribution as follows:

- Bachelors 1st semester – 60;
- Bachelors 4th semester – 30;
- Masters 1/2 semester – 30.

Specialties of the surveyed Bulgarian students are in the field of economy, management and business linguistics (social sciences), as specialties of Polish students are Geo-informatics, Geodesy and Cartography and Computer Science, generally speaking technical studies.

II. 2 Entrepreneurial intentions for starting a business by students

Summarized data from the question regarding intentions for starting a business are given in Fig. 1. Small part of the surveyed students – 12%, indicates that they do not intend to start their own business and prefer to be employed. The remaining 88% expressed a positive attitude towards the entrepreneurial initiative, with the majority of them – 61 out of 120 counting on the emergence of an idea that would risk their own endeavour. With an immediate entrepreneurial mind-set by 1 year are 4% of the surveyed, and only 2 students have already had a small business they manage.




Fig. 1. Distribution of answers to question “Do you intend to start your own business”?

II. 3 Main motives to start own business

The five strongest motives for starting a business according to surveyed students are:

- to do the work they like (72%),
- to earn more money (55%),
- to unleash the creative potential, they have (51%),
- being masters of their time (48%),
- realization of innovative ideas they have (47%).

What exactly stays behind these motives stated by the students? Analysing, we will see that the leading motive directs to the realization of entrepreneurial energy of students in the economic sphere which they have chosen to study. It is obvious that entrepreneurial students like their choice of education and consider it a place where they can succeed. This fact is supported by the motive on second position, which shows that the surveyed student’s belief that through entrepreneurship they will have a higher income than received by hired positions. The data once again prove that entrepreneurial careers are perceived as more challenging and therefore more profitable than employment.

If we compare with the results from a similar study conducted among students at two Bulgarian universities in 2017 [8] will see that the main motive – *To do the work they like* is also leading among a very large part of the studied students. The other top motives have a very similar order.

Table 1. The summary of “What would motivate you to start your own business?” question, arranged in descending order by groups

Groups of motives	Motive for starting own business	Not a motive		Neither yes, neither no	Main motive	
Very significant motives	1. To do the work I like	1	3	7	23	86
	2. To have a higher income	4	4	14	32	66
	3. To unleash my creative potential	4	12	20	33	61
	4. Being the master of my own time (including having time for family)	10	3	13	36	57
	5. To realize my innovative idea	3	3	26	31	56
Significant motives	6. To acquire knowledge, skills and professional experience in a particular field	6	4	22	37	50
	7. To put into practice the knowledge and competencies I possess	1	8	21	45	45
	8. Having an exciting, challenging job	5	7	29	33	45
	9. To have enough freedom	9	5	22	31	42
	10. To lead a good team	5	8	26	39	40

Not so significant motives	11. Don't have a boss	13	10	29	30	39
	12. To do something good for the community	8	15	34	26	38
	13. To have a job (not to be unemployed)	21	12	27	23	37
	14. Make my own decisions	4	7	24	52	36
	15. To succeed like the entrepreneurs, who I admire	14	19	25	32	30
	16. Seize the market opportunity to achieve economic success	9	6	30	47	28

The summary of the motives for starting business by both Bulgarian and Polish students is presented in Table 1, where the absolute values of the answers are given. If we divide the motives into three groups: very significant (from 1st to 5th), significant motives (from 6th to 10th) and not so significant (after 11th place) we will see that the lowest results are for such motives as: not having a boss, to do something good for the community, not to be unemployed, making own decisions, to “follow” the example of admired entrepreneur/s and this less answers to the motive of seizing the market opportunity to achieve economic success.

II. 4 Differences between different groups of students in Poland

Based on the answers, the major differences were discovered. In case of Poland, significant differences are between the youngest group (1st semester) and the older students. In connection with the establishment of entrepreneurial intentions, students showed that on: *Do you intend to start your own business?* question², 33% of 1st-semester students do not have such a plan – i.e., 10/30, while in the older groups over 85%, on average i.e., 26/30, plan to have a business, however under specific conditions i.e.:

1. after having sufficient work experience as an employee (20/30),
2. only if I come up with an idea that is worth the risk (16/30),
3. under certain conditions (specified by student 1/30):
 - depending on what the situation on the market will be and whether it will be favourable

The students from higher semesters are usually more experienced and their entrepreneurial competencies are more developed. They are more aware of opportunities which are around. From the other side, they are more careful. It means, that some specific circumstances shall fulfil, before they decide to start the business. Moreover, the time horizon is longer. Four students from the youngest group are ready to start the company within one year, while there is no such person in the older groups. Polish answers regarding motivation were quite similar to general results.

Answering question: *What would motivate you to start your own business?* Polish students, despite of the age group, have chosen:

1. To have a higher income,
2. To do the work I like,
3. To have enough freedom,
4. To acquire knowledge, skills and professional experience in a particular field.

Open answers were mentioned as: additional language courses; developing a passion; ensure family existence; to work when I want to; don't be a nerd or neat; money; being a part of the local economy.

The biggest differences (it means at least two steps gap between the most common answers, range from 1 to 5)? are concerning the motive of: *To realize my innovative idea*. While the youngest group pointed out this aspect as the main motive (5), the other groups chose as *Neither yes, neither no* (3).

² Multiply answers were accepted.

II. 5 Differences between different groups of students in Bulgaria

The summarized data of Bulgarian students' answers also indicated interesting differences.

Regarding their entrepreneurial intentions, the most frequently mentioned answer from them was *Yes, but only if I come up with an idea that is worth the risk*. The highest results here were given by the Master students – 87%, followed by the 2nd semester students – 73% and lastly the bachelors from the 4th semester with only 40%. According to these data, it is convincing that students studying in Master programs are highly entrepreneurial in recognizing an idea that they think would be more respectable, as some of them indicated that they intend to develop entrepreneurial projects within existing business structures, i.e., they pointed out the intrapreneurial career as desired development path. These data are logical, as the specialties studied by the students suggest enhanced entrepreneurial behaviour inside and outside the existing business structures. We also have to point that only 3 students – 1 from each group, have convincingly stated that they did not intend to start their own business.

The ranking of the “Very important” cluster of motives to start a business varies in the three groups of students studied, as 100% from Master students pointed *To do the work I like* motive.

In percentage, the dissemination of responses is summarized in Table 2. It should be noted that the “Very important” motives are almost the same ones from the three students' groups, and only Masters' have the motive *To lead a good team*, due to the accumulated knowledge from the previous level/s of training on the importance for modern companies of the teamwork.

Table 2. Summarized “Very significant” motives for starting own business³ (in %)

Group	“Very significant” motives	%
Bachelor's degree, 1 st semester	1. To do the work I like	80%
	2. To acquire knowledge, skills and professional experience in a particular field	63%
	3. To have a higher income	60%
	4. To unleash my creative potential	60%
	5. To put into practice the knowledge and competencies I possess	50%
Bachelor's degree, 4 th semester	1) To do the work I like	80%
	2) To have a higher income	73%
	3) To realize my innovative idea	67%
	4) To acquire knowledge, skills and professional experience in a particular field	67%
	5) To unleash my creative potential	60%
Master's degree students	1. To do the work I like	100%
	2. To realize my innovative idea	87%
	3. To unleash my creative potential	87%
	4. Having an exciting, challenging job	67%
	5. To lead a good team/To acquire knowledge, skills and professional experience in a particular field	60%

While the strongest motives are almost indistinguishable as a presence in the first group, in the last one – “Not so significant” motives the arrangement is quite different. For the 1 semester Bachelors the weakest motive is *To succeed like the entrepreneurs, who I admire* – 30% and *Seize the market opportunity to achieve economic success* – 27%. Considering that these students have not yet been acquainted with both examples from entrepreneurial practice and the lack of knowledge about recognizing the opportunities that the market provides for the implementation of entrepreneurial endeavours; the results seem logical. For Bachelors who are in the middle of their studies, the motives with the weakest effect were respectively *Don't have a boss* and *To have a job (not to be unemployed)* with 20% each. The motives of the Masters were identical to those of

³ Multiply answers were accepted.

the 4th semester Bachelors, but with a higher percentage – 33%. The answers lead to a gradual accumulation of both confidence and knowledge that the business world is full of opportunities, but also many challenges.

Instead of a Conclusion – Are there Differences Between Bulgarian and Polish Entrepreneurial Intentions and Motives or the Focus Should be Somewhere Else?

Is the nationality influenced on the entrepreneurial intentions and motives of students to start their own business? Probably the answer of this question is not possible to be given by this study, but we could outline some of the differences, taking into account that students from universities in focus have very different profile of specialties accredited (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3).

Bulgarian students	Group of students	Polish students
Yes, but only if I come up with an idea that is worth the risk – 73%	Bachelor’s degree, 1 st semester	No – 33% AND Yes, but after having sufficient work experience as an employee – 27%
Yes, but only if I come up with an idea that is worth the risk – 40%	Bachelor’s degree, 4 th semester	Yes, but after having sufficient work experience as an employee – 80%
Yes, but only if I come up with an idea that is worth the risk – 87%	Master’s degree students	Yes, but after having sufficient work experience as an employee – 53%

Fig. 2. Distribution by nationality of top answer to question “Do you intend to start your own business”? (in %)

Figure 2 shows that students from Bulgaria and Poland rely on different reasons that would encourage them to take the path of an entrepreneurial career. While Polish students prefer to gain experience first, Bulgarian students put the idea at the heart of their reasons for entrepreneurship.

In our view, adopting a balanced approach to gaining experience and consciously/creatively searching for ideas that are worth taking a risk, will be very useful in promoting entrepreneurial behaviour among young people in the future. The adoption of enhanced practical training in a real and virtual environment will significantly increase the percentage of graduates who start their first company during the training.

Bulgarian students	Group of students	Polish students
To do the work I like – 80%	Bachelor’s degree, 1 st semester	To do the work I like – 50%
To do something good for the community – 50%		To have a job (not to be unemployed) – 30%
Seize the market opportunity to achieve economic success – 27%		To acquire knowledge, skills and professional experience in a particular field – 17%
To do the work I like – 80%	Bachelor’s degree, 4 th semester	To do the work I like – 60%
To put into practice the knowledge and competencies I possess – 53%		To have a job (not to be unemployed) – 27%
To have a job (not to be unemployed) – 20%		To lead a good team – 7%

To do the work I like – 100%	VS	Strength of motive	Master's degree students	Strength of motive	VS	To do the work I like – 73%
To have a higher income – 60%	S				S	To acquire knowledge, skills and professional experience in a particular field – 20%
To have a job (not to be unemployed) – 33%	NSS				NSS	To do something good for the community – 0%

Fig. 3. Distribution by nationality of top answers in each of the groups with motive by their strength (in %) ⁴

The summarized data by nationalities and year of study, through the prism of the strength of motivational factors show differences in individual sections. The important point is that the surveyed students confidently claim that their main motive for entrepreneurship is to realize themselves through the work and they expect universities to support their desire for changes regardless of what specialties they are trained in. This once again shows that universities occupy and will occupy a very important place in their role as motivators and moderators for future entrepreneurs. To support this goal, the entrepreneurship education should play more important role in the training of professionals, uniting and motivating people through the power of the multidisciplinary model of education.

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⁴ For indicating *Strength of motive* the following abbreviations are used: VS – Very significant; S – Significant; NSS – Not so significant.

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Spiridon Kazandjiev¹ and the Metaphilosophically Status of the Theory of Knowledge

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Abstract

The paper presents a reconsideration of some metaphilosophically ideas of the Bulgarian philosopher from the first half of the 20th century Spiridon Kazandjiev through a comparative analysis in the light of contemporary naturalism in epistemology. The point of comparison has both relevance to the question about the methodological importance of epistemological naturalism and to the historical task of understanding the philosophical contribution of Kazandjiev himself.

By exploring Kazandjiev’s views on the status and functions of the theory of knowledge, I aim to show that his arguments in favour of naturalism are still topical and that the question about the place of philosophical analysis in the domain of knowledge remains unresolved. In addition, I present a case for the hypothesis that his metaphilosophically views about the character of philosophy can be explained not only by his ideas on the meaning of philosophy but also with regard to his understanding of science.

Keywords: Bulgarian philosophy, Spiridon Kazandjiev, epistemological naturalism, psychologism, metaphilosophy

Spiridon Kazandjiev was a notable figure in Bulgarian metaphilosophically debates about the nature of philosophy and its relation to science [1]. In his writings, he also studied the problems of knowledge and cognition from both psychological and philosophical point of view. This paper compares his conception about the status of the theory of knowledge with some of the arguments favouring naturalism in contemporary epistemology². Furthermore, his understanding of science is discussed and some explanatory suggestions are drawn about his general conception of philosophy as a worldview. The analysis is limited to Kazandjiev’s metaphilosophically views about the subject matter of the theory of knowledge and to his important remarks about science but it could be relevant to a much broader and complicated historical task – the comparison of the early 20th century psychologism with the naturalist approaches in contemporary epistemology.

Such a comparison along with a revisit of the criticisms against early psychologism could positively influence the contemporary debate on the methods and nature of epistemology.

As a student and a researcher of the works of Wilhelm Wundt, Kazandjiev was familiar with and sympathetic to the philosophies that developed psychologistic conceptions about logic and epistemology. One of the key ideas of psychologism of the time, which has consequences on the status of epistemological problems, is that “Normative-prescriptive disciplines – disciplines that tell us what we ought to do – must be based upon descriptive-explanatory sciences.” [3, sec. 3].

¹ Also known in terms of alternative transliterations as S. Kazandzhiev and S. Kasandjiew.

² For a comparison between some of Kazandjiev’s views and a specific contemporary naturalist approach-virtue epistemology, see. [2]

When applied to the problems of knowledge, this statement amounts to the thesis that the normative constraints of belief acquisition and belief revision cannot be constructed without a proper understanding of the nature of these processes in actual cognitive agents. An argument that favours this stand is that no *a priori* analysis of validity will ever be sufficient to guarantee the attainment of any particular truth, as it cannot tell us if a rule of inference is effective under the factual conditions of cognition. A theory of knowledge that is based on an account of the factual conditions of cognition invites naturalism and scientific methodology. According to a general definition, provided by Lehrer, a theory is naturalistic if its entire vocabulary consists of terms that describe natural phenomena [4, p. 154]. This definition is too restrictive for epistemological conceptions since it excludes some well-established designations. Exhaustive naturalizing in epistemology is hindered by the fact that the truth condition is an indispensable part of the definitions of knowledge and one that is very hard to explicate in naturalistic terms. Instead, an epistemological theory may count as naturalistic as long as its most important, basic assumptions are naturalist, and methodologically, an approach may be dubbed as naturalist if it employs methods, typical for the natural sciences. Under this more permissive definition, early psychologism will count as naturalist when the psychological processes that form part of the explanation of knowledge, are studied as natural occurrences and are used³ to draw conclusions in the domain of the normative. Early psychologism was a heavily criticized approach [cf. 5] but the rise of naturalism in epistemology in the recent years [6] provides the possibility for a revisit and perhaps, a reconsideration of some of its ideas.

The naturalist turns in contemporary epistemology provoked by Quine's famous article [7] was driven by both the recognition of the failure of traditional approaches [7, p. 78] and the prospects for interesting developments with the experimental study of some inextricable problems. [cf. 7, p. 90] One could argue that Kazandjiev's writings on the status of the theory of knowledge possess a similar spirit – dissatisfaction with the speculative philosophical methods [8, pp. 80-81] as well as a realization of the revolutionary potential and innumerable prospects of empirical methodology. The Bulgarian philosopher also held a number of views compatible with the methodological perspective of contemporary epistemological naturalism⁴. He argued that the act of knowing is an empirical entity and therefore requires empirical methods of investigation [8, p. 75], recognized the existence of a descriptive and explanatory layer in the theory of knowledge [8, p. 76] and believed that its future was to leave behind philosophy and become an empirical science. [8, p. 86] This general positivist stand in the study knowledge was supplemented by a number of physicalist explanations in both his philosophical and psychological writings. It is an orientation that, despite his discontinuous and in some periods – dualist, views on the mind-body problem [9, pp. 6-9], suggests that the empirical science of knowledge he had in mind was, in the context of contemporary classifications⁵, more of a natural than of any other kind. Another reason for this is presented in the way he viewed the relationship between the theory of knowledge and the sciences.

He argued 1) that the theory of knowledge cannot serve as a justification for the sciences [8, pp. 78-80], 2) that it cannot be free of any presumptions in its explorations [8, pp. 82-88] and 3) that it should use the methods and achievements of the sciences [8, pp. 88-89].

Today, the legitimacy of the conceptual analysis in epistemology is being questioned with motivations very similar in spirit to the ones offered by Kazandjiev's naturalistic perspective. The subject matter of philosophical analysis has slowly moved from the terms and notions to the

³ Together with normative assumptions.

⁴ Which is different from that of Quine.

⁵ It is likely that his classificatory point of view was different from contemporary approaches and was based on Wundt's ideas in this respect.

empirical entities that such notions present. Hilary Kornblith has argued that the proper subject of epistemology is “not the concept of knowledge but knowledge itself” taken as a natural kind [10, p. 327]. Similarly, Phillip Kitcher has identified as a part of what he regards as “traditional naturalism” the thesis that “the central problem of epistemology is to understand the epistemic quality of human cognitive performance.” [6, pp. 74-75]. While these revisions do not stand for a resolution of traditional philosophical problems, they rightly place the cognitive subject at the center of the philosophical interest. A conceptual analysis cannot neglect the linguistic fact that the term “knowledge” is a designation characterizing not propositions but the states of agents, capable of cognition. Furthermore, the interpretation of epistemic terminology is strongly dependent on the linguistic and social context that is drawn into philosophical intuitions.

Epistemologists have so far relied heavily on everyday discourses to fulfil their work but it is clear that while everyday language provides a starting point of considerable clarity it is not necessary that its linguistic framework is complete or accurate when it comes to descriptions of cognitive and epistemic states of mind. Even if there are reasonable objections against the replacement of the subject matter of epistemology, there are no reasons to believe that the everyday discourse underlying current terminology is best suited to fulfil the philosophical tasks. After all, for a proper conceptual analysis what is needed in the first place is a proper concept – one that reflects the detailed picture of cognition well enough and one that does not possess in its content conventional aspects deposited by the repetition of contingent societal factors. Conventional aspects do not necessarily correspond to anything essential in the features of knowledge since they serve a social purpose – to determine the linguistic behaviour in a community [cf. 11, 160].

Because of their contingent origin, they have to be removed from the analysis but it is very hard to recognize and isolate them. In this line of reasoning, it may be argued that science can supply concepts for philosophical projects in a better fashion than common language and that the assumptions drawn from scientific ontology are at best no worse than the ones that are inevitably drawn from the conceptual framework of everyday language.

The hesitation that these arguments for naturalism may induce has to do with the fact that the whole idea of using the contribution of natural sciences for the study of fundamental philosophical questions (even in this modest manner of term borrowing) becomes incoherent when this newborn joint project is merged in one discourse and reviewed under scrutiny. It is questionable whether we would ever be able to even make sense of philosophical questions unless we remain within the framework of common language that provided their first formulation. Scepticism, the biggest epistemological concern, will certainly not reappear in the same fashion if philosophical questions are reformulated within a discourse that is built on positivism and empiricism. In science, knowledge will appear as a fact, while in philosophy its existence remains a hypothesis.

This, however, is not necessarily a problem for naturalism as it allows for two types of conclusions. One is that science cannot resolve philosophical problems but another is that these problems are built on the wrong conceptual base and are inaccurate and outdated. Naturalism in epistemology may invite a much more radical prospect for the philosophical project than a mere terminological correction suggests. There is a big question as to whether the philosophical analysis of knowledge has become redundant and needs to be replaced by a scientific study. The issue must have emerged for the first time in the beginning of the twentieth century with the progress of empirical psychology. Today it is evident that only an exploration on the remainder of questions unanswered by science will provide an answer, a remainder that will take shape in the future after science has done its work in investigating cognitive phenomena. Even for the normative issues of epistemology, preliminary arguments of what scientific methodology could or could not do to

contribute, cannot be decisive, as considerations of this kind have often proven to be misguided in the course of scientific progress.

