CONSTRUCTING "EUROPE" AND SPREAD OF EUROPEAN VALUES

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Selected articles

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INTRODUCTION

The initial stimulus for this book to appear was the presidency of Lithuania in the Council of the European Union in 2013. One of the priorities Lithuania declared for this task was to pay more attention to the region of European Eastern Neighbourhood, which increased the scholarly interest for examining the ideas of "Europe" and "European values" and their presentation both within and beyond the borders of the EU.

There were also some other chronologic coincidences: we have just celebrated 10 years of Lithuania's EU membershipw in May 2014, as well as the 11th anniversary of the Accession referendum, and the annual Europe's Day. The feeling that the everyday political importance of "Europe" was growing was reinforced by the elections to the European Parliament that took place in May 2014 as well.

We - the editor and authors of this book – intended to involve ourselves into the academic discourses both as a subject and an object: "from the region, and about the region". A conference that took place in Kaunas became the arena for discussing these discourses. The conference, as well as the edition and publishing of this book, were financially supported by Vytautas Magnus University. The feeling of historic importance of the conference was enhanced by the ambience of the Historic Presidential Palace of the Republic of Lithuania, were the main part of the conference took place.

We intended to concentrate the efforts of researchers of the region that encompasses Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, and their neighbours. The research object was also dictated by the

region – we analysed Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian discourses of "Europe"; Russian discourses also were included in a number of papers.

We invited the researchers operating within theoretical approaches of social constructivism, discursive institutionalism, and related theories, in order to systematically examine the specifics of construction and spread of what is called "Europe" in this region, and in a broader geographical context.

Particular questions were to be discussed: How "Europe" is constructed within media discourses? What are the specifics of its reflection in/of this region and in/of particular countries? What content, related to European project, the "core idea" and the functioning of the European Union is discovered in political and media discussions? What is highlighted and what remains unaired? How are European policies and European institutions (both narrowly and broadly understood) coded, represented, or falsified within public image of "Europe"? How is the construction of "European profiles" of political parties and politicians influenced by modern media tools? What analytical tools are to be applied?

Quite unexpectedly, security of the region became an important dimension of the works in this book. Back in 2013, the dimension of (in-)security of this region was only discussed as a theoretical concept. In May of 2014 armed invasion, shooting, territorial occupation, and breaking international agreements, unfortunately, became a physical reality.

The realities of the situation in the Ukraine thus were discussed and reflected upon in a range of the papers in this book. No wonder that Russia appears quite often as an unnameable object (or/and active subject), too.

One of the researchers, Olga Brusylovska, is especially trying to find insight on how the approaching pro-Western and pro-Eastern

discourses are to be reconstructed from the speeches of politicians in Verkhovna Rada, made in the timeframe before the Vilnius Summit in 2013, using critical discourse analysis method. She tends to be rather sceptical discussing whether Ukrainian parties re-sound true European values or are rather seeking a populist effect. Moreover, she insights what could be interpreted as meta-narrative constructions such as "power is the property", or "mythical power" would able to save Ukraine from the poverty.

From a broader perspective these constructions might be compared to the meta-narratives that emerged from the Lithuanian discourses of "Europe" in the late 1980-ties. In contrast to the Ukraine, "Europe" was beyond but present in breeding the Lithuanian elite consensus on "impartiality of truth", democratic values, further expressed in the phenomenon of "four in one" – honour and truth, and happiness and wealth.

Analysis of Ukrainian discourses is continued in the study of Olena Malakhova and co-authors. It is a story about the phenomenon of Euro-Maidan sub-culture, where dreams of Ukrainian nation were effused not only in political forms, but also in artefacts, such as installations, performances, concerts, and other forms, symbolically reflecting Ukraine's self-identification with "Europe". Besides, the formation of controversial image stereotypes, such as "Gay-ropa" is also analysed.

In a multidimensional work of Bernaras Ivanovas, images such as EU as 'euro-Sodom', Ukrainians as fascists, and the whole Ukraine as a battle field between Russia and Europe, actively created by Russian propaganda, are analysed. The author used official media sources, such as Russia Today, vesti.ru,rossiya1.ru as an object of the analysis, and stressed the problem that this 'constructed reality' begins to influence "real reality" as an independent factor.

Marcin Gornikiewicz employs a specific point of view, using the case of the Ukraine for analysing how the mass media may become a tool for psychological operations. He is trying to re-construct, what particular target audiences in the West – particularly in Poland – are Russia's efforts to depict Ukraine in a particular light supposedly oriented towards. For contrast he is re-constructing the way Crimean events were depicted by the Western politicians, thus presenting an interesting picture of creating "good" and "bad" images.

In a number of aspects, these insights are resounding in the paper of Erikas Kaukas. Within the approach of securitization he shows that Russia has a special focus on territorial integrity, suggesting the EU and NATO countries re-think eventual threats posed and/or constructed by Russia, with subsequent implementing the adequate and appropriate security policy.

The possibilities to interpret Common Foreign and Security Policy / Common Defence Policy within different theoretical frameworks are discussed in the papers of Tomasz Hoffmann and Ieva Gajauskaite. From a different angle, a view from "Europe" to "others" is touched upon in the text of Vytautas Isoda.

In the already mentioned paper of Olga Brusylovska, as well as in that of Iwona Grzelczak-Milos (differences in the perception of the EU by Polish parties), Ingrida Unikaite-Jakuntaviciene ("issue positioning" in the elections' to the European Parliament campaign in Lithuania), Ausrine Jurgelionyte, and Vitalija Simonaityte, the analysis of reflections of "Europe" by political parties and politicians is continued and developed. The object chosen by Ausrine Jurgelionyte are the referenda slogans, whereas Vitalija Simonaityte chose an interesting approach of "Berlusconization" in analysing political leadership. As Iwona Grzelczak-Milos points out, "juxtaposition of the content of the programs with the election results indirectly provides us with information about the worldview of voters".

Other authors: Vaida Lescauskaite (is the European multi-level governance merely a convenient construct?), Simona Statneckyte (making empirical research on European convergence of public administration reforms), Tomas Vaisnoras (looking for differences of views towards North Stream project by Central and Eastern European countries and Germany), and Agota Adomaviciute (analysis of specific case of African Swine Fever, where national Lithuanian institutions operating in a "soft" and highly European wide integrated sphere, such as food safety, suddenly were mobilized to challenge Russia's demands) attempted to create an in-depth analysis of European, national, and sub-national levels.

The total scope of this book, we believe, enables us to look at the phenomenon of constructing "Europe" through different lenses (as the elite, the parties and politicians, ordinary people), and make a comparison of particular nations and particular governmental levels (European, national, and sub-national, local government and administrative systems).

Within the variety of theories, the most used were discourse analysis, discursive institutionalism and combinations of different approaches. They appear to enable important insights. The totality of all the papers, we believe, presents to the readers broad panorama of problems of constructing and depicting "Europe" both in this and region and beyond its borders, uniting the common and the particular, the importance of changes and stability.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU FOOD SAFETY POLICY IN LITHUANIA: THE CASE OF AFRICAN SWINE FEVER

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ABSTRACT

Historically, food safety was a part of national regulation, so the EU food safety policy is quite phenomenal and associated with the implementation of the principles of the single market. The aim of the paper is to explore the peculiarities of the EU food safety policy in Lithuania, emphasizing the case of African swine fever. Methods of qualitative content analysis and semi-structured interviews are used. The aim is to reveal the main stakeholders and their position in the case of African swine fever.

Keywords: African Swine Fever (ASF), State Food and Veterinary Service (SFVS), EU food safety system

Introduction

The role of the food safety institutions, which became more salient in the case of African swine fever (ASF), the losses that were experienced by farmers and the dominant political discourse shows the importance of this field and of its regulation. Food safety is an area of utmost importance, relevant to consumers, producers, and sellers alike. Food is also a very important sphere of state government control. European Union's food safety policy is based on an integrated approach. This means that food safety issues must be included into all activities of the Union as the basis for policy making, with the aim to ensure the highest level of health protection possible.[1]

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1   Ugland T., *Veggeland F.* Experiments in food safety policy integration in the European Union. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 2006, p. 607-624.

In the analysis of the case of African swine fever, the main aspects and participants of this problem are distinguished, and the solution which was developed in Lithuania in 2014, when two wild boars were diagnosed with African swine fever, is analysed. This problem affected not only Lithuania, but also the whole European Union; therefore, its solution is very relevant on political, institutional and economical levels. The problem of African swine fever reveals the lack of balance among political science, public administration and economic sciences. Studying the issue of African swine fever reveals the importance of the institution in charge of food safety control in Lithuania, namely the State Food and Veterinary Service, and the impact and scale of the decisions made by this institution. This paper applies a combined methodological approach: interview, content analysis of online newspaper articles and analysis of scholarly articles, documents, and legislation. Focus is put on the challenges that the institutions in charge of food safety in Lithuania faced.

Up until now in the scholarly literature research on food safety was based on discourse analysis. In her discourse-analytical study of EU food safety, K. Paul describes the integration of three points: food chain, stakeholders, and consumers, and through this she justifies the existence of an integrated EU's food safety policy.[2] In the process of discourse analysis, one or several elements of the discourse may be studied. Schmidt and Radaelli define discourse according to its content, as a set of political ideas and values, and also according to its usage. Discourse is understood as the process of interaction, aimed at the formulation of politics and communication.[3] According to A. Telešienė, discourse can

2   Paul K. T. The Europeanization of food safety: a discourse – analytical approach, *Journal of European public policy* Vol. 19:4, 2012, p. 549-566.

3   Schmidt V. A., Radaelli K. M. *Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues*. Routledge, 2004, p. 184.

be conveniently defined by describing these main components: object of research (topic or question); content (statements that describe and assess the object); participants of the discourse; context of the discourse (participants are often analysed as a part of the discourse context).[4]

The aim of the paper is to study the peculiarities of the implementation of the EU food safety policy in Lithuania, paying closer attention to the case of African swine fever.

The objects of the paper are the challenges that fell upon the institutions in charge of food safety while dealing with the problem of African swine fever.

In order to achieve the aim, the following *objectives* have been raised:

1. To distinguish the major interested parties and their stated opinion in the presence of the African swine fever problem.
2. To find out how the ASF problem is presented in the Lithuanian online media: what are the dominant problems and participants.
3. To find out whether the situation visible in the online newspapers coincides with the opinion of food safety experts and the representatives of other interested parties.

Research methods. Having in mind the aim and objectives of the paper, an integrated research methodology is used. The research employs content analysis method and interview method. Content analysis of online newspaper articles was selected due to the following reasons: in order to describe how the problem of African swine fever is reflected in online media; what major problems are raised; and, most important of all, in order to recognise and distinguish the dominant discourses and their participants. Following the elements of content analysis that were enumerated by Telešienė

4   Telešienė A. Kritiškosios diskurso analizės metodologinių principų taikymas sociologiniuose tyrimuose. *Filosofija. Sociologija*. No. 2, 2005, p. 1-6.

(2005), the paper analyses articles from three popular Lithuanian online newspapers: delfi.lt, lrytas.lt and balsas.lt that appeared from July 2013 to April 2014. Thus the purpose of using this method was to find out how the problem of African swine fever was presented in online media, and what interested parties emerged in this situation (the participants of the dominant discourse). Semi-structured interviews were used in order to learn the dominant opinion of experts on the topic of African swine fever. The respondents include representatives of institutions that were most cited in the mass media, and representatives of other interested parties: politicians, spokespersons of institutions in charge (State Food and Veterinary Service, Ministry of Agriculture), environmental organisations, the Chamber of Agriculture, etc.

1. Results of the Qualitative Content Analysis

Balčytienė emphasizes, that content analysis is a traditional method in mass media research. Mass media is an important participant in the political communication.[5] Following the elements of content analysis that were enumerated by Telešienė, and having in mind the aim and objectives of the research, the following categories were selected for the analysis: *Main topic:* what the text is about; *Discourse participants:* who is the source of information, who is the claimed author of the arguments and statements; *Type of article* (informative article, analytical article, popular science article, artistic/entertainment article, reader's letter, etc.); *Problem questions:* which problems are given prominence; *Localization of the problem's outcome:* (local, national, regional, global). Qualitative units (words, terms, meanings, identities) - the whole articles are analysed.

5   Balčytienė A., Vinciūnienė A. Žiniasklaida kaip aktyvus politinių procesų veikėjas informuojant visuomenę apie Europos Sąjungą: lyginamasis požiūris. *Informacijos mokslai*, Vol. 36, 2006, p. 91-109.

The main topic

The vast majority of articles are gloomy, which is natural having in mind that a disease, in this case African swine fever, is a negative and undesirable phenomenon. Online newspaper articles focused on the impact of the disease on the Lithuanian pork industry, and what losses would be experienced by the business. When Russia banned pork import from the whole European Union, calculations were made about the extent of daily losses faced by European countries because of this decision. Negative connotations are strengthened by the negative attitude of headlines. After the announcement about the discovery of African swine fever in wild boar in Lithuania was made, article headlines quite often featured words such as "will destroy", "catastrophe", "hits", "threats", "risk" (E.g. balsas.lt 24/1/2014 article *"Lithuanian pork industry may experience a catastrophe")*, lrytas.lt 24/1/2014 article *"Discovered African swine fever threatens massive losses")*, delfi.lt 24/1/2014 article *"Scientist: Lithuanian pork industry faces destruction")*. In the course of the analysis it was found that the main topics discussed in the online newspapers delfi.lt, lrytas.lt and balsas.lt are the management of African swine fever, the measures to prevent the spread of the disease, and negotiations with Russia about the export ban.

Type of articles

The dominant type of articles common in the three online newspapers is the informative article, which gives one specific message or piece of information about African swine fever and its origin, spread, and measures against it. It should be noted that the articles also convey opinions of specialists and interested parties, but the discourse of discussion does not dominate in the articles analysed. The articles usually give the opinion of

one interested party. The discourse of discussion is more visible in lrytas.lt, where articles sometimes include quotes from several parties holding different opinions.

Discourse participants

When carrying out a content analysis, it is very important to name the discourse participants of the space analysed; that is, who is the source of information, and who is the claimed author of the statements. Articles from online newspapers delfi.lt, lrytas.lt and balsas.lt that were chosen for the analysis usually feature representatives of relevant institutions and business companies. Clearly the most important institution is the State Food and Veterinary Service and its head Jonas Milius who, having announced a state-level emergency in Alytus, Lazdijai, Verėna, Šalčininkai, Trakai district municipalities and Druskininkai city municipality, became the leader of emergency state operations. The other two institutions which are reflected in the discourse of the mass media analysed are the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment.

The scope of the problem is indicated by the fact that online newspapers quite often presented statements by the Prime Minister of Lithuania, Algirdas Butkevičius (8/2/2014 lrytas.lt *"A. Butkevičius: "Swine fever is a problem to the whole Europe"*, 7/3/2014 delfi.lt article *"A. Butkevičius: Losses of the pig cull will be covered without doubt"*). Another important group of participants reflected in the articles analysed are the representatives of business: the pig farmers. Here the most prominent is the Lithuanian Pig Producers Association and its director A. Baravykas, whose concern about the future of the pork industry is strongly felt. One more interested party, which was visible in the media in the context of African swine fever are the environmentalists and

hunters. The latter are closely related to the decisions made by the institutions in charge, as they become their executors and had to respond to the situation. It is noted that the online newspapers analysed published articles which reflected one or the other party; discussion-type articles were quite rare. The voice of the environmentalists was the most strongly heard in delfi.lt online newspaper (E.g. 16/1/2014 delfi.lt article *"Hunter about the wild boar cull: we can exterminate everything, but is it an economic way of thinking?"*).

In the perspective of the discourse of EU food safety policy, one of the key variables are the consumers. In the online newspapers analysed, consumers are visible but they do not dominate; therefore, several assumptions can be made. The fact that the voice of the consumers is vague may mean that consumers are well-informed about ASF and its harmlessness to human health, which is probably the most important to the consumer. Nevertheless, another interpretation is also possible, that consumers are under-informed about the problem of African swine fever, and therefore they are not given much attention.

To summarize, the following discourse participants may be distinguished in the online newspapers analysed: institutions in charge (State Food and Veterinary Service, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment), politicians, pig farmers, environmentalists, hunters and consumers.

Problem questions

All online newspapers that were analysed - delfi.lt, lrytas.lt and balsas.lt reflect the same problems, and they analyse the same problem questions. The most important problem aspect is the economic losses for the pork industry as a result of African swine fever (24/1/2014 delfi.lt *"Scientist: Lithuanian pork industry*

faces destruction", 10/2/2014 delfi.lt *"A. Baravykas: Pig farmers lose 120 thousand litas every day"*, 10/2/2014 lrytas.lt article *"African swine fever puts its paw on the business"*. A fair number of articles emphasize the political aspect in the case of ASF, when Russia banned pork import from the EU, arguing that the European Union has no borders, and the infection may spread easily. This has arguably raised great interest in the media. The three online newspapers also reflect the challenges that fell on the institutions in charge. It may be stated that the political problems influenced the responsible institutions; primarily the State Food and Veterinary Service, which had to deal with coming challenges which were related not to food safety, but to issues of international political economics. SFVS is often mentioned in articles about negotiations with the Russian institutions, discussing the issue of Lithuanian pork export. Even though the online newspapers announce that compensations will be paid to farmers for their losses due to pig cull, the articles reflect dissatisfaction of the pig farmers with the unclear payment schemes. This is also relevant to small pig farmers, because if the business is lost, the only mean of income, often the source of income for the whole family, is also lost. Similar attention in the online newspapers analysed was given to the environmental aspect.

Localization of the problem's outcome

Localization of the problem's outcome is visible in the online newspapers on the European level, national level, and regional level. First of all, the problem of African swine fever was presented as a European problem, because ASF is a disease which spreads very easily, and it does not recognise borders; these arguments were also used to support Russia's decision to forbid pork import from the EU. Still, the majority of problems were located

on the national level, when questions about the consequences this disease would bring to Lithuania were raised. To summarise the results of the qualitative content analysis, it may be concluded that political discourse was the dominant discourse online.

2. Results of the semi-structured interview

When discussing the EU food safety policy implementation problems in Lithuania it should be noted that all the respondents admit the presence of unavoidable political undertones in this topic. The EU has created a unified market, most legislation of the EU food safety is based on the statements of the Agreement for European Union, which are aimed at creating an internal market and ensuring its functioning and means of regulation. It may be stated that the EU food safety system to a relatively large extent benefits the European Union member states: unified food safety requirements facilitate trade, member states can share information about unsafe food products – there is an established system RASFF (the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed), all member states have access to the scientific information presented by the European Food Safety Authority. According to the head of the Food Department at the State Food and Veterinary Service, A. Išarienė, this is a very important aspect which leads the country forward. When a country as small as Lithuania can participate in the meetings of the European Commission that search for solutions to problems together, with the same ways and methods, there is merit for everyone: business, consumers and control institutions alike.[6]

Nevertheless, K. Starkevičius, a member of the Lithuanian Parliament and former Minister of Agriculture, claims that the greatest problem of the EU food safety system is the fact that it is

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6   Interview with the head of the Food Department at the State Food and Veterinary Service, A. Ištarienė, 25/4/2014, interview conducted by Adomavičiūtė A.

not recognised by third countries: "The drawback of the system is that the third countries demand separate inspections in each country, even though the same European standards are established in all European Union countries."[7] This is clearly visible in the case of African swine fever which is presently analysed. A political problem is that Russia has banned pork import not only from the infected areas, but from the whole EU. The EU itself restricts pork import from infected Lithuanian regions only, not from the whole country; Russia in this case violated the international regionalization principle, which made the EU appeal to the World Trade Organization. The respondents agree that this situation is quite paradoxical, knowing that Russia is one of the countries from which African swine fever has spread, therefore, such decision is deemed inadequate and unbalanced.

It is noteworthy that the European Union made a decision, according to which Lithuania has to take the measures following the articles 15 and 16 of the 2002/60 Directive. These articles indicate that observation is intensified, movement of pigs is controlled, and medical tests are done to pigs and wild boars. As noted by the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, K. Paliutienė, SFVS has decided to implement stronger measures – (the orders issued by the director in February once again delineated relevant zones and ordered to cull the pigs in these zones regardless of the size of farm, and whether they follow biosafety requirements or not).[8] Additionally the plan of wild boar control was introduced, which received many negative comments on the Internet, and outraged the environmentalists. Still, M. Masiulis, the representative of SFVS, and A. Stančikas, the president of the Chamber

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7 Interview with a member of the Lithuanian Parliament, K. Starkevičius, 18/3/2014, interview conducted by Adomavičiūtė A.

8 Interview with the chief specialist of the Animal Farming Department at the Ministry of Agriculture, K. Paliutienė, 9/4/2014, interview conducted by Adomavičiūtė A.

of Agriculture, noted that there is no unified European strategy which would indicate the specific course of action that a country should take if this disease is found in the wild fauna as it happened in Lithuania; therefore, it is quite difficult to assess actions of responsible institutions. M. Masiulis explained that, following the practice of other countries, SFVS adopted a strategy based on taking samples, which is why it was necessary to reduce the wild boar population, that is, to take samples in the widest area possible, in order to find out whether the virus was spreading[9]; A. Stančikas emphasized that this particular way has shown that the virus was not spreading.[10] Meanwhile, environmental organisations did not agree with such harsh measures. According to the representative of the environmental organization "Baltic Wolf", "the measures against the disease were excessive, they lacked an environmental aspect and a clear communication about the long-term objective of the actions, how they would affect the nature and how that damage would be repaired."[11]

All the respondents agreed that it would be much more difficult if Lithuania had to solve such problems alone, without the help of the EU. Being a part of the common EU food safety system guarantees the help and solidarity from the EU. However, there are several problems in this situation. Politicians and representatives of institutions and other interested parties assert that this problem has already been discussed previously in the European Union, understanding the possible threat of African swine fever in Lithuania and its possible consequences. According to K. Starkevičius, "this situation lacked the unity of different

9   Interview with the head of the Emergency Response Department at the State Food and Veterinary Service, M. Masiulis, 25/4/2014, interview conducted by Adomavičiūtė A.

10   Interview with the chairman of the Chamber of Agriculture, A. Stančikas, 7/4/2014, interview conducted by Adomavičiūtė A.

11   Interview with a representative of the environmental organization "Baltic Wolf", G. Žaltauskaitė, 21/4/2014, interview conducted by Adomavičiūtė A.

countries, the experience of other countries should have been evaluated in order to create a vaccine; the measures which are being taken now can help very little, because the consequences are already being felt."[12]

Nevertheless, it is noted that the EU is not a country, it has many different interests; therefore, it is difficult to reach one way of solving problems. According to the member of the European Parliament, R. Morkūnaitė-Mikulėnienė, at first the EC did not speak of financial aid to Lithuania in fighting ASF, but later it was allocated; therefore, it is possible that the Commission looked into the depth of the problem and saw that Lithuania would not be able to deal with this problem alone.[13] According to M. Masiulis, cooperation between Lithuania and the EU was evident in this situation, when the major responsible institution – State Food and Veterinary service had to deal with the situation. As soon as ASF was registered, a team of veterinarians from the EU came to Lithuania, in order to help find the best solution in that situation, so that the prevention of the virus spreading would be made in as organised a manner as possible.

Conclusions

Having carried out a qualitative content analysis and a semi-structured interview, it turned out that the situation presented in the mass media essentially corresponded to the main problems enumerated by the respondents. The Internet was dominated by political discourse. The major problem which caused political, institutional and economic challenges was the Russian ban on the pork import from the EU, after African swine fever was found in

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12   Interview with a member of the Lithuanian Parliament, K. Starkevičius, 18/3/2014, interview conducted by Adomavičiūtė A.

13   Interview with a member of the European Parliament, R. Morkūnaitė-Mikulėnienė, 1/4/2014, interview conducted by Adomavičiūtė A.

two wild boars in Lithuania. The research has shown that when this disease manifests itself in the wild fauna, there is no specific European strategy and course of action, which should be taken by all member states. Following the practice of other countries, the State Food and Veterinary Service adopted a strategy based on sample taking and reduction of wild boar population. This produced various reactions. Such decisions were particularly criticised by environmentalists in online mass media. The problem of compensations for losses was related to another interested party, pig farmers, who were not allocated compensations for the lost business. Lithuanian institutions met stricter requirements than it is demanded by the EU directives, and had great losses; still the agreement on exporting pork into Russia was not reached, which indicated that the EU food safety system is not always recognised by the third countries. The respondents admitted that the EU's support in solving the ASF problem was important, but still there was a lack of unity when solving this problem before the actual outcome was visible.

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"EUROPEAN IDEA" IN UKRAINE: POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS IN VERKHOVNA RADA ON THE EVE OF VILNIUS SUMMIT (2013)

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ABSTRACT

The study was done employing the method of critical discourse analysis and was aimed at analysing the discourse of speeches of politicians during parliamentary debates. The paper explores how the speeches and arguments delivered by politicians in Ukraine's public sphere created the "European" discourse, and what were the special features of this discourse, especially in the sphere of foreign policy choice. Contradiction between pro-Western and pro-Eastern views has always been a peculiarity of Ukraine. Therefore, this partition was widely used by Ukrainian politicians in order to reach their own aims.

Keywords: critical discourse analysis, Europe, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, foreign policy choice

Introduction

The aim of the paper is to explore how the speeches and arguments delivered by politicians in Ukraine's public sphere created a "European" discourse, and what were the special features of this discourse, especially in the sphere of foreign policy choice. Contradiction between pro-Western and pro-Eastern views has always been a peculiarity of Ukraine. Therefore, this partition was widely used by Ukrainian politicians in order to reach their own aims. Among the main research questions are: 1) How may discourse theory be

adopted to the Ukrainian case? 2) What are the specifics of reflecting "Europe" and "European values" in Ukraine? 3) What is the perception of Europe among the political parties and in the society? 4) What content of the messages dominates in the discussions of politicians on matters such as European project? 5) Is it correct to associate pro-Western politicians with the "democratic discourse" and pro-Eastern politicians with the "authoritarian" one?

1. Critical Discourse Analysis: Methods, Advantages, and Opportunities for the Study of Ukrainian Case.

The discourse theory is represented within different scientific traditions. Poststructuralist tradition of discourse analysis has strongly influenced political science, including theories of international relations, European identities and mass media analysis.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is part of the second generation of discourse theories. Norman Fairclough, who is considered to Bethe main developer of this approach, views discourse as one of the modes of domination or regulation of subordinate relations of social actors[14]. Jacques Derrida's maximalist formula: "Everything is a discourse" is taken as the basis of the analysis. Poststructuralist discourse analysis intellectually originates from the works of Antonio Gramsci, Mikhail Bakhtin, Michel Foucault, and Roland Barthes in which discourse is analysed as the total of social practices, within which senses and meanings are reproduced. Social practices formulate discursive event, and at the same time, discursive event formulates them. The notion of a "speech act" is central to CDA and it disproves the understanding of language and action as being separately existent. Current theory accepts the statement of Richard McKay Rorty, who said that truth was not the characteristic of the outer world but it was the characteristic of language[15]. That is, truth is considered to be a product of discursive constructing.

14   Fairclough, N. *Language and Power*. London, Longman, 1989.

15   Rorty, R. *Contingency, irony, andsolidarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

In poststructuralist discourse theory, essentially historicist view of the identity formation is situated at the forefront. It is claimed that an identity is formed during its positioning against other purported phenomena. This way, for example, meaning of the notion "socialism" can be revealed only in comparison with such notions as "liberalism", "conservatism", "fascism" and others. Comprehension of the meaning of notions is held to imply the examination of contexts and of interpretation techniques.

Currently there is a tendency towards widening the subject field of discourse theories. This is done by means of shifting focal point from topics related to the studying of identity policies (national, gender etc.), to the issues which are traditional for political science – research of public administration, political reforms, strategies, ideologies and so forth.

Comparing with other approaches, CDA method does not have any strictly defined procedure of data collection and analysis; the researcher determines these two processes personally. Thus, interpretation of the data entails potential subjectivity of the scientist. However, CDA has much more advantages than flows. This method does not involve sophisticated procedure of data gathering, materials are accessible via the Internet and within media space. This method is economic: it does not demand material expenditures, only the author's eagerness. It is possible to check, supplement, confirm or refute its findings with the help of any other analytical instrument. CDA implies analyses of huge amounts of textual data; it allows us to analyse data directly, thereby setting political scientists free from traditional accusations of performing secondary analysis and data interpretation. Moreover, CDA gives a possibility to smooth over the difference between qualitative and quantitative orientation of scientific methodology[16].

Being employed in the domain of "political", discourse analysis faces the most conservative manifestations of "traditional science".

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16   Моргун О.М. Критический дискурс-анализ в методологии политической науки, Политическая лингвистика. № 3(37), 2011, С. 122-128.

Analysis of political discourse is not a heavily formalized discipline and it functions as an interdisciplinary methodological approach, which integrates theories and practices of political text analysis. It is hardly expectable that "professional political scientist" would stop at the level of grammatical forms etc. and prevent himself from broader generalization[17]. Until we continue to position ourselves as historians, political scientists and sociologists, texts will be used in "utilitarian" manner and "border-line disciplines" would be labelled as additional. In fact, this is how one of the dimensions of inter-disciplinarian approach, which entails existence of disciplinary boundaries, displays itself. Nonetheless, political discourse analysis is capable of enriching the research tool kit of professional historians, sociologists and political scientists via the usage of linguistic methods of text analysis in "socio-oriented" researches.

With the purpose of fulfilling our own tasks, we tried to describe the perspectives, which the employment of CDA has in the analysis of European discourse within the context of parliamentary debates in Ukraine during 2013. Such dating of materials is accounted for our interest to debates which took place right on the eve of "Maidan" protests, after the beginning of which all parliamentary disputes faded into insignificance.

During this yearlong period representatives of the Party of Regions had been ignoring the European topic. It got articulated only few times and only within the context of balancing of the foreign policy: it was said that it is necessary to develop relations with both the EU and Russian Federation.

The silence as concerns Europe in any context was officially explained as follows: we had already taken the decision and we are steadily advancing towards Europe; European integration is the will of the majority of society. What else there is to say? It is much better to discuss long-standing economic problems. Ruling party

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17 Хмельцов А.И. Когда «они» говорят о «нас»: политический дискурс-анализ и семиотика внешней политики в междисциплинарной перспективе. Актуальные проблемы теории коммуникации, СПб, 2004, С. 59-71.

deputies thought of Europe only as of an economic partner and forgot that the EU is not just an economic association. They called unto opposition "to put aside political contradictions and team up, in the name of the future of the state"[18].

Silencing of the European topic by the representatives of the Party of Regions in Verkhovna Rada came as a surprise to the author, as the President Yanukovych had continuously dwelled upon this issue with optimistic connotations. The President had stated that he managed to achieve great progress at the Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations with the EU. Thus, he explicitly declared that he had done much more than his predecessor Victor Yushenko for the cause of European integration. This very discrepancy is rather intriguing and it gives an impetus to think over the real intensions and policy tools, which the former ruling party used to have and over the probable clash of opinions between the ex-President himself and that clan (or part of that clan), which he used to represented.

2. The European Idea in Speeches of Ukrainian Opposition during Parliamentary Debates in Ukraine (2013).

In the public speeches of the opposition representatives ("Batkivshina", "UDAR", "Svoboda"), discussion of the European topic did not take manifold forms and one can say it even went in "utilitarian" manner – "Europe" was mentioned only within the context of the European integration of Ukraine. Seemingly, the "European idea" was not a part of their broader worldview.

№	Issue discussed in the speeches of oppositional MPs	Percentage
1	Internal Ukrainian problems and the EU	5
2	Criticism of authorities and the EU	30
3	Comparison of the European and Ukrainian developmental levels	5
4	Russian factor within the process of the European integration of Ukraine	15
5	Ukrainian national idea: the European element	15

18   Выступления депутатов Верховной Рады Украины, http://www.whoiswho.in.ua/showspeech.php

In general, it is not possible to speak about some single ideology of the Ukrainian opposition. The All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" bases itself upon the ideology of integral nationalism of Dmytro Dontsov. It is the far right, radically nationalistic political party, which is close to the "soft fascist" parties that were ruling Eastern European states during the interwar period and during World War II. Sometimes in the literature, the ideology of "Svoboda" is defined as anticommunism and left nationalism. On the international arena, it cooperates with the National Front of France.

All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivschyna", beginning from 2008, is the member of the supervisory council of European People's Party. Its ideology is defined as liberal conservative, right centrist. UDAR (the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms) on the international level is a partner of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany. It is right centrist party.

Ideological discrepancies are partly the reason (though one should not overestimate their role in Ukrainian politics) which makes the cooperation between the oppositional parties during the period of their race for power very difficult and quite implausible after they reach it.

Therefore, we shall go on to the study of the ways the European idea was sounded in the speeches of the oppositional members of Ukrainian Parliament.

The first way is to highlight domestic problems. In these speeches it was often stated that Ukraine would have all of its problems solved if it joined Europe and if not – then it'll get stuck for ages. It is remarkable that this kind of rhetoric was peculiar for Arseniy Yatsenyuk ("Batkivschina"): "If we don't sign the Agreement in Vilnius, then Ukraine won't have enough money to pay retirement payments, salaries and to help each Ukrainian citizen to survive. If

this Agreement is not signed, then Ukraine won't take the way of real and comprehensive reforms, we will still have corrupted attorneys and judges, we'll still have educational system which grants diplomas, but not knowledge, and medical system, which takes money, but doesn't give a possibility to get cured" [5].

Thus, the EU accession was viewed as some kind of sovereign remedy for solving of the economic, social and political problems. However it haven't ever been mentioned that the process of conducting internal reforms is an internal matter of the state and that it is the question of the maturity of civil society, whether the Ukrainians were ready to face "developmental diseases" which accompany reforms (and real development of Ukraine within the last 20 years shows that they are not ready).

The second way was to criticise the authorities. The main thesis was – Civil servants in Europe can't behave this way! All of the oppositional representatives were unanimous as concerns this issue; they all tried to criticize the authorities as often as possible. It was worth noting that the opposition members strived to get support and approval from the EU representatives; in this respect, their attention was concentrated on officials from Brussels: thus, they disregarded the importance of negotiations with the representatives of the European national authorities, let alone the broader intellectual society of Europe. In general, it is not clear whether they, and Ukrainians at large, differentiate "Europe" and "European Union", but it does seem that do not.

The most passionate speeches on the topic of "this regime or European integration" were pronounced by Arseniy Yatsenyuk: "It took merely a yearlong period for the main investing countries, for example Germany, to withdraw two billion dollars from Ukraine. They have put it bluntly: we are not able to work in a country, in which corruption is headed by the government and

the President, we are not able to operate in a country, in which courts, police and public prosecution office are business organizations, which rob this country, instead of being the institutions which are entrusted with protection of honour, dignity, law, justice and property rights. The essence of our Agreement with the EU is not just a fight with, but it is rather a war on corruption. No matter what is the sum of tax payments gathered, no matter what is the volume of the state budget. They are so talented that one simply doesn't have a chance to catch them spinning the money out of budget". From the other speech: "We address the President directly. Victor Fedorovych, your trips to Moscow won't help. One cannot sell the country. The country won't forgive you! All you are ready for are political prosecutions, blackmailing, pressure and what not in order to keep your powers" [5].

Vitaliy Klychko (UDAR) turned to this issue much later and in much more restrained language. His speeches got emotional only on the very eve of the summit: "Current authorities do not want to sign the Association Agreement. It is because they understand: the Association Agreement is, first of all, an introduction of the European standards of living. This means the prohibition of cynical, continuous and unpunished theft of money. This way is of no use for the regime of Yanukovych. Yanukovych and his power vertical at large have proved that they are the antithesis to the European Ukraine. The regime of Yanukovych is the mistake of Ukrainian state. And very soon we all will manage to correct this mistake and we'll do this just because Ukraine is Europe and we'll be able to prove it" [5].

In his speeches Oleh Tyahnybok, the leader of "Svoboda", mentioned the European idea sporadically and without considerable enthusiasm. He got inspired only by the dichotomy of "Europe or Russia": "This week the government of Azarov has ratified

as many as five agreements with the Customs Union (*of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan*) and they intend to approve around 70 more. So what about the intentions as concerns the European integration? Dear representatives of the authorities or, to be precise, not really dear, please define you position! Give a chance to Ukraine. Give a chance to the Ukrainians to have a better future. The policy which you have been implementing lately is the policy of the geopolitical ostrich. No one can discern the direction of your movement: is it rightwards or leftwards? Are you going to "Tayezhniy Moscow Union" (*meaning the Customs Union, here is wordplay: in Russian "tayezhniy" (adjective for taiga) sounds similar to "tamozhenniy" (which means customs)* or you want to go to Europe?" [5].

First of all, the difference between rhetoric of main oppositional leaders is evident. Klychko was moderate and cautious and he often used phrases such as "unfortunately", "compromise", "progress", and only at the end of the autumn, he turned to the use of more sharp expressions, which were more inherent to Yatsenyuk.

Yatsenyuk commonly utilized non-parliamentary vocabulary; his speech was full of jargon expressions, it was dense in dull threats, grave accusations to the address of the President and the Party of Regions. Interestingly, both leaders avoided critics of the communists while criticizing the Party of Regions. Supposedly, though pretty unlikely, they did this in order to draw the communists over their side. The language of Tyahnybok was the most emotional, it was abound with rhetorical questions and exclamations, however, it fits the traditional parliamentary boundaries much more than that of Yatsenyuk.

The third way was to compare the Ukrainian and European developmental levels with the emphasis of the advantage of the latter. This was done in a very broad manner, without going into

the depth of the issue. Instead of being viewed and shown as the real development model, Europe was presented as some kind of an ideal myth. Nobody of the opposition members tried to tell Ukrainians that Europe has problems too, but at the moment it is much more important to use their experience of democratic reforms. In general, the word "democracy" was used more and more rarely and the word "liberalism" vanished from the Ukrainian political vocabulary. Instead, "European integration" was used at any given occasion and it was imagined as a final goal, rather than a tool of further development.

Within the studied year, the only exception was represented by the January speech of Iryna Heraschenko: "Today the EU is not just characterized by the high economic and social standards, despite the crisis which the European Union is currently facing. Firstly, it is the values, it is democracy" [5].

At the same time there were lots of tag-phrases common to all the oppositionists which were continually used in the speeches: strategic boundary, strategic choice, geopolitical choice, European choice, European standards, high standards, decent life, responsibility, political will, "we want progress, we want achievements, we want victory", "freedom to Ukrainian people – freedom in free Europe", "we know the way we should go", "we are ready for everything", "we will take Ukraine to the European civilized way".

As concerns the ruling party and its parliamentary representatives, the opposition members often addressed them using rude words such as "bandits, morass, screech, leaves without figs, spinning of the money". Also peculiar was the fact that the sentences were built in a specific way in order to emphasize the speaker's disdain and even disgust towards his/hers opponents: "all this", "this Rada", "this president", "these tales of the President", "the

Party of Regions is telling stories", "dishonoured deputies" and so on. The main conclusion was: "we are the opposition and we are longing to join civilized Europe, and the authorities are the lowest level and the "Russian fifth column".

3. Ukrainian National Idea and Russian Factor in Parliamentary Debates in Ukraine (2013).

Turning to the Russian factor within the development of the European discourse, it is worth noting that this was the part of the discourse in which the authorities-opposition confrontation was most evident.

The Party of Regions named Russian Federation as the natural historical partner of Ukraine. The opposition was set against Moscow and it put forward very distinct conflict of two ideas – of Russia or Europe. Nevertheless, the reasoning was surprisingly weak with the same words being virtually repeated from one speech to another. All the parties were much more unanimous in this issue than in the others. It is even difficult to distinguish the speeches delivered by the representatives of "Svoboda" and "Batkivshchyna", with the latter using the vocabulary of "Svoboda". They all admitted that for Ukraine, Russia meant surrender of the national interests, the gas dependence, the ideological expansion, the unavailability of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures. Arseniy Yatsenyuk: "We are not intended to go back to the USSR – we will go to the EU" [5]. Oleh Tyahnybok: "Due to your efforts we've had a very close cooperation with Moscow in sphere of economics. So what's the result? "Russian embrace" has probably become too tight for us now and that's why we have to give up our current European perspective so easily" [5].

Thus, in the speeches of the opposition members we can find a full set of the accusations for Russia: economic, political and

cultural oppression of Ukrainians under the tsarist regime and during the Soviet times, apologia of the Ukrainian history as of the history of struggle for independence, incompatibility of the Ukrainian independence with the new agreements with Russia. The closest attention was attracted by the Kharkiv agreements, which were described as "criminal and detrimental", especially as concerns the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet until 2042. This was perceived as the variant of "legitimation of the occupation of the part of Crimean peninsula which belongs to Ukraine". "Currently the Russian Fleet at the territory of Ukraine behaves extremely impudently. At present each martinet of the Russian Fleet allows himself to chatter that he would stay in the territory of Ukraine despite of any position taken by the Ukrainian government" (Oleksandr Sych, "Svoboda") [5]. Accession to the Customs Union was perceived as the greatest danger: it was called "*tayezhniysoyuz*" with the ideological doctrine of the "Russian World" [5]. The European integration was the only alternative to the reconstruction of the USSR and to the degeneration of Ukraine's status towards becoming the object, rather than subject, in International Relations. In this situation, the mood of the parliamentary talks in fact was non-parliamentary; mockery, rudeness and sneering were pervasive and in this case it meant that the intensity of the struggle was very high and that the choice of "Russia or Europe" was put forward very harshly.

The last but not the least part of the parliamentary talks related to the European discourse correlated with the following question: does Ukraine have the national idea and if it does then what is the way it may be phrased? There was not even a slightest mention in the speeches of the Party of Regions members of the term "national idea". At the same time the oppositional parties had developed this issue in varying degrees; "Batkivschina" had

the most elaborated variant and evidently it took the leading po-
sition as far as the formulation and exploitation of the European
idea as a tool of the struggle for power.

Yatsenyuk had the most lapidary version of the national idea:
"Our future is the European future". In the subsequent speeches,
he often added: "First of all we'd like to start with the geopolitical
choice. That is the choice, which currently defines the future of
Ukraine for hundreds rather than tens of years. Three hundred
years ago and for the hundreds years to come this choice was
not made (*this refers to the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654 which con-
solidated relations between Ukraine and Russia)*. So now we are
talking about our choice: our choice is Ukraine as the member
of the European Union". "The people of Ukraine want Ukraine
to be the part of Europe. The people of Ukraine want the Eu-
ropean values to become the values of each Ukrainian citizen".
"Ukraine is the state with millennial history and we've had great
state figures. One of them was prince Volodymyr who baptized
Ukraine and Rus', thus making our state the part of the Europe-
an civilization, and that is why he became known as Volodymyr
the Great. Another one was his son Yaroslav, who concluded im-
portant international treaties and also helped Ukraine to become
a part of Europe. And thus he became Yaroslav the Wise. None of
Ukrainian historians will ever decide to write about Victor Yanu-
kovych, if Victor Yanukovych misses the historic chance for the
Ukrainian state and for Ukrainian people to become the member
of the European Union. We are facing ta historical challenge and
a historic chance, which are decisive for where and with whom
Ukraine will be". "We address each of those who want to see their
future as European and civilized, on the 24th November come to
Maidan, it will give each of us the opportunity to protect our
right of choice and to show them who rules our Ukrainian state,

and these are Ukrainian people, European people, who rule it. Glory to Ukraine!" [5]. Vitaliy Klychko agreed: "I am sure that each citizen of Ukraine wants to live according to the European standards of living. Ukraine is Europe" [5].

Thus, for the two parties the national idea was European Ukraine and for them there was no alternative to building that European country with "true values" via the EU membership. So if Ukraine joined the EU, then it would be the European country. This, however, raises the question: what will it be if it does not join the EU? Opposition subconsciously still concentrated on the "Europe vs. Russia" dichotomy while formulating the national idea.

"Svoboda" had a bit different understanding of national idea, which was articulated much earlier. It is rich in reminders of the glorious past and traditions of fighting with the external enemies. The process of fighting seemed to be more important for "Svoboda" than the result of the fight. Members of "Svoboda" were inclined to appeal to the Ukrainian history much more, than representatives of the other parties. They often referred to such chapters of history as Kievan Rus', the Treaties of Pereyaslav, the rule of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Koliyivschyna, Holodnyi Yar, the Battle of Kruty ("it was Ukrainian Thermopylae; three hundred of Ukrainian Spartans fought the army of five thousand") [5]. Oleh Tyahnybok: "Ukrainian Brothers and Sisters! There's not much time left till the way our country will move is going to be determined: whether we will continue drowning in that Asian, Moscow, communist morass or we will have another future and another perspective" [5]. Further: "We, Ukrainians, are the European nation. When we are coming to Europe we are just returning home. Don't try to block our way back home to the family of European peoples. And remember about the consequences. Glory to Ukraine!" [5].

That way the Ukrainian national idea, which is virtually the same for each nation – seeking of security and prosperity, was once again articulated by Ukrainians, as well as ages before, in the form of the geopolitical choice between being rich and protected with Europe, or poor and oppressed with Russia.

Conclusions

The CDA is an especially appropriate methodological tool, since it is aimed at the exploration of the relations of inequality, of social tensions and ideological substitution, which are used by the elites in order to consolidate their power. In general, all this constitutes the essence of social relations in Ukraine where the most ancient law in the history of manhood: the power is the property – still functions.

Parliamentary debates within merely one year – 2013 – represent extensive material for the study of modern myths and illusions, which dominate the public consciousness and which are used by the political elites in their struggle for power. They are also trying to detect and use protest moods in the society; the analysis has shown that the growing activity of the MPs was directly related to the street actions (there were 2 waves in 2013: in April and November).

We have discerned five main issues, which lied at the core of all speeches of the opposition members, in which the European discourse was concerned. The analysis has shown that the first place is firmly occupied by the contraposition of the European integration idea to the current Ukrainian authorities. The second place is shared by the idea of historic belonging of Ukraine to the European civilization and by contraposition of the latter to the Russian influence.

We should, however, admit the most important omissions in the speeches of the opposition members. The term "values" stayed extremely unpopular with Ukrainian politicians, though

it had no relation to the solving of real problems within the public consciousness. Ukrainians mainly embrace only one type of values – those related to their individual life (family, health etc.). All the more alien were the perceptions and debates on the issue of the "European values"; probably the opposition representatives did not support the public discussion of the "European values" on purpose, keeping in mind that traditional Ukrainian society is dominated by the not so liberal views.

The main sense of exploitation of the European discourse in the parliament was much prosier: the EU was perceived as the mythical power, which was able to relieve Ukrainians from long-standing poverty and oppression.

In the speeches of Ukrainian politicians, the contraposition of "Europe-Russia" was used most frequently. It was implied in this context that "Europe" is synonymous to the "West" and "Russia" – to the "East". Russia pursued anti-Western and anti-European policy. Hence, those who supported an alliance with Russia were automatically considered to be in opposition to the West, Europe and the EU. In the interviews shown on the national TV, the Russian-speaking representatives of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea expressed univocal anti-EU position, explicitly declaring, that those who want to join the EU were welcome to do this, but Crimea was not intended to follow them. This was an unambiguous provocation, aimed at the breakup of the state.

Research of the political vocabulary of the oppositional leaders enables us to conclude that populism was a characteristic, which was common for all of them. Putting it simply, they articulated only those thoughts, which, in their eyes, were supported by the voters. Furthermore, parliamentary speeches served to change the images of the oppositional leaders, which were already rooted in the mass consciousness. Yatsenyuk tried to position himself as a strong, decisive

and hard-line fighter; Klychko instead tried to show publicly that he was an intelligent and serious-minded politician, and Tyahnybok keenly avoided radical statements, which could affirm his strive for creation of "Ukraine for Ukrainians". As a result, parliamentary disputes were used to expose political principles and positions to a lesser extent than they were used to disguise them.

Thus, the veracity of the pro-Western and pro-European longings of the opposition appears to be questionable. However even more important question arises: is it correct to associate pro-Western politicians with the "democratic discourse" and pro-Eastern politicians with the authoritarian one? It seems that it is possible to answer positively and not only due to the fact that the presidency of the leader of pro-Eastern politicians Victor Yanukovych proved that turn to authoritarianism was real under his rule more than ever. The phenomenon of "Svoboda" is equally interesting. On the one hand, this party was an important element of the Ukrainian opposition to Yanukovych, which sought support of the EU, but on the other hand, this political power has anti-Western and anti-liberal ideological roots and as a result, it is prone to authoritarianism.

Summing up the conclusions of the research, it should be said that political discussions in Verkhovna Rada on the eve of the Vilnius Summit have shown that usage of the "European idea" in Ukraine was widespread but it was not profound. The members of the opposition were using it on the ad hoc basis in their struggle with the ruling party and hence with the parliamentary majority. Even though, on international arena "Batkivschina" and "UDAR" cooperate with centre-right political parties of Europe, technically speaking they have not yet become the European parties (with respective program principles and systems of values). Serious challenge for the future development of Ukraine is the radicalization of both right and left wings of political spectrum with the centre remaining weak and disjointed.

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THE EUROPEAN NETWORK OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS: BECOMING OR CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR?

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ABSTRACT

In 2010 the European Union launched a policy of strategic networking on a global level. This decision was empowered by the necessity to prove that the Lisbon treaty provisions on the EU as an International actor were not just official discourse. USA, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, China, India, South Africa, South Korea and Japan were called strategic partners of the EU. However, these partners acknowledged the incapacity to name European Union as a federation or confederation, as an inter-governmental or supranational organization. Close strategic cooperation from the European perspective was seen as a possibility to take part in the design of the multipolar international system on the one hand, and on the other hand to shape its own international identity. In this context few aspects are important for the European Union: 1) legal basis for being a united strategic actor on the global level 2) recognition from other members of the international system, and 3) just bilateral cooperation with USA, Russia and China.

Keywords: Strategic partnership, Strategic actor, European Union, International identity, Cooperation identity

Introduction

In the historical perspective, the European Union was created as a political and socio-economical project in order to decrease

political, economic and other differences between its members. The integration of a wide range of policies was seen as a 'deepening' process or internal politics. On the other hand, for many years the external policy was characterized in the terms of the enlargement. The Maastricht treaty was the first step to broaden the understanding of the external policy of the Union. The creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy showed the inspiration to emphasize the EU capacity to become an international actor, able to act on the international level. However, in case of the EU, foreign policy is first of all a question of a deeper integration and consensus between the members. This process reflects the creation of the European identity on four different levels:

- Members' European identity (being 'one');
- External European identity (acting as 'one');
- Bilateral European identity with third countries (being partner);
- Multilateral European identity on global level (being equal to states).

In 2003 the European Security Strategy stated that the EU will seek to cooperate with other countries to establish oneself in the global system as a global actor. In order to achieve this objective the multilateral cooperation and network of strategic partnerships with key actors was named as a mean. The aim of this article is to analyse how creation of the strategic partnerships with third states can be defined as creation of the External, Bilateral and Multilateral European identity. The structure of this article consists of three sections. First section is indented to explain the theoretical understanding of constructing an international identity and common identity-building. The second section is for to analysing the basis of the External European identity and the capacity of the EU to build bilateral and multilateral international

identities. The last section is about the analysis and the evaluation of the European strategic partnerships in the context of creating EU's image/identity as a unified actor. The main conclusion can be made, that in order to create international identities and become an international actor, the Member states' European identity must be established and promoted.

1. Construction of the Identity

International relations are social facts, existing just as a common agreement on the understanding and value of the interaction between states. Common, widely spread ideas, convictions, expectations, material resources and social practices compose the international system. Consequently, the international system is a social structure that includes material resources, common knowledge and practices, i.e. discourse determines what value is given to material resources in the international arena[19]. Through interaction states (as collectives of individuals) create each other and attach to each other anthropomorphic characteristics: interests, goals, convictions, needs, fears, etc.[20] Accordingly, regular practices create agents, and agents and their established norms create structures.

Collective meanings and taking part in the concrete structure of these meanings ensure the states' identity and the role deriving from its identity. It creates concepts of 'self' and 'other', which moderate/direct the behaviour in any given situation, based on the subjective interpretation corresponding to the identity[21]. In this way, identities create predictability, stability and social order:

19   Wendt, A. Constructing International Politics. *International security,* Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 71-81, 1995, p. 73-74.

20   Wendt, A. Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International organization*, Vol. 46 (2), p. 391–425, 1992. p. 397.

21   Ibid.

"it tells you and others who you are, and tells you what they are."[22] The result of the social identity is a state and its interests. The national interests are not given; i. e. interests are defined in a specific social context.

Changes of identity result in changes of interests, accordingly, that changes national policy[23]. States acts in accordance to their identity, which is a result of their historical experience. It allows forecasting the behaviour of states – an identity is interpreted as a state's reputation, which indicates whether the state is inclined to cooperate, assist, conflict or fight. Moreover, historical experience indicates, what strategy the state is more likely to adopt. Identity not only determines the behaviour of the state, but also the behaviour of others towards it.

Cooperation (regular interaction) creates self-identification and other-identification - stereotypes of the expected behaviour. However, interaction can lead to slow and limited identity transformation. Often the changes are not noticeable, because the state has a number of identities and different roles in different contexts. Some of the identities and interests derive from the relationship between the national society (internal source), others – from the relationship with the international community (external source)[24].

Collective identities are created by social interactions and practices. Collective identity is a self-definition in the relationship with other – self-identification from the perspective of the other subject of the interaction. Another important aspect of the

22   Hopf, T. The promise of Constructivism in International relations theory. *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 171-200, 1998, p. 175.

23   Jepperson R. L., Wendt A., Katzenstein P. J. *Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security. In Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 53.

24   Wendt, A. Collective Idnetity formation and the International state. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, p. 384-396, 1994, p. 385.

collective identity is a positive or negative self-identification with the other[25]. A positive self-identification with other conditions state's need to take care of the development of the other state, giving rise to intensive cooperation and collective identity-building. Consequently, the other country is perceived as a natural part of the self. Conversely, negative self-identification points that the other is an enemy – the object of manipulation in order to benefit[26].

Collective identities allow the formation of the collective interests. However, it should be noticed that states have a lot of different collective identities and interests, arising from different social situations. Consequently, states have bilateral, regional, global collective identities, which vary depending on the time, place, and issues at hand[27]. Thus, interaction is an independent variable and identity – dependent. Structures influence agents, and agents influence structures. State's identity is not the only a result of the social practices in the international arena. The internal social practises have the same effect: identity politics enables or restricts the foreign policy decisions or implementation measures[28].

The main question is whether all subjects of social interaction will enable the same identity from the number of individual and collective identities in the same situation. The same interpretation of the situation and occurring interests can be explained by a few more anthropomorphic characteristics attributed to states: a strategic empathy and a long-term commitment synergy. Both of these properties can be derived from the

25   Wendt, A. Collective Identity formation and the International state. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, p. 384-396, 1994, p. 386.

26   Ibid.

27   Wendt, A. Collective Identity formation and the International state. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, p. 384-396, 1994, p. 288.

28   Hopf, T. The promise of Constructivism in International relations theory. *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 171-200, 1998, p. 195.

collective identity and discursive practices that support it.

The strategic partnership is an expression of the bilateral collective identity, which is characterized by mutual treatment of each other as a strategic partner. The evaluation of any other state as a strategically important continuation/part of the self is the core of the strategic partnership. Altruism towards that state is not seen as an exception, but as a necessary condition for effective partnership. In the long term, strategic partners form common identity. Moreover, intensive social interaction in many fields and continuous confirmation that the countries are strategically important to each other decrease the distinctions between different states' identities. This makes a strategic empathy and a long-term commitment synergy possible.

Bilateral identity also can trigger the transformation of the self-identification. Consequently, it has influence to attached characteristics by others to specific international actor. Social construction of the identities allows us to make the presumption that in order to change self-identification; a subject can perform social acts with other actors, which can contribute to the transformation of the identity by assigning specific characteristics to the subject.

2. Construction of the European Union as an International actor

The European Union can be seen as an expression of the emerging new world order, definition of which varies from a regional organization to a unified global actor. The EU can be defined as an international actor, seeking to become tantamount to a sovereign state, as an actual actor of the international system, as a process formatting its internal and external environment[29]. The union can not only restrict the foreign policy of its member-states, but

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29   Wessels, W., Franziska, B. *The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty: Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead?* CEPS Challenge Paper No. 10, 2008. P. 3.

also it implements an independent foreign policy, despite the fact that the EU's external policy is purely an intergovernmental form of cooperation.