Because of this, Kazandjiev's arguments for the importance of empirical investigations of knowledge are still relevant for the contemporary philosophical discussion. The beginning of the twentieth century was a privileged historical position for dealing with such problems since the question of knowledge reflected the general situation regarding methodology in the study of consciousness, where scientific progress stood in sharp contrast to the stagnation of philosophical investigations. Kazandjiev, who studied Wundt's justification of empirical psychology, was familiar with the compelling power of the empirical methods of physiology and the arguments for the preference of scientific methods in this domain. Since the beginning of his philosophical investigations, he was thus involved with methodological problems and discussions and was able to compare the fruitfulness of traditional philosophical approach to the advances in the scientific study of consciousness. Through the works of Wundt, he gained a clear understanding of what science was and was able to compare it to the philosophical tradition. In the light of such academic background it is not surprising that he considered the empirical method a crucial contributor to the study of knowledge and viewed with suspicion the "the speculative philosophy of the old days" [8, p. 80].

The contrast of the two approaches in the theory of knowledge, a field considered for a long period to be the main philosophical concern, has no doubt, also influenced Kazandjiev's general views about the nature of philosophy. One could expect that he was opposed to the thesis about the "basic character of philosophy as a science" [12], advocated by his contemporaries, not only because of his vision of philosophy but also because of his vision of science. For him, natural sciences are committed to being "mostly inductive, anti-authoritarian and anti-dogmatic" and because of this, they would never take any readymade solution from the outside without investigating it on their own [8, p. 80]. While this could be seen as a pressing reason for philosophy to fully adopt the critical and objectifying methodology of science (if it wished to become a trustworthy collaborator in knowledge), for Kazandjiev it had the opposite consequences. This is because he was able to recognize that the conceptual analysis and the critical work was not exclusive to philosophy and was better performed from within the sciences themselves [8, p. 88] – a very reasonable suggestion on his behalf when it comes to terms designating natural entities or any other empirical entities in fact since the social sciences also have or at least could have a better standing in the concept development than philosophy. However, it is also a suggestion that poses the danger of redundancy for the philosophical work in these areas.

When a philosopher holds a conception, according to which science is methodologically self-sufficient and exhausting the rational means of investigation, then he is pressed to reconsider the epistemic legitimacy of the philosophical endeavour. For the retaining the cognitive merit of philosophy, he must seek to establish either its subject matter or at least – the perspective toward it, "out of the reach" of the sciences. If that interpretation is correct – if Kazandjiev had an understanding of science that left no room for natural philosophy – then paradoxically, the high price of relativism for philosophical knowledge he may have had to pay for the sake of remaining true to the positivist and rational spirit of science. His naturalistic inclinations in the theory of knowledge as well as his competence on the nature of scientific method might be an important connection between the seemingly incommensurable areas of his works leaving his philosophy appear a little less unsystematic.

For Kazandjiev the domain of subjectivity, individuality and cultural and historical contingency provided a ground for a distinction between philosophy and science. In his writings, philosophy was portrayed as an expression of a worldview – a vision of the overall being from a personal or

at best – specifically human point of view. He assigned it a double task – on the one hand, the historically established role of a preliminary cognitive activity that provides the material for the emerging sciences; on the other hand – a provider of the unity between “the demands of the reason and the needs of the heart” [14, p. 15]. This way, although the sciences that take, distil and critically and objectively develop initial philosophical intuitions are ultimately better at fulfilling the demands of reason, philosophy does not become obsolete after their separation as it strives to unite reason and heart. However, with this resolution, the justification of the epistemic significance of the philosophical work becomes a hard challenge. Instead of knowledge, the philosophical worldview becomes a creative product with evaluative and practical functions. Perhaps this motivated Kazandjiev to propose a relation of interdependence between the objective and the subjective aspects of knowledge and belief acquisition as he probably sought to defend the veridical significance of philosophy by reference to a total scepticism based on the alleged limits of scientific work [15].

It is hard to judge whether he succeeded to create a consistent picture of the structure of human knowledge considering how his works unravel with sharp swings from the methodologically presupposed scientific universalism to full relativism when it comes to philosophical creations but we can certainly say that Kazandjiev’s tackling of the dilemma on the relationship between science and philosophy is an instructive effort for contemporary philosophers and even more topical now in the context of the rise of philosophical naturalism. It raises the question about the range of application of conceptual analysis – if it has become obsolete in certain areas of research and if after all philosophical explorations under this method possess bigger epistemic merit than their counterparts from other philosophical traditions do. The question about the domain to which a problem belongs as a guidance toward the methods appropriate for its tackling is a source of constant tension in contemporary epistemology. Other areas of philosophy have no doubt undergone the same processes of differentiation of subject and methodology but none has seen such a grand setback – from the status of the discipline with the most fundamental philosophical questions to a not quite popular domain in comparison to its “affiliates” in the analytic tradition – the philosophy of language, of mind and of science. If concepts are the proper subject matter of philosophical analysis, then we should be aware that they change and depend on scientific progress, as the understanding of their referents evolves. This situation rearranges the relationship between philosophy and science in a manner that does not favour the fundamentality thesis for philosophical problems. This is concerning because philosophical doubt is usually viewed as running deeper than what scientific ontologies present. The resources of historical discussions over methodological issues of this kind are an important tool for dealing with the question about the place of philosophy in the study of knowledge. Kazandjiev’s views and their surrounding historical context are useful in this respect as they provide an occasion to consider that the problems about the respective domains and the relationship between science and philosophy need to be addressed equally from the standpoint of philosophy and the standpoint of science.

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Analysis of Tendencies of Enterprise Innovative Activity in Lithuania

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Abstract

The article deals with the changes in the innovative activity of Lithuanian companies in 2008-2018 period. The scientific problem of the research is formulated by raising a question: *What significant changes took place in the companies that implemented innovations in Lithuania?* The aim is to perform the analysis of changes in enterprise innovative activities in Lithuania. Research methods: academic literature analysis, information grouping, comparison, detailing, statistical data analysis.

The research data show that *innovation can be defined as a new/improved product/process that is successfully implemented (adapted to the market) and meets the needs of consumers and creates economic or material benefits for the company.* The analysis showed that innovations can be classified according to many criteria, the number of factors determining the implementation of innovations is very large – from external to internal factors. The survey data shows that the largest number of employees in innovative enterprises was in financial and insurance economic activities sector, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, whereas the lowest number of employees was in construction sector. Larger positive changes in the innovative activity of enterprises in Lithuania can be seen in those enterprises where *technological innovations* were implemented (technological process and product innovators), while the costs of technological innovation enterprises in innovative activities by number of employees were observed in manufacturing, transport and storage, information and communication sectors as well as in professional, scientific and technical activities. The research data revealed that the number of enterprises that implemented *non-technological innovations* (organizational, marketing innovations) in Lithuania was decreasing during the analysed period.

Keywords: innovative enterprises, promotion of innovations

Introduction

Innovations in today's Lithuanian economic policy are becoming more and more noticeable. In order to promote their development in a country, new strategies and programs are being applied, with a strong focus on cooperation between science, business and government. The planned measures are related to the creation of an innovation-friendly environment, development of their infrastructure, fostering of innovative capacities and culture.

In today's world, innovation is one of the most important drivers for economic development. Innovation is a key action for the development and productivity of any economic activity.

Therefore, companies need to create, implement and expand innovations as one of the main conditions for the company's development and successful operation in the market. Innovation is

having an increasing impact on the development and expansion of companies and is a prerequisite for a company to operate in an increasingly competitive market. Staying in such a competitive market is a big challenge for companies.

The research problem could be formulated presenting the following question: *What significant changes took place in the companies that implemented innovations in Lithuania?*

Research object – innovative activities of companies.

Research goal – to perform an analysis of changes in the innovative activities of companies in Lithuania.

Methodology of the research. To carry out the innovative activity analysis of the companies theoretically, the Lithuanian scientific works have been analysed (Bučinskas, Raipa, Giedraitytė, 2012; Liutkutė, Vijeikis, 2012; Kudokas, Jakubavičius, 2019, etc.), as well as the foreign authors' works (Avermaete, Viaene, Morgan, Crawford, 2003; Hamel, Breen, 2008, etc.).

In order to base the theoretical fundamentals, an empirical study of the innovative activities of enterprises in Lithuania was carried out, in which the aim was to reveal the changes of the innovative activities of enterprises in Lithuania in the period of 2008-2018. The following indicators were used in the empirical study: (1) enterprises, which introduced organizational innovation; (2) enterprises, which introduced marketing innovation; (3) technological innovation enterprises; (4) expenditure on innovation activities of technological innovation enterprises. The data for the analysis was taken from the official information of the Department of Statistics of the Republic of Lithuania under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania (due to the lack of data in the survey, some indicators were presented for different periods).

Research methods: academic literature analysis, information grouping, comparison, detailing, statistical data analysis.

Genesis of Innovation Concept

An analysis of the scientific literature reveals that there are a lot of different definitions of the term “innovation”. The role of the father of the term “innovation” is attributed to J. Schumpeter, who presented the first description of the innovation process to economics in 1911, in the work “Theory of Economic Development”. In the dictionary of the current Lithuanian language the term “innovation” is used to describe something new, something novelty. P. F. Drucker (2006) defined innovation as the transformation of resources from a lower level of productivity to a higher one.

Innovation consists of new ideas generation and their implementation in the form of new products, processes or services, which lead to both an increase in the national economy and employment and an increase in profits for the innovative company [7]. Lithuanian Innovation Strategy of 2010-2020 identifies innovation as “... the process by which new ideas respond to societal and economic needs and develop new products, services or business and organizational models that are successfully introduced into existing markets or have the potential to create new markets” [10]. Innovation is a process that combines science, technology, economics and management, innovation starts from the creation of an idea to commercialization, production, product launch [9].

According to the descriptions of innovation, the authors of the article take the view that *innovation is a new/improved product/process that has been successfully introduced to the market, meeting consumer needs and creating economic or material benefits for the company.*

Conception of Innovation Classification

Successful management of innovation activities requires careful innovation research, and innovative research usually begins with the classification of innovations. Innovations can be classified according to *the content, level of implementation, scale, level of novelty, organizational specificity, nature, end result, and impact* [2]. Innovation can be divided into product and process innovations, which are categorized according to the characteristics of novelty [6]. T. Avermaete *et al.*, (2003) distinguish four types of innovation: *product, process, organizational, market innovation*. Other authors Hamel, Breen, (2008) *present operational, product/service, strategic, and managerial innovations* that take into account their hierarchy. R. Osborne (2011) presents the typology of innovation – four groups of innovations (*development, progress, absolute innovation, evolution*). Consequently, innovation can have features of technological and non-technological activities. According to V. Kudokas, A. Jakubavičius (2019), innovations are only in rare cases completely new, often the product or service created is the improvement of the old product by using new knowledge. Innovation does not come from nothing; new ideas emerge from old and proven truths.

Strategy of Lithuanian Innovation Policy

Implementing the State Long-Term Development Strategy and the National Lisbon Strategy Implementation Program, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania approved the Lithuanian Innovation Strategy for 2010-2020, in which priority areas are *increasing Lithuania's integration into global markets, developing a creative and innovative society, developing technological innovations and taking a systemic approach to innovation implementation*. The strategy sets out the vision, goals, objectives and achievable results of Lithuania in the field of innovation until 2020. The mentioned strategy is the basis for the development of the Lithuanian economy – the creation of a favourable environment for the creation of high value-added services and products, gaining and strengthening a competitive advantage, setting priorities for science and research, forming a high-level knowledge base in cooperation with business.

The Science, Innovation and Technology Agency (MITA) implements the innovation policy in Lithuania. In order to strengthen cooperation between science and business society, expand the research and technology base and increase its efficiency, five integrated science, study and business parks (valleys) have been established in different regions. 25 open access science and technology centers are located in these valleys, which promote cooperation between science and business, combine scientific potential and attract companies to work together with Lithuanian researchers. Science and technology parks play a key role in fostering and promoting innovation, fostering the creation of new innovative enterprises, the innovative development of existing enterprises, fostering innovation partnerships between science and business, and carrying out activities related to the provision of innovation support services. Much attention is paid to creating favourable conditions for the creation of clusters. Clustering is one of the key priorities for the strategy of Lithuanian economy (industrial and business) development.

Lithuanian innovation policy identifies the main tasks/directions: (1) to increase public awareness in the field of innovation, to form a culture of innovation; (2) to orient science towards the creation of innovations, to promote the cooperation between science and business society; (3) to create an environment conducive to innovation [10] (see Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. The Direction og Lithuanian Innovation Policy

Lithuania provides two tax incentives for companies investing in research and experimental development (R&D) and one benefit for companies seeking technological renewal. The benefit is a reduction in income tax. Practice shows that many companies in Lithuania are engaged in R&D activities, but do not take advantage of the opportunity to save. Income tax relief is available to companies operating in any field—manufacturing, construction, service companies, logistics companies, transport companies, IT companies and others.

According to the data of the State Tax Inspectorate of the Republic of Lithuania, in 2015-2018 716 declarations were received for incentives of R&D costs, 360 companies benefited and the amount of benefits was more than 240 million euros. In 2019 the Agency for Science, Innovation and Technology received 52 applications for recognition of R&D activities from 26 companies.

In order to encourage companies to invest in R&D, the Agency for Science, Innovation and Technology (MITA) has simplified the process of recognition of R&D activities and the status of an approved innovative company. The status of an innovative company is a novelty not only in Lithuania, but also in Europe, which opens the way for companies to recognize innovative activities, more convenient and faster identify R&D activities, to perform these activities independently [5].

The Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Lithuania coordinates the activities of institutions that formulate innovation, research and technology develops the policy and strengthens administrative capacity – supports the participation of civil servants in conferences, working group meetings and meetings organized by the European Union and its state institutions. It seeks to ensure proper coordination of innovation, research and development policies, not only at national or regional level, but also at European Union level. The Innovation and Competitiveness Enhancement Program prepared by the Ministry of Economy, the financing scheme, requirements for submitting applications, and preparing documents for applying for the European Union Structural Funds have been prepared. A procedure for the support of state funding (aid) patents has been prepared, which promotes entrepreneurship, investment development and research.

Analysis of Changes in Innovative Activity of Enterprises in Lithuania in the Period of 2008-2018

Analysing the share of employees in innovative enterprises in comparison with the employees of all companies in Lithuania in 2012-2018 upward trends were observed during the analysed period (see Table 1).

Table 1. Proportion of Employees of Innovative Enterprises, Compared to Employees of All Enterprises, percent

	2012	2014	2016	2018
Economic activities	50,5	63,6	68,4	67,1
Mining and quarrying	42,7	70,8	72,7	69,1
Manufacturing	57,3	70,3	73,4	75,1
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	73,7	89,5	82,1	81,0
Water supply, sewage treatment, waste management and remediation activities	37,5	77,9	74,7	78,5
Construction	28,8	42,6	51,1	43,4
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	41,8	59,1	63,7	58,8
Transport and storage	49,7	61,0	66,2	65,8
Information and communication	74,7	76,1	80,8	74,2
Financial and insurance activities	82,6	81,1	87,0	90,0
Professional, scientific and technical activities	48,0	55,0	65,7	62,42

According to the data of the analysis, the majority of employees in innovative enterprises by economic activity were in *financial and insurance* areas and it increased steadily until 2018 from 82.6 per cent up to 90 per cent or 8.96 percentage points compared to the employees of all enterprises. The data shows that a large proportion of employees were in those innovative enterprises that carried out *electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply*, increasing from 73.7 per cent in 2012 up to 81 per cent in 2018 or it increased by 9.9 percentage points. Meanwhile, the lowest number of employees was in the *construction sector*, but growth trends are visible – from 41.8 per cent in 2012 to 43.4 per cent in 2018 or 3.83 percentage points.

The following is an analysis of statistical data of enterprises that have *implemented non-technological innovations* (organizational, marketing innovations), which shows that enterprises that implemented organizational innovations had a decreasing trend during the analysed period (see Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. Enterprises which Introduced Organisational Innovations, percent

Fig. 2 shows that in Lithuanian companies, where *organizational innovations were implemented*, the implementation of new business processes were decreasing compared to innovative companies every year from 42.5 per cent in 2008-2010 to 27.8 per cent in 2014-2016 or 34.6 percentage points. Declining trends also persisted in companies that introduced *new*

methods of workplace organization compared to innovative companies, i.e., from 42.6 per cent in 2008-2010 it decreased to 36.7 per cent in 2014-2016 or 13.85 percentage points, and in companies that have introduced *new methods of organizing external relations* compared to innovative companies from 29.2 per cent in 2008-2010 to 21.4 per cent in 2014-2016 or 26.71 percentage points. Analysing the statistics of *companies that implemented marketing innovations*, it can be seen that companies that implemented marketing innovations of all economic activities had a decreasing trend in the analysed period (see Fig. 3).




Fig. 3. Enterprises which Introduced Marketing Innovation, percent

The results of the analysis show that the number of companies in Lithuania that implemented marketing innovations in comparison with innovative companies in the analysed period decreased significantly, i.e., it decreased from 23.2 per cent in 2010-2012 to 21.2 per cent in 2016-2018 or by 8.6 percentage points.

Fig.4 presents statistical data of Lithuanian companies that have *implemented technological innovations* in comparison with other innovative companies.




Fig. 4. Technological Innovation Enterprises, percent

From the data of Fig. 4, it can be observed that the largest change in the analysed period can be seen in the number of technological process innovators, i.e., a significant increase from 37.8 per cent in 2010-2012 up to 83.1 per cent in 2016-2018 or 119.8 percentage points. The number of product innovators by implementing technological innovations in Lithuania has almost halved,

i.e., increased from 33.7 per cent in 2010-2012 up to 58.9 per cent in 2016-2018 or changed by 74.8 percentage points.

Analysing *the costs of innovative activities of companies that have implemented technological innovations* in 2010-2018 according to the number of employees, upward trends in all types of economic activities can be seen in manufacturing, transport and storage, information and communication, and professional, scientific and technical activities (see Fig. 5).




Fig. 5. Expenditure on Innovation Activities of Technological Innovation Enterprises, million Euros

Fig. 5 shows that *the expenditures on innovation activities of the companies* that have implemented technological innovations in all economic activities in 2012-2018 increased over the period from 638.3 million Eur in 2012 up to 1074.9 million Eur in 2018 or by 68.4 percentage points. The biggest change is seen in information and communication activities, where expenditure on innovation increased from 75 million Eur in 2012 up to 101.8 million Eur in 2018 or 35.7 percentage points.

Having analysed the dynamic indicators of Lithuanian innovative companies that have implemented innovations, it is possible to identify negative changes in a timely manner and, if necessary, take measures to increase the level of innovations in the country. It is important to identify those factors in order to determine their potential impact on innovation in companies.

Conclusions

1. The analysis of the scientific literature revealed that based on the descriptions of innovation, *innovation can be defined as a new/improved product/process that is successfully implemented (adapted to the market) and meets the needs of consumers and creates economic or material benefits for the company.*
2. The analysis has shown that innovations can be classified according to a number of criteria: content, level of implementation, scale, level of novelty, organizational specificity, nature, end result and impact; according to the products and processes, which are grouped by novelty characteristics; according to the type of innovation: product, process, organizational, market innovation; according to operational, product/service, strategic and managerial innovation, taking into account their hierarchy; according to the innovation clusters (development, evolution, absolute innovation, evolutionary) and innovation can have technological and non-technological signs of activity.

3. Analysing the scientific literature, it is noticeable that the number of factors determining the implementation of innovations is very large – from external (political environment, role of the state, economic situation of companies, competitiveness, market recognition, consumer behaviour) to internal-skilled workers, teamwork, entrepreneurship, motivation, employee mobility and commitment, sources of ideas, financial resources, knowledge, attitudes of managers and employees.
4. In formulating Lithuanian innovation policy, the Lithuanian Innovation Strategy for 2010-2020 was approved, in which the priority directions are increasing Lithuania's integration into global markets, developing a creative and innovative society, developing technological innovations and implementing a systematic approach to innovation. Lithuania provides two tax incentives for companies investing in research and experimental development (R&D) and one benefit for companies seeking technological renewal. The benefit is a reduction in income tax. Innovation implemented in Lithuania, and also in Europe, is the status of an innovative company, which opens the way for companies to recognize innovative activities, more convenient and faster identification of R&D activities, and when companies can perform these activities independently.
5. Summarizing the data of the empirical study, it can be stated that the largest number of employees in innovative enterprises was in financial and insurance economic activities, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, and the lowest number of employees was in construction. Larger positive changes in the innovative activity of enterprises in Lithuania can be seen in those enterprises where *technological innovations* (technological process and product innovators) were implemented, and the expenditures of enterprises that have implemented technological innovations on innovative activities by number of employees, changes were observed in manufacturing, transport and storage, information and communication, and professional, scientific and technical activities. The research data revealed that the decreasing tendencies of companies that implemented *non-technological innovations* (organizational, marketing innovations) in Lithuania became apparent in the analysed period.

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Regional Dimensions of Strategy “Europe 2020” – the Case of Veliko Tarnovo District

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Abstract

The article analyses the territorial dimension of the Europe 2020 Strategy on the case study of Veliko Tarnovo district. The paper presents the targets set and contributing to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and how they are measured and what is the role of the EU funding in order the various policy targets of the Strategy to be reached on regional and municipal level.

Keywords: Strategy Europe 2020; indicators for regional monitoring; economic, social and educational development; EU funds

In March 2010, the European Commission (EC) launched the so called “Europe 2020” Strategy. [1] It was foreseen as the basic document for reaching social and economic equality in the member states and lead to social cohesion. In the Strategy, three key drivers for growth were identified and to be implemented through concrete actions at EU and national levels:

- Smart growth – fostering knowledge, innovation, education and digital society;
- Sustainable growth – making the production more resource efficient while boosting the competitiveness, and
- Inclusive growth – raising participation in the labour market, the acquisition of skills and the fight against poverty.

The European Commission outlines three main key priorities, which are described in eight main goals. The main objectives are set through a set of indicators that allow the collection of reliable and comparative information and data between member states, which allows monitoring, reporting and taking accompanying measures to achieve the goals and priorities. Each member state develops its own goals for achieving the key indicators and thus contributes to the achievement of the pan-European ones.

The coordination of European Union (EU) economic and fiscal policies are observed by the introduction of the six-month cycle of the European Semester, which allows monitoring of national targets by regularly monitoring problems and directing the implementation of corrective policies in the member states.

The policy framework outlined relates to achieving smart growth, understood as improving education and expanding opportunities for increasing skills and knowledge, as well as expanding the field of research and innovation, which must create new jobs and lead to growth to create of a digital society with extensive use of information and communication technologies. It also envisages sustainable development based on the development of a competitive low-carbon economy through efficient use of available resources, environmental protection measures, biodiversity conservation, development of environmental technologies and diversified energy sources and networks, support and good business environment for small and medium-sized enterprises, raising consumer culture. The policy framework aims not just to increase employment

in Europe, but to improve the quality and working conditions, to support marginalized groups – women, young people, the elderly, migrants –, modernize social systems in member states and achieve social cohesion and overcome poverty.

The European institutions and national governments have shared responsibilities for achieving the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. These responsibilities also reflect in the political priorities stated by the Commission Von der Layen (2019-2024).

Each year the EC issues a specialized report on the achievement of the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy in the member states, which allows analysing the achieved results and their effectiveness. The indicators monitored at the level of the European Commission – national reports – are covering the employment levels and unemployment levels, youth employment, education, poverty index, the implementation of cohesion policy.

There is a strange contradiction between the intention stated by the EC and the goal of the Europe 2020 Strategy to ensure smart, inclusive and sustainable growth, while at the same time the goals set in this way have a manifestation and significance only at the level of the member states. Following the logic for the importance of the regional development in EU, the lack of any goals in the Strategy directly linked to the regions, cities and communities is under question.

Related questions that occur and search answers are:

- is it possible to have pan-European and national growth, without regional one; what is the territorial dimension of the Europe 2020 Strategy;
- will be all regions able to reach the targets set and contribute to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and how we measure them;
- what is the role of the EU funding in order the various policy targets of the Strategy to be reached on regional and municipal level?

The case study searching answers of these questions is Veliko Tarnovo district, North-East Bulgaria. The paper tackles on the regional implementation and results of reaching the strategy goals in comparative approach with the national ones.

Veliko Tarnovo region is located in Central Northern Bulgaria, which determines many of its specifics. The district is situated in the middle of the country, on the main pan-European transport corridors, the population demographically represents the country's population profiles.

The economic environment in Veliko Tarnovo is specific. Achieving the social and economic goals of the Europe 2020 strategy are directly linked to the development of the regional economy and to supporting science and expanding investment in innovation and research. For 2018 Veliko Tarnovo economy ranks ninth in volume in the country with 1.1 billion euros, in the study of Institute for market economy “Regional Profiles 2019” [2] the assessment is assessed as “unsatisfactory” development. The growth of the economy for the last decade in the region is 45% compared to the national average of 59%. The economic profile of the district, according to the National statistical institute (NSI), includes – the most widely represented are “services” with a share of nearly 64% of the generated value added – 28.6% – industry and 7.7% – agriculture. The most dominant sector is trade, tourism and related industries – 47%. [3] It also seems strange that 6% of all employees in the region are in the budget sector, which points to the conclusion of low business activity compensated by the state by supporting budget activities. The gross domestic product per capita in the district is lower than the national average, investments are low, and foreign investors are an exception. The total amount of foreign direct investment in the region is 134 million euros in the period 2000-2017, and per capita it is only 561 euros. [4] Veliko Tarnovo region is among the leaders in the process of outsourcing business, mostly in the field of digitalization and software. Concerning investment, Veliko Tarnovo is not meeting the 3% Strategy and national target. To say nothing on the other municipalities in the district. After 2017,

the investments are in the construction industry and in operations with properties, which forms unstable and fragile profile of the invested money. After Brexit and the pandemic of COVID-19 for sure this investment weakness will be deepened. Although it is unlikely that all of the municipalities will reach this threshold, regions ranking very poorly should be especially targeted not only by the Cohesion policy and its financial tools but also by the national government.

The dynamics of the labor market reflects the changes in the economic situation in the areas, incl. the expansion/contraction of investment and production. As a result, the demand for labor also varies. The dynamics of investments in the districts is similar, measured by the costs for acquisition of tangible fixed assets (on average per 1 employee in the districts). Veliko Tarnovo region registered very low levels of investment in fixed assets (812 euro per person for 2017). The main contribution to this result falls on the only two large enterprises. [2] It is important to note that during 2019 in one third of the enterprises in Veliko Tarnovo district were advertised new jobs. The contribution to this number mainly belongs to the small and medium enterprises in the district, which are over 7 thousand as of March 2019. The business has sharply increased over the last ten years, with small and medium-sized enterprises contributing 64.9% of total GDP at district level. Micro-enterprises (up to 9 employees) are 91.8% of the enterprises in the district, small (from 10 to 49 employees) – 6.6%, medium (from 50 to 249 employees) – 1.4% and large (with 250 and more employees) – 0.2%. 48.7% of the active enterprises in the district were active on the territory of Veliko Tarnovo municipality as of 2018. Micro-enterprises employ 33.1% of the employees in the district, small – 24%, medium – 25.0% and large enterprises – 17.9%. The largest relative share of employees in SME in the district is Veliko Tarnovo municipality – 48.1%, followed by Gorna Oryahovitsa municipality – 15.9% and Svishtov municipality – 11.1%. [5]

Europe 2020 strategy aims to monitor the poverty indicator and overcome the risk of social exclusion. Gathering information related to the level of poverty turned to be extremely difficult due to subjective reasons, to the impossibility to track the level of poverty risk in the region, there is not enough data to analyse the situation. Baseline data in this report will be the average wage levels and the dynamics of unemployment. Although there is a continuous increase in the average salary, the region reports reaching about 65% of the average levels for the country in 2017. The district is in 14th place in terms of average salary in 2019. [4] Far ahead Sofia remains a leader, with an average gross salary of 690 euros. In the neighbouring districts, the situation is similar – in Ruse – 427 euros, Gabrovo – 525 euros, compared to 404 euros in Veliko Tarnovo. Although the average wage is not a sufficient indicator, it allows tracking of trends in a community. The relative share of the population living in material deprivation (26.6%) and that of the population living below the national poverty line (28.8%) report almost 6% higher values than the national average (respectively 20, 9 and 22.0%) in 2018. [3]

Undoubtedly, there are vulnerable groups in the region that could easily be marginalized and threatened by falling into the risk-of-poverty – young people, especially the group of the uneducated and unemployed; unemployed and inactive job seekers; single parents, sole proprietorships, people with low education; retirees; rural residents.

Europe 2020 strategy aims to achieve high levels of employment, productivity and social inclusion by reducing unemployment and paying special attention to employment among women and the elderly aged 55-64. Veliko Tarnovo region performs very well in terms of employment according to data after 2013. According to the NSI, there is an active and dynamic labor market in the region. Over 70% of its inhabitants aged between 15 and 64 are directly engaged and working, compared to 72.2% for the country. This data explanation is the favourable educational structure of the workforce, as the share of graduates is 26% in 2018, and the relative share of people with primary or lower education is one of the lowest in the country. This trend stands out

and is reported as lasting against the background of the registered unemployment rate, respectively 4.6% for 2017 and 5.4% for 2018. [3, 6] The percentage of jobseekers is constantly falling and the unemployment rate is decreasing, as in the months before the pandemic, the percentage is only 4.1% October 2019. Then begins a gradual increase given the seasonality of some productions, during and after the end of the state of emergency. By May 2020, the unemployment is 7.5%, with significant growth in manufacturing, trade and hotels and restaurants related jobs. An average of 62% of those registered with the Labor Office, lost their jobs due to the pandemic of COVID-19 till May 2020. There is also a sharp increase in the number of citizens over the age of 60 in the region and their forthcoming exit from the active labor market, which may lead to a threat to the functioning of the market due to the low value of the possibility of replacement. According to data in the study “Regional Profiles 2019”, for every 100 people aged 60-64 in the district there are 59 people aged 15-19 to take their place. [2]

The identified risk groups in the labor market in the region are the following according to the NSI. In the first place – unemployed women – 58.4% of the total registered at the end of 2018.

The percentage of women over the age of 50, without qualifications and with primary and lower education is high; long-term unemployed; single mothers and mothers with children up to 3 years and those with reduced working capacity. This group also falls under the indicator – prerequisites and danger of falling into a hypothesis of poverty.

The second group if of unemployed young people up to the age of 29, who are mainly without qualifications, with primary and lower education and long-term unemployed – 13.3%. This forms a worrying trend. The same trend is also permanent among the unemployed over 50 years of age, who occupy over one third of the registered unemployment – 34.5% of all unemployed persons.

This group is highly resilient because it brings together people who are unskilled, with primary and lower education and are long-term unemployed. The percentage of unemployed persons with reduced working capacity is relatively high – over 10% of all unemployed persons 11.2% at the end of 2019 without qualification, with primary and lower education. The group of long-term unemployed – persons with a registration duration of more than one year, are 7.3% of the total registered at the end of 2019.[6] There is an increase forming a worrying trend together with the high and permanent percentage of unemployed young people.

Youth employment is essential for achieving the objectives of the Strategy. Although employment rates in general are rising steadily, there are still worrying trends among youth employment at both national and regional levels. Employment among young people aged 20-29 is significantly lower than the age of 30-54. In Bulgaria, according to the Employment Agency 2019, the employment of young people between 16-24 years is about 23% and the level of youth unemployment is 13.3% of all unemployed persons in the country. Starting from over 30% youth unemployment in Veliko Tarnovo region in 2014, at the end of 2018 youth unemployment has been reduced to 14.6%. [6] The reason for this is unqualified staff due to gaps in the Bulgarian educational strategy and low pay in a number of sectors and industries in the district. Low pay forces young people to leave the region after completing their secondary and higher education in search of social welfare. Emphasized negative demographic processes and population aging are undoubtedly among the most significant problems facing the regional economy in the near future.

So far, the restructuring of the economy and the growth of high value-added activities have largely mitigated the impact of the shrinking labor force, but in the mid-term plan it may present more difficult obstacles. An important reason for youth unemployment is the discrepancy between education and labor market needs and demands (especially the discrepancy between education and demands of the professional profile of unemployed graduates).

In Bulgaria, the group of NEETs is growing significantly, young people aged 16-24, who neither work nor study, and are not active in the job search process – 22% in the country in 2018.

In school age, the group is nearly 11%, but in the age group 19-28, the percentage is 28%. The most significant facts that hinder finding a job among young people are the low level of education and early school leaving 47%, lack of qualification 69%, those who have never worked 67%, motivation lack of desire for development, work or study, social isolation. The numbers are from 2018 national report. [6] Veliko Tarnovo region is also not isolated from this trend. The age of 12-14 is crucial for the dropouts from school. For 2019, after finishing primary education, over 170 kids left school in order to leave the country and join their parents working abroad. The pandemic in 2020 put another test in front of the educational authorities. As reported by the Regional educational inspectorate about 20% of the students in Veliko Tarnovo district didn't have access to education for the months of pandemics due to the lack of having any electronic tool (PC, mobile or stable Internet). [8]

Education is an important component of Europe 2020 strategy and is part of the indicators subject to monitoring. Veliko Tarnovo region demonstrates a high level of education, as in the national ranking it is in sixth place in the assessment of the educational status of the labor market. [7] There is an easy explanation of this fact by the presence of the three higher education institutions and two colleges on the territory of the region – Veliko Tarnovo University, the Academy of Economics in Svishtov and the National Military Academy, as well as the branches of Varna Medical University and Plovdiv Higher School of Agribusiness and Regional Development. However, the Regional study of the Institute for Market economy identified a serious decrease in the number of students enrolled. This is also a national policy and trend. In Veliko Tarnovo it is the fastest nationally – from 109 students per 1000 people in 2012 to 69 people per 1000 in 2018. However, the NSI reports that higher education graduates do not stay in the region after graduation and leave – in Veliko Tarnovo the percentage decreases by 2.5 percent and falls to 21.8% by the end of 2018 at an average for the country of 28%. [8] The main reason for leaving of the graduates is the lower salary, compared to other regions of the country.

The educational system and educational infrastructure of Veliko Tarnovo region is well developed. At the same time, it has difficulty reaching and retaining students, but achieves results that are close to or better than the national average, which is a testament to the quality of education in the region. A high relative share of dropouts from primary and secondary education has been registered (4.08% compared to 2.98% for the country, results for 2018). There are 15 professional high schools in the region but the level of dropouts is comparatively high – 5.68%. [8] The problems of the education system to cover and keep the population subject to education are also related to the low enrolment values of the population in V – VIII class (84.0% compared to 87.4% for the country). These processes are especially visible in the smaller and peripheral municipalities such as Strazhitsa, Zlataritsa and Elena. [2] The main reasons for the high number of dropouts are of economic nature, ethno-cultural, educational and social reasons.

The specific educational environment requires both businesses, local authorities and educational institutions to initiate specialized studies on the needs of the labor market and to link training with the new business environment. A study within a cross-border cooperation project shows a shortage of graduates, as it is the largest in the field of light and heavy industry, as well as tourism. Although new vocational classes have started in recent years, they still seem self-serving, even limited in the district center, leading to a shortage of machine operators, electricians, food processing and construction workers.

Europe 2020 strategy indirectly takes into account the effects of the usage of European funds in regional economies, with the aim of achieving the most favourable living environment for

citizens through the effective use of European funds. The interest towards the EU structural funds and possibilities to absorb funds for development and implementation of community projects on the territory of Veliko Turnovo is comparatively high. The municipalities, the companies and the social actors from Veliko Turnovo region use the possibilities of the existing different European programs to apply on different thematic priorities. All municipalities have designed, developed and adopted strategic plans for absorption of EU funds and implementation of EU funded projects, have agreed on the priorities for community development and have started organizational municipal structures for project design and management. In the Regional Strategy for Sustainable Development till 2020 and following the national priorities on the development of the strategy Bulgaria 2020, different regional hot issues and priorities are listed. [10] Some of the most important and strategic ones adopted are: the investment in the human capital and creating smart economy; introducing and developing of green economy; development of human resources on the basis of Life-long education; qualification and requalification; development of social infrastructure; development of alternative tourism and creation of new tourist destinations and attractions and investments in social inclusion of the marginalized groups in the region.

The most significant projects are under the program “Regions in Growth”, “Innovation and Competitiveness”. For the programming period 2014-2020, 244 contracts have been signed for a total value of over 90 million euros. The projects mostly cover the development of modern educational infrastructure, urban transport, developing urban environment – parks and gardens –, social services and social infrastructure, energy efficiency, bio-waste management. The list of the largest completed projects includes mainly private enterprises that have utilized grants under the Innovation and Competitiveness Program, such as Sugar Factories – Gorna Oryahovitsa, Kim Plast, Dav 11, Sokolov and others. Among the municipalities in the district, the leader is the Municipality of Gorna Oryahovitsa and Svishtov concerning the completed projects. The Municipality of Veliko Tarnovo is implementing three major projects as of May 2020, mainly related to the creation of an authentic urban environment worth 6.5 million euro. Analysis shows that the majority of the signed contracts are under two operational programmes – programme “Development of human resources” and “Innovation and competitiveness”. To encourage infrastructural developments, only 27 contracts are signed and some are still in process of implementation. [9]

The actual paid European funds per person from Veliko Tarnovo district is – 735 euros compared to 897 euros for Bulgaria. Far better are performing the neighboring districts of Veliko Tarnovo: Gabrovo – twice as much, Ruse and Razgrad. [2] The analysis of the data shows there is a gap and huge difference between the number of signed contracts, funds accumulated and the certified and verified project expenses.

During the first, after the accession of Bulgaria financial period, total of 324 projects with total value of 194 million euro have been implemented in the region by 174 beneficiaries. They cover the spectrum of all structural funds – under the programme “Environment” 12 projects for 75.8 million euro, under programme “Regional Development” – 49 projects for 63.1 million euro, under programme “Human Resources Development” – 154 projects for 7,6 million, under programme “Competitiveness” – 87 projects for 49.8 million euro, under programme “Administrative Capacity” – 21 projects for 0,8 million euro and under programme “Technical Assistance” – one for 270 thousand euro.

Serious point on the raising the effectiveness of EU funds absorption on municipal level is the analysis of local private-public partnerships and the level of commitment of the different local actors in the success of the partnership. In the oblast of Veliko Turnovo the practice of municipal partnering and project joint application and communication is not quite popular.

Conclusion

Each country sets its own targets derived from the EU targets. The aggregation of all the national targets does not mean achieving the overall EU target. It is not implicit that all the regions can or should reach the national 2020 targets. At the same time, the solidarity continues to be among the main symbols and goals of EU development and of the Cohesion policy fund which distribution is directly related to the level of achievements at regional level. This, once again, make big importance to the performance of Europe 2020 on regional level. The enormous differences of levels of growth between centres and peripheries are seen as on national-regional level as on regional-communal level. The centre scores higher levels of economic activity and growth than their rural counterparts that deepens the economic distinction.