The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, gave precondition for the EU to become a united international actor. The goal of the established Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was to assert the Union's identity on the international scene. In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon established the most important changes and innovations of the CFSP. The new provisions codified and emphasized the development of the EU as a unified actor in the international arena[30]. EU was defined as a legal entity, capable of signing international agreements and implementing world-wide peacekeeping, civil, military and police missions. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty formalized the legal possibility to develop partnerships with third countries and international, regional organizations.

In 2003 the European Security Strategy stated that the EU will seek to cooperate with other countries, not only in dealing with security issues - terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states, organized crime, but also to establish oneself in the global system as a global actor. In order to achieve this objective the multilateral cooperation and network of strategic partnerships with key actors was named as a mean. The main characteristic of possible strategic partners was identified as common goals, values and will to take action to protect them[31]. In 2010, the European Council launched a coherent policy of strategic cooperation, i.e. Free trade agreements with strategic partners, named as a specific CFSP objective. Moreover, the EU established reporting on the implementation

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30   Schmidt, J. Common foreign and security policy and European security and defence policy after the Lisbon Treaty – Old problems solved? *Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy*, 2009, p. 239-240.

31   *European Security strategy: Save Europe in the better World.* European Union, 2003, p. 14-15.

of the strategic goals with partners and summits with partners[32]. All EU's strategic partners were chosen because of their (growing/potential) importance in the international arena. The few priorities, principles of coherence and effectiveness were established as a basis of the creation of 'strategic European network'.

3. Strategic partners of the European Union

The concept of the strategic partnership was introduced into the rhetoric of the EU's CFSP framework in the light of the changing international system. Only one country was called a current strategic partner of the EU - the United States. Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India were named potential strategic partners. Functional use of these (potential) strategic partnerships was clear: (1) increase of the EU's influence in the international system; (2) increase of the efficiency of implementation of the EU's diplomacy and (3) involvement of powerful countries in the decisions on international security issues relevant to the EU. These partnerships reflect the collective power of the Union on the international stage and help the EU create the image and identity of a unified political actor. Additionally, cooperation with powerful countries reduces the likelihood of the competitive multipolarity and contributes towards international security[33]. The emerging multipolar world commits the EU to choose cooperation with rising powers.

Formally, Russia was named the first strategic partner of the EU in 1998. The Strategic Partnership was developed on the basis of the CFSP common strategy towards Russia. Other strategic partnerships also departed from the common strategies. The U.S., Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, China, India, South Africa, South Korea and Japan can be considered strategic partners of the EU. The aspiration to develop strategic partnership with these countries shows EU's ambition

32   *European Council Conclusions*, Brussels, 12 October 2010.

33   Grevi, G. Making EU strategic partnerships effective. FRIDE Working Paper, No. 105, 2010, p. 5.

to become a strategically important actor in global politics and to acquire the status and be recognised as a united actor by the existing/emerging/potential powers in the multipolar international system.

The EU does not have a unified justification of the cooperation; consequently, choice of partners can be seen as a chaotic process. Partners can be divided into allies, distant partners, hard partners, etc.[34]. Partnerships reflect the different goals and circumstances of co-operation – the historic partnership with Canada, USA, Japan (Western civilization), inter-regional partnerships with Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and South Korea, the partnerships of multipolar structure with Russia, China, and India[35]. These strategic partnerships represent cooperation with countries that can be identified as partners, competitors or enemies at the same time in different areas[36].

As few partners are key players in the international system, it follows that the United States, China and Russia are the most important to the European Union. The United States is a key strategic partner for the EU, according to its global influence and leadership in the NATO. China is a rising power, which is extremely important in the context of economical/trade cooperation. Russia is geographically close and has great influence in Eastern Europe[37].

Despite the fact that the EU's strategic choice of partners is based on formal values and common interests, the development of the strategic partnership does not have a single common dimension. The partnerships are initiated with great powers, rising powers, regional powers and states, which are nor influential, nor important such as Canada, South Korea and Mexico[38]. Moreover, it is hard to

34   Gratius, S. Can EU Strategic Partnerships Deepen Multilateralism? FRIDE Working Paper
      No. 109, 2011, p. 12.

35   Gratius, S. The EU and the 'special ten': deepening or widening Strategic Partnerships?
      FRIDE Policy Briefs, Issue 76, 2011, p. 3.

36   Islam*, S. 'Strategic Partnerships':* The *European Union's. Quest for Global Clout. EU*–Africa
      Project. Occasional Paper No 33, 2009, p. 4.

37   Grevi, G. Making EU strategic partnerships effective. FRIDE Working Paper, No. 105, 2010, p. 3.

38   Gratius, S. The EU and the 'special ten': deepening or widening Strategic Partnerships?
      FRIDE Policy Briefs Issue 76, 2011, p. 2.

find a common security determinant for strategic partnerships with Japan, China, India, South Korea, Mexico, and Brazil. Additionally, from the perspective of international realism, partnership with USA points to the strategy of band-wagoning, while at the same time partnerships with India, China, and Russia refer to their use as a balancing factor against USA. For this reason, the EU's strategic partnership cannot be regarded as instrumental, as there are no clear criteria or form, nor a concept of strategic cooperation.

Table No. 1 ***Strategic partners of the European Union***

	Informal Partnerships	**Formal Partnerships**
Superpower	The United States	
Great Powers	Russia	China
Leading Powers	Japan, Canada	India, Brazil
		Mexico, South Africa

The Essential Partner	The Pivotal Partners
The Natural Allies	The Regional Partners

Source: Renard, T. *Strategy Wanted: The European Union and Strategic Partnerships*. Security policy brief No. 13, EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, 2010. p. 3.

Although the concept of strategic partnership emphasizes the uniqueness of the cooperation, it also refers to the strategic coherence: strategic partnerships in foreign policy should complement each other, be based on common criteria. The main problems of the EU's strategic partnerships derive from the inefficiency of the strategic approach: "today's strategic partnerships of the EU cannot reasonably be deemed strategic or even partnerships" [39]. Moreover, all these countries implement a double-minded policy towards the EU.

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39   Renard, T. *The treachery of strategies: a call for true EU Strategic Partnerships. Egmont Paper No. 45*. The Royal Institute for International Relations in Belgium, 2011, p. 1.

Table No. 2 *The Evaluation or the European strategic partnerships*

Bilateral	Core issues	Aid	FTA	Type of Sp
Brazil (2007)	Trade (10th partner) enviroment, energy	Yes	Negotiations Mercosur since 1999	Limited, value and interests based asymmetric SP
Canada (no official SP declaration)	All-inclusive, focus on values, global peace, enviroment, energy, trade (11th partner) and investment	No	Negotiations since 2009	All-inclusive, like-minded SP
China (2008)	Trade(2nd partner), investment, securuty	Yes	No (PCA)	Limited, interest based asymmetric SP
India (2008)	Trade (8th partner) / investment, security	Yes	Negotiations since 2006	Limited, value and interest based asymmetric SP|
Japan (no declaration)	Trade (6th partner), investment, development, peace	No	No (in consideration)	Limited, like-minded SP
Mexico (2009)	Trade (19th trade partner), investment, development, (public security)	Yes	Yes (2000)	Limited, like-minded SP
Russia (2009)	Trade (3rd trade partner), energy	Yes	No (PCA)	Limited, interest based SP
South Africa (2006)	Development, trade (13th trade partner), regional peace	Yes	Yes (2008)	Limited, development focused SP
South Korea (2010)	Trade (9th trade ppartner), development, denocracy	Yes	Yes (2010)	Limited, like-minded SP
United States (1990)	All-inclusive (1st trade partner)	No	No	Like-minded, value and interests based asymmetrics SP

Source: Gratius, S. *The EU and the 'special ten': deepening or widening Strategic Partnerships?* FRIDE Policy Briefs Issue 76, 2011, p. 3.

Strategic partnerships are necessary for successful adaptation to the changing structure of the international system, but EU's strategic

partnerships are usually identified as not complying with the concept of strategic importance and the EU itself is not treated as a strategic partner. The European Union is not seen as a strategic partner, because other states do not consider the Union a united actor. Consequently, the strategic partnership is not helping the creation of identity as a strategic international actor. Moreover, the EU does not have a grand strategy[40] of the strategic partnership development. This can be considered as an incapacity to maintain the process of building its own international and cooperative identity.

Conclusions

Although, in 2011 UN General Assembly vested to European Union a special status, including the opportunity to submit proposals to the General Assembly, strategic partners of the Union, such as China, India, Russia and South Africa voted against this decision. EU's diplomatic tools do not provide it the opportunity to be an equal partner in negotiations or crisis management. All European (so called) strategic partners consider the EU as a market, restricted and stringent by common rules, but politically on the global level it is just a stage for Western European countries, their politicians, lobbyists and economically influential groups, driven by profit, not by so called European values. The club of negotiations – European Council – is incapable to react to any global issue that needs to be solved at the moment. Different, conflicting identities and interests of the European countries stand on the way to demonstrate, that the official discourse of the Union has power to shape, create and promote common International identity. The double-hearted thinking of the partners prevents the creation of that cooperative identity. The only possible, but very unlikely way for the EU is to become a constitutionally designed federation, rendering up the formation and implementation of the foreign policy to supranational (federal) subjects.

40 Smith, M., Xie, H. The EU and 'Strategic Partnership' with China: How Much Strategy? How Much Partnership? Paper Presented at the UACES Annual/Research Conference Angers, France, September 3-5, 2009, p. 7.

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MASS MEDIA IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS – UKRAINIAN CASE

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ABSTRACT

The main topic of the article focuses on how the mass media could be used as an instrument of PSYOP in a crisis situation. The case of the Ukrainian crisis is used to present a methodology of using mass media during a conflict. Two types of electronic mass media, which were used in Ukraine crisis: information portals and social media are pointed out. Within the second type social networking sites, forums and chats are distinguished. In the author's opinion, on the one hand the target group had access to "official information" in all media agencies and portals, but on the other hand it communicated with "normal peoples" at social websites. As a result, the target group doesn't have access to different information and all the time is under the influence of the PSYOP specialists.

Introduction

The main problem of the article lies in the question: *How the mass media were used in psychological operation during the Ukraine crisis?* To answer this question it was necessary to establish two specific problems: *How the mass media is used in psychological operations?* And *How to interact with people through the mass media*

today? The objective of the study was to indicate the most important elements of the mechanism of mass media in modern psychological operations. It was considered that the method of examination of documents, media reports and posts in social media portals was most appropriate for the analysis.

Before the findings of the paper are presented is worth considering the understanding of the two terms: psychological operations and mass media. The US and NATO in their military nomenclature use shortened version "PSYOP" for psychological operations. According to *FM 3-05.30 MCRP 3-40.6 Psychological Operations* the PSYOP mission is[41]:

(…) to influence the behaviour of foreign target audiences (TAs[42]) to support U.S. national objectives. PSYOP accomplish this by conveying selected information and/or advising on actions that influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign audiences. Behavioural change is at the root of the PSYOP mission. Although concerned with the mental processes of the TA, it is the observable modification of TA behaviour that determines the mission success of PSYOP. It is this link between influence and behaviour that distinguishes PSYOP from other capabilities and activities of information operations (IO) and sets it apart as a unique core capability.
According to Dictionary.com *mass medium* is[43]:

Any of the means of communication, as television or newspaper, that reach very large numbers of people.

Mass media is an important element in modern psychological operations. In fact it's quite impossible to conduct modern psychological operations without mass media. The Internet is a very powerful type of mass media. Electronic media such as newspaper, TV, radio pages or social media such as Facebook or

41   FM 3-05.30 MCRP 3-40.6 Psychological Operations, Chapter 1, p. 1-2.

42   TA – target audience - FM 3-05.30 MCRP 3-40.6 Psychological Operations, Glossary 19.

43   http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mass+media, 01.03.2014

Twitter provide possibilities that influence the human way of thinking and their behaviour[44]. The corner stone of every psychological operation are the methods of psychological influence on all human senses. Properly prepared communications, which affect the sense of sight, hearing, and in addition smell, taste and touch, could be very powerful. Sensory stimulation may also have a place in the imagination. So how is it possible to use social electronic media in this process? Facebook or Twitter contains much information about the users of these services. It's possible to get to know their habits, psychological profiles, strengths and weaknesses. This kind of knowledge could be used in planning the process of psychological operation and in designing media coverage in the press, television, or radio. It's possible to get to know specific symbols, graphic, sounds, music etc. which will be specific for the target group. This knowledge has been used in the Ukraine during the Crimean crisis.

1. Role of media in Ukrainian PSYOPs– Russian propaganda

Since the beginning of the crisis in the Crimea Russian and Western media presented a very different picture of those events. From one side, the Russian media presented the idea that the lives of Russians from Crimea could be in danger after Yanukovych fell[45]. Russian media also showed numerous anti-war demonstrations in the cities of Russia itself in a very limited way[46]. Western media, in turn, completely overlooked the fact that Yanukovych

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44 Praktanis A., Aronson E., Wiek propagandy, PWN, Warszawa 2005, p. 11

45 Russians' lives in Crimea in danger, Russia can't remain indifferent – Russian MP, The Voice of Russia, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_01/Russians-lives-in-Crimea-in-danger-Russia-cant-remain-indifferent-Russian-MP-5680/, 01.03.2014.

46 Antywojenne demonstracje w Rosji. Sądy skazują opozycjonistów, Nasz Dziennik, http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/452351,rosyjskie-sady-skazuja-opozycjonistow-za-udzial-w-antywojennych-demonstracjach.html, 03.03.2014; Protesty w Moskwie i Petersburgu. Rosjanie wspierają Ukrainę, tvn24, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/protesty-w-moskwie-i-petersburgu-rosjanie-wspieraja-ukraine, 403605.html, 02.03.2014.

was unlawfully compelled by force to leave, even though he was democratically elected by the majority of the Ukrainian population. Western journalists focused on Russian aggression in the Crimea agreeing with the agenda of the earlier coup. Western public opinion accepted this state of affairs[47]. In determining which target group the media coverage was driven to, it is possible to determine what the political objectives were behind the actions of Russia and the West. The main target group of the Russian media campaign were Russians in their homeland and in the Crimea. For the Western media the target group was their own societies. The media coverage was a little different in USA, German, France, Great Britain or in Poland.

Russian electronic mass media specialists created two communication strategies for two different target groups – for their own society and for western societies. In the second case, the main goal was to convince people that Ukrainian post-Maidan government did not respect the right to freedom of the Crimean people. The transmission of information was carried out through both traditional media and through discussion forums and social networking sites. For example, there were many pro-Russian comments on the polish forums. Ordinary Polish quests on the forums dedicated to the crisis in Crimea could get the impression that most Poles understand and even supports the Russians. There were also many comments comparing Maidan's opposition to the supporters of Ukrainian nationalism. So in a short time there were many comments comparing the opposition to UPA, which was responsible for genocide of the Polish nation during World War II. Russian propaganda specialists always have been masters in using national

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47 P. Cywiński, Cały ten "majdan", W polityce, http://wpolityce.pl/dzienniki/korespondencje-piotra-cywinskiego/72773-piotr-cywinski-dla-wpolitycepl-caly-ten-majdan-slepe-poparcie-polski-dla-calej-ukrainskiej-opozycji-w-jej-nowej-brukowej-rewolucji-nie-oznacza-politycznej-madrosci, 29.01.2014.

differences and painful cards of common history to manipulate people's way of thinking, emotions and actions. This intention did not succeed and the Polish people supported the Maidan opposition. All political parties and the Polish government opted against the Ukrainian government, who ordered to use force against its own citizens[48].

Russian propaganda specialists wanted to convince Russian citizens that president Putin acted in order to protect the Russian people who lived in the Crimea. They tried to create an image of total chaos in all the Ukraine and present it as a serious threat for Russians in this region of the world. If weak and illegal post-Maidan government could not protect the Russians – the Motherland had to help, because it's the duty of Russia to protect its citizens all over the world. To maintain a semblance of legality the rights of the population of Crimea to self-determination were emphasized. In Moscow's opinion, if the citizens of Crimea (mostly Russians) opted for joining their land to any country, the international community should respect such a decision. In this continuous emphasizing of the right to self-determination, the basic right of the all population inhabits the entire country to do the same were forgotten, as well as the fact that the violation of territorial integrity should not decides by a minority, but by all the citizens of the country. Russian propagandists very cleverly used this subtle difference by focusing on fundamental freedoms of a smaller part of Ukrainian society, referring to the emotions, and thus ignoring the will of the majority[49]. On the other hand they used (and still they are using) social networking to create

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48   Ukraine's Berkut Police: what make them special?, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25895716, 26.02.2014.

49   Russia Says Ukraine Action Aimed at Protecting Human Rights, Ria Novosti, http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140303/188052066/Russia-Says-Ukraine-Action-Aimed-at-Protecting-Human-Rights.html, 03.03.2014.

an impressing that their version of Crimea story is true. What did the West do in this situation? The same, but in the opposite direction[50].

2. The Western PSYOPs

United States' media showed the brutal and sophisticated Russian aggression in the Crimea. There were connotations of the Cold War period and the manifestation of Putin as a worthy next Stalin[51]. The Russians had their military bases in the Crimea, where tens of thousands of soldiers were legally stationed. In fact, the Russians who comprised the majority of the Crimean people, rebelled against the new government in Kiev, which overthrew the previous power through coups d'état. They had the right to express their opposition to the new, undemocratic government. However, they had no right to interfere in the territorial integrity of their own s, but should have waited for the next elections instead. So, in American media these people were shown as the Russian fifth column in the Ukraine. This generalization and division into "good" and "bad" people, was needed by the American specialists in their psychological operation. The Americans also missed the fact there were many anti-war demonstrations in all the major cities of Russia. In the media there was only a brief mention of the 260 arrested, without giving details about the scale of these demonstrations and the number of people involved in them[52]. Wider representation of this issue was not on hand. Russia and the Russians were to be presented in a clearly negative

50   Saul the bat tle for legal legitimacy in Criema, ABC, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-03/saul-the-battle-for-legal-legitimacy-in-crimea/5294828, 03.03.2014.

51   Ukraine crisis: Does Russia have a case?, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26415508

52   Protesty w Moskwie i Petersburgu. Rosjanie wspierają Ukrainę, tvn24, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/protesty-w-moskwie-i-petersburgu-rosjanie-wspieraja-ukraine,403605.html, 02.03.2014.

way. Possible sanctions – political, economic or other – will have to be justified, even if they touch mainly ordinary Russians[53]. So, they must not enjoy the public support in the United States. Such views also strengthened the support for the current president. Therefore, social networks and forums in the U.S. were flooded with criticism of Russia, and even the Russian way of thinking.

How did the case of Germany and France look? It was much more stable and diplomatic. Russia is an important player in Europe, a potential ally in the political games of the EU and a balance to Washington. On the one hand, German media condemned the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, but on the other it constantly called for resolution of the dispute through diplomatic means[54]. The unofficial communications were pointing out that the Russians may have made the wrong actions, have acted too sharply. French politicians and journalists in unofficial communications have raised concerns about the peaceful future of Europe, indicating the importance of Russia for building a common, stable and secure future. One of the French political scientists pointed out even that Poland could be a potential next target of Russia, which can be read as a covered threat discouraging the escalation of the conflict by Warsaw, which is loyal to Washington[55]. Comments on the German and French internet forums were much more balanced, than the comments on the American or Polish forums.

53   D. Vink, What are economic sanctions and how would they affect the crisis in the Ukraine?, New Republic, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116908/definition-and-explanation-us-economic-sanctions-against-russia, 06.03.2014.

54   P. Wittrock, G. P. Schmitz, All Eyes on Merkel, Speigel, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/angela-merkel-plays-central-role-in-russia-diplomacy-over-crimea-a-956834.html, 04.03.2014

55   Francuski politolog Raphael Glucksmann: na celowniku Putina będą kraje bałtyckie i Polska, http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1356,title,Francuski-politolog-Raphael-Glucksmann-na-celowniku-Putina-beda-kraje-baltyckie-i-Polska,wid,16445974,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=112582&_ticrsn=3, 03.03.2014.

3. The general role of the media

Modern mass media are two inextricably linked different worlds that are interdependent, create and complement each other. They also destroy each other and force their own self-development. One world is the official media, such as television, radio, newspaper, or internet news sites. The second world is social networking, forums, various types of online messaging, even online games. The first world depicts a specific vision of the world. In the second world, this vision is discussed and evaluated. The second world creates thoughts that become facts. These facts are used by the first world. The symbiosis of these two worlds of mass media not only poses a question of how people perceive reality, but also how this reality is shaped.

The ability to influence people through these two worlds not only allows strategists to create a perception of the world, but also to influence the attitudes and assess behaviour, shape morality, indicate the difference between good and evil, what is right and what is reprehensible, direct thoughts and behaviour. Fortunately, thanks to the tremendous transfer of information in cyberspace and the diversity of mass media, it's not fully possible. Chaos of the information could be a threat on the one hand, but on the other, it could protect against a flow of information that is too explicit and targeted. However, this does not mean that efforts to influence people are not taken. The facts that this shaping does occur is seen in the example of the crisis in the Crimea. An information war is being waged on all fields of mass media, and it has entered a new phase, where all known techniques to influence and manipulate information – old and new – are being used. It can be presumed that work has already begun on shaping new techniques. Mass media can be dangerous, but it can also give shelter and be used for defence. The brave citizens of Ukraine did not fail to take advantage of this opportunity.

Picture One: *A man of two worlds of mass media – information's environment that shapes our reality.*

Conclusions

After the study it's possible to answer the questions raised by the research problems. Mass media is currently the best tool for manipulation of information and of any society that has access to any media. Mass media is the ideal mean of propaganda, especially against civilians. Thanks to the mass media it's possible to surround the target group with filtered information and block alternative information. This block also involves reducing the credibility of other, independent media. Today, the mass media can be used in two ways: through all agencies (radio, TV, press) and web portals, and through

social networking sites, forums and websites. As a result, mass media allows strategists and propagandists to completely informationally surround any group of civilians.

Russian news agencies and web portals had created the discourse, according to which Russia, unlike the NATO countries, acted in accordance with international law and ethics. This message was addressed to the population of Russia; it glorified the power of Russia, and also depicted the Moscow authorities as lawful and morally good. This message was not dedicated to the societies of the Western countries. For these societies a message was sent through social networking sites, forums and events, dedicated to the crisis in Ukraine. Russian specialists of information sought to lessen the public support for the activities of governments of NATO in the Ukraine.

The most important elements of the mechanism of mass media in the modern psychological operations are: TV, Radio, Press (both general and specialist), Web Information Portals, Blogs of famous people and institutions, Social Media, Chats, and Internet Forums. These elements have been used during Ukraine conflict, most of all to manipulate civilians living in the region of these events. These same means can be used with comparable success in any society that enjoys the benefits of mass media.

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MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU AND SAFETY OF POLAND IN THE PROGRAMS OF POLISH POLITICAL PARTIES

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ABSTRACT

Security is one of the most important issues of state policy. There-fore, political parties, competing for power in democratic elec-tions, cannot therefore ignore this problem in the preparation of their political agendas. The positions they present depend largely on their perceived risks in the external and internal state politics. Polish membership in the EU significantly influenced the posi-tion of Poland in the international arena, and therefore it is one of the most important factors shaping the safety of the country. It is, however, evaluated on the basis of the perception of the Union as a positive or negative factor. The analysed political programs show differences in the perception of the EU, and its impact on security and policy of the Polish state, both by the ruling and the opposition parties

Keywords: Political programs, political parties, security, European Union

Introduction

For almost 10 years, Polish political scene has been dominated by two competing right-wing parties: Civic Platform, and Law and Justice. They shape Polish politics by winning every election and form govern-ments in different coalition layouts. Other parties that permanently entered Polish political scene by exceeding the electoral threshold of

support, oscillating between 7-10%, are the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party. Further places are occupied by newly formed parties, arising from fractions of the dominant parties, like Your Movement (until recently Palikot's Movement) and the periodically appearing so-called political plankton[56], representing snap political rulers[57].

In the present study, the programs of all political parties currently registered in accordance with the Polish law, have been analysed, regardless of the role played by them: the ruling party or political plankton. Not only the content of the election programs, but also the ideological declarations, program thesis, "Proposals of elements of the program ..." and other program documents containing information on the political activities that a certain group intends to undertake once in power, that is, in fact the program of each political group, have been studied in this paper. The reaction of the party to the reality around it is changing. Because of that, only the latest programs have been taken into account.

1. State of Research

It should be noted that the theme of party programs does not enjoy excessive interest of researchers; however, the issue has already been addressed in Polish literature[58]. This issue has been considered in recent years both in terms of the relation of the party to

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56   Political plankton is a term created by the Polish operation, specifying extra-parliamentary parties, having no real impact on Polish politics, not participating in the elections, or gaining symbolic support (0.01-2%). See Kornaś T. Sieving plankton. *It's About Time*, No. 39, 2007, p. XI-XII.

57   The concept of starters appeared in the Polish press, under the rule of Law and Justice to specify smaller coalition (Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families), from which PiS gradually "took over" members and voters. To this day, a trace of this process is the cooperation of PiS with Radio Mary, originally associated with LPR. See Karnowski M., Zaremba P. Government Appetizers. *Newsweek Poland*, No. 13, 2006, p. 12-15.

58   In 2002 Xymena Bukowsko and Nicholas Cześnik wrote that "the analysis of election programs does not occupy the rightful place in Polish political science." Bukowska X., Cześnik M. Content Analysis Polish election programs of political parties, 1991-2001. In: The party system and electoral behavior. Decade of Polish experience, edited by Markowski R., Warsaw, 2002, p. 267.

the EU and safety. With a few exceptions[59], a whole series of causative works has been published[60]. The article of Marcin Płoski raises the issue that relatively little interest of Polish political parties is being paid to the question of national security. The same issue was discussed in the work of Arkadiusz Indraszczyk[61]. The common feature of these works is the restriction to the analysis of the programs of the most important political parties (that is, those which are represented in the Parliament) in Poland. Additionally, all authors focus only on the election programs.

2. Political parties and the way to communicate with voters

On the NEC website, there is a list of parties entered into the register of political parties, prepared according to information provided by the court[62]. Currently, the list consists of 77 reported parties. 72 of them are deemed active (activity is understood as minimally

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59 For example, the above mentioned work of X. Bukowska and M. Cześnik in which the authors are trying to find common features - the problems discussed in the programs of different parties, Ibid

60 Among others, one of the first articles related to the topic of the relation of political parties to the Polish membership in the United Europe by Anna Kordos should be mentioned here. On issues of Polish membership in the programs of political parties: Kordos A. Problems of Polish membership in the programs of political parties. *European Overview*, No. 2, 2002, p. 167-178 and Joanna Sidor Political parties on European integration which is based on analysis of political agendas. A whole series of works that discuss relationship of Polish parties to the European integration has been published by Anetta Grzesik- Robak: Grzesik-Robak A. Polish political parties towards European integration. *Scientific Papers of the Higher School of Economics and Innovation in Lublin*, No. 1, 2005, p. 26-34. These publications are based not only on party programs, but also on extensive analysis of political discourse, study of shorthand reports of public speeches or press interviews. Grzesik – Robak A. Strengthening or weakening of state sovereignty in the context of European integration according to some Polish political parties. *European Studies*, No. 1, 2007, p. 31-48, Grzesik – Robak A. The Constitutional Treaty for the European Union as a desirable act or threat to the nation-state in the opinion of some Polish political parties, *Athenaeum*, Vol. 18 (2007), p. 34-51, Grzesik – Robak A. Polish liberal parties against Polish integration with the European Community/ European Union, *World of Ideas and Policy*, Vol. 7, 2007, p. 127-144.

61 Płoski M. Issues of national security programs of the main political parties, *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Sociology*, No. 37, 2005, p. 65-70. Indraszczyk A. Issue of national security and international programs of Polish political parties, *Doctrine,* No. 5, 2008, p. 31-48.

62 http://pkw.gov.pl/wykaz-partii-politycznych/wykaz-partii-politycznych.html

supplying the financial statements)[63]. Other data indicate the CSO survey carried out in 2013 and published on 30.01.2014. According to GUS, in the course of the study 67 out of the 82 parties evidenced in 2012 have been confirmed as active[64]. However, the basis for such a conclusion is doubtful, as the study was based on a statistical survey, using the SOF-3 form and according to CSO, 56 parties have submitted completed forms[65].

Through their activity, parties exercise a lot of influence on public opinion. What is important is not only the form of action[66], but also the way the parties communicate with the public. Television and press play a crucial role in the election campaign, but the systematically increasing role of the Internet should not be overlooked[67]. Even though it is a difficult scope for actual activity, more than 76% of the parties (59 out of 77) have their own websites, by means of which they communicate with potential voters.

The websites provide information on the objectives and current activities of the party. They are the least expensive form of communication, and nowadays more and more voters derive information about candidates and groupings from the Internet.[68]

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63 Art. 38 par. 4 of the Act of 27 June 1997 on Political Parties (Journal of Laws of 2011 No. 155, item. 924). However, it should be noted that recently the National Electoral Commission Communication of 7 October 2013 on accepted and rejected reports of political parties about the sources of obtaining funds in 2012, refers to the 72 that made the report, out of the 83 parties entered into the register of political parties as at 31 December 2012.

64 Information Memo. Political parties in 2012, p. 1. http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/GS_partie_polityczne_2012.pdf 05.03.2014 godz. 21.52.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid, p. 2. That publication also lists the declared forms of activities, among which the most frequently mentioned included were: participation in public debate and conducting public education, for example by organizing press conferences, participation in TV and radio programs, conferences, seminars, publishing disseminating information about the party, organizing demonstrations and public gatherings, other forms of civic activity, such as writing letters or pinning ribbons , interventions for groups or individuals, the research, preparation of draft laws.

67 Dziegiec J. *The use of the Internet in election campaigns - local elections in 2006 in Krakow, in municipal elections in the context of media and politics*, edited by Magoska M. Krakow 2008, p. 113.

68 Babiel J. *How to win the election?,* p. 55, 90.

3. Party program

The statutory definition of a party does not include tools which can be used in order to gain power. However, the guide addressed to electoral candidates and the election staff treats the program as the major factor of influencing the electorate[69].

The importance of programs is also emphasized by researchers analysing ways of communication in politics: "(...) a political party preparing to take power should also be prepared to do well in terms of content. We are talking not only talking about "keeping in a drawer" ready draft legislation, but about having a coherent program based on the analysis of social, economic and international realities. Similar expectations should be addressed to the party remaining in opposition to the majority of the government, if it is to be a constructive opposition"[70].

The program, points program or other program documents are presented by mere 58% of parties (45 out of 77).

The date of creation or update of the program is also of vital importance. Unfortunately, most of them are not dated at all (See Appendix 1).

On closer inspection, it also appears that potential representation in parliament does not affect program updates, as the newest programs are of those parties that do not have their representatives in the parliamentary benches (See Appendix 2).

Of course we can ask the question how the date of developing a program influences the issues of our interest, which is the perception of the impact of EU membership on Polish security. The answer is simple: as time passes, the Polish geopolitical position changes, and changing alliances alter the risks for the country.

69   Ibid, p. 18.

70   Lewicki J. Intellectual and expert meeting of political parties in Poland. In: Sobolewska-Myślik K., Hess A., Kowalczyk K. *Polish political scene. Environment - political communication - strategies*, p. 121.

4. Safety and its types in party programs

Currently, security is not only a military issue. We distinguish, among others, between political, economic, social, cultural, and ecological securities[71]. In the view of this, the presented programs should be considered at numerous levels.

The problem of widely considered Polish security in the context of the EU has been mentioned in 51% of the published programs (23 out of 45). Many of these programs, however, do not have the date of publication, or come from even 10 years ago, which makes their arguments outdated in connection with contemporary reality.

Comparing the publication dates with the content of the programs that focuses on the questions of security, it can be concluded that most of the programs that ignore security issues are not dated. The oldest dated political programs also do not mention security. Security in the context of Polish membership in the EU appears at the time of Polish preparations for accession into the European Union and in the first years after it. After 2011, other problems come to the foreground, which was undoubtedly connected with the parliamentary elections in Poland carried out that year. In turn, the return of the security problem in the context of the EU is associated with the elections to the Europarliament (See Appendix 3).

Writing about the EU and safety associated with the Polish accession to the EU, the most important areas are political, economic and social security, while military, energy, cultural, public and environmental security remain in the background (See Appendix 4 and 10).

Differences in the perception of the EU affect the topics discussed in party programs and the discussed types of security. The programs

71   *Security in theory and research*, edited by Wisniewski B., Szczytno, 2011, p. 20-21.

on the parties that positive "attitude" towards European integration, are dominated by issues of economic, military and social security, while keeping almost equal proportions (there are respectively 25%, 20%, 20% party programs that mention those kinds of security). Subsequently, political and energetic security questions are discussed less (10% each) and public (8%), cultural (5%) and ecological (3%) security even less than that (See Appendix 5).

In the case of parties expressing negative opinions about European integration, 24% of the presented programs addressed problems of security of the political, economic and social development; 13% raised the issue of cultural safety, 8% of the programs addressed energy security, and public safety was covered in 5% of the programs, whereas military safety was only mentioned in 3%(See Appendix 6).[72]

Parliamentary representation also has an impact on the security types presented. Out of the five parliamentary parties, the program of the Polish Peasant Party is the only one that does not relate directly to the problem of the relationship between the Polish membership in the EU and the security of the country. Programs of the other parties discuss issues of political, military and economic security (23% each). Issues of energetic, social, public and cultural security are mentioned less. Ecological security has been omitted (See Appendix 7).

5. Features of the program assumptions on safety

Statistical treatment is difficult in the analysis of texts because of the ambiguity of some of the problems. Is for instance the purchase of land by foreigners a part of economic, cultural or social security? Is agricultural policy only an economic problem? Is the

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[72]   In statistical terms, the content of party programs is difficult to classify as far as PiS, Self-Defense and PPP are concerned, because of their ambiguous relationship to the EU. They are therefore included in both lists.

issue of state sovereignty only a political problem? Therefore, it is necessary to look closer at the content of individual programs in the field of security and the EU.

Party number 1: Improved Poland

The program mentions the EU in the context of its requirements to reduce carbon dioxide. For Poland it means abandoning the national resources, which can carry negative impact on the Polish economy and energy sector, as well as large social costs[73].

Party number 2: Polish National Rebirth

The party program calls for the immediate cessation of the integration process with the EU. It considers integration a threat to state sovereignty and conflates it with a desire to liquidate the Polish state[74].

Party number 3: Defence of the Polish Nation

It criticizes the ruling party and accuses it of manipulating information in order to obtain a positive result of the referendum of accession. It claims that the independence of the country is threatened, because of the experienced economic, political and social crisis. The primary aim of the ruling to join the EU is defined as "the biological extermination of the Polish nation."[75]

Party number 4: Organization of the Polish Nation – Polish League

The program consists primarily of a political critique of the parliament. The representatives of each party are accused of promoting the impoverishment of the broad masses and the "loss of political and economic sovereignty."[76]

73   http://www.lepszapolska.com/node/2 12.03.2014 godz. 20.53.

74   http://www.nop.org.pl/deklaracja-trzeciej-pozycji/ 12.03.2014 godz. 20.58.

75   http://www.samoobronanarodupolskiego.friko.pl/deklaracja.html12.03.2014 godz. 21.05.

76   http://www.skovron.kei.pl/onplp/info.php?id=tezy12.03.2014 godz. 21.13.

Party number 5: Democratic Party - demokraci.pl

This party proclaims that the EU should play a significant role in solving "humanitarian, political and security-related" problems and Poland within the EU can play an important role in strengthening Euro-Atlantic relations. It stresses the importance of active participation in building a common defence policy, especially using the possibility of an exchange of military technology in the EU. At the same time, the program mentions that in political cooperation within the EU should be strengthened for greater security[77].

Party number 6: Civic Platform of Polish Republic

This program states that the intention of the parties is to further promote the construction of a common defence policy and promote the expansion of the EU. This also applies to the development of cooperation in the field of crisis management and the promotion of Polish civilian employees and military positions in the structures of the EU[78].

Party number 7: Polish Left

This party proclaims the need of loyalty to the EU partners and building good relations with its neighbours, but it also promotes the withdrawal of Polish troops from the "international adventures" which include the mission in Afghanistan[79].

Party number 8: Polish Pirate Party

The Party calls for reform of the Union itself. It is proposed to strengthen the legislative authority - the European Parliament, at the expense of the executive - the European Commission. One of the allegations against the Union is the departure from the

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77 s. 35, http://www.demokraci.pl/files_multimedia/6/2009_09_27_13_56_27_materialy_programowe_pd.pdf.pdf12.03.2014 godz. 21.17.

78 s. 86-87, http://platforma.org/media/dokumenty/Program_PO_100dpi.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 21.21.

79 http://www.polskalewica.pl/index.php?view=article&catid=106%3Apolityka-gospodarcza&id=664%3Alewica&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=18212.03.2014 godz. 21.28.

principles of democratic and progressive surveillance of citizens, and acting to the detriment of citizens by limiting the growth resulting from patent law[80].

Party number 9: Polish Labour Party - August 80

This program states that Poland has an advantage in the European energy debate – the coal deposits – but this asset is used too little by the Polish authorities. The party supports the integration and efforts to build a "social Europe". (...) The introduction of a common EU employment policy, common labour standards (European minimum wage, the European Labour Code) and equal standards for all countries access to health and education"[81].

Party number 10: Polish Socialist Party

It uses the recommendations of the European Commission to promote co-operatives "as an important link in the social economy." It also stresses the importance of using the European funds to improve the situation of Polish agriculture. However, at all times the sovereignty of the country must be born in mind[82].

Party number 11: Polish Socialist Workers Party

According to the authors of the program, propaganda and psychological pressure pushed the Poles to vote in a referendum in favour of integration to the EU, which did not solve the problems of the Polish people, but created new ones. The party proclaims that economic relations with the EU are clearly unfavourable for the Polish people, resulting in multimillion-dollar trade deficit. It is also stated that the accession to the EU structures affects the Polish education and its level, despite the investment in school infrastructure[83].

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80   http://polskapartiapiratow.pl/program/ 12.03.2014 godz. 21.31.

81   http://www.partiapracy.pl/?skelMod=ModContent&aid=75&mmid=367   12.03.2014   godz. 21.33.

82   s. 16-19, http://issuu.com/ppspolska/docs/deklaracja_programowa_pps 12.03.2014 godz. 21.38.

83   http://www.pspr.republika.pl/12.03.2014 godz. 21.45.

Party number 12: Polish National Community

The Party proposes to adopt a new constitution, which would prevent the EU from imposing laws unfavourable to Poland and prevent the loss of state sovereignty. The new constitution would also be a mode of protection against expropriation of Poles and would ensure military security by increasing the number of Polish soldiers, as well as prevent the stationing of foreign troops on the territory of Poland. It is stated that the current constitution is used to reduce the number of Polish troops and promote the introduction of German and American troops on Polish territory[84].

Party number 13: The Right of the Republic

This program states that the EU can only promote the defence of the interests of all its members, provided that it acts in solidarity on foreign relations, especially in terms of economic relations with Russia. The EU should uphold the safety of all members and do not allow the isolation of smaller states. European policy should be national policy, not transnational, and therefore should strengthen institutions such as the European Parliament[85].

Party number 14: Law and Justice

This party stresses that Schengen has opened the borders, not abolished them. But allowing foreigners to purchase the Polish land can threaten Polish property. Poland should actively participate in the creation of the EU, but must keep in mind that the EU is an international organization and this should remain so. At the same time, the party supports the development of defence policy and military cooperation within the EU. It stresses that EU legislation should be in accordance with national law, not vice versa. Attempts to deepen cooperation by resigning from some Polish

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84   http://www.pwn.waw.pl/12.03.2014 godz. 21.49.

85   s. 11-12, http://prawicarzeczypospolitej.org/pobieranie/Silna_Polska_dla_cywilizacji_zycia-Zalozenia_polityki_Prawicy_Rzeczypospolitej.pdf12.03.2014 godz. 21.53.

demands must not be made. The Polish state should also refrain from certain arrangements in the framework of the EU economy for the better protection of the interests of the Polish people[86].

Party number 15: Self-Defence

Conditions of our membership in the EU do not meet the needs of reality. We agreed to integrate in violation of our economic interests, because the conditions of accession, such as payments to farmers are worse than the conditions laid down for the other Member States. Membership in the EU prevents us from preserving the internal market. Already since the signing of the Association Agreement, it has been proceeded to adjust Polish regulations to the EU regulations which, inter alia, led to the impoverishment of Polish society. The threat to Poland and the Polish is that it is also possible to acquire Polish land by foreigners. Estimating the cost of accession to the EU should also take into account the amount of the membership fee we will pay[87].

Party number 16: Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL)

SDPL is in favour of strengthening alliances and Polish activities in the international arena, including enhanced cooperation within the EU. It also says that Poland should participate in peacekeeping operations with the mandate of the EU, NATO or the UN, as unilateral action for peace is not effective[88].

Party number 17: Democratic Left Alliance

This program states that cooperation within the EU should be deepened, at the same time taking care of the balance of political and economic development in the countries of the EU, as it is necessary to cooperate in order to overcome the

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86   s. 58, 98-99, 151, 154, 157, 161 http://www.pis.org.pl/dokumenty.php 12.03.2014 godz. 21.59.

87   http://www.samoobrona.info.pl/pages/02b.Program/index.php?document=/489.program.html12.03.2014 godz. 22.09.

88   http://www.sdpl.pl/index.php/ida/116/12.03.2014 godz. 22.09.

economic crisis. This party also promotes increasing the powers of Parliament and the role of national parliaments in making EU law and also stresses the importance of creating a common financial policy and cooperation for the enhancement of operational capabilities in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy[89].

Party number 18: Democratic Party (SD)

SD advocates the transformation of the EU into a federation, the progressive construction of a common market in services and energy. It stated that membership in the EU gives the ability to leap through economic development and the building of the information society. It also promotes expanding the abilities of European countries in the field of defence and seeking cooperation with NATO[90].

Party number 19: Peasant Party ("Ojcowizna", RP)

This euro-sceptical party announces that the EU ideas on politics, economy and society have become bankrupt. Therefore, it promotes indoctrinating young people with universal values, prohibiting the sale of land to foreigners, and rebuilding family farms, which in turn will ensure food security for the country[91].

Party number 20: Your Move (Palikot's Movement)

These party states that the EU should seek to build a common market, especially in the energy sector, in order to guarantee the strategic security[92].

89   s. 81, http://www.sld.org.pl/public/ckfinder/userfiles/files/program_sld.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 22.15.

90   http://www.sd.pl/POLSKA%20JAKIEJ%20CHCEMY_program%20SD.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 22.22.

91   http://www.ojcowizna-stronnictwoludowe.pl/webespresso.php/PageId,182,lang,.html 12.03.2014 godz. 22.29.

92   http://twojruch.eu/sites/default/files/materialy/postulaty_srodek_druk.pdf 12.03.2014 godz.22.34.

Party number 21: Union Left

This party says that Polish security stems from the membership in the EU and NATO. In order to increase it the military security, the government should strive to complete the professionalization of the army[93].

Party number 22: Labour Union (UP)

This party promotes the strengthening of the position of the EU in the field of security and demonstrates greater concern for energy security. UP proposes the creation of a Common European Energy Policy. "The EU should lead efforts to peace and sustainable economic and social development in the world. (...) We propose to strengthen police, judicial and security cooperation, the fight against drug trafficking, crime and terrorism. Fight against terrorism should be a priority for the EU, but it must be compatible with the rule of law and cannot be associated with limiting fundamental freedoms"[94]

Party number 23: Green 2004

This party states that the EU institutions should be strengthened and the role of national parliaments in the process of EU law should be increased. The EU must strive for the coordination of economic and financial policy, employment policy and tax coordination. Common security should be based on non-military ways of solving conflicts[95].

6. The impact of the demands voiced in the Polish political life

Tracing the elections to be held in Poland in recent years shows that the majority of these parties did not take part in them, although this criterion does not show the real political activity.

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93   http://www.unia-lewicy.org/program/ 12.03.2014 godz. 22.39.

94   http://www.uniapracy.org.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66:program-wyborczy-koalicji-sld-up-&catid=11:program-wyborczy-partii-europejskich-socjalistow&Itemid=3 12.03.2014 godz. 22.44.

95   http://zieloni2004.pl/program_wyborczy.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 22.49.

Not participating in elections is not a result of solely apathy, but it mainly stems from the lack of support for their proclamations. Election Code requires the registration of electoral lists to collect an adequate number of signatures of persons residing in the constituencies[96], and it seems that these controversial announcements might prevent the party from collecting those signatures. The result is that these parties have a very low impact on the demands proclaimed by the majority of the political community in Poland.

Conclusions

The problem of Polish membership in the EU and its impact on Polish security is an important issue in the programs of Polish political parties, as evidenced by its presence not only in the programs of the ruling parties, but also of the so-called "political plankton". Types of security discussed in the programs are dependent on the view that the parties have on European integration. Lots of parties regard the integration to the EU as a threat to social, cultural or ecological security. In turn, military security is discussed almost exclusively in the context of the positive effects of the membership. The issue of the economy and whether Polish accession to the EU has improved its safety in this area is the most controversial question.

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96   Art. 83§ 1; art. 210. § 1; art. 343; art. 427 § 1; Art. 457. § 3; Art. 464; Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. - Kodeks wyborczy (Dz.U. 2011 nr 21 poz. 112).

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16. *Security in theory and research*, edited by Wisniewski B., Szczytno, 2011.

Party programs, websites and laws:

1. Kodeks wyborczy, Dz.U. 2011 nr 21 poz. 112.

2. The Act of 27 June 1997 on Political Parties. Journal of Laws, No. 155, item. 924, 2011.
3. http://pkw.gov.pl/wykaz-partii-politycznych/wykaz-partii-politycznych.html
4. Information Memo. Political parties in 2012, p. 1. http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/GS_partie_polityczne_2012.pdf 05.03.2014 godz. 21.52.
5. http://www.lepszapolska.com/node/2 12.03.2014 godz. 20.53.
6. http://www.nop.org.pl/deklaracja-trzeciej-pozycji/ 12.03.2014 godz. 20.58.
7. http://www.samoobronanarodupolskiego.friko.pl/deklaracja.html 12.03.2014 godz. 21.05.
8. http://www.skovron.kei.pl/onplp/info.php?id=tezy 12.03.2014 godz. 21.13.
9. http://www.demokraci.pl/files_multimedia/6/2009_09_27_13_56_27_materialy_programowe_pd.pdf.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 21.17.
10. http://platforma.org/media/dokumenty/Program_PO_100dpi.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 21.21.
11. http://www.polskalewica.pl/index.php?view=article&catid=106%3Apolityka-gospodarcza&id=664%3Alewica&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=182 12.03.2014 godz. 21.28.
12. http://polskapartiapiratow.pl/program/ 12.03.2014 godz. 21.31.
13. http://www.partiapracy.pl/?skelMod=ModContent&aid=75&mmid=367 12.03.2014 godz. 21.33.
14. s. 16-19, http://issuu.com/ppspolska/docs/deklaracja_programowa_pps 12.03.2014 godz. 21.38.
15. http://www.pspr.republika.pl/ 12.03.2014 godz. 21.45.
16. http://www.pwn.waw.pl/ 12.03.2014 godz. 21.49.
17. http://prawicarzeczypospolitej.org/pobieranie/Silna_Polska_dla_cywilizacji_zycia-Zalozenia_polityki_Prawicy_Rzeczypospolitej.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 21.53.
18. http://www.pis.org.pl/dokumenty.php 12.03.2014 godz. 21.59.
19. http://www.samoobrona.info.pl/pages/02b.Program/index.php?document=/489.program.html 12.03.2014 godz. 22.09.
20. http://www.sdpl.pl/index.php/ida/116/ 12.03.2014 godz. 22.09.
21. http://www.sld.org.pl/public/ckfinder/userfiles/files/program_sld.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 22.15.
22. http://www.sd.pl/POLSKA%20JAKIEJ%20CHCEMY_program%20SD.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 22.22.
23. http://www.ojcowizna-stronnictwoludowe.pl/webespresso.php/PageId,182,lang,.html 12.03.2014 godz. 22.29.
24. http://twojruch.eu/sites/default/files/materialy/postulaty_srodek_druk.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 22.34.
25. http://www.unia-lewicy.org/program/ 12.03.2014 godz. 22.39.
26. http://www.uniapracy.org.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66:program-wyborczy-koalicji-sld-up-&catid=11:program-wyborczy-partii-europejskich-socjalistow&Itemid=3 12.03.2014 godz. 22.44
27. http://zieloni2004.pl/program_wyborczy.pdf 12.03.2014 godz. 22.49.

Appendix 1
The date of creation or update of the program

■	Shortage
	2014
	2013
	2012
	2011
	2010
	2009
	2008
	2007
	2005
	2002
	1999

Appendix 2
Parties having the latest political programs and their representation in the Parliament

Nazwa partii – Party	Data opracowania programu – program published	Reprezentacja w sejmie – represented in parliament
Krajowa Partia Emerytów i Rencistów	2014	No
Polska Partia Piratów	2014	No
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	2014	No
Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe	2014	No
Partia Emerytów Rencistów Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej	2013	No
Unia Polskich Ugrupowań Monarchistycznych	2013	No

Appendix 3

■ Programs that do not contain information about safety in the context of the EU

■ Programs containing information about safety in the context of the Polish EU

Appendix 4
Types of security in party programs

- ■ political
- military
- social
- ▦ public
- cultural
- environmental
- economic
- energy

Appendix 5
Types of security discussed in party programs expressing positive
opinions on the EU

political
military
social
public
cultural
environmental
economic
energy

Appendix 6
Types of security discussed in party programs expressing negative
opinions about the EU

political
military
social
public
cultural
environmental
economic
energy

Appendix 7
Types of security disscused in party programs with parliamentary
representation

Legend:
- political
- military
- social
- public
- cultural
- environmental
- economic
- energy

PROCESSES OF EUROPEANIZATION IN THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

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ABSTRACT

Numerous scientific publications and documents published by certain Institutions of the European Union made a lot of references to the phenomenon of Europeanization. Undoubtedly, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its executive form of the Common Security and Defence Policy are public policies of the European Union, which are subjected to quite a wide process of Europeanization as a result of actions of different interest groups.

The aim of this article is to analyse the processes of the Europeanization that happen inside the European Union. An appearing research problem is defining a role and meaning of the processes of Europeanization in Common Foreign and Security Policy. In particular, the author endeavours to show the positions of different research approaches (used in safety studies) on the issue of Europeanization of the policy. A research hypothesis is based on an assumption that even though there is a strong element of inter-governmentalism in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, this policy also is influenced by widely spread processes of Europeanization, particularly in the so-called "light instruments[97].

Introduction

Recently, in public discourse, numerous scientific publications and documents published by certain Institutions of the European

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97   I mean the Open Method of Coordination, etc.

Union, there have been a lot of references to the phenomenon of Europeanization. Undoubtedly, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its executive form of the Common Security and Defence Policy are public policies of the European Union, which are subjected to quite a wide process of Europeanization as a result of actions of different interest groups. Europeanization uses a top-down or bottom-up approach, and also quite often an ad-extra one. The European Union tries (by means of light methods) to influence member states which consequently introduce processes of Europeanization to their actions. It also works the other way round – member states influence processes of Europeanization happening in the European Union. Therefore, it can be said that these actions have a nature of a voluntary isoformism.

The aim of this article is to analyse the processes of the Europeanization that happen inside the European Union. An appearing research problem is defining a role and meaning of the processes of Europeanization in Common Foreign and Security Policy. In particular, the author endeavours to show the positions of different research approaches (used in safety studies) on the issue of Europeanization of the policy. A research hypothesis is based on an assumption that even though there is a strong element of inter-governmentalism in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, this policy also is influenced by widely spread processes of Europeanization, particularly in the so-called "light instruments[98].

1. The Common Foreign and Security Policy in scientific theories– an attempt of Europeanization

In the case of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, three research models were to indicate the way the European Union attempts to ensure its security, independence and influence. The realistic school's views, which relate to the project of the European

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98   I mean the Open Method of Coordination, etc.

integration quite sceptically, are referred to. What is more, its representatives claim that international organizations are not essential subjects of international relations[99]. Therefore, a phenomenon of ignorance of the European Union as an actor of international reality can be easily observed. There are also assumptions that the European Union is a faint organization in case of its meaning for a political cooperation, because conflicts of interests between countries limit the mentioned cooperation, even despite an existence of some kind of interests' convergence[100].

Realists come to a conclusion that the European Union did not achieve any significant improvement in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy. International relations are controlled by a so called security dilemma, based on a fact that actions directed at increasing security of one country cause a decrease of a sense of security in other member states. In this situation the remaining states, while seeing their partner's actions, accept an assumption of the worst possible scenario for them[101].

A similar thesis is spread by neo-realists, who do not believe in a possibility that the European Union could make significant changes and reforms of the common defence policy. A representative of the neo-realists' school is K. Waltz, who assumes that Europe is not able to produce a sufficient safety and defence policy, because as an international organization it can only do what is allowed by member states. Consequently, this makes it impossible to undertake any risky and doubtful actions[102].

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99   Łoś-Nowak T., Paradygmat realistyczny – projekcje porządku międzynarodowego w XXI wieku, in: Kuźniar R. (red.) *Porządek międzynarodowy u progu XXI wieku*, Warsaw, 2005, p. 21; See also: Baldwin D. A. *Power and institutional Relations,* in: Carlsneas W., Risse T., Simmons B. A. (red.) *Handbook of International Relations.* London, 2002, p. 177–178; Williams P. D. *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*. Krakow, 2012, p. 15–18.

100   Compare: Williams P. D. *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, *op. cit*., p. 17.

101   Czaputowicz J. Bezpieczeństwo w teoriach stosunków międzynarodowych in: Żukrowska K., Grącik M. (red.) *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka*, Warsaw, 2006, p. 49–51.

102   Waltz K. Intimations of Multipolarity in: Hansen B., Heurlin B. (red.) *The New World Order. Contracting Theories*. Macmillan, 2002, p. 3–4.

Despite possessing the abilities in a form of appropriate resources and also a strong economy, the European Union does not have the collective will to actualize the defence policy. K. Waltz claims that this situation is to some extent a result of the Cold War, during which fear of Soviet domination did not allow Europe to create an efficient defence policy. The view remains similar nowadays. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the defence of the European Union will always stay in the shadow of NATO, which is the main forum for actions of a military nature[103].

A similar thesis is proposed by another representative of the neo-realists' school, J. D. Mearsheimer. He assumes that a military presence of the USA on the European continent holds back countries such as France or Germany from confrontation. Mearsheimer claims also that if the USA left Europe, France and Germany would start to fight for influence, which could lead to a cold war and maybe even to an open conflict. According to the above, the presence of the USA in Europe is some kind of a guarantee for the Old Continent[104]. According to J. D. Mearsheimer, one of the principles of functioning of the European Union is a policy of force and more particularly – the presence of military force of the USA on the continent. That force made it possible for the European Union to develop its economic side.

To sum up, neo-realists reject a possibility of a future development and emancipation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, because they assume that it may work as an element or a supplement of the North Atlantic Treaty[105].

Another approach which is helpful in the studies of the processes happening in defence policy is institutionalism. It is based on an assumption that member states join an international

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103   *Ibid.*

104   Mearsheimer J. D. Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War. *The Atlantic*, November 1990, p. 24–49.

105   Łoś-Nowak T. *Paradygmat realistycznych...*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

organization due to a variety of benefits[106]. Therefore, scholars representing institutionalism perceive European integration as a process based on a systematic growth of power, authorization and jurisdiction of transnational institutions, which is also supposed to be followed by a limitation of autonomy, as well as a decrease of exclusive competence of the member states. They reject a vision of peace based on equilibrium of forces and they believe in an assumption that institutions of collective security create some value added in relation to a totality of military potentials of its members[107].

Representatives of institutionalism claim that a change in balance of power after the Cold War caused a situation that forces the countries to fight the limitations associated with their territoriality and actively cooperate to widen a zone of influence, security and political stabilization[108].