The European Union is a union of values. The Union is based on the fundamental rights of citizens, solidarity, unity and unification, which it has affirmed for the last seventy years. The adopted Europe 2020 strategy and accompanying documents undoubtedly aim at establishing and expanding this European unity and strengthening the world economic and political scene. The understanding that the EU funded programmes of all types (horizontal and vertical) may contribute and might be the key element for reaching the goals is basic in all municipal and oblast documents.

That understanding puts the strategic goal for development of new type of civil actors and administration open to communities and formal and non-formal community actors. The territorial dimension of the Europe 2020 Strategy on the case study of Veliko Tarnovo district, the targets set and contribute to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and how they are measured, clearly show the need the various policy targets of the Strategy to be reached on regional and municipal level in order to fulfil the national set of indicators. Only the integration of national goals and their implementation through regional specific indicators can lead to the success of the Europe 2020 Strategy.

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Study of the Possibilities for Expanding the Commodity Export of Russian Agro-Industrial Complex in the Markets of Bulgaria

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Abstract

The article provides a quantitative analysis of the dynamics of Russian agricultural products exports to Bulgaria by major product groups. The factors hindering the expansion of supplies of Russian products, as well as the prerequisites for the development of commodity exchange, have been identified. The conclusion is made about the potential opportunities for the food line diversification of exported products.

Keywords: Bulgaria, Russia, foreign trade, export, agro-industrial complex (AIC)

Introduction

The dynamics of foreign trade between Russia and Bulgaria in recent years is characterized by a generally downward trend. According to the calculations of the Russian Export Center (REC) and based on the data of the Federal Customs Service (FCS), in 2017-2019 the volume of trade between Russia and Bulgaria decreased from 3,446.8 to \$ 3,268.1 million. The reduction in the trade balance in favour of Russia decreased from \$2,347.6 million to \$ 2113.9 million. See Table 1.

Table 1. Trade turnover between Russia and Bulgaria, 2017-2019, million dollars

	2017	2018	2019
Export	2897.2	2941.8	2691.0
Import	549.6	525.2	577.1
Turnover	3446.8	3467.0	3268.1

Source: calculated according to the FCS

According to the REC, in 2018 Bulgaria ranked 38th in Russia's foreign trade turnover: 34th – in export (29th in 2017) and 56th – in import (51st in 2017). In 2019 Bulgaria's export position remained unchanged in exports – 34th place, in import – it increased by one position to 50th place.

This year the Bulgarian market accounted for 0.4% of Russia's non-primary non-energy exports (44th place), the complementarity index was about 40% [1].

At the present time foreign trade between two partners has a pronounced asymmetry with the commodity export dominance and a stable positive surplus of the Russian Federation. The

Bulgarian economy remains highly dependent on Russian oil and gas imports. In 2005-2017 Bulgaria's dependence on crude oil and gas condensate imports increased from 97.7% to 101.1%, on gas – from 87.7% to 97.6%.

At a meeting of Russia and Bulgaria business circles in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) of the Russian Federation on October 25, 2018, Vice-President of the CCI Vladimir Padalko announced intentions to increase mutual trade to \$ 5 billion. He noted that despite economic sanctions against Russia, there has been a positive trend in the growth of trade relations, which has resulted in the Russian export commodity line expansion in the Bulgarian market [2].

However, the situation with commodity exchange of certain goods may change due to the fact that a number of projects are currently being implemented in Russia aimed at improving the competitiveness of Russian products and promoting them on export markets, primarily in Asian countries. So, on December 24, 2018, the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and National Projects approved the national project “International Cooperation and Export” for the period from October 1, 2018 to December 31, 2024. One of the project's priority objectives is to achieve the export of non-primary non-energy goods in the amount of \$ 250 billion per year and agricultural products up to \$ 45 billion per year by the time the project is completed [3]. Within the framework of this national project, the federal project “Export of agricultural products” is also being implemented, which is focused not only on achieving quantitative indicators, but also on creating new commodity stock with high added value and export-oriented distribution infrastructure, and also on eliminating trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff) to ensure access to target agricultural products markets.

The setting of these goals is determined by the need to overcome the key difficulties that Russian exporters experience in promoting agricultural products to foreign markets, including: the lack of competitive system for supporting the export of agricultural products; lack of an analytical base on the main priority foreign countries markets for domestic agricultural products sales, shortage of knowledge of business practices and legal features of doing business in foreign countries; application by foreign countries of requirements and measures restricting the possibility of exporting domestic agricultural products; the need to improve the quality and safety of domestic agricultural products, harmonization with international quality standards, as well as the lack of a positive image of agricultural products in foreign countries.

It is planned that as a result of the implementation of this project, the export of meat and dairy products in 2019-2024 will increase from \$1.10 to \$2.80 billion, fish and seafood – from \$5.40 to \$8.50 billion, grain – from \$7.60 to \$11.40 billion, products of oil and fat industry – from \$4.00 to \$8.60 billion, food and processing industry products from \$3.70 to \$8.60 billion, other agricultural products from \$2.10 to \$5.20 billion. In order to increase export-oriented agricultural products it is planned to provide state support to enterprises for the modernization of production and the elimination of trade barriers, which will allow to increase the share of target markets after the completion of the federal project. To this end, by the 2024 the Russian Federation authorized banks will provide credit resources in the amount of 3,998.18 billion roubles, compensate part of the cost of transporting agricultural products by expanding subsidies for export transportation, which will amount to 29.78 million tons. The financial support for the project will reach 407,014.57 million roubles, or \$5,924.5 million.

Literature Review

The subject of this article is the focus of many Russian scientists, including researchers of Plekhanov Russian Economic University. So, in the paper of G.V. Podbiralina & T.E. Migaleva it

was revealed that, despite the existing sanctions, foreign trade cooperation between Russia and the EU countries is recovering and continues to dynamically develop in new promising areas [4]. In the study of G.V. Podbiralina, T.E. Migaleva, A.V. Ryzhakova, N.P. Savina [5] and G.M. Zinchuk, M.Y. Anokhina, A.V. Yashkin, S.A. Petrovskaya [6] it was identified the problems of Russian agriculture development and food security, as well as suggested ways to solve them.

The research of M.A. Ananiev, A.V. Ryzhakova, T.E. Migaleva [7] summarizes the features of the current stage of the national food supply system development, identifies key problems of the food sector in the Russian consumer market and the reasons for their occurrence. Evaluation of the grain balance of Russia and grain markets, as well as an analysis of state support measures for the grain production and processing are given in the study of G.V. Podbralina, T.E. Migaleva, A.V. Ryzhakova [8].

Issues of increasing the effectiveness of the import substitution strategy of the Russian Federation were considered in the article of T.V. Murtuzalieva, M.E. Seifullaeva, I.P. Shirochenskaya, [9] Murtuzalieva T.V., Panasenko S.V., Tultaev T.A., Slepenskova E.V., Pogorilyak B.I. [10] and L.G. Eliseeva, E.V. Grishina, M.A. Vanzidler, A.V. Betyaeva. [11] The research of L.G. Eliseev, E.V. Grishina, D.A. Agadzhanian, P.P. Gorojanin is devoted to improving safety and preventing food fraud. [12]

The problems of expanding the export of Russian agricultural products and improving the quality of management of the Russian agricultural complex are considered in the paper of R.A. Romashkin, D. Sedik, M.V. Avdeev, O.V. Cherkasova [13], and M.Y. Anokhina, G.M. Zinchuk, A.V. Butov, [14] as well as M.Y. Anokhina, G.M. Zinchuk, O.N. Kondrashina, N.S. Seredina [15].

Methodology

A quantitative analysis of Russian agricultural exports to Bulgaria was carried out by the method of data aggregation based on the statistical methodology for calculating indicators of the federal project “Export of agricultural products” developed by the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. The main export groups of goods were selected based on the current monthly statistics of the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation, which reflects the value of export flows for the items of the nomenclature of foreign trade activities which is identical to those of the international Harmonized system for the description and coding of goods. All commodity items are divided into six groups, including meat and dairy products, fish and seafood, cereals, oil and fat products, food and processing products, and other agricultural products. Product codes for each product group are listed in the methodology description [16].

The prospect of increasing the export of certain product groups was determined conditionally, based on the dynamics and volume of trade, and does not take into account the conditions for market access. The study period includes 2017-2019 and the first quarter of 2020, which is determined by the availability of the FCS statistical database.

Results

An analysis of the dynamics and structure of Russian agricultural exports to Bulgaria was initially carried out for 6 major product groups, including cereals, oil and fat, fish and seafood, meat and dairy products, food products and other agricultural products. The study showed that in 2017-2019 Russian agricultural exports increased \$5.66 million to \$ 35.22 million. The main

growth for the entire study period was demonstrated by the group of other agricultural products, whose share in 2017-2019 increased from 72% to 99%. In value terms, it increased from \$ 4.09 million to \$ 32.80 million, that is more than 8 times. Steady growth was also demonstrated by the food products supply: in 2017-2019 exports increased by 30.7% – from \$ 1.25 to \$ 1.64 million.

However, its share in the total volume of delivered products decreased substantially – from 22% to 5% due to the rapid growth in the supply of other agricultural products.

A significant volume was made up of grain exports, the maximum share of which in the structure of agricultural exports was reached in 2018 – 13% (\$925.2 thousand), but in 2019 it decreased significantly to \$605.4 thousand dollars (See Fig. 1, 2, 3, 4).




Fig. 1. The structure of commodity exports of the Russian agricultural sector to Bulgaria, 2017




Fig. 2. The structure of commodity exports of the Russian agricultural sector to Bulgaria, 2018




Fig. 3. The structure of commodity exports of the Russian agricultural sector to Bulgaria, 2019.




Fig. 4. The structure of commodity exports of the Russian agro-industrial complex to Bulgaria, Q1 2020.

Presented on Fig. 5 data of export dynamics for 5 major export groups of agricultural products excluding other products confirm that in 2017-2019 steady growth is demonstrated only by the export of agricultural products.

For all major product groups, Russian agricultural exports have a low degree of diversification.

Meat and dairy products are represented only by ice cream and other types of edible ice (2105), which is supplied from Moscow and the Krasnodar in small quantities, fish and fish products (0303) – as frozen cod. Exports of cereals are represented by three types of items, exports of oil and fat products include vegetable oil, sauces and products for their preparation (7 items). The

most diverse products are the food industry, which includes tea, coffee, chicory, flour and flour products, cocoa products, including chocolate, etc. (more than 60 items).




Fig. 5. The dynamics of commodity exports of the Russian agricultural sector to Bulgaria, in 2017-2019, thousand dollars

Analysis of geographical sources of agricultural products export in 2017-2019 for the federal subjects of Russia indicates that their number increased from 15 to 18 republics and regions in 2018, and then decreased to 14 in 2019 (to 13 in the Q1 2020), however, in the same period the number of export positions increased from 16 to 33 (32 positions in the Q1 2020), taking into account both criteria – the number of federal subjects and commodity positions – exports expanded from 35 to 65 positions (up to 47 in the Q1 2020), which generally indicates the process of the sources diversification.

An analysis of the other agricultural products dynamics shows a more than tenfold increase during 2017 – Q1 2020: from \$4089.9 to \$45315.9 thousand. Such a rapid growth in other products occurred due to the export of sunflower seeds, which amounted to \$44.2 million.

Discussion

In recent years, favourable conditions have developed for increasing the supply of Russian agricultural products to foreign markets. According to the FCS, the volume of deliveries to all countries of the world has more than tripled – from \$8.1 billion to \$25.5 billion. In 2017-2019 export of Russian agricultural products increased by almost \$4 billion – from \$21, 6 to \$25.5 billion. The main export products of the Russian agricultural sector are cereals, oil and fat products, fish and seafood. The largest buyer countries are China, Turkey, South Korea, EU countries, and countries of the former USSR. The geography of sales covers 158 countries.

Despite the fact that grain remains the main product of Russian export of agricultural products, there is a tendency to change its structure due to a significant increase in the supply of oilseeds, meat and dairy products, fish and seafood. Various measures of state support should contribute to the further development of the agro-industrial complex export segment, including innovations such as stimulation of oilseed production, compensation for part of the costs of certification of products, and measures designed to reduce the logistics costs of agricultural companies. For the

Q1 2020, according to the authors' calculations, Russia increased the export of the main agricultural products groups from 18% to 35%.

In the ranking of the ten largest importers of Russian agri-food products by major product categories in the Q1 2020 Bulgaria occupied a significant position only in the product group of other products – 7th place after Turkey, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Latvia [17].

An important factor constraining the development of trade relations is the low complementarity in the trade exchange between Russia and Bulgaria – about 40%. According to the calculations of Russian scientists, many of Russia's trading partners, such as Iran, which has a maximum indicator of complementarity (72%) and Germany close to Bulgaria (41%) overtake her on this indicator [13, p. 13]. So, in the world grain market Russia and Bulgaria are competitors. In 2018 and 2019, Bulgaria ranks 11th as a world wheat exporter and 6th – in Europe after Russia, France, Ukraine, Romania and Germany. During the pandemic, the new strategic importance of the agricultural sector in Bulgaria is emerging. This market has been developing very rapidly in recent years.

Analysts believe that the agrarian sector and the food industry should solve not only the issues of food for the Bulgarians, but also become the pillar of the economy during the recession, when many sectors ceased to operate, large and small enterprises closed and lost revenue, and tourism industry practically stopped [18]. The second reason is that Russian exports of products with a higher degree of processing, such as meat and dairy products, remain insignificant. The third factor is that the food industry in the Russian Federation is extremely poorly developed by international standards. The fourth factor is insufficient attention to issues of veterinary safety, which is why Russian livestock enterprises cannot expand their production and supply to foreign markets. And finally, in general, the amount of investment in agricultural infrastructure and agrolgy is not yet sufficient [13, p. 50-53].

However, the conducted research allows identifying a number of promising directions for expanding Russian agricultural exports to the Bulgarian markets.

Firstly, it is oilseeds (0713), the largest supplier of which to Bulgaria is the Rostov Region, which exports agricultural products to 75 countries of the world. Among the buyers of sunflower seeds, in addition to Bulgaria, European countries such as Turkey, Romania, Italy and others.

Rostov Region expects to increase exports of agricultural products from \$ 4.5 to \$ 5 billion in 2020 and to \$ 7.7 billion in 2024, when the implementation of the national project "International Cooperation and Export" is completed [19]. Secondly, confectionery and chocolate (1806), the export of which from Russia to foreign markets is already in the Q1 2020 amounted to 449 tons worth \$ 1.5 million. The main supplier of this product group to Bulgaria is Moscow. Thirdly, frozen fish and seafood (0303), as well as frozen dairy products (2105). Fourth, Russia could expand the range of its traditional export items: alcoholic and non-alcoholic products (22), vegetables and root crops (07), medicinal plants (12), cocoa and its products (18), tobacco products (24), flour confectionery (1905), and others. Export of pork (0203) and other meat products is likely in the future.

To date, Russia has not been able to enter the upward trajectory of export of non-primary and non-energy goods to Bulgaria, the cost of which is at the level of 2014. However, there are all the necessary prerequisites for the change of this trend. The most effective mechanism for solving this problem is to create a positive image of Russian food and agricultural products in foreign markets, which will be facilitated by the participation of Russian agricultural producers in fairs, exhibitions and targeted events, as well as the development of a single nation brand "Made in Russia" and regional sub-brands.

Despite the fact that the crisis, in general, has an adverse effect on agriculture, it is right now a window of opportunity and the current situation gives Russia a chance to increase its share in the

export of agricultural products, including food. Factors that will favour the growth of Russian exports are: the depreciation of the ruble, a possible break in excessively long global supply chains of export products to the markets of the Far and Middle East and Central Asia, a decrease in production in other exporting countries due to a shortage of professional seasonal workers, the growth of products with the greatest economic usefulness (maximum saturation and satisfaction with minimum costs) in the structure of food consumption of importing countries and the successful implementation of government support measures for the agricultural sector as part of a Russian national project.

Conclusions

As the study showed, despite the fact that the total commodity turnover between Russia and Bulgaria does not show stable positive dynamics, the exchange of agricultural products tends to increase. The main constraints to the expansion of the Russian exports are the low rate of complementarity of mutual trade and the low degree of supplied goods processing, insufficient development of the Russian food industry and unsolved problems of veterinary safety. We do not assume that there are prerequisites for a significant increase in the quantitative indicators of Russian agricultural exports to the Bulgarian markets in the near future, but we note the availability of opportunities for expanding the variety of supplied products.

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Western Balkans Dilemma: The West Vs. the East?

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Abstract

Western Balkans doesn't cease to be a combat zone in almost every occasion when the West and the East are debating solutions for the existing political, economic, security and any other issues. Thus, there is a significant outside influence on the Euro-Atlantic integration (E-A) efforts of the countries from this region. The progress towards NATO and the European Union (EU) membership is bumpy and generally slow, caused by numerous factors, including internal support, but also external influence, which has been often considered as disunited from the West or assertive from the East. Apart from the Western encouragements, there is also a concurrent and increasing incentive from Russia, and some other Eastern countries to take part in the political and commercial interests battle over the Western Balkans, which has been generally considered as uneven with E-A intentions. This has been causing an obvious division among population, but also a political dilemma about the future of the region.

The paper begins with an elaboration of geopolitical position of the Western Balkans, next analyses NATO integration developments in respective countries, including Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. It then describes disunited and sluggish EU that empowers Russia in the region. Finally, it warns of the unpleasant alternative to the Euro-Atlantic integrations in the Western Balkans.

Keywords: Western Balkans, Euro-Atlantic integrations, EU, NATO, West, East, Russia

1. Geopolitical Position of the Western Balkans

Although the term Western Balkans has different meanings, including the geographical, historical, political and even cultural connotation, in this paper we will consider it as a political coinage, created to refer to the territory of the former Yugoslavia without Slovenia, plus Albania.

This approach is very much in line with the EU practise, that includes countries, which are not members of the EU. Experience shows as soon as a country gain NATO and EU membership it expresses aversion towards being associated with the term Western Balkans.

Historically, the Western Balkans area use to be a sort of frontline between the West and the East for centuries, even before invasions by the Ottoman Empire in Europe occurred. It continues during the existence of ex-Yugoslavia, when this country served as a tampon zone between North-Atlantic Alliance and Soviet Union. The advantage of that time was the fact that all republics shared the same national interests, at least when foreign policy has been considered. That perhaps helped the Yugoslav president Tito to manage the balancing approach towards two opposing blocks, the West (NATO and EC) and the East (Warsaw pact).

However, these same republics, after becoming independent states, suddenly began to compete in differences instead of benefiting from similarities and shared values. Thus, their national

interests turn out to be different, in some occasions became opposite, and very often confronting with interests of others. Nevertheless, after all, overall circumstances predisposed that they have formally set roughly common goals that in some cases matches more, in others less.

Consequently, the Euro-Atlantic integration supposed to be the one of the objectives listed as a top priority on the foreign policy agendas of all these countries. However, it seems this term does not have the same meaning for all of them. Therefore, efforts vary from country to country, in some cases restricted by the popular support, in others, depending on the actual state leadership, but in all cases, it has been influenced externally.

The Western Balkans is still an area of interests of the West as well as the East, and these dual arrangements have direct effects in the countries from the region. Consequently, there is a significant outside influence on the E-A integration efforts of the countries from the region. It has been demonstrated through continues pursuing of various national interests, categorized by power, ideology or geopolitical positioning. Indeed, Western reassurances to embrace the region are thus challenged by coexisting investments from the East, predominantly Russia, which engagements with the countries from the Western Balkans are not harmonious with their E-A integration attempts.

While both E-A organizations, NATO and the EU have specific policies and mechanisms for accepting new members from the Western Balkans, it doesn't go always as it has been declared.