What is more, they also assume that countries of the European Union will gradually spread their sovereignty (shared among them) and *ipso facto* lead to internal tensions between members. Consequently, it would lead to a decisive paralysis and an inability of the European Union to take a quick and effective action. In this situation some roles will be assigned to the USA and the European Union[109]. The USA would feel confident in situations requiring quick and determined military actions, while the European Union would take care of negotiations and consensus. According to the above, in order to quiet down the mutual

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106 Particularly, these benefits are: joining a cooperative system of conflicts' solving, increasing of possibilities of a force projection, decreasing of transactional costs; see: Simmons B. A., Martin L. L. *International Organizations and Institutions*; Williams P. D. *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, *op. cit.*, p. 39–40.

107 Keohane R. Ironies of Sovereignty. The European Union and United States. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* no. 40, November 2002, p. 743-745.

108 *Ibid.* p. 746.

109 Williams D. *Studia Bezpieczeństwa*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

animosities between the USA and the European Union, a perfect solution would be to divide certain roles on the European continent[110].

As it can be seen, the realistic theory explains a slow development in a field of defence of the European Union and its member states. The neo-realistic approach provides knowledge about a national balance of power, which can reveal itself in various forms and create a completely different view of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Institutionalism shows a lot of essential and also new tools that can be used in studying contemporary international security.

However, in the author's opinion none of the presented theories explain the phenomenon of the Common Security and Defence Policy in a complex and complete way. It results from the fact that origins and development of the Common Security and Defence Policy are heterogenic processes, happening on many surfaces and involving multiple subjects. Their final shape is a derivative of many different factors.

However, a thesis can be risked that a development of the Common Security and Defence Policy is conditioned by the dynamics of two competing trends: an aspiration to protect sovereignty as well as to maximize their influence from the side of certain member states and efforts to build a collective security system, based on a respect of international law. The most useful theories for a depiction of these processes are the realistic and neo-realistic ones. Institutionalism can be very helpful as well.

As shown by history, an idea of common defence in a declarative level has already been a subject of interest right after the Second World War. However, the domination of the Soviet Union and the bipolar division of Europe (or the world) did not allow for making the idea real. Although there have been initiatives

110   Keohane R. *Ironies of Sovereignty...*, *op. cit.*, p. 759.

in the form of the European Defence Community or the Western European Union, but in the first case it has been rejected by France[111] and the second one was perceived mostly like a lifeless idea based on declarative aspects rather than specific actions[112]. Despite that, they have given a reason for further alterations in the foreign and defence policy field.

Essential changes were made after 1990, when the bipolar political block slowly started to disintegrate and the Cold War ended. That moment, together with circumstances in Yugoslavia, caused a situation where Europe had to deal with its responsibility for the fate of the Old Continent. Due to these situations, in 1992 the Common Foreign and Security Policy was incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty. In spite of it, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has remained inefficient.

A forthcoming meeting of the European Council in Amsterdam was supposed to solve a problem of ineffective European politics in a field of security and defence. Finally, on the 15th and the 16th of June 1997 heads of states and member states' governments have reached an agreement concerning a novelization of the Maastricht Treaty and problem solving of security policy[113].

In the Treaty of Amsterdam it was emphasized that the European Union will create tighter connections with the Western European Union[114]. Moreover, it was assumed that the WEU is not only an integral element of the European Union and supports the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but it will also have an

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111   Fursdon E. *The European Defence Community*: *A History*, London 1980, p. 26–28.

112   Szyjko C. T., Ślusarczyk Z. 50-lecie EWG: studium prawno-historyczne, "Studia Prawnicze Ius et Praxis" 02 [03]07, Cywilizacja. Europa. Globalizacja, Warsaw, 2007*, Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji*, p. 19–27.

113   Miszczak K. Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa a rozwój Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. *Polska w Europie*, No. 2 (44), 2003, p. 12–13.

114   Capik A., Kuźniak B. *Traktat Amsterdamski – Komentarz*. Krakow, 2001, p. 7 and subsequent.

operational ability that is essential for fulfilling Petersburg missions[115]. The Petersburg missions have been included in the Amsterdam Treaty, which meant that the Union will be concerned with their realizations.

During an unofficial meeting of the state heads of the European Union in Pörtschach on the 24th and the 25th of October 1998, Tony Blair declared that the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union cannot remain in the present shape anymore[116]. He claimed that a European military capacity should be created, which would make it possible for member states of the European Union to jointly lead peacekeeping operations, especially military ones, which aim to maintain the peace[117].

Finally, in the autumn of 1998, the European Union was functionally associated with the Western European Union and a new episode started – the episode of a discussion on the development of European military capacity, aiming to secure strategic interests of Europe by equipping it in such military capacity, which would enable more independent actions, especially in situations when the USA will not be able to or for some reason will not want to interfere[118].

Slowly, a consensus on the defence policy of the European Union has started to appear[119]. Three largest and most significant European countries: Great Britain, France and Germany - agreed to the strengthening of the CFSP. However, France and Germany still preferred implementing the European Union into their own operational capacity by incorporating the WEU to the EU, while Great

115 *Ibidem.*

116 Zięba R. Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. Geneza i założenia, *Przegląd Europejski* no. 1, 2003, p. 32–33.

117 Zięba R. *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*. Warsaw, 2005, p. 38.

118   Starzyk J. *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*. Warsaw, 2003, p. 164.

119 Zięba R. *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. Geneza i założenia, ed. cit.*, p. 33.

Britain was more willing to create a separate pillar in the North Atlantic Treaty, from which the European Union could draw. A culmination of disputes happened at a meeting that took place in Cologne on the 3rd and the 4th of June 1999[120], which also ended the German Presidency. It introduced a new subject: "European policy in a field of security and defence"[121].

What is more, in Cologne the Declaration of the European Council on strengthening of the common European policy in a field of security and defence was also accepted. The declaration included intentions to transfer to the Union's Council a task of decision making in a range of conflicts' prevention and crisis management operations, meaning the Petersburg tasks[122].

Therefore, the General Affairs Council was obliged to prepare appropriate decisions and resources (including the specification of accepting operational functions of the WEU by the European Union), indispensable for acting on the Petersburg tasks. Creation of the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff Committee has been announced for a purpose practically implementing the European Security and Defence Policy[123]. The WEU transferred its competences and institutions to the European Union. These were the Satellite Centre in Torrejon and the Institute for Security Studies in Paris[124].

An official proclamation of the Common Security and Defence Policy happened six months later on a meeting in Helsinki on the 10th and the 11th of December 1999[125]. The Helsinki Headline Goal[126] was specified there – it implied a creation (until the end

120 More: Miszczak K. *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa…*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

121 Zięba R. *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony; Geneza i założenia, ed. cit.*, p. 37.

122 Zięba R. *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej.* Warsaw, 2007, p. 86.

123 *Idem*, *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obron.* Warsaw, 2005, p. 49.

124 Czaputowicz J. Instytucjonalizacja Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. *Polska w Europie*, No. 2, 2003 (44), p. 57.

125 Zięba R. *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, op. cit.*, p. 87.

126 *Ibidem*, p. 88.

of year 2003) of military forces in size of 50-60 thousand soldiers, being able to collocate in 60 days and to lead any operations like Petersburg missions for at least one year. These forces were also supposed to have aviation and navy components. It was also decided to develop common command, control, intelligence and strategic transport systems, as well as cooperation in armament and supplying the army with military equipment[127]. Moreover, it has been agreed to use existing procedures of defence planning, including procedures of NATO and the Partnership for Peace.

A supplement of these preparations for the EU to perform the Petersburg tasks was the creation of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management[128]. It was done on a meeting of the European Council in Feira, in June 2000. Police and the member states' administrative staff were included in the civilian structures[129].

Autonomy of the European Union in the Common Security and Defence Policy has been confirmed in the Treaty of Nice, signed on the 15th of February 2001.

During the ratification processes of the Treaty of Nice, further aims of security and defence policy of the European Union have been accepted. It was decided to create a group of about 200 experts in order to create a widely understood lawful system, a group of civilian experts in the field of administration and a unit of 2000 people for dealing with protection from any kinds of cataclysms. Work on the procedures had also started. It needs to be emphasized that the process of consolidating the Common Security and Defence Policy did not proceed without disruptions. The EU's position was strongly criticized by Turkey, which was going to participate in building the European safety structure; however, thanks to mediation of the Great Britain the conflict had been resolved[130].

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127 Zięba R. *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony; Geneza i założenia*, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

128 Zięba R. *Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obron*. Warszawa, 2005, p. 49.

129 Miszczak K. *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa…*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

130 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

The Treaty of Nice from the 1st of February 2003 has both strengthened and developed operative components of the Common Security and Defence Policy as a practically independent project of the European Union. Since then, the European Union could independently define all fields in a range of security and foreign politics. Unfortunately, some discrepancies concerning defence policy appeared. They "smeared" the military component of the common protection concept, while not defining its final form. The Common Security and Defence Policy was a subject of disputes of the appointed Convent and their records were included in the Project of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe. Due to its rejection and coming to existence as the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, regulations concerning the policy can be found in this document.

As a result, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been strengthened by creating the European policy of security and defence, which has been renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy due to regulations in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. What is more, its pillar structure has been liquidated and new institutions have been appointed for the purpose of improving the functioning of the security and defence policy of the European Union.

The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union introduced the institutions of a solidarity clause, common defence, a rule of constructive abstaining from voting. Quite a significant emphasis was put on solutions promoting a convergence of member politics in the CFSP field[131].

What is more, the Treaty of Lisbon also standardized a system of lawful acts, introduced a "double-hat" of a high representative,

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131   It was about establishing a strengthened cooperation in a field of foreign policy and a constant structural cooperation in defense, activity of the European Defence Agency, a duty of a mutual consultation.

standardized and simplified a decision process and strengthened a representation of the European Union thanks to institutions' establishments of the lasting president of the European Council and high representative of the Union for foreign and security policy. It also introduced the External Action Service of the European Union.

Summary– conclusions for Poland

The European Union is contemporarily immersed in an economic crisis, which basically touched all its states. Thus, an issue of the Common Security and Defence Policy[132] is not actively explored in literature or discourse. These problems were pushed to the side and are not presently in the interest field of the European Union.

Leaders of member states, especially these quarterback ones (France, Germany), wonder how to resolve a problem of the crisis and they do not pay attention to the defence policy, although it is very important. It is even evidenced by a fact of placing it in Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy for years 2012-2016[133].

Despite this, Europeanization, the CFSP and the CSDP have led to a situation, where the Republic of Poland, as a member of the European Union, takes an active part in forming the policies and administers a significant voice co-deciding about their further shape. If the processes of Europeanization failed, Poland would never have any influence on security and defence policy.

Participation in the CFSP and the CSDP forces Poland to bear financial, human and political costs of Polish army soldiers taking part in missions lead by the European Union. It seems that a perspective of achieving a real independence of European Union's defence policy is quite far away, especially while using an institutional or realistic approach. It is still unknown if it will ever come true.

132   The Common Foreign and Security Policy.

133   *Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012–2016*. Warsaw, 2012, p. 15–16.

If it was ensured sure that the European Union will achieve a technical operational ability via creating strong European intervention forces, the rule of solidarity would not work. Member states will not be willing to use them. This lack of will is caused by the lack of effective political leadership in the European Union, diverse preferences and priorities of the member states. Besides, institutionalists claim the Union is characterized by a deep pacifism, which can significantly decrease the chances of using intervention forces, even if they are created. According to that, the most possible scenario of the further development of the CSDP would be a tight cooperation and also acting together with the USA or a gradual empowerment of the CSDP, because autonomic defence policy lead by the European Union would be characterized by higher level of political legitimization than the North Atlantic Treaty.

Nonetheless, it should be noticed that this empowerment will proceed very slowly. According to the above, at present and in future years NATO will be a fundamental tool of collective defence of member states, including Poland.

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HOW THE DEBATE OVER THE NATURE OF EUROPEAN UNION POLITY FEATURES IN THE EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS: A VIEW FROM TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

The range of ideas and "European" values shared by Turkish political elites is analyzed taking into consideration behavioural aspects of "being European". Traditions of justifying European-level institutions are studied within context of EU enlargement. The official discourse of Turkey is presented with regards to the three legitimating criteria of the EU. Differences between the EU and Turkish conceptions of the Union as well as the prospects of Turkey joining it have been discussed.

Keywords: EU enlargement, Turkey

Introduction

Since the beginning of the European integration process in the 1950's the European elites have been trying to define, what the European-level polity *is* or *ought to be*. Political scientists analysing this particular segment of elite discourse have identified various sources of legitimation and justification for European level of governance – ranging from 1) the constitutional input of European citizens to 2) the economic output of the single European market to 3) the consolidation of historical European heritage and identity. Depending on how each of these sources of legitimation relates to the idea of statehood, it may translate into a vision of European federal superstate, of intergovernmental cooperation between

nation-states, or an idea of post-national polity and economy[134]. More importantly, however, on a conceptual level this constructs the EU as either 1) a political community of *all-inclusive* civic participation under the rule of law, 2) an economic community of *diffuse* material benefits, or 3) a cultural community of *particular* historical experience and *exclusive* markers of identification. This debate has a clear-cut effect on the on-going process of EU enlargement. The formal membership criteria set forth by the EU[135], which any aspiring country has to satisfy, include the similarity of political and economic systems of the aspirant and the member states, but do not explicitly envision similarities between any other social institutions and cultural practices. In the eyes of the candidates, this constructs the EU as a community of economic gains and civic-legal rights, both features being *universally* obtainable and applicable. Based on this interpretation of what EU membership entails and a continuous reflection of many countries joining the EU over the past two decades, the political elite of Turkey has developed a genuine belief that it is eligible for membership in this community. Since no particular features that are historically contingent and *not* universally obtainable – e.g., race, cultural heritage, or religion – are part of this formal membership 'code', Turkey feels it has the moral 'right' to be accepted as a full member as soon as its polity and economy parallel those of a typical EU member. At the same time, the EU is attributed 'a duty' or 'an obligation' to accept Turkey. These findings are based on a number of semi-structured elite interviews conducted over the course of year 2013 in Ankara, as well as the analysis of public speeches by top state officials of Turkey.

134   See, for example: Diez T., Jachtenfuchs M., Jung S. Which Europe? Conflicting Models of a Legitimate European Political Order. *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 4, No. 4, 1998, p. 409-445.

135   Copenhagen European Council, 21-23 June 1993. Conclusions of the Presidency. *The Bulletin of the European Communities.* No. 6, 1993, p. 13.

The paper is organized into three sections. First, the existing literature on the EU legitimating discourse is reviewed and three ideal models of reference are presented. Second, three traditions of justifying European-level institutions are analysed in the context of EU enlargement. In the final section the official discourse of Turkey is presented with regards to the three legitimating criteria of the EU. This leads to a conclusion about the differences between the EU and Turkish conceptions of the Union, as well as the prospects of Turkey joining it.

1. The Traditional *raison d'être* for European-Level Institutions in Member States' Discourse

Although the European demos may still be in its embryo state and an average EU citizen weakly identifies with the European level institutions[136], political scientists nonetheless take a great interest in the basis on which the Euro-polity is legitimated. The existing literature on the justification/rationalization of EU polity mostly deals with the elite discourse as an object of study. Given that European-level governance was (and to a large extent *still* is) an elite project, common notions shared by European leaders is what matters at the end of the day. Over the last 10 to 15 years EU scholars of the social constructivist bent – like Thomas Diez[137], Vivien A. Schmidt[138], Helen

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136   On European identity formation in the context of EU institutions see: Herrmann R., Risse T., Brewer M. B. (eds.). *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

137   Diez *et. al.*, Op. cit.; Diez T. International Ethics and European Integration: Federal State or Network Horizon? *Alternatives,* Vol. 23, No. 3, 1997, p. 287-312; Diez T. Europe as a Discursive Battleground: Discourse Analysis and European Integration Studies. *Cooperation and Conflict,* Vol. 36, No. 1, 2001, p. 5-38.

138   Schmidt V. A. European Elites on the European Union: What Vision for the Future? In: Gamble A., Lane D. (eds.) *The European Union and World Politics: Consensus and Division.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 257-273; Schmidt V. A. European Member State Elites' Diverging Visions of the European Union: Diverging Differently since the Economic Crisis and the Libyan Intervention? *Journal of European Integration,* Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 169-190.

Sjursen[139], and Erik O. Eriksen[140] – have come up with (at least) three ideal models that recursively feature in the European elite discourse and serve as a basis of justification for any new step in European integration. They are usually called 1) the problem-solving, 2) the value-preserving, and 3) the rights-based models. Within the problem-solving/pragmatic discourse, the EU is largely equated with the Common Market and legitimated in terms of economic outcomes that a larger market can facilitate. There are hardly any collective interests and goals, only national interests of the member states and cross-border businesses; the European-level rules and institutions are seen as a necessary 'Leviathan' that ensures long-term benefits for all participants of the Common Market. By contrast, the value-laden discourse of European integration entrusts the EU with preserving the supposedly unique European way of life. Proponents of this model are generally prone to use historical arguments and draw much clearer boundaries of the Union on the basis of religious and cultural background. Lastly, the cosmopolitan discourse of equal rights and constitutional patriotism envisions the EU as an arena for democratic deliberation and civic participation. Its purpose is to preserve *universal* principles of justice and equality rather than a historically contingent collective European identity (see: table 1).

The problem-solving (or utility-maximizing) model of market Europe is typically featuring in the discourse of the United Kingdom, Nordic and Central Eastern European countries, and to a lesser extent also Ireland, whereas value-based arguments are more often used by Germany, France, and on a lesser scale the other four founding members of the EEC. The cosmopolitan rights-based discourse is mostly reproduced by the European Commission as well as some prominent figures within the

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139　Sjursen H. (ed.). *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity*. New York, London: Routledge, 2006; Sjursen H., Smith K. E. Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement. In: Tonra B., Christiansen T. (eds.) *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*. Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 126-141.

140　Eriksen E. O., Fossum J. E. Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed. *International Political Science Review,* Vol. 25, No. 4, 2004, p. 435-459.

European academic elite (e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck)[141]. However, the three modes of justification are all sustained in parallel with each other and always present within the debates on European integration; the debates on European Constitution from 2001 to 2005 are the best example of all three, as the analysis of Erik Eriksen and John Erik Fossum shows[142].

Table 1. Ideal models of the EU within the European elite discourse

Type of entity	Type of discourse	Logic of integration / conception of rationality	Indicator	Base of legitimacy
Problem-solving	Pragmatic	Instrumental (logic of consequentiality)	Utility	Pareto-efficiency
Value-based	Ethical-political	Contextual / communitarian (logic of appropriateness)	Values	Collective self-understanding
Rights-based	Moral (universalistic)	Communicative (logic of justification)	Rights and equality before the law	Justice and fairness

Sources: Sjursen H. (ed.). *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity*. New York, London: Routledge, 2006, p. 10; Eriksen E., Fossum J. Europe in Search of Legitimacy // *International Political Science Review,* 2004, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 438.

2. Logical Implications of Internal Legitimating Discourse on the Process of EU Enlargement

According to Vivien Schmidt, 'the pragmatic discourse of a borderless free market and security area, and the normative discourse of a bordered values-based community <...> can be summed up in terms of the perennial "widening vs. deepening" debate about

141   Schmidt, 2012, Op. cit., p. 170; Schmidt, 2009, Op. cit., p. 259-267.

142   Eriksen E., Fossum, Op. cit., p. 448-454.

the nature and scope of the EU'[143]. In other words, more often than not the marginal utility can be raised by expanding the free market and including new member states into the economic and monetary union. If, however, the European Union is considered to be more than just free market and is attributed the mission of preserving the historical European values, the enlargement must stop 'at the borders of Turkey', to quote former French President Nicolas Sarkozy[144]. The three aforementioned discourses of legitimation within the EU translate into three different types of criteria for including new members. Membership in the 'market Europe' requires first and foremost market institutions – protection of private property, unrestricted trade and investment – so that economic gains from enlargement could be maximized. This requirement is fully stipulated as the so-called economic Copenhagen criteria[145]. The development of rights-based Union in turn requires the rule of law and consolidated democratic institutions: free association, free self-expression, and political (parliamentary) representation. Such attributes are unequivocally mentioned among the Copenhagen political criteria[146]. However, very often the old members of the EU – especially, as mentioned above, the founding members of European Economic Community – stress the 'thick' cultural and historical background as a prerequisite of membership in this organization. In his famous 'Europe speech' in Strasbourg on 2 July, 2007 French President explicitly stated that:

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143   Schmidt, 2012, Op. cit., p. 172-173.

144   Quoted in: Schmidt, 2009, Op. cit., p. 264. See also: Yilmaz H. Turkish Identity on the Road to the EU: Basic Elements of French and German Oppositional Discourses. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,* Vol. 9, No. 3, 2007,p. 293-305.

145   European Commission. Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union. *The Bulletin of the European Union*. Supplement 5/97, p. 42.

146   European Commission. Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union. *The Bulletin of the European Union*. Supplement 5/97, p. 40-41.

Europe isn't only the currency, it isn't only budgetary discipline, it isn't only competition law <...>. Europe is a civilization project. <...> [T]he Europe of civilization and culture is a legacy going back many centuries, while European man has been a reality for a very long time.[147]

Even the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso admitted in one of his speeches:

The undeniable truth that a European Union of culture preceded and nurtured the economic and political European Union that we know today. <...> If finally, over the last sixty years, we have succeeded in uniting our countries on solid economic and institutional foundations, and if it happens, it is because the Union was buttressed by the existence of an underlying fundamental unity; the cultural kinship shared by Europeans. For, in its very essence, our Union is both a political and – let's not be afraid to say it – a cultural project.[148]

Some EU leaders were as bold as to explicitly include cultural-historical kinship among the criteria for accession to the Union. For instance, former President of the European Parliament Nicole Fontaine, while addressing the Helsinki European Council on 10 December 1999, stated the following:

[The] Parliament considers it essential without further ado to identify and prepare for the economic and even democratic requirements which applicant countries must meet and which will enable the Union itself to control and make a success of an ambitious

147 Sarkozy N. Speech at the Meeting on Europe, Strasbourg. 2 July, 2007 (Available at: http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-Strasbourg).

148 Barroso J. M. Culture: The Cement that Binds Europe Together. Speech at the 'Opera Europa' RESEO Spring Conference, Vienna. 4 April, 2013 (Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-280_en.htm).

enlargement without diluting its cohesion, identity, solidarity or powers of decision. And among these conditions, cultural integration is an aspect which should not be underestimated.[149]

Nonetheless, at the present moment, the assessment of any candidate's progress towards fulfilling the membership criteria does not take into account the cultural background. The candidates are officially only required to comply with the economic and political Copenhagen criteria, as well as transpose the EU acquis into their national law. Thus whereas officially the EU identity is *all-inclusive* and based on performance of the nation-states (their governments) and the society at large, in practice it is also *exclusive* and based on the origins and cultural background of the nation in question[150].

3. The Implications of Values-Based Discourse on Turkey's Accession to the EU

The Republic of Turkey had an association agreement with the European Communities since 1963 but only applied for full membership in 1987. From 1982 to 1986 the association between the EC member states and Turkey was even temporarily suspended due to the military regime in the country. Only in 1999 Turkey was officially recognized as an official candidate for membership in the EU; the Helsinki European Council stated that 'Turkey is <...> destined to join the Union on the basis of the *same* [Copenhagen] criteria as applied to the other candidate states'[151]. Since among those criteria there was no reference to Indo-European or

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149 Fontaine N. Address to the European Council, Helsinki. 10 December, 1999 (Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel-pres_en.htm).

150 On the dialectics of exclusiveness and inclusiveness in European identity formation see: Rumelili B. Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation. *Review of International Studies,* Vol. 30, No. 1, 2004, p. 37; Kantner C. Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understanding: The Case of the Emerging European Identity. *European Journal of Social Theory,* Vol. 9, No. 4, 2006, p. 509-515.

151 Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999. Conclusions of the Presidency. *The Bulletin of the European Union*. No. 12, 1999, p. 8.

Judeo-Christian cultural background, the Turkish political elite was led to believe they were in principle eligible for membership in the EU. The interviewed Turkish politicians and high-ranking diplomats see no difference between the EU and other trans-Atlantic and European internationals organizations[152]; since in the late 1980s and 1990s Turkey was already a member of NATO and the Council of Europe (the latter of which also applies the standard of democracy towards its members), the Turkish elite believe they are close to the EU standard. As one high-ranking diplomat put it, 'we already have a relationship with and presence in so many European institutions, so it [would be] natural for us to be in the European Union. But there are, of course, requirements to being there'[153].

Turkey sees the EU first and foremost as a single market on the global stage and therefore recognizes the economic Copenhagen criteria. Many interviewed decision-makers tended to compare the Turkish economy with the European in the context of 2009 global economic crisis, during which Turkish economy, unlike the European, kept on growing[154]. Turkish leaders also stress that their country managed to achieve an 'economic miracle' over the last 20 to 30 years without a significant financial assistance from the EU. The trade asymmetry between Turkey and the EU in favour of the latter is presented as a source for EU countries to cover their looming government debts[155]. This train of thought

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152   Interview with Mr. Osman Faruk Loğoğlu, Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Foreign Relations Committee), Vice-President of the CHP Party. Ankara, 7 May 2013.

153   Interview with Deputy Director General for EU Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Ankara, 8 May 2013.

154   Interview with Ms. Sermin Balik, Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Internal Affairs Committee) from AKP Party. Vilnius, 6 June 2013.

155   Erdoğan R. T. 'hy the EU Needs Turkey. Speech at the St. Anthony's College, Oxford. 28 May, 2004 (Available at: http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/docs/Erdogan1.pdf).

is typical in arguing for Turkey's membership in the EU. For example, to quote the current Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu,

*Turkey [of today] is not Turkey of 10 years ago. <...> [D]espite of economic crisis, last year [2011] Turkey created 1,500,000 new jobs and in Europe around 1,500,000 have lost their jobs. If Turkey had been **in** the EU, there would be zero unemployment.*[156]

Turkey also recognizes the civic-participatory nature of the Union and sees the political Copenhagen criteria as natural. According to Turkish President Abdullah Gül, the EU 'represents a way of thought and living, based on ***universal*** values and high standards. <...> Europe is our common house cemented by our common norms <...> such as democracy, human rights, tolerance and respect for differences. Being "European" means internalizing these norms'[157]. In the interviews the most often recurring word with regards to the political process in Turkey in the context of EU accession is 'homework'[158]; the political elite of Turkey considers it to be their unquestionable duty to meet the standards of democracy and human rights as acknowledged not only by the EU, but also the Council of Europe. On the other hand, Turkey meeting these criteria translates into a 'trap'[159] for the European Union, which will no longer be in a position to deny Turkey's *right* to membership. One senior Turkish official explained this in the following way:

156 Davutoğlu A. Speech at the Ambassadors' Conference of Ukraine, Kiev. 2 October, 2012 (Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?e02fbae4-66f5-4813-96b7-40986c71f171).

157 Gül A. 'Turkey's Vision with Regard to the Future of Europe'. Speech at the College of Europe, Natolin, Warsaw. 6 June, 2011 (Available at: http://www.tccb.gov.tr/pages/president/Speeches).

158 Interview with Deputy Director General for EU Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Ankara, 8 May 2013.

159 The idea of a rhetorical entrapment in the context of EU and NATO enlargements was proposed by political scientist Frank Schimmelfennig. See: Schimmelfennig F. *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

We have obligations. The European Union is based on the rule of law. There are treaties, there are regulations, and so on. We have to adopt them, we have to implement them. And these treaties and regulations are all based on the idea of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. We have to act accordingly to carry forward this relationship with the European Union; and, if possible, to crown this relationship with membership at certain point. So these are our obligations. We have to do it. As for the European Union side, it has a very important commitment: when the European Union gave Turkey the candidate status by a decision of all member states, and when our negotiations with the European Union started – again by a common decision of all European Union members – this constituted the most important commitment of the European Union. This is what the EU decided and it is committed to the European Union membership of Turkey.[160]

Unlike cultural particularism, equality of all peoples and all nations before the law places the EU countries and Turkey on an equal footing. In one of his speeches Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu reiterates:

As Turkey, we are ready to continue doing our homework. However, we expect from our European friends few very basic things, which are in fact compatible with Europe's main moral principles. First is the loyalty to commitments, i.e. 'pacta sund servanda', which is not only a European value but also a value of humanity. <...> We demand only one thing from the EU: respect for its own values and 'pacta sund servanda'.[161]

As for particular cultural values and historical heritage that distinguishes 'Europe' from the rest of the world, the Turkish

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160 Interview with Deputy Director General for EU Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Ankara, 8 May 2013.

161 Davutoğlu A. Speech to EU Ambassadors on the Occasion of Europe Day, Ankara. 8 May, 2009 (Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?e02fbae4-66f5-4813-96b7-40986c71f171).

elite does not recognize it as a viable criterion and even denounces[162] EU leaders for using such arguments against Turkey: 'The idea of "Christian Europe" belongs to the Middle Ages [and] it should be left there'[163] says Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although occasionally Turkish officials tend to invoke some common cultural roots between the EU nations and Turkey, especially dating back to Antiquity[164], they primarily see Europe as culturally 'unifying the principle of plurality with <...> "ethics of coexistence"'[165]. From the viewpoint of Turkey, the above-mentioned universal principals of democracy and human rights, which the EU so often declares, are incompatible with cultural exclusivism, as President Gül puts it:

'European identity' can never be designed on exclusivist terms. In fact, Europe has never had a homogenous identity. It is built upon different ethnicities, cultures, faiths and traditions. <...> In democratic societies, there can be no exclusion to 'inclusiveness'.[166]

Conclusion

Altogether the evidence suggest that the Turkish political elite does not share the same range of ideas for a potential EU polity that is found in the existing member states, and this has likely been caused by the obscurity of the Copenhagen criteria. The

162   Interview with Senior Expert in EU Accession Policy, Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkey. Ankara, 13 May 2013.

163   Erdoğan R. T. Why the EU Needs Turkey. Speech at the St. Anthony's College, Oxford. 28 May, 2004 (Available at: http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/docs/Erdogan1.pdf).

164   Interview with Deputy Director General for EU Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Ankara, 8 May 2013. Also see: Erdoğan R. T. 'Why the EU Needs Turkey'. Speech at the St. Anthony's College, Oxford. 28 May, 2004 (Available at: http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/docs/Erdogan1.pdf).

165   Davutoğlu A. Speech to EU Ambassadors on the Occasion of Europe Day, Ankara. 8 May, 2009 (Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?e02fbae4-66f5-4813-96b7-40986c71f171).

166   Gül A. 'Turkey's Vision with Regard to the Future of Europe'. Speech at the College of Europe, Natolin, Warsaw. 6 June, 2011 (Available at: http://www.tccb.gov.tr/pages/president/Speeches).

current European Union members (at least some of them) feel that they have the ethical-political right to refute Turkish membership in the EU, which – while also serving other purposes – is designed for preserving particular European values; whereas Turkey feels it has the universal moral right to be treated as equal despite a different religious and cultural background as long as it complies with the behavioural aspects of being 'European'. This results in an enormous miscommunication and tensions between the two sides (or the 28 + 1 side, to take every EU member separately), and may eventually roll back the Turkish bid for membership in this Union by either of them.

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THE IMAGE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE OFFICIAL RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA IN 2014

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ABSTRACT

The democratic revolution in Ukraine spurred the Russian political regime towards an unprecedented propagandistic campaign, not only against new government in Ukraine, but also against the European Union. The European Union is the key feature in the propaganda war, where all main political and even cultural aspects are involved. This paper attempts to extract the main ideas of this propaganda, evaluate it and connect it with the main issues.

Keywords: propaganda, European Union, Ukraine, Maidan

Introduction

In 2014 the Russian political regime had met a challenging situation in Ukraine. Geopolitical interests of the political actors in the region involved European Union, which had a strong interest of attracting Ukraine to the European economic area. The Russian political establishment took that "as an aggressive policy in the area that is traditionally evaluated as Russian area of geopolitical interests"[167]. Such issue had encouraged the Russian official propaganda to mobilize their resources and to represent a 'new image of European Union' in the context of the new political situation.

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[167] Keri Phillips, Post-Soviet republics in tug-of-war with Russia and the west. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/post-soviet-republics-in-tug-of-war-with-russia-and-the-west/5359762 (2014 04 17).

An image is understood as an ideologically based media construct that tries to affect public opinion in the way government prefers.[168] Such propaganda is part of what specialists call "hybrid warfare", when a whole spectre of instruments (partisans, separatists, terrorists, also soft power elements and media) is used. This is very important when trying to avoid carrying out international agreements that regulate land war[169].

First of all, the Russian official media tried to focus on the problem of European political values, criticizing them and at the same time legitimizing the official aggressive political position of Putin's regime towards Ukraine. This paper will focus on official media recourses, such as Russia Today, vesti.ru, rossiya1.ru. The media projects an artificially constructed reality to the public sphere, attempting to influence the public opinion and encourages various processes towards a marked direction. The problem is that this 'constructed reality' begins to influence the "real reality" as an independent factor and finally we have an uncontrolled escalation that leads to unexpected results.

1. The image of Ukraine and the EU in official Russian propaganda in 2014

Since the independence of Ukraine, Russia has had geopolitical intentions to keep this region in the status of a Russian political province. The first challenge for such a geopolitical strategy was raised in 2004, after the first 'Maidan'. 'Maidan' can be described as a phenomenon of Ukrainian political process that represents a social and political movement of civil society. The roots of this

168 Beata Beigman Klebanov, Daniel Diermeier, and Eyal Beigman, Lexical Cohesion, 2008 Analysis of Political Speech. Political Anglysis. 16 (4): 447-463.

169 Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. *Warsjournal, ndupress.ndu.edu*, issue 52, 1st quarter 2009. http://www.google.lt/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&sqi=2&ved=0CDEQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsmallwarsjournal.com%2Fdocuments%2Fjfqhoffman.pdf&ei=ddbU66JJrDa4QTmoYDIAg&usg=AFQjCNGcQFhNuLAoKd3Hvk_2zv9uzNm8sQ&bvm=bv.65397613,d.bGE (2014 03 25).

political phenomenon were in West Ukraine, the territory that became part of Ukraine only in 1939. The most important aspect of this is region is the lesser extent, to with the social relations here were disturbed, compared to the other parts of Ukraine. The influence of Soviet policy in this region was specific. Generally speaking, the West Ukraine had a stronger potential for social movement and it became obvious during the political manifestations in Kiev after the president elections in 2004. "Maidan" had become an important political factor and a serious problem for Russian intentions in Ukraine. Soon, Viktor Yushcenko became president of Ukraine. He represented new democratic coalition that created a western vector in policy of Ukraine. Unfortunately, he couldn't reach political consensus with all the political groups, and especially with Julia Tymoshenko, his coalition partner and prime minister of Ukraine, and also with his political rival from Eastern Ukraine – Viktor Yanukovych, who had tried to become Ukrainian president and finally reached this goal in 2010. The main idea of his policy was a balance between Russia and the European Union. He postulated a loyalty to the Russian minority of Ukraine and Putin's Russia. At the same time he started an active political trend towards the European Union and even succeeded in preparing an important treaty between Ukraine and EU: the treaty of association. At the same time, Julia Tymoshenko was accused of doubtful economic crimes and was jailed for 7 years. Such an act of the Ukrainian government was deemed by the EU as political persecution, because Julia Tymoshenko was competing with Viktor Yanukovich during the presidential elections in 2010. During all this period, Russia was a passive watcher of Ukrainian policy. Propagandistic demarches were only pointed towards the political opponents of Yanukovich. His views on integration with the EU were not the main focus of Russian foreign

policy. The situation in Crimea was often discussed in official Russian media, but mainly because of problems with the Tatar community in this region.[170]

Situation had changed dramatically after the primal agreement about signing the association treaty between the EU and Ukraine was made. Changes in Russian political position became obvious in October 2013, one month before the meeting in Vilnius, where this treaty had to be signed. The official media of the Russian Federation started a campaign against Ukraine and the European Union, trying to discredit the Ukrainian attempts of integration to the EU economical area and at the same time suggesting a Russian alternative – the Customs Union (established in 2010 by Russia, encompassing Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus) in the post-soviet area.

Official propaganda was trying to discredit not only the idea of Ukrainian euro-integration, but also all the EU as a 'decadent organization' without political and economical future. All resources of propaganda were turned on, especially the official television. The main audience were the Russian citizens, but also the people of Ukraine, because all main Russian TV channels are very popular in Ukraine, especially among the Russian speaking people. The Russian community of Ukraine was chosen as the most important target for propaganda because of its potential to put stress on the government. At the same time, economical problems of Ukraine were also used as a factor. The prices of gas and other energetic resources have always been used by the Russian government as a political instrument of pressure. The image of the Ukrainian debt has always been popular in the Russian official media, especially during an actual economic crisis.

When the Ukrainian president decided not to sign the treaty of association with the EU, political factor of 'Maidan' rose again

170 Tobolsk: where history reverted 27.01.2010 14:14. http://rt.com/shows/russia-close-up/to-bolsk-where-history-reverted/ (2014 03 07).

and became even stronger than before. Independent televisions were transmitting from Kiev an image of about a million people, who were protesting against President Yanukovich's decision and his corruption. 'Maidan' became 'Euro-Maidan', emphasizing the political preferences of a large group of Ukrainian people. At the same time, the Russian official media was accusing 'Euro-Maidan' of "radical nationalism, anti-Semitism and even fascism".[171] Step by step, the Russian official media reached the question of the EU.

The image of the European Union had become a part of this propaganda trend. Key propagandists, such as Dmitri Kiselev, Mikhail Leontief and Maxim Shevchenko, understood, that the EU must also be their target in the context of the Ukrainian vector. Very soon, propaganda against the EU became an autonomic unit in official propaganda of Putin, especially in the beginning of 2014. Such a premise can be made after analysing the main themes of anti-European propaganda. This propaganda did not contain only political or economical aspects, but aspects of culture and values. Soon, the Ukrainian theme displaced all other topics from the Russian news sphere.

First of all, this values aspect was raised with an image of the EU as a 'euro-Sodom'[172]. Putin's Russia is well known in the EU for its homophobic policy, that even result in laws against homosexual persons. That's why it is no wonder that the official Russian propaganda was emphasizing European laws about homosexual marriage or the tendencies of its legalization. According to the propagandist Dmitri Kiselev, 'it's the main European value'.[173] As the BBC journalist Stephen Ennis noticed, this

171   Евро-фашистский майдан. http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1409951.html (2014 03 14).

172   Russia dumps on Sweden in TV toilet rant. http://m.thelocal.se/20131205/russia-dumps-on-sweden-with-tv-toilet-attack (2014 02 27).

173   Pomerantsev Peter, The Kremlin's attempt at soft power is back-to-front. Moscow is boosting itself at home by being the west's bogeyman, says Peter Pomerantsev. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/143ecf74-4e18-11e3-8fa5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2uVHa2YSF (2014 02 27).

Russian propagandist even drew a Swedish Children's TV show into Ukraine-EU row: "the Russian state TV has come up with an unusual weapon in its propaganda offensive against supporters of Ukraine's integration with the EU - a Swedish TV programme designed to help children understand their bodily functions."[174] Furthermore, Stephen Ennis remarks that: "A respectful article in pro-Kremlin tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda recently praised it for helping spare children some of the "suffering connected with various physical manifestations". But, Kiselev says, in Sweden, there has been a "sharp rise in child abortions, early sex is the norm – from the age of nine, and it is not surprising that child impotence starts at 12. There you have European values in all their glory." Kiselev has become notorious in recent months for his attacks on homosexuals, and his likening of enemies of the Kremlin, both in Russia and abroad, to the Nazis. He is also one of several presenters of Rossiya 1, who regularly suggest, that if Ukraine opts to ally itself with the West, it will find itself in some sort of "Euro-Sodom".[175]

The Kremlin propaganda even raised the image of Nazism. Such correlations have strong ideological connection with a propagandistic view of Western Ukraine society and supporters of Stephan Bandera during WWII, who were fighting against the Soviets for the independence of Ukraine, as they understood it. The image of "Bandera supporter" is also crucial, because the Kremlin propaganda has noticed a great potential for discrimination of the idea of Ukrainian euro-integration.

As the journalist P. Pomerantsev noticed, D. Kiselev also emphasizes a pseudo-historical background: "Sweden, Poland, Lithuania – does that remind you of anything?" asked Dmitry

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174 Ennis Stephen Russia: Children's toilet TV show drawn into Ukraine-EU row. http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-25198264 (2014 02 27).

175 Ibidem.

Kiselev, presenter of current affairs on Russian state television,
referring to the nations supporting <u>Ukraine's EU integration</u>."[176]
He continues: "It's the same alliance Peter the Great defeated
at Poltava in 1709. Amusing as it sounds, it now looks like they
want revenge for Poltava," he continued. "The Swedish foreign
minister Carl Bildt hails from an old Swedish aristocratic family,
some of his ancestors were generals, and he was a CIA agent in his
youth."[177] As we can see here, the rhetoric of Russian propaganda
is very radical and extreme, reminding of the Cold War situation.
Dmitri Kiselev is trying to show how the United States, the Eu-
ropean Union (first of all Great Britain) or NATO are connected
with past politics of the Nazis. An old soviet propagandistic idea
that the Western world had an agreement with Nazis at the end
of war is being re-imagined in Putin's Russia again. According to
his idea, the European Union is rotten in the same way Hitler's
Germany was[178] (debts, financial and economic crisis), and that is
the root of aggressiveness in Eastern Europe and Ukraine.[179]

Special attention is paid to the EU leaders, first of all, the French
President François *Hollande. Russian propagandists try to show him as
a very complex person in this context. On the one hand, he is trigger-hap-
py; on the other is his libertine side: his relations with women. Sexual
moments here are very important. It's a thin red line of Putin's propa-
ganda.* <u>Silvio Berlusconi</u> is also mentioned, but he is "Putin's friend".
That is the reason his sexuality is represented as almost "normal" and
"attacks against him (in Italy) even shown as" a part of anti-Russian

176 Pomerantsev Peter, The Kremlin's attempt at soft power is back-to-front. Moscow is boosting
itself at home by being the west's bogeyman, says Peter Pomerantsev. http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/143ecf74-4e18-11e3-8fa5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2uVHa2YSF (2014 02 27).

177 Ibidem.

178 Многоликий Степан Бандера. http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/25209525.html
(2014 02 28).

179 Дорогой Дмитрий Киселев, ты был прав! Европа разлагается. http://politkuhnya.net/
blog/2014-01-06-11295 (2014 02 28).

policy in the European Union. His successor Mario Monti is an Euro bureaucrat and that's why "he represents EU anti-Russian political establishment".[180] Generally speaking, the EU aggressiveness (political or even military) in Ukraine (Syria is also mentioned as a context) is pictured as a reflection of sexual problems of the EU leaders. According to the official propaganda, this mostly imagined "crisis of "values" in the EU leads to an economical, financial and political disaster. As another propagandist Aleksey Pushkov said, "Only a morally strong politician can resist such attacks. This politician in Ukraine is Viktor Yanukovych ("Janek Molotok").[181]

The most shocking is that such official attitude lives together with an idea of a "conspiracy". Such dualism is quite common for propaganda of an authoritarian regime. The same trend could be seen in Soviet propaganda against the Western world, and now we can see a new version in the context of the situation in Ukraine. In propaganda, the lines of the situation are represented like this: "Ukraine is a battle field between Russia and the European union".[182] Propagandists develop this antinomy, trying to picture Europe as a civilization that is melting, and that's why new recourses are needed. Russia is an object of such policy of destruction and Ukraine is the "last frontier".[183] This imaginary or virtual battle is canalized to a moral confrontation, where the Russian defences are the "true source of morality" – the Russian civilization. The Kremlin ideologist V. Surkov explained that as "a

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180   "Вести недели" с Дмитрием Киселевым (19.01.2014). http://dochronika.ru/load/novosti/vesti_nedeli_s_dmitriem_kiselevym_19_01_2014/3-1-0-1560 (2014 03 02).

181   Алексей Пушков: оппозиция хочет свержения Януковича. http://www.vesti.ru/videos?vid=571834 (2014 03 02).

182   Ukraine PM does not want his country to become a 'battlefield' between EU, Russia. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/131126/ukraine-battlefield-between-Russia-EU (2014 03 09).

183   Россия и Европа борются за Украину. Судьба грандиозных планов Путина по восстановлению российской империи может зависеть от того, какую дорогу выберет Киев. http://inosmi.ru/world/20131118/214866376.html#ixzz2vSFUbJZF (2014 03 09).

new conservative ideology" that is very eclectic.[184] It collects ideas
from the times of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, but
generally it's imperial nationalism, or, as nationalism researcher
E. B. Haas said, integrated nationalism, that is far more radical
than traditional or ethnic nationalism because is orientated to
expansion.[185]

Generally speaking, the radically negative propaganda against
the European Union in the context of Ukraine shows that it is
the obvious ideological preparation for a war. This propagan-
da is first of all orientated to Russians, because Russian people
are closed in a very narrow information field. Critical or inde-
pendent resources are eliminated (for example, www.rain.tv) or
isolated (www.echomsk.ru). Putin's regime tries to close even
internet resources that can be reached only by a very small
number of Russians. Bloggers (the symbol is Aleksej Navalnyj)
or social networks (especially Russian, like www.vkontakte.ru)
are persecuted. Such a turn demonstrates Putin's intention to
re-establish a totalitarian regime in Russia and at the same time
to re-built the Russian empire (or the Russian world[186]) as he
understands that, but mostly in a virtual sense, because Rus-
sia doesn't have real power for real actions. At the same time,
A. Piontkovky describes such situation as an evolution of Pu-
tin's regime to its most dangerous level, where all, even military
resources can be used for one goal – political power.[187]

184   Казаков А. Инставрация смыслов: лекция Суркова и новый русский консерватизм.
Русский журнал. Политическая философия. http://www.russ.ru/layout/set/print/Mirova-
ya-povestka/Instavraciya-smyslov-lekciya-Surkova-i-novyj-russkij-konservatizm (2014 03 14).

185   Haas E. B. *Beyond the Nation-State – Functionalism and International Organization*. Stan-
ford, 1964, p. 465.

186   Russkiy Mir Foundation - Фонд «Русский мир». http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/

187   Пионтковский А. Последняя стадия. Мнения / Право автора http://www.svoboda.org/
content/article/25294282.html (2014 03 14).

Conclusions

The development of Russian propaganda against the European Union has demonstrated very important issues that characterize the main weaknesses of the EU. First of all, it's clear that the previous Western attitude towards the Russian political regime was wrong. This corrupted regime is not only dangerous for Russians, but also for all post-soviet area. We now see that lies can be unprecedentedly used as an ideological, political instrument, trying to discredit opponents from Western Europe. Finally we can see how fast can the political and geopolitical situation in Europe change. Stability and international laws are now revealed as just fiction. Power is the only thing that matters.

Finally, the "new conservative" ideology and its propagandistic projection more or less reflect the neurasthenic mind of kleptocratic Putin's Russia: uncertainty in the sense of geopolitics, economy and especially moral values.

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CONSTRUCTION OF "EUROPE" IN THE REFERENDUM SLOGANS

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the reflections of the idea of "Europe" in the EU accession referendum (2003), and "nuclear" referenda (2008, and 2012) campaigns in Lithuania., Campaign slogans are mainly taken into account, reconstructing various discursive devices. Explanatory power of new institutionalism (discursive) theories is discussed.

Keywords: referendum, Lithuania, institutions, campaign, slogans, political actor

Introduction

The idea of "Europe", as an opposition to the East and as an axis for the fortification of the restoration of independence, appeared in the discourse of Lithuanian politics at the end of the last century and have been constantly claimed since then. Therefore, the goal to become part of the European Union (EU) became a strategic goal of Lithuanian politics, directly correlating with the idea of freedom and democracy.

In such context, the referenda of the 21st century were also inevitably related with the "European" construct: completely directly – referendum in 2003 on the membership of the Republic of Lithuania in EU; disrupted by the accession commitments; therefore, not even always considered to be valid, the referendum of 2008 on exceeding the operation of the Ignalina Nuclear

Power Plant (INPP); and seemingly a not directly related consultative (deliberative) referendum of 2013 on building a new nuclear power plant in the Republic of Lithuania. Currently there also exists the fourth referendum initiative related to EU, namely the future voting on selling the land to foreigners, which Lithuania has committed to allow when signing the EU agreement, but in the context of this research, this referendum is only an object for future studies.

The first three referenda, their initiation and proceedings in the construction of the idea of "Europe" in the Lithuanian discourse will be further analysed in respect to both political practice and academic thought.

The academic thought on this issue has several dimensions. On the one hand, it is usual to analyse referendums with the help of rationalist arguments, by assessing the entire essential FOR and AGAINST. However, they cannot be separated from the European tendencies, which corresponded with the timeframe of the referenda: the referendum on accession took place after the two treaties of Nice, which opened the door for the largest expansion of the EU, the INPP referendum took place in an environment that coincided with a "wave" of analytical studies related to the two failed referenda of 2005 in France and Holland[188], and the referendum on the construction of the new nuclear power coincided with the considerations of the Treaty of Lisbon. All of this is took place at the same time when more and more attention was being paid to the approach of new institutionalism and especially its new branch – discourse institutionalism, even if it was not highly used for the referenda.

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188   Taggart P. Questions of Europe - The Domestic Politics of the 2005 French and Dutch Referendums and their Challenge for the Study of European Integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 44, 2006.

Therefore, the goal of this article is to analyse the structural factors and the behaviour of the actors in the three mentioned referendums, which contributed to the construction of "Europe" in the Lithuanian society with direct access to the new institutionalism.

The analysis is performed by assessing the structural environment and its specificity, the positions of the actors, their changes. The campaign slogans, which dominated the media are reconstructed, as a best way to illustrate the change that took place.

1. Structural environment: historical experience and legal situation

There are two types of referenda that may be organised in the Republic of Lithuania - mandatory and consultative (deliberative) referenda[189]. A mandatory referendum is deemed having taken place, if over half of the citizens, having the right to vote and having been registered in electoral rolls, have taken part in it[190]. The same norm is valid for the consultative (deliberative) referendum, but it is emphasised that in the event, that over one half of the voters have taken part in the referendum and at least one half of those voters who have participated, have been in favour of the resolution, the resolution shall be deemed as having been adopted. The issue of conducting of this referendum must be deliberated in the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania according to the procedure established by the Parliament Statute, within one month from its announcement. In the event when fewer voters have taken part in the referendum, it shall be deemed that the referendum has not taken place, and the voter's opinion voiced during its course, may (or may not) be considered in the Parliament during the deliberation of laws and other draft legal acts.[191]

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189 Lietuvos Respublikos referendumo įstatymas, 2002 -06-04, Nr. IX-929, Žin. Nr. 64-2570 2002, art. 3, http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=437639

190 Exept for special provisions. Lietuvos Respublikos referendumo įstatymas, 2002 -06-04, Nr. IX-929, Žin. Nr. 64-2570 2002, art. 7, http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=437639

191 Op.cit., art. 8, http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=437639

When assessing the practice of referenda it should be noted that after the restoration of independence, 11 referenda have been carried out in Lithuania and they took place following certain waves, but the presence of an initiative for a referendum was almost constant.[192] In some of them even several provisions were submitted for voting. Out of all of them, six were considered to be failed because of the small number of the participating respondents and the submitted provisions were not accepted. In five referenda, the provisions were accepted when the vast majority were voting for them.

A certain moment of manipulation with direct democracy may be felt and the similarity parallels may be derived even from the 1992 referendums, initiated by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania. By understanding what were the value dispositions of the society of that day and the fact that they are not easily replaceable, the political elite groups, represented by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, were seeking not only to influence those societal dispositions, but also to use merely formal institutional possibilities, seeking the desired political result. The advocates of a strong presidential model were seeking to bring more voters by pairing the referendums on the strong presidential state model with the referendum on withdrawal of foreign troops. But the opponents of such a model managed to influence the dates for the referendums so that they would be separate and the participation would be insufficient. In 1994, the referendum became a mobilisation effort of the Homeland Union (Tėvynės Sąjunga) party. Meanwhile the entire "bouquet" of referendums during the October-November of 1996 was a desperate attempt of the Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania to mobilize their voters.

192 Website of Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, http://www.vrk.lt/lt/pirmas-puslapis/referendum/buve-referendumai.html

Only four referendums that took place in Lithuania had a "continuous" structural value context: the 1991 plebiscite, i.e. global population survey, on the independence of the Republic of Lithuania, in 1992 a referendum on the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of the former USSR army, now belonging to the Russian Federation, from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania in 1992 and on compensation of the harm made to Lithuania; in 1992 another referendum in order to adopt the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, and in 2003 a referendum on the membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the EU. All these referenda took place with full consensus of the elite; therefore all four of them received a formal and legally uncontested YES[193].

Further, the referenda that took place in 2008 and in 2012 may be treated as a natural continuity of the Lithuanian tradition of that time, not so much because of deep structural plays, but because of the self-importance of the players.

Therefore all three analysed referenda were naturally resulting from the state referendum practice traditions, similar in their European dimension, but legally, in a formal manner they rather differed.

First of all, as it was already mentioned, in 2003 the referendum was marked by the full consensus of the elite, which spared no effort in order to reach a desired result. The result was the following: participation was at 63,3 percent, 91,04 percent of the participants said YES and 8,96 percent said NO[194]. To get the needed participation, for the first (so far only) time the referendum was being held for two days, and it also relied on certain "marketing" measures[195].

193   Mažylis L. Lietuvos referendumas dėl narystės Europos Sąjungoje. *Politologija*, 2004, Nr. 2 (34).

194   Website of Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, http://www.vrk.lt/lt/pirmas-puslapis/referendum/buve-referendumai.html

195   Mažylis, L., Unikaitė, I. Europe and Election of the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, October 2008, Election Briefing No 47, EPERN, www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-election-briefing-no-47.pdf

In 2008, the consultative referendum on extending the operation of INPP seemed rather ambiguous from the point of view of formal political logic. The Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania initiated the consultation with the nation on the withdrawal of the provision which was a part of an international agreement Lithuania had signed. Based on it, there were no legal ways for extending the operation of INPP without changing the treaty. However, these types of agreements cannot be changed unilaterally – it is a complicated international process that should include all the EU Member States. This case also forces us to remember a certain systematic, manipulative nature of a referendum as an instrument of the direct democracy[196]. The referendum took place together with the election to the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania. The election took place, but the referendum was announced as "failed". 91,09 percent of the participants in the referendum voted for the total suspension of INPP[197]. It is a vast majority of Lithuanian residents, who participated in the referendum. However, for this research it is still important that the number of people who came to the referendum and voted against was relatively and statistically small (9 percent.)

The complete opposite is the referendum of 2012 on the construction of a new nuclear power station: the participation was 52,58 percent: 34,09 percent voted YES and 62,68 percent voted NO[198]. It was also combined with the election to the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania; however, differently than in 2008, it has been deemed as having taken place, but the decision is not made so far (however, as it was stated earlier, the laws obligate to make a de-

196 Mažylis L. Kodėl netiko Konstitucija Europai. Monografija. Kaunas, Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, 2005.

197 Website of Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/2003/referendumas/rezultatai/rez_l_16.htm

198 Website of Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, http://www.vrk.lt/lt/pirmas-puslapis/referendum/buve-referendumai.html

cision within a month), even though discussions are renewed once in a while. During the referendum the citizens did not agree with the construction of a new nuclear power plant. This was also the first referendum that has taken place, but the result was negative.

2. Analysis of the campaign in the referendum on joining the EU

Upon inviting the Lithuanian citizens to decide on the EU, the biggest obstacle was considered to be not the decision itself, but surpassing the threshold for the required participation of the citizens (50 percent +1). There was almost no doubt that by achieving it, the referendum will finish in approval.

The government and the main parties (except for the several separate parliamentarian or poorly supported marginalized groups) demonstrated a total consensus since the announcement of the referendum. Officially, even before the campaign has accelerated, two small parliamentary parties: Union of Peasants and New Democratic Parties (UPNDP) and Centre Union of Lithuania (CUL) (appropriately 7 and 3 seats) were expressing a more critical approach to the future membership. However, it is necessary to emphasize that not the whole parties approved such a position, but only a certain coalition wing: constituent part of UPNDP – Peasant party and separated CUL (who one month after the referendum did not want to connect to the Liberal Union of Lithuania[199]), leaded by Romualdas Ozolas[200]. Despite that, the official pre-referendum position of both of these blocks became softer (Peasant party did this because of the influence of a new coalition party New democracy and CUL because of the aforementioned approaching collision and the separation that appeared).