Both organizations set specific preconditions for membership, and they are complementary to the huge extent. NATO's Open-door policy as well as the EU Enlargement policy implies certain criteria that require democratic and efficient government, market economy protection of human rights, rule of law, respect of the common values and to overtake obligation of the membership.

In order to achieve that, they have developed explicit mechanisms that assist potential members to conduct required reforms and comply with the adopted treaties. Thus, NATO uses the Partnership for peace program (PfP), Individual partnership action plan (IPAP) then the Membership action plan (MAP) for aspirants; EU practices the Stabilisation and association agreement (SAA) particularly designed for Western Balkan countries and consistent with the Copenhagen criteria, and it applies "acquis Communautaire" for candidate countries.

Formally, there is a common interest expressed by the West as well as uttered by the Western Balkans' countries for integrating the region into the E-A associations.

Hence, there is strong evidence that the processes of the E-A integration have significantly contributed in supporting stability, reforms and prosperity in Western Balkan countries. The progress is apparent in the countries that have joined NATO and/or EU. Croatia, Albania (not ex-Yugoslav republic) Montenegro, and North Macedonia became members of NATO. Bosnia and Herzegovina activated the MAP program; Serbia exercises a high level of corporation, implementing the IPAP program. Even Kosovo declared NATO aspirations and applied for the PfP program. As far as the EU is considered, only Croatia gained the membership status, while Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro are candidate states. Bosnia and Herzegovina are a potential candidate. In the meantime, Kosovo signed the SAA with the EU.

2. NATO Integration Developments

If we examine the NATO integration progresses of these countries, we could straightforwardly realize that after Slovenian quick success, Croatia spent more time since it opened the accession process in 2000, when country started the PfP program. The MAP happened in 2002, but an invitation for the membership arrived six years later, so Croatia became a full NATO member in 2009. However, comparing with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and

Serbia, it could still be considered as a smooth process of integration. Yet, Russian interest for the region never disappeared, as a former Russian ambassador Vorontsov stated: “Russia’s attitude toward NATO enlargement has been and remains unequivocally negative...” [1]. Noticeably Croatia was not in the core of the Russian interest at that time. An additional explanation could be offered by the fact that Russia entered an open conflict with Georgia at that time. Accordingly, we could claim that external influence didn’t substantially interfere Croatian integration to NATO.

2.1 Montenegro

It started its cooperation with the Alliance in 2003, when The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro applied for the PfP program. After declaring independence in 2006, Montenegro swiftly joined the PfP. In 2008 country adopted an IPAP and then activated the MAP in 2009.

There are several arguments suggesting that integration of Montenegro occurred in much different circumstances than it was case with Croatia. In addition to the external multidirectional interference, there was also a constant irritable internal discussion about the NATO membership.

The public support to the membership was fairly low, around 41 percent [2].

Although Montenegro gained an extensive backing from individual NATO member states, particularly to be invited during the Wales summit in 2011, which was initiated by Slovenia and Croatia, NATO publicized that it would not call new members that year. Many claimed that both, Russian obstruction as well as the lack of public support influenced the decision. Externally, Russian direct opposition to the membership could be illustrated by the statement of the Russian MP Mikhail Degtyarev, who warned that NATO membership would make Montenegro “a legitimate target of Russian missiles”. [3]. Internal circumstances were also extremely complex.

Opposition political parties and activists demanded a referendum on NATO membership to be held at the same time as parliamentary elections in 2016, however the government suggested that the elections were an authentic reflection of the public position regarding the subject. No doubt that these developments complicated the integration as well as overall situation in the country, highlighting the political as well as a division between people, obviously creating a pro-Western versus pro-Eastern bloc. It is important to mention that pro-Serbian opposition was very active, on streets as well. Thus, abrasive protests were held in Podgorica in 2015 that ended in an unrest.

Protests continued in 2016, culminating to an attempt to a *coup d’état* on 16 October 2016, exactly on the day of the parliamentary election. According to the statements made by Montenegrin officials the coup attempt apparently would have included assassination of Montenegro’s prime minister Milo Đukanović, where a direct involvement of Russian nationals has been evidenced [4].

Population support for NATO in 2016 clearly demonstrated division in Montenegro, going from 39,9 to the maximum 54 percent. Although pro-NATO parties won elections, they represented only 41% of the popular vote. Hence a formal invitation was issued by the Alliance in 2015, Montenegro gained a full NATO status in 2017, becoming so member of the Western club.

This has been followed by increasingly hostile reactions from Russia, which can be noticeable from the statement by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who said: “This is a purely geopolitical project that does nothing to enhance the security of NATO. It causes extra spending by the alliance’s member states, because they will have to incorporate Montenegro’s territory in military and technical terms [5]. Thus, a clear division of the country remains strong even today during the global COVID-19 crises, which has been proved by rejection of the medical assistance from Serbia, with an explanation that Serbia has seized an earlier Montenegrin purchase of medical instruments.

The case of Montenegro undoubtedly illustrates a strong overlapping of the Western and the Eastern influence in the state, which created a wide-ranging partition among people.

2.2 Nord Macedonia

Even though Macedonia possessed considerable internal support for the Euro-Atlantic integrations, it suffered more than 20 years to join NATO. Macedonia pursued for the NATO membership even before it commenced the PfP in 1995. It formalized the quest in 1999 together with other former Soviet bloc members, as one of the first ex-Yugoslav republics to submit the application. However, integration of the country has been blocked for decades by Greece, which required change of the country's name. Although Macedonia gained general support from the residual Alliance members, this historical and cultural dispute blocked the integration. While this was the main issue that gridlocked the process, the country also suffered from anti-Western propaganda. Leaked intelligence documents revealed that Russian spies were actively involved in spreading propaganda and inflaming tension in the country. "By using the assets and methods of so-called 'soft power', as part of the strategy of the Russian Federation in the Balkans, the goal is to isolate the country from the influence of the West"[6] Documents also proved that Russia was interested in other Western Balkans countries too, discontinuing Western influence in the region, by preventing countries to join NATO. "...Russian Ambassador Oleg Shcherbak highlighted Moscow's extant idea to change its international political course towards the Balkans to create of a strip of military neutral countries (Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Macedonia and Serbia)" [7]. These developments had considerable impacts on the situation in the country, causing a clear political and public disunion, which led to internal ethnical and political tensions, significantly influencing functioning of Macedonia as a state. Thanks to the incessant prevailing public preference of Macedonia's people for the Euro-Atlantic integration, which inclined political pre-composition of the government.

Loud backing from Russia that ex-prime minister Gruevski enjoyed was ended by formation of the new coalition government led by prime minister Zaev, which made a strategic shift towards Western integration. After a long-lasting hesitation, perhaps prompted by Russian proactive doing, Western countries finally unified about the necessity to find an immediate solution, engaging directly in the negotiations. Following the agreement reached in 2018 between two nations, Macedonia became North Macedonia, and Greece ended its oppositions to the NATO membership, which enabled North Macedonia to become the 30th member of the Alliance on 27th of March 2020. Arguments above visibly shows an ongoing absence of the determination of the Western countries regarding the Macedonian struggling to solve the issue, which created the long-lasting uncertainty about the country's future.

2.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina

The country remained as the only aspirant member from the region. Joining the PfP in 2006, and IPAP in 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina gained a conditional MAP status in 2010. Due to the lack of the internal political consensus to fulfil the Tallinn precondition and register immovable prospective military property, Bosnia and Herzegovina was not able to activate the MAP for ten years. It was an outcome of the continues blockade from the Bosnia and Herzegovina's entity Republika Srpska (RS). Milorad Dodik, leader of the SNSD party, opposed NATO integrations during the last decade, although his political party, as well as other parties from the RS entity previously supported adoption of the all legal acts that regulated path of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards NATO. This includes the Defence law from 2004, Letter of intent declaring NATO

aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Defence review and number of other documents that are commonly approved at the state level, with participation of legal representatives from the entity.

Dodik explained his obstruction by the position of Serbia towards NATO, advocating that RS will follow the attitude of Serbia. We should notice that Serbia and Russia both reinforced this behaviour of Dodik. As it is claimed by The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies, “Aleksandar Vucic has done nothing visible for the political stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary, his opposing to Bosnia and Herzegovina accession to NATO and his support to the government of the Republika Srpska (RS) which has constantly been blocking the Euro-Atlantic integration process.” [8]. Even as a member of the BIH presidency, Dodik’s efforts to destabilize his own country haven’t vanish. He advocated anti-constitutional referendum in RS, about the issues that are undoubtedly the state responsibility, neglected the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, blocked adoption of numerous decisions at the state level, and so on. But all this that he was doing stood constantly backed by Serbian and Russian leadership. That’s way no surprise for locals when he as a chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina said: “My country is Republic of Srpska and Serbia, but Bosnia and Herzegovina are just a place where I must live.” [9]. At the same time, as Timoty Less argued, “Russia, traditionally the Serbs’ main external sponsor, used the Bosnian Serbs to block NATO membership for the whole of the country.” [10]. Russia’s systematic patronage to Dodik’s destructive efforts were additionally proved by frequent confronting of the Russian representative with other members of the Peace Implementation Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, correspondingly sponsoring shutting of the Office of the High Representative in the country. Clearly, Dodik has been continuously implementing pro-Russian proxy roles, also overtaking activities that are aimed to ruin state level institutions and efficiency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. He has also prized Russian support by selling the energy sector of the RS entity to Russian companies. According to the NDI research, people of Bosnia-Herzegovina prefer pro-EU course, however, they are tightly divided between the West and the East in case of NATO, where Bosniaks and Croats are both widely in favour of NATO, while ethnic Serbs support much more Russia than NATO [11].

However, NATO has recognized progress made in other areas, particularly in the field of Defence including the endured participation of the AFBIH in NATO operations exercises and programs. Also, Russian and Serbian intensive interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina triggered that NATO foreign affairs ministers offered to the country to submit the first Annual National Program (ANP) in December 2018. Nevertheless, Bosnia and Herzegovina lost an additional year in reaching the internal consensus about that, which finally happened in December 2019, when the Program of reforms of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been submitted to Brussels, as a political compromise. Accordingly, NATO acknowledged receipt of the document in January 2020, announcing that Bosnia and Herzegovina are in the MAP status. Though activation of the MAP represents the clear signal for the country where does it belongs to, huge efforts are still needed from the West to stay engaged and by internal pro-Western forces to compete with those against NATO integration that are backed by Serbia and Russia. Thus, either external integration to the E-A society will enhance internal integration of the Bosnia and Herzegovina, or destructing forces from the East will divide the country and boost its own influence there.

2.4 Serbia

This nation also started its cooperation with NATO in 2006, but this is the only one from the region that has not declared aspirant ambitions to NATO. The NATO bombing from 1999 has been largely used in anti-NATO public campaigns, justifying constant political move of Serbia towards the East. Serbia has been proved as the strongest ally of Russia in the Western Balkans,

and this cooperation has been loudly defensible by cultural, religious and historical ties with Russia. Thus, no doubt that Russian presence has been continuously robust in this part of the region. Serbian leadership was very often used as proxy for Russian political influence in the region, particularly president Vucic, who is overtaking full control over all state's institutions and media as well. At the same time, Russia is openly supporting every anti-Western effort in Serbia.

Thus, Russia opposed NATO's air campaign in Kosovo in 1999, seeing it as unlawful, and then used the UN Security Council veto power to support Serbia regarding the Kosovo dispute. Also, a resolution initiated by the Security Council members, condemning the Srebrenica massacre as genocide, has been vetoed by Russia. All that influenced public opinion of the Serbian citizens.

According to the NDI research of public opinion in the Western Balkans from 2019, support for the EU membership is strong in all countries, except in Serbia. The same research shows that in case of referendum, Serbia and Montenegro are the countries that will not support NATO membership. Russia's favourability in Serbia is the strongest and has even augmented more than 20 percent during the last seven years. Thus, Russia, and China, has been perceived much positively than the EU and the US [12].

Although the West often suspected Serbia for extensive ties with Russia, it has not prevented the country to develop very dynamic cooperation with NATO too. This well-adjusted 'seating in two chairs', the Western and the Eastern one, has been lasting already for 15 years. It is even intensified in 2015, when Serbia joined the IPAP program, engaging with NATO not just militarily, but also in the sphere of politics, economy, security and so on. Thus, Serbia is vigorously involved in the Building Integrity (BI), the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), the Interoperability Platform, the NATO Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative and many other programs. Obviously, it has been exploiting cooperation greatly, but not offering much to the Alliance.

Alternatively, in addition to the common exercises that were conducted jointly with Russian military forces, Serbia made very controversial procurement of the military equipment from Russia, including the Pantsir missile system, Mi-35M military helicopters, MiG-29 fighter jets, tanks and combat vehicles. Treat of sanctions by US officials during their visit to Serbia confirmed that the sitting in two chairs is not an easy business. The US Special Representative to the Western Balkans, Matthew Palmer, expressed worries "about the deployment of Russian military equipment on the territory of Serbia, but also about the possibility that Serbia requires specific Russian systems, which would run the risk of imposing special sanctions on the purchase of Russian military equipment" [13].

All above mentioned clearly suggest that Serbia is the safest ground for Russian interests in the Western Balkans area. At the same time, if take in consideration the E-A ambitions of the region and Serbian interference in other countries affairs, it is clear that this country is a destabilizing factor in the region.

3. Disunited and Sluggish EU Empowers Russia in the Region

Slow integration of the Western Balkans is undoubtedly a consequence of internal developments, including incompetent governing, corruption, inside divisions or absence of required reforms. However, reluctance to realistically grasp the circumstances and necessity for much faster and comprehensive actions by the West create the space for others to turn in. Although EU was very auspicious during the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki, in 2003, when the European Union's Heads of State or Government adopted the Declaration, identifying Western Balkans countries, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, as potential candidates, most of them are still kept far away from the club. So far, only Croatia succeeded to join the EU, while Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro are still straggling as the EU candidate states. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina formally applied for the EU membership, country up to now remains as a potential candidate.

Many analyses explain faster integration of some Western Balkan countries by either a broad consensus or stronger Western support or by the less exposed interest from Russia over these territories at that time. Hesitation to accelerate the integration processes has been proven recently when the EU cancelled beginning of the accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. Even though both countries made great efforts, French president Macron banned any consensus to be reached to acknowledge it officially. The EU also failed to embark Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Western train, accepting the blockade internally imposed by indolent or pro-Russian local politicians, which has been entirely enabled by extremely restraining Dayton Constitution. This EU negligence caused pessimism and instability in the most countries of the region. Trusting in the EU promise, Northern Macedonian PM Zaev resigned following the EU refusal, which could lead to the new internal political battles, both, ethnically and politically based.

Luckily, after additional six months delay, “the European Commission welcomes the Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, subject to final endorsement by the European Council members.” [14].

Similar consequences are caused for Bosnia and Hercegovina. Apparently, that status quo will remain as an estimable prerequisite for incompetent political leaders to shadow corruption, nepotism and absence of reforms by ethnical reasoning, deepening so division of the country. Or, they will perhaps continue to blame international community for ineffectiveness, without assuming any responsibility.

Serbia seems to be the only country in the region attentively balancing between the West and the East. Eliminating opposition from the political scene and controlling all media, regime of the president Vucic is continuing with a strategy of selection and picking between EU and Russia, enabling Russia to be entirely present in the region. President Vucic clearly verified this, stating for the Financial Times that: “the EU’s decision has left the region feeling it cannot rely on its Western neighbours alone”. Obviously, he uses each opportunity to justify his policy of close cooperation with Russia, including the military collaboration, even telling that he is undeniably correct letting Russia to seize also country’s energy segment. Russia apparently made some investments in both, Serbia and Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Hence, in addition to the political and military collaboration and investments in the energy sector, Russia has financed Serbian-language media, like Sputnik News, and Russia Today, promoting so its global position.

Thus, consuming the soft power, by spending negligible resources and using Serbs as proxies in the region, Russia will be in the position to reinforce anti-Western orientation in the Western Balkan, further challenging Euro-Atlantic integration of other countries. It has been already proven by the fact that Serbia never joined the EU sanctions against Russia. Serbia recently even used current COVID-19 pandemic crisis to highlight the division between the West and the East in many occasions. Firstly, it frequently highlighted the supporting character of China and Russia, simultaneously presenting the EU as chaotic and inefficient; and secondly, it publicized the Serbian assistance to Serbs in the region. In that regard Vucic said: “But we have to fight for our people. Do you think we obeyed international laws when we were transporting tankers to Kosovo?

Or when we were sending aid to Republika Srpska.” Noticeably, Vucic deliberately breaching the international law, without any respect toward neighbouring countries and their sovereignty, perhaps knowing that Russia will prevent any sentence attempt against Serbia.

Evidences raised above suggests that the West, particularly the EU, has not recognised as very efficient in regard to the Western Balkans integration. As long as the Western countries allow Serbia its hypocritic seating in two chairs, this country will remain as the strongest Russian proxy in the region, maintaining the continues Eastern influence in the Western Balkans.

4. Are there Alternatives?

Apart from Russia, there are also other countries from the East, like China and Turkey, that proposing good-looking alternatives to the Western Balkans. Actual arguments suggest that the longer the E-A integration is delayed, the more space is given to other powers to fill the gap. The space caused by insufficient Western strategies has directly enabled Eastern powers to forcefully engage in the region. They look for every opportunity to fill the vacuum, whenever the EU is not vigilant about.

Therefore, it is very inconsistent by Europeans, particularly president Macron, which suggest that the EU should retune because of the Russian, Chinese and Turkish influence in the region, and at the same, time to retain their undetermined attitude toward Western Balkans. Actually, this dilemma must cause concern among the EU members, because these Eastern powers will probably endure by pursuing their influence in the region, regardless of the EU priorities. This ought to be an abundant trigger point for the West to refocus on the Western Balkans.

This is not just about geopolitical or economic competition over the Western Balkans, rather a reminder to also consider a fragile security situation in the region that can be swiftly endangered by nationalistic and other destructive forces, particularly if they are supported externally. That has been already seen in this area.

An alternative to avoid it is undoubtedly the E-A integration of the Western Balkans, and West can still do it, but without additionally wasting time. This is a desire of majority of the region's population, but also it is the Western commitment. An instant and comprehensive engagement with Western Balkans countries is needed, implementing all existing mechanisms, but also introducing new once, to get these countries in the club as soon as possible. An employment of the special envoy for the NATO integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the remaining NATO aspirant from the region, as well as the EU representative for the entire Western Balkan may perhaps be an added value to the existing efforts.

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Dimensions of Bulgarian Identity on the Eve of World War II (Cultural and Psychological Discourses)

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Abstract

The article aims to mark the metamorphoses of the Bulgarian political culture in the crisis period, as well as their impact on the dimensions of the Bulgarian identity on the eve of the World War II. The impact of large-scale social, political, and historical events (such as World War II) on how individuals and large communities experience themselves in a shorter or longer period of time is the key to understanding political and historical processes.

Keywords: identity, political culture, national psychology, psychohistory, anomie

For a long time, the humanities remained captivated by simplified historiographical schemes explaining the complicated historical course of the Bulgarians as a chronological sequence of events consisting of prerequisites – causes – beginning – development – ending – consequences.

Furthermore, political and historical discourse in the past escaped the notion of mental experiences, both at the individual and at the community level, influenced by these same events.

Despite the achievements of the modern psychoanalytic trend called psychohistory in the second half of the twentieth century, Bulgarian science lacks a lasting interest in the influence of historical and political processes on the mental experiences of the individual, and during periods of deep historical turmoil. I am not referring here to the study of the peculiarities of the Bulgarian national character object in the studies of several intellectuals in the period after the Liberation and in modern times, such as Zahari Stoyanov, Todor Panov, Stoyan Mihaylovski, Ivan Hadzhiyski, Prof. Petar Mutafchiev, Prof. Nikolay Genchev, and others. The impact of large-scale social, political, and historical events on how human individuals and large communities experience themselves over a shorter or longer period is a key to understanding political and historical processes. Such an event of global significance is World War II, which not only greatly alters the established political status quo internationally, but also leads to national identity crises.