With six months still left until the referendum, one could observe the greatest separation of opinion between separate segments of the society; the rural residents were especially against

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199   Susijungus LCS, MKDS ir LLS įsteigta naujoji LIBERALŲ IR CENTRO SĄJUNGA. *LiCS informacinis centras.* http://www.lics.lt/naujiena30601.php

200   New party – National Centre Party – is established.

accession, and they were the ones who constituted a large part of the voting public and therefore could have made a big impact on the final result. Mainly for this reason the Catholic Church, which is overall separated from the politics after the restoration of independence, got involved in campaigning as well as encouraged to accept the integration of the country. The Catholic Church, as an institution, at that time had one of the biggest trust rankings[201], and the authority of its representatives, the priests, especially in the province, was likely to have a significant impact for the final decision of a large part of Lithuanian citizens.

Table 1. Actors[202] in the referendum on joining the EU

Supporters of YES	Supporters of NO
Parliamentary parties	Separated block of the small parties: constituent part of UPNDP – Peasant party and the separated people from CUL – later National Centre party.
The highest national leaders (president of that time R. Paksas, former presidents A. M. Brazauskas and V. Adamkus, Chairman of the Seimas A. Paulauskas)	A small part of residents in the rural areas, small "milk producers", some of the Russian speaking people.

Sources: Created by the author, based on the sources provided in the footnotes.

Such unified agitation created certain conditions that meant that during almost all the pre-referendum period, the parties in general and most of their members separately spoke a lot to the Lithuanian people about the fact that being part of the EU will provide Lithuania with many goods[203]. Meanwhile the poor and quite insignificant campaigns for NO sometimes would raise the

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201   Ratings from: http://www.5ci.lt/ratings2/lit/frameset.htm

202   Mažylis L., Unikaitė I. The Lithuanian EU Accession Referendum 10-11 May 2003. Referendum Briefing Papers No 8, EPERN, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-breflith.pdf

203   Op. cit.

arguments of sovereignty or unequal conditions in the EU, and would threaten a little with unpopular decisions, which "are required by the European Union". The latter motive during the negotiation for the membership was often repeated by the representatives of the government, in order to justify their decision, which was later successfully suppressed by the same representatives.

Table 2. Typical slogans for the campaign for joining the EU (2003)[204]

Campaign YES	Campaign NO
"Let's be Europeans!" "Feel like Europeans" "Choose West" "NO to domination of sovietism" "We will receive investments and support of millions (especially for the farming)" "New possibilities"	"Europe requires reforms/unpopular decisions "It is just another Union"

Sources: Created by the author, based on the sources provided in the footnotes.

The obvious domination of the campaign for YES in the public discourse is seen even from the quantitative point of view of the typical campaign slogans. The leading theme is ideological-valuable choice of Europe and West, supplemented with certain rationalist motives (possibilities, investments), but for the most part it appeals to the feelings. The campaign for NO in general did not oppose the Europeanization argument and the dichotomy between Europe and the East, as could have been intuitively expected, but only relied on hidden nationalism (the EU was perceived as a limitation). Therefore constructing the idea of "Europe" in general in the Lithuanian society of those days was a strong and dominating direction.

204 Recordings of agitational TV programs for the 2003 referendum, http://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/2003/referendumas/referendumas.htm

3. Analysis of the campaign of referendum on decommissioning the INPP

If the announcement and results of the referendum in 2003 did not raise any questions, then in 2008 the finish was long and difficult. In the beginning of 2008, the initiative group of a referendum on extending the operation of INPP has collected only one sixth of the citizen signatures required to organise the referendum and such initiative failed. Meanwhile, in the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, the fraction of Liberal and Centre Union (LiCU) collected the signatures of MPs, allowing the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania to initiate the referendum.[205] It was decided to announce a consultative (deliberative) referendum on the extension of operation of INPP for a technically safe period, but no longer than completion of the construction of a new nuclear power plant.[206]

Despite the possibilities for agitation, provided by the law, the campaign was dull and quiet, as well as greatly overshadowed by the Parliamentary election campaign and other background issues which were appearing at the same time[207]. There were no clear consent between the leaders of political parties and it was difficult to gauge their positions, which were changing unpredictably. Political parties – leaders of the top-ranking at the time Homeland Union, as well as the second most important Social Democratic Party of Lithuania, which was still ruling the Parliament with a minority government, in some way supported the idea, but at the same

205   Seimas pritarė LiCS iniciatyvai rengti referendumą dėl Ignalinos AE darbo pratęsimo, Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_r=3347&p_k=1&p_d=75209

206   Nutarimas dėl referendumo dėl Ignalinos atominės elektrinės darbo pratęsimo paskelbimo, Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_e?p_id=324562

207   Mažylis L., Jurgelionytė A. The Lithuanian Referendumo n Extanding the Working of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station: The Rationality of Actors within (Un-)Changing Structures. *Baltic Journal of Law and Politics*, Vol. 5, No 1, 2012

time avoided accentuating the importance or significance of the referendum. On the other hand, the winner of the future elections, Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) and its chairman Andrius Kubilius was spreading the sceptical attitude towards the idea to organise the referendum; he called it a measure for ridiculing people and said that it is a cover for inactivity of social-democrats. But he also did not openly support the option NO. Meanwhile, the prime minister of that time Gediminas Kirkilas, after being asked by the journalists, would say that he is FOR; however, he also would not promote it openly. Therefore, even if it was possible to observe in the media that social-democrats were supporting the referendum in separate episodes, but at that time the popularity of the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania was falling and it reflected in the voting results.[208] Other parliamentary groups acted with similar caution or limited themselves to soft criticism.

Only during the last days before the referendum, the highest-ranking politicians of the country started campaigning in favour of extending the operation of INPP. One of the leaders of the country, the president Valdas Adamkus, who was speaking for a long time that this referendum was only fooling the people and in the case of eventual referendum he would ruin his ballot as a citizen, suddenly suggested voting for extending the operation of the nuclear power plant. On the other hand, the leader of a new political power Arūnas Valinskas was criticising the particular idea of such referendum. The leader of representation of EC in Lithuania Kęstutis Sakalauskas (he overall had a rather negative opinion to the intention to violate the agreement) joined the critics together with the chief negotiator A. Abišala (who, even though he was assigned for negotiation on the possible renegotiation, did not support this idea), who was a supporter of alternative energy (they maybe have been treated as the

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208   2008 m. spalio 12 d. rinkimai į Lietuvos Respublikos Seimą. Balsavimo rezultatai. Lietuvos Respublikos vyriausioji rinkimų komisija, http://www.vrk.lt/2008_seimo_rinkimai/output_lt/rinkimu_diena/rezultatai1.html

real representatives of the NO side because of the sole idea that they were propagating). However, their position as well could be named as jumping between a YES and a NO.

Table 3. Actors[209] in the referendum on INPP

Supporters of YES	Supporters of NO
Parliamentary parties: SDPL, LU, LiCU	Parliamentary parties: HU
Non-parliamentary parties: LSDU	Non-parliamentary parties: Green Union
	Society groups: supporters of alternative energy.
President Valdas Adamkus	Candidate to members of Seimas and known public figure Arūnas Valinskas, leader of representation of the European Commission in Lithuania Kęstutis Sakalauskas, Chief negotiator Aleksandras Abišala

Sources: Created by the author, based on the sources provided in the footnotes.

However, such a division cannot fully explain the multiplicity of the argumentation. Efforts have been made to maximize their own interests, but they were not necessarily related to the nuclear energy policy. The referendum became a supplementary measure to the campaign that was the most important at that time – elections to the Parliament. Furthermore, it is also important to consider the attitude which was present in the society. In some sort of macro sociological background sociologists opposed the attitude of the Lithuanian residents on the nuclear power[210]. When the closing of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant was established in the Accession treaty, the analysis shows that the argument "it is necessary to meet the agreements" was valid only for 7 percent of the respondents and there were 33 percent

209   Mažylis L., Jurgelionytė A. (2012).

210   Gaidys, V., Rinkevičius L. Černobylio baimė, pigios energijos nauda ar kai kas daugiau? Dvidešimties metų visuomenės nuomonės apie Ignalinos AE sociologiniai tyrimai Lietuvoje. *Filosofija. Sociologija*. 2008. Vol. 19. No. 4.

of supporters of renegotiation. It might be the reason the elite started escalating "renegotiation". The argument of that also became formally institutionalised, by creating a special position of a "negotiator". In such context it is not surprising that the formulation of the referendum claim and "manoeuvring" between the positions caused attention to this issue and led to a formal institutional non-compliance with requirements of the law.

Table 4. Typical slogans in the campaigns of the referendum on extending the operation of INPP (2008)

Campaign YES	Campaign NO
"The conditions of the Agreement shall be met not only by Lithuania, but by the EU" [213] "The price for electricity may jump from 33 cent to 1 LTL [214] "this is the future of all of us" [215] "it is sincere because it is consultative" [216] "We cannot be manipulated by one monopoly"[217] "future of Lithuania with atomic energy"[218]	"Lithuania may need to return the EU support" [219] "you will not receive the support of 3,5 billion"[220] "there are no legal or physical possibilities to change the Accession treaty" [221] "Lithuania risks receiving financial sanctions"[222] "fooling the voters"[223]

Sources: Created by the author, based on the sources provided in the footnotes.

211   A. Kubilius: sutarties sąlygas turi vykdyti ne tik Lietuva, bet ir ES, DELFI.

212   Armonikos garsų fone rinkti parašai dėl IAR darbo pratęsimo ir Seimo paleidimo, DELFI, 2008 05 10.

213   Referendumas - žinia ES, KaunoDiena.lt, 2008 09 12.

214   J. Vaiškūnas. Ar tautos nuomonė dėl atominės elektrinės žalinga valstybei? DELFI, 2008 09 17.

215   V. Adamkus: "Yra daugiau negu vilčių", lrytas.lt, 2008 09 10.

216   V.Adamkus kviečia atlikti pilietinę pareigą ir balsuojant nesivadovauti emocijomis, DELFI, 2008 10 10.

217   A. Abišala: Lietuvai gali tekti grąžinti ES paramą, DELFI, 2008 03 05.

218   Liberalų akcija – žaidimas prieš rinkimus, DELFI, 2008 05 23.

219   K.Sadauskas: referendume neigiamai atsakysiu į klausimą dėl IAE pratęsimo, DELFI, 2008 07 22.

220   Europos Komisija: "Referendumas dėl atominės elektrinės darbo pratęsimo - bevertis", lrytas.lt, 2008 08 22.

221   V. Adamkus žada sugadinti referendumo biuletenį (papildyta), lrytas.lt, 2008 09 10.

Based on this assumption it should be stated that in during the polit-ical campaign on extending the operation of INPP there were signs of clear manoeuvring between the opinions acceptable for the majority of the Lithuanian society, stating that the power plant continuing its work is a positive thing and between the arguments that the power plant is dangerous and it was an obligation to close it. It should be noted that such moral value in the society has been formed and rooted a long time ago. Other valuable attitudes, related to the behaviour norms and rules (safe environment, obligations and duty to meet them), could hardly be relevant in the campaign: those arguments were not new and had been fully considered by the society from all the sides from 1997.[222] The European dimension of the referendum is obvious (agreement with the EU, possible sanctions, possibilities to "negotiate" with the EU) howev-er, they did not work in the same way as in 2003 – this time it was not so much emotional, but more pragmatic.

4. Analysis of the campaign of referendum on construction of a nuclear power plant

When the INPP was closed, the considerations for the future of nu-clear energy in the level of "high" politics were far from over. In 2007 a new law on constructing a new power plant was passed, which later received a generic name "LEO LT". Later, after the governing majority of the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania changed, this initiative, which for some time has been raising a lot of public confrontation, was cancelled. Then, in 2011, the negotiation began with a Japanese investor "Hitachi". In the beginning of 2012, Lithuania initiated a new contract for nuclear power plant construction. Then, a new initiative for a referendum appeared: the collection of signatures on (not) ap-proving the construction of a new nuclear power plant was started.

At that time there were discussions on organising the referendum and three leading ranges of the attitude were dominant: wheth-er it was overall necessary to organise the referendum (as well as the

222   Mažylis L., Jurgelionytė A. (2012).

nuances whether it is necessary, but not now; it was necessary before but whether it will be necessary even later); whether the nuclear energy is accepted; whether this specific project is approved. In this way, in various nuances the attitude and claims of the actors were arranged. The Lithuanian Green Movement (LGM) was one of the first political powers to start promoting the idea of a referendum[223]. A little bit later they were joined by the Lithuanian Peasants and Green Union. Meanwhile, the main supporters of the Visaginas nuclear power plant were the parties constituting the government of that time - Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrat Political Group (HU-LC-DPG) and Liberal Movement of the Republic of Lithuania. It was not surprising, considering the power plant was considered to be their project. Meanwhile, the president Dalia Grybauskaitė, who supported the initiative of the government, was trying to manoeuvre when expressing her opinion in the public place on a certain issue of the referendum. The biggest opposition party of that time, SDPL, was opposing the governing in regard to the referendum issue as well.

Table 5. Actors in the referendum on the construction of the new nuclear power plant

Supporters of YES	Supporters of NO
Governmental parties : HU-LC-DPG, Liberal Movement of the Republic of Lithuania [226]	Opposition in the Parliament: The Christian Party, SDPL, Labour Party (LP), Order and Justice Party, a mixed group of members of the Parliament[227]
President Dalia Grybauskaitė[228]	Union "Yes"[229], the Greens[230]

Sources: Created by the author, based on the sources provided in the footnotes.

223 Žalieji prieštarauja Vyriausybės pasirašytiems susitarimams dėl Visagino A. Respublika.lt, 2011 12 23.

224 Premjeras teigia, kad visuomenei bus pateikta išsami informacija apie atominę elektrinę, Lrytas.lt, 2012 07 19.

225 Žiemelis tapo referendumo iniciatyvinės grupės koordinatoriumi, Lrytas.lt, 2012 07 25

226 Premjeras teigia, kad visuomenei bus pateikta išsami informacija apie atominę elektrinę, Lrytas.lt, 2012 07 19.

227 Referendume balsuoti prieš VAE statybas raginami ir kavinių lankytojai, 15min.lt, 2012 10 05.

228 VAE: žmonės sprendžia – ne valdžia! Žaliosios politikos institutas, 2012 03 13.

In the statements related to the Greens the problems of nuclear safety issues were emphasised, as well as criticism of the choice of strategic partner "Hitachi". R. Karbauskis, leader of that political power, also raised the issue of the future price of electricity.[229]

The prevailing theme in the discussions of the governing bodies was whether was a need of such referendum at all there, but after the decision to organise it, they became strong supporters of YES. The prime minister at that time Andrius Kubilius stated, that he does not see any point in organising the referendum, while the project development works were still not finished[230]. Later he just tried to deny the threat of the raising prices[231]. Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission of the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania Rokas Žilinskas, belonging to the same party, emphasised the problems of energy safety and named the new nuclear power plant as a measure to reduce the dependence on Russia[232]. In general, the supporters of the construction of a new nuclear power plant had a tendency to blame the ones that did not agree with the project as having relations with Russia. The preparation of the referendum deciding upon the construction of a new nuclear power plant was named as a threat, which could scare away the investors or even totally stop the project, harming the implemented strategy of national energetic independence. Liberal Movement of Lithuania, which also belonged to the governing coalition, named the positive aspects of the new power plant, supported by a referendum, including energetic independence and potentially smaller price of electricity. Even the rhetoric reminded of the referendum of 2008, which has failed, as a serious decision made by the citizens on the atomic energy.[233]

229   R. Karbauskis: Visagino atominė elektrinė – Lietuvos savarankiškumo kapas. DELFI, 2011 12 10.

230   Premjeras abejoja referendumo dėl Visagino AE racionalumu. Respublika.lt, 2012 03 27.

231   A. Kubilius: iki 2028 m. Visagino AE elektra kainuos apie 18 ct. DELFI, 2012 03 24.

232   R. Žilinskas: referendumas dėl Visagino AE yra Rusijos plano dalis, DELFI, 2012 03 26.

233   E. Masiulis. Nauja atominė sustiprintų žmonių pasitikėjimą valstybe, DELFI, 2012 05 11.

The main argument of SDPL in the public space was the fact that they are not against the atomic energy in general, but against this uncertain and not clearly calculated project.[234]

Table 6. Typical slogans in the referendum campaign on the construction of a new NPP (2012)

Campaign YES 2012	Campaign NO, 2012
"for the nuclear energy"[237] "we will ensure the independence of energy"[238] "the cheapest alternative to gain electricity"[239]	"it is not useful to build power plant with the reactor of such power"[240] "today the state is offered the unbearable burden[241] "it is not clear so far how much would electricity cost"[242] "not against the atomic energetic, against a specific Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant"[243] "the small children of today will get the burden of all the loans for Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant"[244] "it is scary to live near the power plant"[245]

Sources: Created by the author, based on the sources provided in the footnotes.

When summarising this campaign and comparing it with the previous ones we may notice that pragmatic arguments dominated it (the size of the reactors, price of electricity); however,

234 Socialdemokratai pasisako ne prieš atominę energetiką, o prieš konkretų projektą, lrytas.lt, 2012 07 18.

235 Premjeras teigia, kad visuomenei bus pateikta išsami informacija apie atominę elektrinę, lrytas.lt, 2012 07 19.

236 Atominė elektrinė - baubas ar išsigelbėjimas? Vakarų ekspresas, 2012 10 03.

237 E. Kūris: referendumas dėl VAE buvo klaida, Seimas tegul sukasi, DELFI, 2012 10 24.

238 Referendumas dėl VAE – politinė reklama, Lietuvai kainuosianti 4 milijonus? LRT.lt, 2012 07 15.

239 Atominės likimą vėl lems tauta, Respublika.lt, 2012 07 17.

240 Premjeras teigia, kad visuomenei bus pateikta išsami informacija apie atominę elektrinę, lrytas.lt, 2012 07 19.

241 Socialdemokratai pasisako ne prieš atominę energetiką, o prieš konkretų projektą, lrytas.lt, 2012 07 18.

242 Referendume balsuoti prieš VAE statybas raginami ir kavinių lankytojai, 15min.lt, 2012 10 05.

243 Op. cit.

valuable-normative environment, even though it is not directly related, but it would still raise the issue of "Europe" and more precisely of being with the West (and by contrary the fear to be with the West, being European and through this comes construct of freedom and sovereignty (which unintentionally brings to the same slogans and narratives, which were essential in the referendum of 2003).

Final discussion

The importance of the referendum of 2003, constructed as an importance of another historical choice between the East and the West was a fundamental issue, which had to bring the nation to a new path and a new age. Meanwhile, future considerations of atomic energy upon the closing of the INPP were not only put to the level of "high" politics, but also became the issue of the political agenda as well as consideration, issued for the whole society, just as a context part of Lithuania being in Russian energetic system and energetic independence[244]. The same context appeared in the referendum of 2012, even though it did not raise a controversy on the European level: in principle it seems that like an economic issue and a specific decision on a specific project of constructing a nuclear power plant, but in relation to the previously held referendums, it also has another ideological-valuable context.

Rational argument is a common tool, used to analyse referendums in numerous academic discussions. However, there remains to be unanswered questions on the impact of rational argumentation and how much did the society know and what was the importance of the arguments themselves. A difficult research is being carried out on how to explain the dependant variable (the

244 Vaičiūnas Ž. Europos Sąjungos bendros energetikos politikos formavimasis ir Lietuvos interesai. *Politologija,* Vol. 3 (55), 2009.

greater number of the ones voting YES or NO) through such independent variables as sociodemographic factors, ideological parties, ethnic cultural characteristics.

It is through the aspect of explaining the behaviour of the public that the referendums also become a relevant study object for political communication. Taking up research of campaign argumentation in the public space, is akin to automatically presuming that the argumentation is an independent indicator, that could explain how the "micro changes" in it define the "micro impact" in the scale. The result of all this would be a determining a total decision for YES (or NO), where a very important part is taken by the actors.

By further following the idea of the rational logic[245], it should be stated that the national governments tend to organise referenda as a result of a rational calculation of political benefit. It is argued that the elite (governments, parliamentary parties) choose the formal and legal rules of the referendum, including the wording of the question, provides a possibility to spread political interpretations[246]. This leads to the fact that the same elite is responsible for the outcome of the referendum. The logic of manipulation is not alien to the analysed cases; however, the period after the referendum shows that the result cannot always be predicted or acceptable to the aforementioned elite (it could be especially said about the 2012 referendum, the decision on which has not already been made).

In parallel with the referendum, the assimilation of the on-going voting campaign allows us to find another rational

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245 Closa C. Why convene referendums? Explaining choices in EU constitutional politics. *Journal of European Public Policy,* Vol. 14:8, December 2007.

246 Hug S., P. Sciarini. Referendums on European Integration. Do Institutions Matter in the Voter.s Decision? Comparative Political Studies, 2000, Vol. 33, no 1; Schneider G., Weitsman P. A. The Punishment Trap. Integration Referendums as Popularity Contests. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 28, No 4, 1996.

construct – "the second-rate"[247]. It needs to be agreed that, when assessing them in isolation, both 2008 and 2012 referendums could be treated as such, inserting additional topic to the parties that run for the Parliament. A certain phenomenon is observed, the obvious feature of which is the setting of a higher meaningful weight to the voting side by the assimilated campaigns. On the other hand, as the further development of political events has shown, the normative space of values that formed during the 2008 referendum – whether Lithuania needs the nuclear energy – implicitly influenced the decision on voting YES or NO in the referendum of 2012.

Therefore, when analysing the referendum it may be stated that the actors consciously change and form another field of values (even though the ration is also considered). Therefore, everything looks far more clear and more convincing, when the formal institutionalism and ration choice is successfully supplemented with the remarks of discursive institutionalism. Without the discourse it is very hard to explain, how the decision of an individual affects the collective decision, therefore in the analyses of political campaigns some of the authors[248] emphasize its essential relation with the norms, ideas and institutions. Others[249] treat narratives, slogans, myths, collective memory, scripts etc. as important units of analysis. From the whole enumerated ones, for referendums and their campaigns the most suitable would seem the slogans, which in this research are made a central object of the analysis. They are the one that allow tracking, noticing and further assessing the changes of discourses.

247   Mažylis L., Jurgelionytė A., 2012.

248   Diez, Th. Speaking "Europer": the politics of integration discourse. JEPP 1999/4.

249   Schmidt Vivien A. Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth "new institutionalism". European Political Science Review 02/2010; 2(01).

In this way from the point of view of discursive institutionalism, it becomes meaningful to state that up until 2003, the discourse "we want to be Europeans" was constantly forming and was "carrying" with itself such essential narratives and ideas as freedom, sovereignty, consolidation of independence, which were changing up to 2008, but did not fade. They were also felt in 2008, even though some certain political powers "added" new discourses (for the Lithuanian political space), which are also reconstructed in the referendum campaign of 2013. All of these cases have the same dimension of constructing "Europe", but completely different and changed situations.

Conclusions

In each of the analysed cases the discourse (or its segments) is described as fundamentally changed. It is accepted that the actors have consciously changed the structural environment: they added new, changed, discourses. Therefore, the approach of discursive institutionalism allows assessing the relations between the structural environment and the actors, their (changing and unchanging) interests. Consciously changed political discourses, recognised through the campaign slogan (re)construction, provide additional explanatory power. After all, the YES and NO camps not only used the arguments, but also constructed them, by basing them on such strong, basic ideas and values, such as sovereignty, freedom, "selling" neutrality, energetic independence as part of the overall independence; how the East are opposed as representing dependence and restriction. Therefore it is not possible to totally refuse the idea that a person was affected by ideas of such type, which are not only the subject of behaviour and socialization, but also of deep human nature. Naturally, for proving such claims, completely different research methods are necessary.

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17. Mažylis L., Unikaitė I. The Lithuanian EU Accession Referendum 10-11 May 2003. Referendum Briefing Papers No 8, EPERN, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epernbreflith.pdf
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25. Various articles from the site www.15min.lt

CONSTRUCTING THREATS IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF RUSSIA

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ABSTRACT

Threats both internal and external have a huge influence on public life and political behaviour. Therefore, the understanding of threats is the matter of paramount importance. It is the essential task for scientists and politicians to apprehend how threats are constructed, how they could be explained and when exactly and why threats emerge. Although the nature of the threat matters a lot, the context of it, particularly the regional context, has no less significance in assessing the severity of the threat. The context especially matters for those living in the neighbourhood of a powerful country such as Russia.

   This paper argues that threats do not exist *per se*; threat is not a natural phenomenon, but socially constructed one. Therefore, the threat becomes real only then when it is constructed by someone. The central idea of this paper is to showcase the importance of the region in constructing the threats. For this purpose both regional security complex theory and securitisation theory are used.

Keywords: securitisation, Russia, regional safety, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy

Introduction

Threats both internal and external have a huge influence on public life and political behaviour. Therefore, the understanding of

threats is the matter of paramount importance. It is the essential task for scientists and politicians to apprehend how threats are constructed, how could they be explained and when exactly and why threats emerge. Although the nature of the threat matters a lot, the context of it, particularly the regional context, has no less significance in assessing the severity of the threat. The context especially matters for those living in the neighbourhood of a powerful country such as Russia.

Security is constructed in accordance to the geopolitical situation of the region; it much depends on the relations with neighbour countries and international organisations (IO). For example the security of Europe is much affected by IO such as the European Union and NATO. The security policy of Europe is largely defined by the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP); besides that, NATO policy and national security policies also have great influence in shaping the security environment of Europe. However, all security policies are constructed with references to external threats. Therefore, in order to have an effective security policy, first of all, one has to understand the threats one faces.

This paper argues that threats do not exist *per se*; threat is not a natural phenomenon, but socially constructed one. Therefore, the threat becomes real only then when it is constructed by someone. The central idea of this paper is to showcase the importance of the region in constructing the threats. For this purpose both regional security complex theory and securitisation theory are used.

Section 1 of the paper establishes the plausibility of securitisation approach explaining the construction of threats. Section 2 tackles the question of regions by investigating regional security

in the neighbourhood of Russia. And finally, section 3 provides some recommendations on how threats and security should be perceived in the European Union.

1. Constructivism and Securitization Studies

The main assumption of this study is that threats cannot exist *per se*; it is not a natural phenomenon; in other words, *threats are constructed*. But when the construction process is done the threats become real. Therefore, to understand the process of construction means to understand the causes of the existing threats. In that case, decision makers have the possibility to act not only reactively but also proactively, i.e. to act before a situation becomes a source of confrontation or crisis. Consequently, the analysis of adequate theories is provided, that proves the assumption.

International Security Studies is a wide discipline, embracing a variety of International Relations theories. In the post-Cold War era, some new and influential security theories emerged, which endeavoured to explore and explain the changed order of the World. Constructivism was one of those theories. It is one of the most prominent and modern theories, that increasingly continues to significantly influence the political scholars' thought even today; it has, in turn, become one of the dominant paradigms for analysing security issues. However, constructivist approaches vary widely in their nature.

One of the most notable modern approaches is the theory of securitization, developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, an approach that has now come to be titled as the Copenhagen School. In its simplest terms the approach might be understood in the following way: securitization analyses how security issues emerge, evolve, and dissolve[250]. According to the Copenhagen

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250   Balzacq T. Constructivism and Securitization Studies. In: Dunn M., Cavelty & Victor Mauer (ed.) *Handbook of Security Studies*. London: Routledge, 2009.

School, a certain issue reveals itself as a threat through the discursive politics of security[251]. Wæver defines securitization in the following way:

"With the help of language theory, we can regard security as a speech act. In this light, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). […] The word 'security' is the act […]".[252]

However, in order to understand securitization theory one first has to examine the ontology and epistemology of the constructivist tradition. Any possible approach to security starts with, and rests upon, peculiar ontological and epistemological assumptions.

It is worth saying that theories can be categorised by different types of commitments to ontology. Two wide categories embrace a wide range of these ontological commitments: materialism and idealism on the one hand, and monism, dualism, and pluralism, on the other hand. In this regard, constructivism is attributed to pluralist-idealist ontology[253]. Basically, constructivism is based on relativist ontology. To put differently, it based on the notion that the truth about *"what is what"* is socially negotiated.