Bulgaria does not remain untouched by World War II. The policy of neutrality proclaimed in September 1939 by the Bulgarian government was changed only two years later (March 1941) under the pressure of circumstances and military-political alliances with the Axis powers.

Although not directly involved in hostilities, engagement with the Third Reich forces leads to a declaration of war on Britain and the United States (the so-called “strange war”), the creation of political tensions in Bulgarian society, and Anglo-American bombing (fall 1943 – spring 1944) and the entry of the Soviet army into the country (September 1944). Since September 1944 Bulgaria has been at war with Germany. Bulgarian troops participate in hostilities in the territories of the former Yugoslavia and Hungary and reach the Austrian Alps.

The relatively long period in which the country is not actively involved in hostilities allows Bulgarian society to continue its economic modernization, which began in the 1930s, and to some

extent has a beneficial effect on scientific and cultural development. However, entering the active military phase, the country suffers considerable losses. The bombing, mainly over Sofia, besides human casualties, also causes considerable destruction, economic and financial difficulties [1].

In this regard, the article aims to highlight the metamorphoses suffered by Bulgarian political culture during this crisis period, as well as their impact on the dimensions of Bulgarian identity on the eve of World War II.

As a social construction, the identity reflects an abstract reality, an imaginary image that a group of people has for themselves. National identity, in this order of thought, does not reflect any historical or cultural reality, but merely a perspective on that reality, often ideologized and distorted indefinitely, serving political interests, be they political or economic. (turning national consciousness into a political project). This process becomes especially visible after the Liberation when our country does not take the path outlined by the ideologues of the liberation movement [2]. The Bulgarian state is beginning to form a “national” identity, serving the interests of the authorities. As an element of identity, the idea of expansion under the slogan “national unification” is added, which is permanently placed among the constituents that fulfil the concept of political culture.

Bulgarian political culture has been the subject of a great number of researches done in different academic fields: history, philosophy, historical anthropology, sociology, political science. Some of the texts devoted to this research subject are defined as “folk psychology”. The recognized authority in the area is Ivan Hadzhiyski, author of reference texts on “the lifestyle and spirituality of the Bulgarian people” [3]. His approach is sociological and largely allows for the reconstruction of an acceptable picture of basic values in modern Bulgarian society, formed over three major historical periods: collectivism (represented by the cohabiting peasantry); individualism (represented by small craftsmanship); and selfishness – characterizing the morality of Bulgarian society in the period between the two world wars [4].

Based on the historical approach and observations of Hadzhiyski, Prof. Nikolay Genchev outlines some basic laws that have had a lasting impact on the construction and manifestations of Bulgarian identity. In general, they are:

- 1) The highly broken curve of ups and downs in the development of the state and nationality;
- 2) Prolonged interruptions of state life, which reflects in the depersonalization of the Bulgarian state, as a dominant tendency;
- 3) The incompleteness of historical processes and, in particular, of the national entity, in which the accelerated formation of the nation is accompanied by rapid destruction;
- 4) Numerous wars, bloody and almost continuous clashes with powerful adversaries, combined with internal conflicts that do not recognize national tolerance.

It is these moments of our national history that build in the Bulgarian self-consciousness, according to Genchev, the brief optimism of achievement and the deep turmoil of destruction. The Bulgarian psyche is permanently formed independence and under the influence of factors such as blood, grief, and lack of historical chance. It models a state of expectation for what is coming as something bad and unforeseeable. All this in a special way marks Bulgarian folk psychology.

Foreign political domination, according to Genchev, contributes to the construction of stereotypes in Bulgarians, among which he often finds it difficult to find the measure between national nihilism and national megalomania [5]. According to psychologist Prof. Lubomir Georgiev, the transition to the formation of one’s state as a situation of social anomia, in which the norms of the Ottoman Empire did not exist, but those of the new statehood has not yet been strengthened, mentally suggests the activation of the old and reproduced in history. ambivalent ethnocultural markers such as 1. Underdevelopment of the cultural notion of community and the

idea of the extreme importance of its opposite, which in turn activates individual coping and survival strategies; 2. Extreme suspicion of statehood and its opposite, which in turn leads to self-incarceration in family structures; 3. The notion of the necessary short-term of any change that carries extreme enthusiasm that runs counter to it – pessimism about the impossibility of realization [6]. These in-depth and polar ethnocultural models that fulfil the content of our national psyche regulate the thinking and behaviour of the Bulgarian community in times of crises and historical transitions, demonstrating the conflict between experiencing as traditional Bulgarian identity and the attempts of one or other elites to modernize the same identity. This “matrix” resists the transformations of time as if it were immortal. It can also be found in the evolution of Bulgarian spirituality. The psychic qualities created once do not disappear, but remain in the “psychogenic” if we can use this notion, passing on historically from generation to generation. The “matrix” of enduring qualities contains the deeply secreted, conscious and unconscious in people’s mentality.

An example in this respect is the evolution in the spirituality of the main and most numerous strata of the Bulgarian people. Their complex and multifaceted spirituality changed with the economic and political changes during the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the capitalist development and yet remained constant and solid in-depth, bearing the basic, typical Bulgarian qualities [7]. The peasantry is depicted as a stable shoot from which the other strata grow: clericalism, poverty, intelligentsia and more.

According to Prof. Nikolay Genchev, the centuries-old conservation of small existence is also evident in the attitude of the Bulgarian peasant towards state policy and social institutions. It is not because of biological conservatism, but because of the petty proprietary instincts in the soul of the peasant, that nihilism towards the state, hatred of the rich, disrespect for the intelligentsia continues to be alive [8]. Particularly important here is the conclusion that “in the short bourgeois period in Bulgarian history, remarkable social differentiation could take place, but no complete restructuring of the Bulgarian rural psyche could be expected”. This drama or this “rural” behaviour (according to Genchev), manifesting in the underdevelopment of the notion of community and the rejection or suspicion of statehood, together with individual strategies for survival and incarceration in family structures, remains valid for the Bulgarian bourgeoisie.

Despite some nuances, the historical and psychological times are too short to allow radical community and individual psychic transformations to be made to transform the patriarchal peasant into a modern individual and urban person. The rural mentality of the non-rural classes will remain a typical feature in the development of the dynamics and structure of the Bulgarian national psyche up to the most recent time [9].

It turns out that the more the traditional features of the Bulgarian national psyche do not suggest the prospects for its development and modernization, the more they offer resilience in laying down fundamental manifestations of the traditional Bulgarian identity. In other words – the more historical changes bring with them the political 'obligations' to transform our collective attitudes, the more the traditional Bulgarian psyche blocks such transformations as they are experienced at the community and individual level as another crisis of identity [10].

A systematic attempt to take a snapshot of the Bulgarian society from the Liberation until the eve of World War II is also made by Rumen Daskalov in his monograph “Bulgarian Society. 1878-1939” [11]. Daskalov’s research allows the identification of some important community characteristics that have marked the Bulgarian identity and political culture in the period under review, namely:

- 1) Egalitarianism, generally related to the rural roots of our post-liberation society;
- 2) Low civic activity, which is manifested in the strong dependence of parties on power and their difficulty to survive in opposition;

- 3) Political personalism leading to the identification of parties with their leaders, to strong party fragmentation and short political life;
- 4) Political violence, which is often resorted to and which leaves traumatic traces in the Bulgarian social memory;
- 5) The predominance of the personal regime as a kind of authoritarianism, in which key policy decisions are always dependent on the supreme leader;
- 6) The special attitude towards Russia, whether friendly or hostile, which, however, should be considered as part of the more general idea of the patron saint of Bulgaria;
- 7) The heavyweight of the theme of national unification manifested in different national plans (in Macedonia, in the Black Sea Thrace) and as a glorification of leaders related to the national idea.

Plamen Georgiev, who makes a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the Bulgarian national consciousness as crystallized community interests, other than private-corporate and professional ones, argues with this thesis. The egalitarianism in Bulgarian political culture is based on the dominant patriarchal one, which in the course of the preparation for the April Uprising was displaced by a “specific Bulgarian nationalist-activist culture”. It is characterized by the submission and worship of the charismatic leader [12]. This last reflection points to a second, undemocratic dimension of egalitarianism, which gives rise to a willingness to accept authoritarian rule as long as its subject bears the marks of indisputable authority.

The dominance of the personal regime, regardless of the particular form of the political system, is a sustainable feature in Bulgarian political life, influencing the political culture and national identity. In a sense, parliamentary elections are losing their significance, as citizen participation in political decision-making, and become a mere plebiscite, affirming the decision already made by the monarch. The belief that the most important elections remain in the prerogatives of the political leader, that the will of the citizens does not matter much becomes a stable thinking stereotype of the mass Bulgarians. This also gives rise to a sceptical attitude towards such a democratic procedure as elections, not by chance in our political jargon the words have been kept in circulation-elections are being made.

The personal regime continued in the twentieth century: Two anti-government coups (1923 and 1934), and after the failure of the regime established by the second, the country was governed by a model of parliamentary majoritarianism, controlled by Boris III. However, parliamentary elections are taking place in the country and there is legal government opposition. In the elections of 1938 for the first time, women in Bulgaria were also granted voting rights.

The practice of the personal regime stimulates political conformism, as well as the conviction that the only way to change something in politics is by influencing the very center of power. The inability to do so, either because of lack of opportunities and social skills, or because of historical turmoil, most often sublimates in identity crises. If we interpret them in the context of the traditional peculiarities of the Bulgarian national psyche, then we can define three fundamental political transitions that marked the lasting mental experiences of the Bulgarian society: 1. The transition from 1878, when our community moved from five centuries of residence in a foreign country to the creation of conditions for the formation of own statehood; 2. The transition from 1944, when the Bulgarian community moved from a constitutional-monarchical political system and capitalist economic relations to a one-party political structure and a state-regulated planning economy; 3. The transition from 1989 [13]. These three transitions are, in essence, those states of social anomie that French sociologist Emil Durkheim speaks of. In his work, “Suicide” (1897), Durkheim used statistics of suicide in societies that at the time tracked this data: mainly the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. He notes that suicides are not constant, but they increase and

their numbers drop. The reason for this, Durkheim finds that during war or natural disasters, suicides decrease. The conclusion he makes is that when an individual feels part of a cohesive community and has clear simple goals, he is less prone to suicide than if he is an impersonal atom with a vague meaning to life. Durkheim's second condition is called “anomie”.

Anomy characterizes transition societies, such as the transition from traditional to modern society. The previous traditional culture is being replaced by a new one that has not yet fully formed. As a result of this dissonance, individuals remain torn between the norms of old and new culture, falling into a crisis of identity. On the other hand, such conditions provide the conditions for the regulatory functions of deep ethnocultural ideas, setting the matrix of community and individual behaviour, as well as the mental experiences that transform the Bulgarian national psyche according to the specific political priorities. Among the characteristic manifestations of Bulgarian identity are some of its fundamental constituents, such as language, religion, patriarchal relations, perhaps the experience of land ownership as a value because of the prospects that it provides biological reproduction and treatment of one's home as over-value.

The ideology of the historic Bulgarian home coincides with what for Roger Scruton is the emotional and value base of the nations. According to Scruton, who is by far not only the most famous English conservative philosopher but also the most prominent defender of the rights of the nation-state, the sense of nationality is based precisely on the values embodied in the notion of the “Bulgarian home”: sedentariness; a sense of “one’s own” and “one’s own”; inheritance, as well as the resulting sense of gratitude and reverence for the ancestors whose heritage we inhabit.

According to Scruton, individuals in nation-states have a particularly strong sense of belonging and loyalty to their nation. Because in defending their nation, they “defend a shared identity against the attacks of those who do not belong to it and try to claim a legacy to which they have no rights”. There is no reason to doubt the evidence between the mid-19th and the mid-20th century, Bulgarians were a nation with a clear awareness that they were living in their own national home [14].

In conclusion, I will paraphrase political scientist and historian Prof Trendafil Mitev, according to which the generations who lived during the era of the Third Bulgarian State (after 1878) find themselves drawn-drawn into a constant “character chaos” [15]. It is a unique paradox in our modern psycho-psychology, forcing every generation from Liberation to the present day (about 4-5 generations) to start from scratch, or by objective circumstances to replace the nature of their character in harmony with the oncoming social, political and economic changes. Perhaps somewhere around the synthesis and the antithesis, between modernization and nationalism, the DNA of Bulgarian society was formed on the eve of the Second World War.

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Human Resources Planning

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Abstract

Human resource planning is a continuous process that requires constant monitoring and analysis, always in accordance with changes in organizational goals and the environment. This is a complex task, taking into account a large number of independent variables-scientific and technological development, changes in the labor market, staff resistance to change, market demand, government regulation of labor relations and much more. Personnel managers are obliged to take into account a set of economic, psychological, physiological, social, technical and legal variables, as this is one of the main prerequisites for effective work of staff.

Keywords: planning, prognosis, human resources

The Importance of Human Resources Planning

The main activity of the personnel manager is to attract people necessary for the successful development of the business. The selection, of course, is not arbitrary, but is carried out on the basis of forecasting the quantitative and qualitative needs of the organization for employees in the future and the assessment of the possibilities to meet these needs. This is actually a process and is presented as a comparison of the current human resources of the organization with the possible needs in the future. Effective human resource planning facilitates the selection and adaptation of the necessary people to perform the necessary work in the appropriate places at the right time.

Human resource planning found on management decisions regarding: personnel selection, avoidance of layoffs, staff training, management of their development, calculation of labor costs, etc.

Personnel needs planning can be seen as the continuous implementation of a program aimed at assessing the quantitative and qualitative needs of people and allocating over time the numbers and qualifications needed by the organization in connection with its market development.

Quantitative assessment answers the question “how much”. It is based on the analysis of the organizational structure (current and future), with the respective levels of management, number of divisions, requirements of the production technology, the plan for production and realization, etc.

Qualitative assessment of staffing needs answers the question of “who”. In practice, this is a much more complex forecast, as it must take into account the value orientations, the level of culture and education, the professional habits and skills of the people needed. Of particular complexity is the assessment of the needs of management staff as they take into account not only all the qualities listed so far, but also management skills related to decision making, psychological resilience, critical and systematic thinking, goal setting, etc.

The number of staff is adjusted in accordance with the situation on the labor market and in accordance with the supply and demand of individual groups of staff. The labor market also affects

the size of wages - the greater the demand for a particular type of labor, the higher the wage (other things being equal). The objective basis for determining the salary is the dynamics and level of development of the following two main factors – the complexity of work and the conditions under which it is carried out. The more complex the work performed; the more time is needed for the respective training. Therefore, as a rule, the salary increases according to the growth of the qualification of the employees.

Recruiting (also referred to as recruitment, staffing, and Talent Acquisition) activities are geared toward hiring people who are interested in the company and who have the skills and behaviours needed to successfully perform their role. The recruiting process is composed of planning, sourcing the candidate, pre-assessment, final selection, job offer, and contracting [1].

People are the most valuable resource of every country, respectively of every enterprise. The management of any economic system must be based on the management of human resources. Its content is determined by social relations, volumes produced, technologies used and other factors.

Within the state economy, human resource management is focused mainly on regulating employment, working conditions and remuneration, ensuring fair business relations between employers and employees, improving the skills of the working population, developing legislation in the field of labor relations and social guarantees.

At the enterprise level, the main tasks of human resource management are related to [2]:

1. Determining the needs of workers, engineers, managers with different qualifications, based on the implemented development strategy of the enterprise;
2. Labor market analysis and employment management;
3. Selection and adaptation of staff;
4. Career planning of employees, their professional and administrative growth;
5. Ensuring rational working conditions.
6. Organization of labor processes, analysis of costs and results of work, establishing optimal ratios between the number of units of equipment and the number of staff from different groups.
7. Development of a system for motivating effective work behaviour.
8. Argumentation of the income structure, the degree of their differentiation, design of the remuneration system.
9. Organization of inventive and rationalizing activities.
10. Conflict management, etc.

The scale of work on each of these main functions depends on the size of enterprises, the nature of production, the situation on the labor market, staff qualifications, the degree of automation of production, the socio-psychological climate in the enterprise, etc.

Content of the organization of labor in the enterprise.

In order to clarify the scope of human resource planning, it is necessary to consider all the elements related to the qualitative and quantitative assessment of the work done and the expectations for changes in it. In this regard, it is important to consider the content of the so-called organization of labor or these are all those components of which in practice it consists and ask questions that arise when planning the development of any activity, namely:

- who, what, where, how and when will do;
- with whom, when and how he will interact;
- to whom will he obey, whom will he lead;
- what are the necessary conditions for carrying out this work?

From a company or organization's perspective, safety and health are a job function – a job function that does not produce a profit [3].

We can summarize that the organization of labor in the enterprise as a system is a certain order of the labor process, clearly outlining the way workers interact in the name of achieving pre-set goals of work. And this is a result of the division of labor between workers and their production relationships and interdependencies and implies appropriate construction and adaptation (through equipment and planning) of jobs for high-productivity work, creating a system for their service, as well as establishing effective methods and forms of work, substantiated in the adopted labor norms. As a process, the organization of labor is associated with the creation of favourable working conditions, selection and training of staff, improving their skills, effective system of planning, reporting, remuneration and stimulation of labor, taking into account the opportunities for development of work, creative initiatives of workers and, of course, in compliance with labor discipline.

HRM system is characterized by a number of unique, rarely repeated and very often repetitive activities to its staff. Today's information technologies allow these arrays of repetitive activities to be transferred from employees to software solutions, thus allowing energy within the organization to be directed to activities that generate higher added value [4].

The production process is extremely dynamic and requires constant maintenance of proportionality, balance and equilibrium. This requires a prompt response to external and internal fluctuations, i.e., requires management. The organization of management presupposes the existence of a certain structure of the governing bodies and implementation of their inherent functions of process planning, their organization, regulation, coordination, coordination, analysis, control, report, etc. In summary, the organization as a dynamic system can be represented in type of set of three subsystems: organization of technological processes, organization of labor and organization of management. The basis of all three subsystems is people with the appropriate organization of their work and requirements for selection.

The importance of the organization of people's work is determined by its place among the various factors relevant to the effectiveness of the organization. The effectiveness of any organization is an important condition for development in market conditions. There are many factors influencing efficiency, but the authors group them into several main groups:

First group. Main factors – this includes scientific and technical progress, new equipment, advanced technologies, new types of materials, new energy sources, etc.

Second group. Integrating factors – this includes the organization of the enterprise, including the organization of labor and the organization of management.

Third group. Decisive factors. These include human knowledge and skills, competence, professionalism, discipline, initiative and more whose totality the authors call the human factor.

In a globalized world, public personnel managers face problems of recruiting employees who have the ability to deal with the challenges of organizations in a constantly changing environment [5]. The organization of labor in the existing enterprise begins with its division. The division of labor is the delineation of types of activities of workers, the establishment of functions, responsibilities, areas of activity for each of them, as well as for groups and units. Depending on the types of work performed, the following types of division of labor are distinguished: functional, professional, technological and qualification. In addition, the division of labor can be considered on a territorial basis between large and small enterprises, as well as within them – all these forms of division of labor are present simultaneously. Most improvements have been achieved in the administration responsiveness, the "Think Small First" principle and access to finance [6].

The functional division of labor implies the division of staff into functionally homogeneous groups, each of which is distinguished by its role in the implementation of the production process or the corresponding type of activity. On this basis, the most common division is between workers

and administration. The administration includes managers, specialists, etc., who are often called technical contractors. Workers are divided into primary and secondary. The former is engaged in the production of products that are considered profiling (basic) for the company, the latter perform maintenance of the main production.

The professional division of labor consists in the division of workers by professions and specialties. A profession is understood as a type of activity of a person possessing certain theoretical knowledge and practical habits, obtained as a result of professional training. The specialty is a variety of the profession, a narrower part of it – the specialization of the worker within the profession.

The qualification division of labor is a distribution of jobs depending on their complexity between workers from different qualification groups. The level of qualification of the workers is established on the basis of the qualification ranks protected by them. The first category corresponds to the lowest level of qualification. There are six-digit, eight-digit and other tariff schemes in the enterprises. For the specialists – engineers, constructors, technologists, etc. – a categorization of third, second and first category is established – the first category means higher qualification. The level of qualification is also determined by the position held, for example: senior or chief engineer, etc.

The technological division of labor presupposes the distribution of workers by stages, phases, types of work and production operations depending on the production technology, the content and features of the work performed. There are four types of division of labor: substantive, detailed, operational and by type of work.

The most common form of technological division of labor is the operational, when the worker performs only one operation. The operational division of labor is related to the relationship labor productivity is its content. Historically, the process of development of material production passes from universal to specialized labor. The development of entrepreneurship and its various types and manifestations are of particular importance for each region and country [7]. Universal work requires versatile qualities from the worker as he has to perform different types of work. This is usually a very meaningful and interesting work because it is extremely diverse and full of creative elements. For all these positive qualities, this work is not characterized by high productivity.

The development of production is closely related to the specialization of labor, which in turn contributes to the growth of labor productivity and increase the efficiency of production. The advantages of specialized work compared to universal work are achieved at the expense of the fact that:

- it is possible even more aptly to select the contractors for a certain robot, requiring precisely defined individual qualities;
- the term for preparation of the employee for the performance of a limited range of obligations is shortened;
- the worker faster high skill, necessary speed and accuracy in work;
- preconditions are created for even more complete mechanization and automation of labor, etc.

With the deepening of specialization, the content of labor decreases, its monotony increases, uniformity, work loses its attractiveness, and in cases of excessive specialization there is a danger of losing the basic essence of human labor, namely the investment of reason, i.e., the worker becomes an appendage of the machine, becomes part of it. The development of specialization ultimately leads to the fact that the growth in labor productivity is limited due to the accumulation of negatives associated with narrow specialization such as: interest in work is lost; staff turnover

increases, leading to additional costs for the selection and training of new workers; new staff need time to absorb the obligations.

The efficient operation and competitiveness of an enterprise depend to a very large extent on its staff. The availability of qualified, creative work-related, responsible and executive associates influences market success in any field of activity. In developed economies, labor resources play a more important role than material ones. Determining the needs of staff is one of the main directions in human resource management, allowing establishing the necessary qualitative and quantitative composition of employees for a given period of time.

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Sustainability Reporting in Bulgaria: A Research on Disclosures of Listed Non-financial Companies

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Abstract

Sustainability reporting has emerged as a common practice in last decades. The existing practices are varying and depend on factors like regulatory, stakeholders’ expectation, companies’ propensity to share information, etc. This paper aims to evaluate the nature and extend of sustainability disclosures and reporting in Bulgarian companies. The focus group are non-financial entities listed on Bulgarian stock exchange. By using the content analysis method are analysed the quality and quantity of disclosures.

Keywords: sustainability reporting, sustainability disclosures

1. Introduction

Sustainability is one of the keywords in the society and business in recent years. The increasing pressure from many groups of stakeholders to reduce negative impacts on the environment and society, as well as demands for more transparent and accountable information has caused the imposing on sustainability reporting as a common practice of the 21st century. As a result, a large number of research studies and publications have been conducted in the context of sustainability reporting and its impact on financial performance. Despite all development in the discussions internationally, there are still a few empirical analyses on disclosure practice of Bulgarian companies. This paper aims to explore this issue. Based on content analysis are defined the nature and extend of reporting practices of companies, listed on Bulgarian Stock Exchange.

Concepts of Sustainability Reporting

Sustainability reporting is practice launched in 1980s and developed in last two decades. It represents the companies’ contributions (positive or negative) towards the goal of sustainable development. Sustainability reporting supports building and maintaining trust in businesses and it is essential to achieving a sustainable economy and world. It helps organizations to measure, understand and communicate their economic, environmental, social and governance performance, and then set goals, and manage change more effectively. [1] According to this sustainability reporting has three dimensions:

- environmental dimension concerns an organization’s impacts on living and non-living natural systems, including ecosystems, land, air, and water;
- social dimension concerns the impacts an organization has on the social systems within which it operates; and

- economic dimension concerns the organization's impacts on the economic conditions of its stakeholders and on economic systems at local, national, and global levels.

Due to

The value of the sustainability reporting process is that it ensures organizations consider their impacts on these sustainability issues, and enables them to be transparent about the risks and opportunities they face. It increases the trust and communication between an organization and its stakeholders. Following benefits can be added to them also:

- better reputation;
- meeting the expectations of employees;
- improved access to capital;
- increased efficiency and waste reduction. [2]

Preparing sustainability report is voluntary. Recent years the attitude of authorities have been changing under pressure of society and stakeholders. As a result, such disclosures become semi-compulsory after adoption and enter into force on Directive 2014/95/EU. For public-interest entities exceeding on their balance sheet dates the criterion of the average number of 500 employees during the financial year is obligatory public to share information related to environmental and social responsibility. In required Non-financial statement, part of the management report, inform about environmental, social and governance matter including respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. By preparing sustainability report organizations face difficulties due to lack of regulation and strict rules and requirements as for the preparation of financial statement. Several professional organizations have been providing reporting initiatives, principles and guidelines, and have established sustainability reporting framework to help companies. The most authoritative among them are Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). All initiatives require company to prepare a sustainability report. It presents the organization's values and governance model, and demonstrate the link between its strategy and its commitment to a sustainable global economy. [1] Sustainability report must comprise quantitative and qualitative disclosures. The revealed information is expected to meet following criteria:

- Materiality – to determine relevant topics are sufficiently important that it is essential to report on them;
- Reliability – to vouch that the report can be checked to establish its veracity, quality and materiality;
- Comparability – to present the reporting information in a manner that enables the stakeholders to analyse changes in the company's performance over time, and that could support analysis relative to other companies or organizations.

Each reporting initiative in addition has some more requirements. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), one of the leading professional organization, define two groups of criteria (reporting principles) to achieving high quality sustainability reporting: principles for defining report content and principles for defining report quality. (See Fig. 1 Sustainability reporting criteria by GRI)




Fig 1 Sustainability reporting criteria by GRI

Principles for defining report content involve considering the organization’s activities, impacts, and the substantive expectations and interests of its stakeholders. Following them is expected the reporting company:

- to identify its stakeholders, and explain how it has responded to their reasonable expectations and interests (stakeholder inclusiveness);
- to present the reporting organization’s performance in the wider context of sustainability (sustainability context);
- to cover the economic, environmental, and social impacts and their reflection of company’s activities on (materiality); and
- to disclose information about all material topics and their boundaries, sufficient to reflect significant economic, environmental, and social impacts, in the reporting period (completeness). [3, pp. 8-12]

Principles for defining report quality ensure the quality of information in a sustainability report, including its proper presentation. By applying them, it is assumed that the disclosed information in sustainability report is:

- accurate and detailed
- balanced, i.e., to report covers both favourable and unfavourable impacts, results and topics;
- clear – to be understandable and accessible to stakeholders using information from sustainability report,
- comparable – to select, compile, and report information consistently; in a manner that enables stakeholders to analyse changes in the company’s performance over time, and that could support analysis relative to other organizations.
- Reliable,

- timely i.e., to be reported on a regular schedule, relative to the reporting period [3 pp. 13-16]

The sustainability reporting practice depends on entity's activities and managers attitude towards revealing information about company's commitment to environment and society. An impact on it have company's strategy and governance as well as ethics and integrity.

In EU countries, the regulation framework of sustainability reporting has changed the practice.

After entry into force on Directive 2014/95/EU the big public-interest entities with 500 employees during the reporting year are obligated to disclose information about their social responsibility. The minimum required disclosures include a brief description of the undertaking's business model; a description of the policies pursued by the undertaking in relation to those matters, including due diligence processes implemented; the outcome of those policies; the principal risks related to those matters linked to the undertaking's operations; non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business.

2. Methodology and Data

Selection criteria


This research was based on studying of listed non-financial companies on Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE). The sample comprised companies whose financial instruments are traded in Equities segment (Premium and Standard). It was reduced to those companies that are traded on BSE Main Market¹ because they have higher turnover, significant number of transactions, i.e., there is heightened interest towards them. The sample includes 55 companies (5 companies from Premium Equities Segment and 50 companies from Standard Equities Segment) and their audited separated financial statements and reports for 2019 and 2018² published as of 01 May 2020.

Representativeness of the sample is determined by scope and various type of the entities.

Analysed companies are operated across different sectors (Fig. 2 Segmentation by sector) and this give wide-ranging scope of research study.

¹ BSE's regulated market consists of two markets – BSE Main Market and BaSE Alternative Market. These markets are segmented according to qualitative and quantitative criteria regarding the issuers and their emissions of financial instruments, incl. the financial instruments type, specific requirements regarding the issuer's shareholder structure, their financial results, liquidity and information disclosure requirements. [4]

² Some of companies took the opportunity caused by impact of COVID-19 and permitted by changed legislation to prepare their financial statements until 31 June 2020. It is assumed that the practice for preparation of financial statement and annual management report won't be changed generally and the year is of no importance and won't be affected on results of current study.



Source: own calculation obtained on data analysis of public information at www.bse-sofia.bg

Research method

In order to study the practice in sustainability reporting of Bulgarian companies is used content analysis of disclosed and reported information about their commitment to environment and society. It helps to quantify the content and to make conclusions about nature and extend of sustainability disclosures. The method was applied by following determination and limitation:

- Sustainability reporting is considered in a broad sense. It defines as a practice of companies and organization to report their business activities concerning social and environmental performance.
- Sustainability reporting in Bulgaria is voluntary except for big public interest entity with more than 500 employees. They must disclose a Non-financial Declaration to the Annual Financial statement as at 31 December.
- It is examined only available public information on BSE website and companies' websites.

3. Findings


The empirical data analysis of disclosed information by the companies in cross selection shows:

First. As more as one-half of companies in cross section have disclosed information about their responsibility for environment and employee. Percentage of entities whose shares are trade at Premium equities segment is bigger than those at Standard equities segment – 80% vs 48%.

Almost all (4 out of 5 companies) of the companies at Premium equities segment make public an information about their social responsibility by contrast with those at Standard equities segment.

Hence, the type of BSE market segment has impact on company's propensity to disclose sustainability information, i.e., heightened investor interest and large numbers of stock transactions encourage companies to disclose more financial and non-financial information.

Second. There is a certain tendency enterprise from manufacturing industries to reveal information about their commitment to environment and society. 13 out of 14 manufacturing companies at Standard equities segment (93%) have represented relevant details. Compared to them holdings (parents) and real estate companies have disclosed fewer details about their social and environmental activities. In percentages, respectively, 20% and 14%. The trend at Premium equities segment is the same. Figures broken down by sectors are shown in Fig 3a and Fig. 3b



Third. Only two companies (at Premium equities segment: Sopharma Pharmaceuticals AD and Monbat AD) are voluntary adopted the GRI Framework and have published report – Communication on progress (CoP). They represent their strategy and activities designed on the Global Compact principles issued by Global Reporting Initiative.


Fourth. Management report and companies’ websites are being favourite for disclosures. Based on analysis (100% of companies at Premium equities segment and 67% of those at Standard equities segment) is found out that the standard practice of companies is to inform stakeholders about their commitment to environment and society in annual management report as at 31 December. Companies share information through various communication channels and different location disclosures. The enterprises’ exciting practices are pointed at Table 1.

Table 1. Enterprises ‘practice for location disclosure

Market segment	At Premium equities segment	At Standard equities segment
Location disclosure		
Annual management report (only)	4	11
Non-financial Declaration to the Annual Financial statement (only)		3
Companies’ website (only)		3
Annual management report & website	2	2
Annual management report & Non-financial Declaration to the Annual Financial statement		2
Non-financial Declaration to the Annual Financial statement & website		2
Annual management report & Non-financial Declaration to the Annual Financial statement & website		1

Source: own calculation obtained on data analysis of public information at www.bse-sofia.bg

Fifth. The disclosure of companies’ social and environmental responsibilities-related aspects is significant higher for qualitative than quantitative information. Mostly, the information includes both short representation of environment policy and/or employee related information and brief description of their activities/achievements regarding social and environment responsibility for the reporting period. This mean companies apply descriptive approach to disclosures.



Sixth. By contrast with complex approach of the United Nations Global Compact, that is required disclosures in the fields of human rights, labour, environment and anticorruption, Bulgarian companies bring out public an information about environment (ecology), employee and society. Without any exception, all listed companies in cross section report their environment responsibility and protection but social-related disclosures are less. The social-related disclosures are made in two aspects – activities that had affected to the society and employee policies and procedures (respectively 26% and 86%). Particular figures are shown in Fig. 4.

Analysed information and documents of listed non-financial companies on BSE have revealed the almost complete absence of sustainability reporting based on framework and principles issued by reputable professional organizations and reporting initiatives. The lack of compulsory requirements (sustainable reporting is still voluntary) and insufficient demand for information about sustainability and social responsibility are some of factors that have impact on it.

Nevertheless, the beginning of sustainability reporting is set. The most of companies are guided by own approach and by established practice. Gradually the quality and quantity of sustainable reporting is expected to improve as a result of increased informational needs and stakeholders' expectations.

Conclusion

Sustainability reporting increasing has grown recent years and slightly is becoming a regular practice even in Bulgaria. The current research on sustainability disclosure of listed Bulgarian non-financial companies found out that:

- Bulgarian companies are inclined to share information about their environmental and social responsibility (especially those from manufacturing industry), despite the quality and quantity of disclosures vary from common practice;
- the disclosure is presented to stakeholders as a non-financial information in annual management report;
- environment (ecology), employee and society (mostly local communities and initiatives) are the key points of sustainability reporting in Bulgarian context.

The research results are intended to contribute to understanding the existing disclose and reporting practices of sustainability. Future studies are expected to use more samples and representative, also the length of study period need to be expanded.

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Legal Regulation and Management of Culture in Lithuania and Slovenia

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Abstract

The state and society cannot be imagined without culture, but the answer to the question “What is culture?” Is quite difficult today. The concept of “culture” has also been studied and analysed in society by scientists from various countries, such as Edward Burnett Tylor, A.L. Kroeber, and Clyde Kluckhohn, Leslie A. White, Schein [1] and others. It is a broad concept that can refer to the visual arts, including a wide range of works of art, cultural goods, and services. Culture should be understood and accepted as a unique set of spiritual and material characteristics specific to a particular society or social group, including literature, art, as well as lifestyles, systems of different values, national traditions, and people’s beliefs. This research paper analyses the aspects of cultural management and legal regulation in Lithuania and Slovenia. In the field of culture Lithuania and Slovenia, being the EU Member States, follow the principles of respect and recognition set out in the Community Treaties. The EU Member States adhere to a common understanding and rules that ensure not only peace, stability, prosperity, and solidarity, but also cultural heritage and creativity [2]. The main goal of the research is to provide scientific insights and connections between the two countries after analysing the legal regulation and management of culture in Lithuania and Slovenia.

Keywords: culture, cultural policy, legal regulation, management

Introduction

“Culture is and will therefore primarily remain a responsibility of Member States; in some countries it is largely dealt with at the regional or even local level. Article 151 does not provide, for example, for harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States. Action at EU level is to be undertaken in full respect of the principle of subsidiarity, with the role of the EU being to support and complement, rather than to replace, the actions of the Member States, by respecting their diversity and stimulating exchanges, dialogue and mutual understanding.” [2]. It is therefore up to the Member States of the European Union to determine how and in what way culture will be regulated in a Member State. However, it must be borne in mind that the concept of culture is multifaceted and encompasses a wide range of activities, where the implementation of the provisions of EU directives in national law may be required.

Slovenia as a country was selected for the comparative study of legal regulation and management of culture, because together with Lithuania became members of the European Union on 1 May 2004. Both countries have similar political systems – both parliamentary democratic republics [3, 4], a similar population – in Lithuania according to Eurostat data (2020) – 2794184 inhabitants [5], in Slovenia (2020) – 2080908 inhabitants [6].

The aim of the research: after the analysis of the legal regulation and management of Lithuanian and Slovenian culture, to provide scientific insights and connections between two countries. The object of the research is culture.

The Research Methodology and Methods

In order to answer the chosen topic, hierarchy of legal acts of the European Union and their influence on the national law of Lithuania and Slovenia were analysed; also adopted national programs and strategic documents in the field of culture; international treaties and conventions, protocols, agreements, national legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania and Slovenia; the areas of activity of the Ministries of Culture of both countries were analysed and compared too. The following research methods were used: descriptive, content analysis; systematization and comparison, generalization and analytical.

Results

As mentioned above, Article 151 of the Treaty on European Union does not provide for the harmonization of Member States' legislation in the field of culture at EU level [2], however, the cultural programs curated by the European Union lay down certain requirements with which the Member States must comply.

In both Lithuania and Slovenia, culture is regulated by international legal acts (conventions, international treaties, agreements) and national legal acts (laws and by-laws).

According to the data of 2020, Lithuania has ratified the following international conventions in the field of culture: the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, the UNESCO Convention on the Prohibition of Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property; the revised European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, the European Convention on the Protection of the Architectural Heritage, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage [7]. Lithuania is also developing international cultural cooperation on the basis of international agreements, of which Lithuania has signed more than 70 by 2020 data [8]. It is important to note that in 1997 the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia on Cooperation in the Fields of Culture, Education and Science was signed and entered into force in 2002 [9]. The agreement stipulates that “the Parties will contribute to the dissemination of knowledge about the culture of the other Party and will support all types of cultural contacts and joint events” [9].

The article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (1992) provides that the Lithuanian language is considered to be the state language; the article 42 states that “... the state shall support culture and science, take care of the protection of Lithuanian history, art and other cultural monuments and values” [10]. The article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania enshrines the provision that censorship of mass information is prohibited, and the article 45 provides for the right of citizens' national communities to manage their national cultural affairs, education, charity, mutual assistance independently” [10]. Similar provisions are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, where culture is mentioned in the articles 5 and 11 in the General Preamble to the Slovenian Constitution, freedom of artistic expression is enshrined in the article 59, and culturally related articles 39, 59, 64, 65 and 73 of the Slovenian Constitution [11].

The main provisions of the Lithuanian cultural policy are provided for in the Cultural Policy Strategy approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania in 2019, which envisages the goal of "...providing a significant contribution of culture, creating a harmonious Lithuanian society, a dignified national and European identity, the social and economic well-being of the population, the international prestige and competitiveness of the state [12] and The Guidelines for the Change of Lithuanian Cultural Policy (2010) approved by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania provide for the renewal of the Lithuanian cultural policy model, which would help to reveal, preserve and develop the cultural identity and creative potential of the society. [12].

In Slovenia 2002 was adopted the Act Regulating the Realisation of the Public Interest in the Field of Culture – general cultural Act defining public interest for culture, the responsible bodies and scope of their tasks, the documents of its articulation and the mechanisms for its implementation [11].

Slovenia has ratified and acceded to these international conventions and protocols: Social and Cultural Rights CERD, Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination CRC, Convention on the Rights of the Child CEDAW, Convention Eliminating All kinds of Discrimination Against Women European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities European Charter for the Protection of Regional or Minority Languages European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms European Social Charter Protocol No 3 on the Act of Accession to the European Union UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage [11]. The Granada Convention: ratified 1993, embodied in the 1999 Cultural Heritage Protection Act. The Valletta Convention: ratified 1999, embodied in the 2008 Cultural Heritage Protection Act and others. Slovenia in the field of heritage protection has ratified these international conventions: The European Landscape Convention: ratified 2003, partially embodied in the 2008 Cultural Heritage Protection Act and the Faro Convention: ratified 2008, partially embodied in the 2008 Cultural Heritage Protection Act [11].

The Program of the 18th Government of the Republic of Lithuania (2016) envisages the directions of activities for 2016-2020 such as the reform of tax policy, improvement of business conditions, implementation of cultural policy guidelines, etc. In this 2016-2020 program, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania has planned to implement an open and inclusive cultural policy, and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania has made clear and stable state commitments to culture for the preservation and development of Lithuanian culture, its renewal and strengthening [13].

Regarding the further improvement of the legal basis of culture, it is important to note that in Lithuania in 2019, the draft Law on the Fundamentals of Culture was registered in the Seimas.

This law provides for the legal definition of the concept of culture, the basic principles of cultural policy, the formation, implementation and financing of cultural policy. When analysing the legal regulation and management of Lithuanian and Slovenian culture, it was important to single out the main areas of cultural activity supervised by the Ministries of Culture.

The Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Lithuania bases its activities on the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, international treaties, legal acts of the European Union, laws of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, laws on public administration, decrees of the President of the Republic, resolutions of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, decrees of the Prime Minister, as well as regulations. The following areas of activity of the Lithuanian Ministry of Culture are distinguished: copyright, archives, libraries, regional culture and cultural education of children and youth, certification of movable cultural property restorers, cinema, cultural and creative industries, protection of cultural heritage, digitization policy of Lithuanian cultural

heritage, literature and publishing, museums and galleries, music, reading promotion, international cooperation, national minorities, theatre, public information policy, visual arts, state language, meaning of cultural and historical events significant for the Lithuanian state, design and architecture [14].

The Ministry of Culture of Slovenia is responsible for regulating those matters in the sphere of culture which are in the public interest. These include: involvement in the coordinated cultural development of Slovenia; protection of the cultural heritage; ensuring the plurality of the media landscape; providing suitable conditions for the creation; communication and accessibility of cultural assets; guaranteeing the special cultural rights of minorities; international cooperation in the sphere of culture; and the promotion of culture at home and abroad [15]. The main task the Ministry of to provide suitable opportunities for cultural creation and the protection of the cultural heritage. The Ministry of Culture works on the basis of the three main principles of cultural policy: quality, accessibility, and diversity [15].

The main areas of activity of the Slovenian Ministry of Culture are the following: architecture, film, new media art, dance, literature, theatre, design, music, visual arts, heritage protection, monuments and sites, museums [16].

As we can see, the activities of both the Lithuanian and Slovenian Ministries of Culture cover similar areas. The same can be said about the legal regulation of culture in both republics. What legislation is adopted in both republics can be seen in the table below.

Table 1. Basic legislation in the field of culture in Lithuania and Slovenia

No.		Legal regulation – Main Laws Lithuania	Legal regulation – Main Laws Slovenia
1.	Copyright	The Law on Copyright and Related Rights of the Republic of Lithuania	The Slovenian Copyright and Related Rights Act
2.	Archives	The Law on Documents and Archives of the Republic of Lithuania	Protection of Documents and Archives and Archival Institutions Act
3.	Architectures	The Law on Architectures, The Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania	Not found
4.	Libraries	The Law on Libraries of the Republic of Lithuania	Librarian act
5.	Cultural heritage and its protection	The Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage of the Republic of Lithuania, The Law on Protected Areas of the Republic of Lithuania, The Law on Territorial Planning of the Republic of Lithuania, The Law on Movable Cultural Property	Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Return of Unlawfully Removed Cultural Heritage Objects Act, Nature Conservation Act,
6.	Literature and publishing	Law on Copyright and Related Rights of the Republic of Lithuania, The Law on the State Language	Act on the Use of Slovene Sign Language, Legal Deposit Act, Act establishing the Public Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Books Single Price Act
7.	Museums and galleries	The Law on Museums of the Republic of Lithuania	In Slovenia no specific legislation other than legislation of declassification of cultural monuments, was found, Slovenia has a national register of museum objects, administered by the Ministry of Culture
8.	Music	There is no specific sector law, related law – The Law on Copyright and Related Rights of the Republic of Lithuania	There is no specific sector law

9.	Ethnic minorities	Orders of the Director of the Department of National Minorities under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania	Self-Governing Ethnic Communities Act The Roma Community Act
10.	Theatre	The Law on Professional Stage Art law	There is no specific sector law. Sector specific legislation exists mostly in the fields with traditional public services like monument protection, archives, museums and libraries.
11.	Public information policy	The Law on Public Information, The Law on the Protection of Minors from the Negative Impact of Public Information	Radiotelevizija Slovenia Act Mass Media Act Slovenian Press Agency Law
12.	Visual arts, Cinema	The Law on Cinema	Audio-visual Media Services Act Film Fund of the Republic of Slovenia Act Media Act
13.	State language	The Law on the State Language, The Law “On the Implementation of the Law on the State Language of the Republic of Lithuania” The law on the State Lithuanian Language Commission, The Law on the State Language Inspectorate, The Law on the Term Bank	Public Use of the Slovene Language Act
14.	Design	The Law on Design	No special regulation that would take into consideration the cultural dimension of this field has been adopted so far.

Compiled by authors based on www.culturalpolicies.org (Slovenia, 2014)

As we can see in the table, both Lithuania and Slovenia have adopted the main legal acts related to the main areas of activity of the Ministries of Culture. However, it is important to note that both republics have also adopted legislation regulating taxes, social security of artists, the status of artist’s labor relations, activities of theatres and concert halls.

Conclusions

1. Although culture policy is primarily a matter for EU countries themselves, Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that the EU can play a part in supporting, coordinating and supplementing EU countries’ activities in the field [17].
2. The study showed that in both Lithuania and Slovenia, the Ministries of Culture supervise the same areas of activity with slight differences. The Ministries of Culture of both countries follow international and national legislation in the performance of their functions in the field of culture.
3. Both Lithuania and Slovenia have a well-developed legal framework in the field of culture, which is being improved taking into account current issues. Legislation in both countries focuses on the legal, social and economic protection of the cultural sector.

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The Psychosocial Profile of the Bulgarian Citizens and their Mindset for Participation in the Political Process by the Referendum

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Abstract

The psychosocial mindset of citizens are factors for participation in the political process. That is why society pays attention to them. This is usually done through the constitution and different procedures, the dominant political culture and the influence of political parties.

Keywords: Political process, civil role, national referendum, democracy, totalitarianism, psychosocial mindset, etc.

Notes

Citizens can participate in the political process by using different forms of direct democracy like the referendum. It's a way the people to express their opinions on the public matter and eventually their opinion to become part of the solution of public problems. Their active participation is determined not only by their standard of living but also by their psychosocial profile and institutions.

My goal with this theoretical study is to characterize the psychological image and attitudes of the Bulgarians who participated in national referendums initiated by the totalitarian period and modern democracy.

1. Political Process and the Participation of Citizens

Policy and power are in interaction with their subjects - citizens, parties, state institutions in the context of the political process. This is a way of solving the problems of the people living in municipalities, towns, and villages.

According to the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, the political process is a work of different groups of people who are struggling for power and that is used for achieving individual and group interests [4]. The political process involves a whole system of activities, from a functional and dynamic point of view. They are grouped into separate phases. According to G. Almond and B. Powell, the phases of the political process are the articulation of individual and group interests, aggregating them in political platforms and formulating collective decisions in a political course, implementation of achieved decisions, control and arbitration [4]. This is done by the public authorities, citizens and their political associations according to the constitution and other laws.

There are two forms of citizen participation in the political process - representative and direct.

Citizens directly participate by referendums, plebiscites, local or national citizens' initiatives and a general assembly in the political process. In Bulgaria, there are 7 referendums with national importance.

The dominant political culture plays an important role in the process of educating the active participation in the political process. It includes political values, knowledge, norms, and traditions of political behaviour. Overall, the most important are political values. Back in the year, our values were influenced by the totalitarianism regime and nowadays widespread are the values of democracy.

The question now is how the values of democracy are understood by citizens to participate directly in the political process. In this point of view D. Held's thesis for democracy is very interesting: "If democracy means the government of the people", free and equal members of the political community make public decisions and this supports and strengthens autonomy – not only for individuals as citizens but for the community as well" [11].

In other words, people have to act and behave autonomously to participate in the democratic political process. This allows them to act both in private and public life for the democratic good of society.

The opposite of democracy is the totalitarian procedures for direct participation in the political process. In that period the people did not have the freedom in their political life nor the right of self-determination. The Bulgarian country at different times had both totalitarian procedures and democratic values.

2. Psychosocial Profile of Citizens During Totalitarianism and their Participation in Referendum

In terms of a totalitarian regime, the community did not have the power to make decisions by themselves. There is "only one way of movement from society to the individual... it turns out to be only an object of social influences and a product of social development" [1]. The personal interests were subjected to the requirements of the state authorities. This regime leads people to lose their individuality and interest in politics different from those that the government introduces to them. The people have to rely on the state government for their existence. The social and justice system increases the dependence of the people from the authorities and the regime. This is a closed cycle that defines their way of thinking and living.

For people to feel free they had to implement requirements of the state authorities, as fast as possible. The totalitarian way of understanding freedom is connected to setting political goals that have to become a motivation for citizen's behaviour. The government creates administrative instruments that force people to act in the public interest, by building the new society. In other words, freedom is measured by inspiring people to act only in the public interest.

The understanding of collectivism as a virtue is very specific in the process of forming the active citizenship. Collectivism was used by the government as an instrument for making people appreciate the responsibility that they have in keeping the unity of the nation and country. The most important thing is taking care of public order and justice [5].

This understanding of collectivism was used from the totalitarian government to create the psychological attitude of citizens to obey the dominant political power. Human life became an instrument for building a new society. In their political plans, there was no place for self-determination and free will [9].

In 1971, new legislation for the referendum was passed for the new constitution to be accepted in Bulgaria. After a national referendum, the new constitution took action. The official results

from the vole were clear – 99,7% of the people voted for the new Act. The results correspond to the citizens' attitudes according to the party-state policy [8].

In 1983, the new Direct Citizen Participation Act was passed. The legislative bases of the new act were on the principles of direct democracy. Article 1 guaranteed direct participation of the people in the process of problem-solving from the competence of the National Assembly and the Local and National councils which are done through discussion or referendum. For the first time, the Act defines the institutions and the number of people who have the right to propose the direct participation of the citizens. This Act was repeal in 1996 [8].

3. The Psychosocial Profile – Mindset and Motivation for Citizens to Participate in a Referendum During Modern Time of Democracy

Political life in Bulgaria in the twentieth century is impossible without undertaking the principles of democracy. The principles of democracy can be subdivided into two main component elements. First, as rules that institutionalize the political process and his subjects. The second element principles and values are involved in the implementation of the state policy which is in the interest of the people.

As a testimony of great importance, the key principles and values of democracy: freedom, peace, humanism, equality, justice, and tolerance took their place in the preamble of the last Constitution of Bulgaria from 1991 [6]. Those norms are part of the “common good”. All state authorities and political parties have to work according to those principles. They give opportunities for participation and self-realization to people in the political community. These are the guiding principles of political life in Bulgaria. They are based on Bulgaria's political culture. Every legitimate initiative of citizens has to correspond to those principles.

The Constitution from 1991 rises to the highest point of human rights and secures them from any violation. This is a recognition that “the public interest also includes the individual interest or in other words the interests of one or another group of people.” [1] in contrast to the political system of Socialism which saw the man like an instrument for achieving the public interest.

The leading principles of the new Constitution are rising human rights above all. Now the public institutions have to support them not only in the process of creating our new legislature of modern and democratic Bulgaria but also to provide that the implementation of those new acts will secure their rights and will not tolerate inequality. The new policy is supporting and respecting the individuality and dignity of people, giving them the opportunity of self-initiative and autonomous actions. Nevertheless, reminding them that now they are also responsible for all their actions.

Nowadays definitely individualism is part of the Bulgarian psychosocial profile. The new generations are living in a market economy and the political practice in pluralistic. Now people place at first position taking care of the individual interest, as a motivation for well-being and public prestige. This need for individual expression of citizens is not in conflict with the rights given to them with the Constitution. The real problem appears when the people have to fuse their interest with the “common good”. This new way of thinking is harder to be understood.

From the socio-geographical point of view merging the individual interest with the “common good” is closely connected to the rising quality of life in a given geographic region. In this sense, it is noteworthy the concept of D. Simeonov as a set of vital values, needs, and activities that are necessary for the human being (people's satisfaction of life and environment) that provide an opportunity for individual personality development, taking into account the impact of processes related to the balanced socioeconomic development of the particular territory [12].

From a political point of view, we see difficulties infuse the individual interests with the “common good”. This is connected to the political culture of the people and political parties.

According to A. Todorov, we can see these difficulties in three directions.

In the first place, A. Todorov says that the generations born after 1989, “lives in another reality where wealth brings power and power is an instrument for reaching personal goals, the market is almighty, not the government. New generations are the labour market and consumer-oriented.

These are the generations of the digital era ...unknown to previous generations.” This new era changes youth attitudes toward politics. The direction is in “captivating new practices: protest, public pressure, lobbying, advocacy, persuading other people and disputes with opponents” [10].

In this case, people need a common goal in order to work together. For example, our entry in the EU was that kind of a goal.

Second, A. Todorov notes that “after January the 1st 2007, the big political causes are missing, the agenda of all political parties look alike, and the people are not feeling interested in politics due to that reason” [10]. People change their attitude towards politics because of a lack of new political aides and common goals. Under the influence of the market values, the political agenda is being understood as good trying to be sold to the electorate. These attitudes towards politics are stimulated also by the widespread understanding of the idea for the “political market”. Todorov says, these “new values” “are the opposite of the democracy and republicanism which requires citizens to be active, empathize and participate in the cause for the common good (res publica)” [10].

In third place, the mass culture and the advertising harvest individualistic a market-oriented value that overthrows’ the idea for solidarity and civil actions [10].

The constitutional requirement for “common good” has to be placed as the highest value not only in the work of public institutions but as well in all initiatives of parties and people participating in the political process. When those values are neglected the people or institution violating them have to be sanction.

A. Todorov explains it very well, “when one political order is change with another resignation and total replacement of the old elite with a new one is necessary. Nowadays nothing has changed significantly in the way of thinking after the transition from Totalitarics to Democracy. Instead, people put constant pressure on the public institutions and how they work If there is a problem, they want resignation’s again.” [10]

Despite the arguments of A. Todorov’s, we cannot agree and conclude that all the political initiatives of people are irresponsible. Citizens take very seriously participation in the process of solving local problems that affect their interests. The local referendums are good examples of that.

On the 25th of June, 2011 a local referendum took place in the Municipality of Gorna Malina.

The question that was “Do you want the Municipality of Gorna Malina to permit creating hazardous waste landfills on its territory? People who voted with “No” were 92% and those who voted with “Yes” where only 8%. The voting activity in numbers was 3.823 or 74,5%. For the local referendum to be valid, the activity has to be higher than the last local elections. The results were outstanding – 101,16% above the last elections [2]. The successes of this referendum helped local public figures, businessmen and regional media. In conclusion, we can say that when the people are asked to participate in the process of solving local problems that concern their interests the success of such kind of in native is immanent.

We cannot neglect the number of people who voluntarily participate in a different social, cultural and public initiative organized by local NGOs. For example, in the Veliko Tarnovo region, such organizations are Institute Perspectives, TurnovoRuns, and many others. They promote different ideas and values but above all, they are for the common good of the local society.

If people don't vote during the elections this isn't an act of irresponsibility or low political culture nevertheless, this is a way to show to political parties that people have lost their trust and they are sceptical about the democratic process of elections.

One of the reasons people do not believe in political parties is the political culture of their leaders. The example that A. Todorov gives is very illustrative. During one of the debates between two politicians, there was a question "Can you name one or two positive things about your opponents? They were unable to say anything positive about their opponent but that was not all they even qualified them as enemies [10]. Taking care of the dignity of the opponent is a fundamental democratic value that most politicians do not have. Politicians using their rhetorical skills to compromise their opponents and turn the political debate in a show [10]. Vilifying their opponents, politicians can lose thousands of their supporters.

This behaviour has its traditions from the decades after the Liberation from the Ottomans at the end of the XIX century. In that period, the elections were not always democratic. The elections in those times were not always democratic, evidence for this is the political jargon that still exists and compares it to a business that you are making [7].

We can see the same lack of trust in the two national referendums that took place in 2013 and 2015 (especially the second one). The legal procedure of the referendum rises a lot of questions about how democracy is measured nowadays and is it really in the interest of all people or is it orientated to serve the interest of a specific group of people.

The national referendum from 2013 was about nuclear energy in Bulgaria. It was initiated by the Bulgarian socialist party. To be successful, it has to respond to specific legal requirements.

The first one, on the referendum, had to vote the same number of people that participated in the last parliamentary elections in numbers this is 4.345.450 from the whole electoral pool – 6.949.120. Second, if the votes are 50% + 1 the referendum will be legitimate. In the end, the decision was taken by the National Assembly because the referendum didn't reach the needed votes [8].

The referendum from 2015 was initiated by the president of the Republic of Bulgaria R. Plevneliev. The topic of this national referendum was remote voting in Bulgaria. Again, the election was illegitimate because the voters were not as much as the previous parliamentary elections.

In 2009 was passed the Act for direct participation of citizens. There is one very important difference from the previous act. In the act from 1983, the number of people needed to initiate a referendum was at least 30.000. Now with the new Act, the procedure is a lot complicated. The National Assembly accept the decision for organizing a national referendum if we had an initiative committee with the signatures of at least 400.000 Bulgarian citizens [8]. Compared to the totalitarian law from 1983 the required number of people is 10 times more.

The described referendum procedure above may not be created with the idea of "common good" so we can have nuclear power or a working remote voting system. This is the reason why people feel sceptical about the given opportunity to participate directly in the process of decision making.

But the unsuccessful national referendums don't stop Bulgarian people to believe in the possibilities of the referendum as an instrument of democracy.

In this line of thinking I want to share with you the results of a recently made study for the opinion of Bulgarian citizens about the referendum. The study was published in his PhD thesis "Managing public processes by referendums" from Ivan Ivanov in 2018 [3]. The author's conclusion from the study is that citizens share the values of democracy but they are disappointed

by the way things are done. People don't think that the election leads to social change. We need not only new elections but as well as strict parameters of the democratic process in our country.

At every important step in the political, social, economic life there has to be a referendum where citizens need to decide as a society about the important matters in their country. This will give the needed confidence and activate society that democracy is a process in which the majority and minority are working together for the greater good of the nation and no one is using more rights than the given with the Social contract [3].

4. Conclusion

As a conclusion, the analysis of the psychosocial attitudes of the Bulgarians for direct participation in the political process by a referendum in the context of totalitarianism and in the time of democracy, give me reasons to say that partly our mindset is influenced by the political parties and the political culture connected to the regime and constitutional rules.

We can say that there is a lack of cohesion in the psychosocial mindset of citizens participating in political life during the different periods of Bulgarian history. As a very good example of this is the conclusion of A. Markovska about the "unique paradox in our modern psychology that every generation from the Liberation of the Ottomans till now (approx. 4-5 generations) starts from scratch or forced by the circumstances to changes their point of view in balance with the social, political and economic situation [13].

Each referendum is connected to a specific phase of the political process. For example, the referendum on May 12, 1971, was connected to the "turn solutions into practice" phase, in other words, authorities take decisions with the permission of the people. The fifth referendum was about the future of nuclear power energy and the sixth was about distance voting in Bulgaria. They both are connected to the first phase of the political process-researching the public opinion for decision-taking.

As a sum up at every phase of the political process citizens can be directly involved in the process of decision making by a referendum. This has to be undertaken and further noticed when legal Acts are passed connected to the participation of the people in political and public life.

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
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