Although constructivism deals with mostly similar epistemological assumptions, different streamlines highlight alternative postures, and inescapably down-grade others. Basically, representatives of constructivism are unanimously opposed to empiricism – meaning that knowledge comes only or primarily from sensory experience[254]. Nonetheless, a number of constructivists

251   Dillon M. *Politics of Security. Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*. London and New York, Routledge, 1996.

252   Wæver O. Securitization and Desecuritization. In *On Security*, edited by Lipschutz R., New York, Columbia University Press, 1995.

253   Balzacq T. Constructivism and Securitization Studies. In: Dunn M., Cavelty & Victor Mauer (ed.) *Handbook of Security Studies*. London: Routledge, 2009.

254   Smith S. Positivism and Beyond. In: Smith S., Booth K. and Zalewski M. (eds) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

apply scientific realism and positivism. Securitization, in turn, uses constructivist approach in two different ways. On the one hand, it proposes a creative material for the moulding of ontological and epistemological commitments of constructivism. On the other hand, securitization creates a fundamental effect that could have wide adaptability within International Relations, as it explains how societal issues (not only threats) arise, evolve and disappear.

To get a perfect understanding about the process of the construction of threats, in the first place it is necessary to be familiar with the concept of security. The concepts of security and threats are very closely related to each over. Obviously, security depends on threats, and security strategy rests on the features of threats (severity, possible consequences, frequency, context, etc.). According to Barry Buzan:

"Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence".[255]

After the Cold War, the concept of security has become multifaceted and complicated. In this regard, Barry Buzan offered a broader framework of security integrating concepts such as regional security, or the political and economic sectors of security. Buzan's framework is holistic; and though he supplements his approach with neorealist features such as anarchy, the essence of his approach refers to constructivism, for he does not accept the given. Buzan argues that the understanding of threats rests on three levels and five sectors. Threats might be analysed at individual,

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255   Buzan B. New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century. *International Affairs*, Vol. 67.3, 1991.

state and international levels, and additionally five sectors, i.e. political, military, economic, societal, and environmental, could be used for the examination of threats.[256]

In order to analyse threats in the neighbourhood of Russia it would be the model of Buzan is used. The referent object, in this regard, would be the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region as it is some sort of frontline of Western democracy, and, therefore, the threats posed by Russia, first and foremost, would affect this particular region.

The direct threats that coulde voke the most serious concerns are military, which are capable of posing threats to the state or the region on several levels. *Military threats* can impact all elements of the region. Russia, in this regard, has one of the most powerful militaries in the world; and, as the recent events show, it does not avoid using it (e.g. the Georgia conflict in 2008; the Crimea conflict nowadays). Those military threats are constructed mainly by the rhetoric of the Russian President Vladimir Putin and by the strength of the Russian military. It is obvious that if Russia had much weaker military capabilities, its strategies would be completely different or, at least, it would not be so aggressive and offensive as it is today. Therefore, the CEE region should be seriously concerned and adapt their security strategies according to these threats.

Political threats could present a serious concern for the CEE region as well; but this type of threats can be more ambiguous and hard to identify, comparing with military threats. Today Russia's political threat towards CEE, aimed at weakening that region, can be considered to be on par with a military threat. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia and Europe has competed over political influence in the region. This competition has been

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256   Bajarūnas E. Cooperation of Nordic-Baltic Countries in the Areas of Security and Defence. *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2013.

constructed in the historical and geopolitical contexts. Generally, Russia has been and will remain a security factor for the whole Europe, as Russia shares borders with five countries of the EU-Europe, and the Baltic states are a direct corridor for it to the West. According to Bajarūnas, no matter how controversial Russia is, it is a strategic partner of the EU, NATO and a member of the UN Security Council.[257]

Economic threats, in turn, are hard to define, due to the complexion of economics itself. As Buzan states, "the normal condition of actors in a market economy is one of risk, aggressive competition and uncertainty", this renders economic security difficult to determine. As had been seen with the recent economic crisis, there were so many states in the EU that had suffered a great deal from it. Certainly, the recent economic crisis was a global threat rather than a regional one. However, the economic downturn just in one country could also have devastating consequences on other countries situated in its proximity. For example, economic issues in Russia could significantly affect countries in the neighbourhood, as it was the case during the Russian economic crisis in 1999. Besides, Europe is very dependable on Russian energy recourses, and this could be considered a great threat to the Europe's economy as well. In this case, energy could be used as an instrument to gain geopolitical advantages and foreign policy objectives. However, the current situation in Crimea has given a chance for the leaders of the EU countries to look very seriously into economic and energy dependency, and as a result alternative ways of obtaining required energy have been proposed. Moreover, Buzan addresses the important linkage between economic security and military security. It is obvious that military capabilities are dependent on economic power of a state because of budget constraints and limits. Besides, economic security can be

257   Ibid.

considered a major factor to the whole security of a state. For example, if one compares developed and developing countries, it will become clear that with economic security other levels of security become easier to establish.

Societal security is probably the most complicated of the five sectors to consider. Although it is hard to distinguish it from the political sector, societal threats are more concerned with identity and the balance that can be identified within a state or region. Some regions are often not capable to deal with disparity in norms and beliefs. If Europe is used as an example, one can notice that the differences in culture, identity, norms and beliefs, which make up ethnic boundaries found within the Europe's region, are not easily reconciled with becoming the member of EU. The construction of one single and united Europe with a common culture and identity is "mission impossible", according to some critics. Even within a single state diversity in ethnic composition could be found. For instance: the Turkish minorities in Germany, the North African people in France, or the Russians in Ukraine. If the minorities within a state are quite large, there might be some tensions between the ethnic majority and minority. It is clear that societal security is deeply connected with political and even military security. Most conflicts that are prevalent now are those that have a societal element. For example, the safety of the Russians in Ukraine has been the pretext for Moscow to invade the Crimea region, the precedent which could be used in other regions as well.

The *environmental sector* proves to be the most debatable of the five sectors. Usually we think of ecological threats as natural and uncontrollable events, such as earthquakes and hurricanes. However, according to a vast number of scientific publications, the activity of mankind is not such a harmless matter. Humanity's

impact on the nature causes ecological issues such as global warming, pollution, and the thinning of the ozone layer. It is worth mentioning that, usually, environmental problems are not limited in space, these issues do not recognise states' borders and these kinds of threats have a widespread effect. The CEE region, in this regard, should be worried about the Russian plans to build nuclear power plants in the vicinity of EU. For example, in the case of an accident in a nuclear power plant, the ecological threat would affect the neighbourhood countries.

Each of these sectors has a significance in its own way, and although military threats have traditionally had the most substantial impact on constructing the security agenda, the broader understanding of security other sectors, such as economic and ecological, has started to gain more importance as well. All sectors should be taken into consideration when analysing regional security.

2. Regional Security in the Neighbourhood of Russia

The regional level of security has become both more autonomous and more prominent in international relations; and, specifically, after the Cold War, the regional variable gained much more significance. This different attitude was obviously caused by the ending of the bipolar system. Without the competition between the two superpowers, smaller countries and their domestic powers gained more space for manoeuvre in the international system. After the Cold War, all the most powerful countries of the world, including, certainly, Russia, had less temptation, and showed less effort, to interfere in security matters outside their own regions.

The purpose of using the regional security complex theory (RSCT) in this study is that it enables to understand how the threats have been constructed in the neighbourhood of Russia

after the Cold War and to assess the security balance in the region. According to Buzan and Wæver, the central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances then over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes.[258] As Friedberg argues: "most states historically have been concerned primarily with the capabilities and intentions of their neighbours."[259] Therefore, in order to understand security of the state or the region one must first analyse the foreign policies of their neighbours. RSCT is based on the securitisation theory which, in turn,put special emphasis on the political behaviour, i.e. domestic and foreign policies, by which security problems is constructed.

Buzan and Wæver present three theoretical trends which could be used in explaining the post-Cold War international security system: neorealist, globalist and regionalist. [260]As the goal of this study is to show the importance of the region in constructing the threats, thus it is focused mainly on the regional theoretical perspective. The regionalist approach can be superficially seen as a post-Cold War perspective based on two assumptions:

1) The decrease of superpower competition diminished the influence of global power interest in the rest of the world [261];

2) Most of the great powers in the post-Cold War international system are now "lite powers"[262].

258   Buzan B. & Wæver, O. *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge University Press, 2003.

259   Friedberg A. L. Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia. *International Security*, Vol. 18 (3), 1993.

260   Buzan B. & Wæver, O. *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge University Press, 2003.

261   Stein A. A. & Lobell, S. E. *The End of the Cold War and the Regionalization of International Security.* In: *Lake and Morgan* 1997c.

262   Buzan B. & Segal, G. *The Rise of the "Lite" Powers: A Strategy for Postmodern States.* World Policy Journal. 13 (3). 1996.

Regional security dynamics has a significant impact on constructing the overall structure of security in the international system. It is worth mentioning that the regionalist approach includes features of both neorealism and globalism; however, it focuses more on a lower level of analysis.For example, threats can be defined as coming from a global level (financial instability, global warming or pandemic), but the referent object to be made secure may be at regional level.

Basically, it could be assumed that contemporary states may be categorised by three characteristics: (1) level of power, (2) geopolitical situation and (3) historical context. The region in the neighbourhood of Russia, which is examined in this study, consists of states belonging to the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The degree of power differs somehow in each of these states but not so much; all these countries are in the proximity to Russia; and the history of each of the state is quite similar – they all belonged to the Soviet Union. Thus, this region is also known as the post-Soviet region. Therefore, it would be rational to analyse this region as a single unit.

Another possible way to categorise states is define them as *strong* or *weak*[263]. However, this spectrum is not about power in the traditional sense, it is about strength and weakness of internal cohesion between civil society and the governmental institutions. Those countries, which could be referred as strong, will face mostly external threats, whereas internally weak states will tend to be more divided and fragile. CEE, before becoming a part of European Union, could be referred to as a weak region, as after the collapse of Soviet Union the countries of this region struggled to establish and maintain democracy, the newly established governments were very fragile and cohesion between governments and society was very weak.

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263   Buzan B. New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century. *International Affairs*, Vol. 67.3, 1991.

Some scholars (Caporos, Buzan and Segal) have slightly different view on how to categorise states. They classify states into three main types: *postmodern, modern* and *premodern*.[264] This kind of typology will be used in analysing the construction of threats in the neighbourhood of Russia.

Modern states are defined as having strong control over society and limited openness policy. These states are absolutely independent and self-reliant, having divergent national identity and politics. Their economic, cultural and political policies are secured from outside influence, and their sovereignty is inviolable. Due to their exceptional focus on territoriality, modern states put much emphasis on securitisation in inside/outside terms. In this study Russia is regarded as a classic example of modern state.

Postmodern states, in turn, tend to have more open economies, and to some extent open societies and politics. They assume that a wider range of interactions is helpful for both their prosperity and their security. Therefore, these countries perceive threats in different light, many of the traditional threats are simply desecuritised, as they are of no importance to this type of states. However, simultaneously they construct a new security agenda, which mostly concentrates on the threats related to their identity and culture[265]. Although the EU is not a state, it is the most obvious example of this sort of structure.

Premodern states are defined by a low degree of social and political cohesion, having fragile and internally divided governmental institutions. Most notable examples are states located in Africa and Central Asia. However, this study embraces only two types of states: modern (Russia is perfect example of this type) and postmodern (members of the EU and the EU itself).

264 Caporos, J. The European Union and Forms of the State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34 (1), 1996, Buzan B. & Segal, G. *The Rise of the "Lite" Powers: A Strategy for Postmodern States.* World Policy Journal. 13 (3). 1996.

265 Wæver O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., Lemaitre, P., with Carlton, D. et al. *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe.* London, Printer, 1993.

Modern and postmodern states perceive threats differently; the latter type feel threatened by things such as migration, terrorism, economic cycles, "democratic deficits" and sovereignty attest[266]. While for modern states, particularly for Russia, inclusion is perceived as the major threat. In Russia, this kind of threat emerges from a conflict between its native cultural and social projects on the one hand, and external influences and penetration (NATO, EU, Western values, etc.) on the other hand. The long-lasting dispute in Russia between the Westerners and the Slavs is an example of such tensions[267]. The comparative analysis of modern Russia and postmodern Europe is shown in Figure 1.

Modern Russia	Postmodern Europe
Strong control over society	Open society
Limited openness policy	Open economy and politics
Focus on territoriality	Focus on integration
Securitization in inside/outside terms	Desecuritization of traditional threats
Security and defence strategies*	
Preservation of the territorial integrity	Regional integration
Deterrence	Reassurance
Secrecy	Transparency
Confrontation	Consultations

Figure 1. The comparative analysis of modern Russia and postmodern Europe[268]

There are various levels of analysis used for examining the national and international threats. However, this study argues that the most useful level for analysing the construction of threats

266 Buzan B. & Wæaver, O. *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge University Press, 2003.

267 Neumann I. B. *Russia and the Idea of Europe.* New York, Routledge, 1996.

268 Security and defence strategies were analysed using European Security Strategy and Russian National Security Strategy to 2020.

in the neighbourhood of Russia is the regional level. The region refers to the level where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other[269]. The EU and the CEE could be considered as perfect examples of it. Buzan and Wæver define regional security complex in the following way: "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another".[270]

Putting the regional security complex in the light of constructivism it could be stated that threats can be understood as socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the security practice of actors. Therefore, the analysis of actors' practices and discourses towards threats need to be studied. Accordingly, "threat" is what the actors make it. However, how actors perceive threats much depends on the context of regional security.

3. The EU Security in the Neighbourhood of Russia

The Western neighbour of Russia is the EU. The EU considers Russia as one of the possible sources of external threats, while Russia, on the contrary, from its point of view sees the EU and NATO as the most severe threat. In order to understand this mutual hostility one has to understand how security of the EU and the Russia is constructed.

It will not be wrong assuming that EU-Europe is the most institutionalised region of the world. Therefore, the main security strategies of the EU are associated with peaceful regional integration. In the Cold War period, the region that is today known as EU-Europe was overlaid and the prevailing security concerns

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269   Buzan B. & Wæver, O. *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

270   Ibid.

in the region were defined externally. Later, already in the post-Cold War era, according to Buzan and Wæver, Europe has faced several new threats such as: (1) Europe's past (Europe has to avoid returning to its own past of wars and power balancing); (2) European integration (it is considered as a threat, primarily in the context of national identity); (3) local conflicts (they can threaten to the integrity of Europe (Northern Ireland, the Basque region, Corsica); (4) ethnic conflicts; (5) globalisation and immigrants; (6) international organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration; (7) environmental issues; (8) global terrorism; (9) infectious diseases; (10) traditional state-to-state threats; and (11) instability in Russia.[271]

All the above listed threats illustrate the diversity of threats Europe faces today. However, this study focuses primarily on threats posed by Russia. Russia is usually not presented as a source of military threat or a radical country, but it is treated as an unreliable country. Nonetheless, resent events in the Crimea region proves that military threat cannot be excluded from the European security agenda.

Why can Russia be seen as a threat to Europe, particularly to the CEE? In order to answer this question, in the first place, one has to understand the foreign policy of Russia. The driving idea of Russian foreign policy has been the idea of "near abroad". It started to emerge as Russia's main priority in 1992, and became official policy in 1993[272]. The former Soviet republics, including Lithuania, were considered as a Russia's sphere of interest. Officially, this policy was justified by the necessity to defend Russian minorities, but the real interests included economic ones. The "near abroad" policy should

271   Ibid.

272   (Smith G., Law V., Wilson, A., Bohr, A. & Allworth, E. *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, Matz J. *Constructing a Post-Soviet International Political Reality: Russian Foreign Policy Towards the Newly Independent States 1990-1995.* PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University, 2001).

not be underestimated. Today, the "near abroad" idea still remains the dominant principal in a variety of Russian doctrines (foreign policy, national security, military doctrine).

The essence of the Russian foreign and security policy towards neighbourhood countries perfectly reveals the words of Dmitry Rogozin, the then Chairman of international affairs committee:

"Discrimination against and threats to the life, let alone taking the life, of Russian subjects amounts to a threat to the Russian state itself and its national security. We have 25 million compatriots in the near abroad. That problem is our number one problem, a national security problem[273]"

The Baltic-Russian relations is an obvious example on how the "near abroad" policy works. Since the declaration of independence in the early 1990s the Baltic States were solving the issue of the withdrawal of Russian armies from their territories[274]. The quest of the Baltic States for membership in the EU and NATO has been the politics of survival par excellence, aimed at securing the Western security guarantees against a historically aggressive and unstable neighbour - Russia. Survival by belonging to Europe, by becoming European, has thus dictated the foreign policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since the end of the Cold War[275]. Moreover, a sizeable minority of Russian-speaking inhabitants in Latvia and Estonia (a less urgent problem for Lithuania) was posing a constant concern.

Russian politicians envision the Russian minorities as threatened mostly by violations of their human rights. And on the contrary, the political elite of the Baltic states paints a picture of the minorities as a fifth column and thus as a threat to the Baltic states.

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273   Monitor. Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC. http://www.jamestown.org

274   Bajarūnas E. Cooperation of Nordic-Baltic Countries in the Areas of Security and Defence. *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2013.

275   Mälksoo M. From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe. *Security Dialogue*, No 37, 2006.

Military security is another headache for the Balts. Russia's relations with the Baltic states are completely different because of the lack of trust between Russia and the Baltic states. The war in Georgia, the constant large-extent and offensive-nature military exercises "Zapad" and "Ladoga" in the neighbourhood of the EU and, certainly, the contemporary situation in Crimea also added to the mistrust. Dmitri Trenin characterised the interests of Russia as follows: Russia tries to prevent the deployment of NATO infrastructure in the Baltic states; aims at obtaining the elements of infrastructure in the Baltic states; forces Latvia and Estonia to decrease standards in acquiring citizenship, thus increasing its political weight in them; and defends the role of the USSR in liberating Europe from the Nazism.[276]

The above analysis leads to an undeniable conclusion: Russia no longer belongs to EU-Europe's Regional Security Complex. Moreover, Europe is seen by Russia as the main interregional problem. In relations between Russia and the EU, the major problems have been the NATO enlargement, the EU Eastern Partnership program and the Baltic states. According to Buzan and Wæver, the Baltic states' main security issue is Russia, while Russians often securitise the Baltic states, particularly the Baltic treatment of Russian minorities.[277]

Conclusions

Taking everything into consideration, it could be stated that constructivism and specifically securitisation might be efficiently used for the analysis of the international security system. Security, in turn, is thought of as the pursuit of freedom from threats. Therefore, in order to be securitised one has to understand the nature of

276 Trenin D. Russian Policies toward the Nordic-Baltic Region. In: Nurick R., Nordenman M. ed*., Nordic-Baltic Security in the 21st Century.The Regional Agenda and the Global Role, Atlantic Council*, 2011.

277 Buzan B. & Wæver, O. *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge University Press, 2003.

threat. As it was mentioned above, threats do not exist *per se*. An international issue becomes a threat only after the securitization process. And that process needs to be initiated by a specific actor.

One of the key objectives of this study was to analyse how the threats are constructed in the neighbourhood of Russia. For this purpose, the regional security complex theory was used. The theory revealed that regional security dynamics has a significant impact on constructing the overall structure of security in the international system. Therefore, two regions were used in this analysis: Russia from one side and Europe from another. In other words, threats posed by Russia towards Europe were examined. Moreover, this study uses Barry Buzan's approach for the analysis of threats. He suggests that five sectors, i.e. political, military, economic, societal, and environmental, could be used for the examination of threats.

The study shows that Russia should be regarded as modern state while EU-Europe is a postmodern region. Modern states are defined as having strong control over society and limited openness policy. Due to its exceptional focus on territoriality, Russia's foreign and security policy is mostly focused on the security of its sovereignty from outside influence. This specific policy, in turn, constructs specific threats to neighbouring countries, particularly to EU and NATO countries. For example, the NATO and EU enlargement process towards the East is seen by the Russian government as contradictory to their security policy. This phenomenon could be called "to pat a scared dog". Though intentions could be the best, nonetheless, it could be understood as a wrongdoing by the other side.

This analysis and the recent events in Crimea region reveal that EU-Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy should be focused mostly on the threats posed by Russia. It is an essential task for EU leaders to understand the nature of threats constructed by Russia. Only with this knowledge it is possible to implement the adequate and appropriate security policy.

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MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE – LEGITIMATE THEORY OR MERELY A CONVENIENT CONSTRUCT?

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ABSTRACT

Multi-level governance as a theory of European integration was started in the early 1990s, by Liesbeth Hooge and Gary Marks as a result of the study of post-Maastricht European Union. It analyses the changing and intertwined relationships between actors, who belong to different territorial levels – supranational, national and subnational. This theory highlights the increasingly fading distinction between the domains of domestic and international politics and describes a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers.

But multi – level governance is criticised not only for its failure to predict further integration of the EU – it is said to give too much attention to the lower levels, compared to non-governmental actors, its lack of predictive powers, its weak explanations of causality. Whatever the weaknesses of MLG, no-one can deny its convenience for the EU institutions – it awards them, as actors of the supranational level, great power in the political playing field, and even promotes transference of more and more state functions – and the power that comes from enacting them – from the national level upwards. So it is no surprise that the development of MLG as a theory was and still is supported from Brussels. The concepts of MLG quickly entered into the vocabulary of policy–makers who played a part in driving it forward. This could raise a doubt of the real nature of MLG – is it a real, legitimate theory of

international relations – albeit very specific ones, or is it a quite successful attempt to construct a scientific discourse that is very favourable to the powers of Brussels? This paper by the way of analysing the scientific and political discourse of MLG will attempt to answer these questions. Analysis of scientific papers and texts as well as publicly positions of European level policy-makers will be employed.

Keywords: Multi-level governance, European Union, local government, scientific discourse

Introduction

Theory of Multi-level governance took its first steps as the idea of "Europe of the regions" was becoming more and more fashionable. It rose from a study that was attempting to capture the developments of European Cohesion Policy and the rising importance of both supranational and subnational actors. The theory was coined by Liesbet Hoodge and Gary Marks, and later built upon by other scholars. At the first glance it was a very successful attempt to explain the idiosyncrasies of European Union of the time – the focus on subsidiarity, the deepening integration and the rise of the supranational European institutions, the attention to regions and subnational entities, brought on by Cohesion Policy. Multi-level governance provided an attractive alternative to both neo-functionalism and liberal inter-governmentalism and so quickly took root in the scientific discourse concerning the EU.

However, as time passed and "Europe of the Regions" did not fully materialise, deficiencies of the theory came to light. Its lack of universal ambition (no-one would really argue that Multi-level governance is not an *ad hoc* theory), uncertain predictive powers were especially criticised in the scientific community, and the amount of admiration for its insights decreased.

However, Multi-level governance became very much a staple of the European political discourse. It was especially embraced by bodies such as The Committee of the Regions, The European Commission, and, to a lesser extent, The European Parliament. The theory was very convenient to those bodies – it spoke of eradication of the state, the rising decision-making powers of the supra-national institutions – it was basically a validation of all the ambitions of growing power European Commission might have had.

This zeal of political communities to embrace a particular theory begs the question whether it really has sufficient explanatory power, firm enough ontological and epistemological foundations of a legitimate theory, or is it merely a convenient construct, that, despite its proved faults, is still being pushed forward by the European decision-makers, in an attempt to influence the scientific discourse in a favourable direction.

This paper will aim to address this question by taking a closer look at both the praise and criticisms Multi-lever governance theory has taken, and also examining the stance of European institutions in regards to this theory. Analysis of scientific papers will be carried out, as well as research concerning examples of papers, events and mechanisms, put out by the European institutions.

1. Multi-level governance: birth, and main concepts

The concept of Multi-level governance was fist mentioned by Gary Marks in his 1993 paper "Structural policy and multi-level governance in the EC", that was published in a monograph "The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond". Since then the theory was expanded by Marks and his collaborator L. Hooghe in titles such as 'An actor-centred approach to multi-level governance', 'European integration from

the 1980s: state-centric v. multi-level governance', 'Contrasting visions of multi-level governance', "Multi-level Governance and European Integration", "Unraveling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance" and so on.

Other scholars expanded upon these ideas - Conzelmann and Smith (2008) focused on structural funds and environmental policy, Piattoni(2009) – on the dichotomies of centre/periphery, state/society, domestic/international in multi-level governance, Kohler-Koch and Larat (2009) explored the diversity of research traditions in Europe, Enderlein, Walti and Zurn's (2010) examined MLG from domestic and EU perspectives, Bache and Andreou (2011) uncovered nascent and emerging patterns of MLG across South-East Europe, Levi-Faur and Bache (2012) examined Multi-level governance within the broader notion of governance.[278]

However, the first steps the theory has taken were from a research of 1988 reform, that basically overhauled the European Cohesion policy. It was then that the European Commission began to speak of a "new era" for the regional policy. The European Commission placed a particular importance on the policy, with one objective in mind: to transform it from an intergovernmental budgetary transfer to a genuine regional development tool. President of the Commission, Jacques Delors put emphasis on the regional disparities within the Community, the underdeveloped regions of the periphery.[279]It was said that the structural funds should make it possible to support structural conversion and adjustment projects in regions that were experiencing difficulty.

Treating the structural funds as a tool of Brussels to take up when "fixing" regions, rather than an inter-governmental deal

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278 Stephenson P. Twenty years of multi-level governance: 'Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?' *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 6, 2013, p. 817–837.

279   G. P. Manzella, The turning points of EU Cohesion policy, Report Working Paper,http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/policy/future/pdf/8_manzella_final-formatted.pdf (accessed on March 15, 2014).

afforded more power to both the EU institutions, ant the regions themselves, and a new alliance was born – EU institutions and sub-national actors saw the mutual benefits of supporting each other in order to weaken the position of the central state governments.

In 1988 key strategic decisions for implementing the Single European Act as pertains to the structural funds and Cohesion Policy were agreed on. The structural funds were provided with a major cash injection and financial stability – their budget was doubled over the 1989-1993 period. Four main principles were also established to underpin policy implementation, heralding a new era in the governance of Cohesion policy and which continue to constitute its cornerstones: concentration, programming, partnership and additionality.[280]

This reform of Cohesion policy directly led to the birth of a new concept in EU integration studies – the new governance arrangements, especially the partnership principle, the growing role of the regions, that came with cash injections, properties of broader significance for the Union, emerging form a larger role of supra-national authorities in the allocation of these funds – all those trends caused the rise of Multi-level Governance, a theory, that emphasised the increasingly shared and interlinked nature of decision-making between Community, national and subnational actors.

Marks in his 1993 paper analysed the then recent developments in the EC's Cohesion Policy. His work was built on asking two sets of questions. At first, he was interested in how have institutional innovations come about, and which actors have been most responsible for shaping them. He also analysed what were the consequences of institutional innovation for existing institutions,

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280 Manzella G. P. The turning points of EU Cohesion policy, Report Working Paper, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/policy/future/pdf/8_manzella_final-formatted.pdf (accessed on March 15, 2014).

what kind of political order was emerging in Europe and what are the consequences of institutional innovation for the existing state system?'[281]

Marks argued that the analysis of institutions must reach beyond areas of central governments. He underlined the increasing importance of subnational levels of decision-making and their myriad connections with other levels. Thus, by shifting the focus on both the sub-national and the supra-national levels, he suggested the emergence of Multi-level governance – 'a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers', that was created by a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that had pulled some previously centralized functions of the state' up and down.[282] Multi-level governance was said to capture the state's 'unravelling' – it was no longer centralized and performing all functions at the highest level, rather it was being pulled apart from both the sub-national and the supra-national sides.

Multi-level governance discourse has also concentrated on the more general diffusion of political authority into a less hierarchical and more network-like structure. The emergence of public-private governance arrangements was highlighted in this discussion. EU has answered this discourse with empirical moments such as the Open Method of Coordination, voluntary accords and the 'new approach directives', as well as delegation to regulatory networks and agencies, instruments, that are characterised by subsidiarity and the inclusion of actors not on the basis of formal competence, but on the basis of the resources these actors can bring into play.[283]

281   Marks G. Structural policy and Multi-level governance in the EC in: A. Cafrunyand G. Rosenthal, *The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond.* Boulder 1993, p. 391–411.

282   Marks G. Structural policy and Multi-level governance in the EC in: A. Cafrunyand G. Rosenthal, *The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond.* Boulder 1993, p. 391–411.

283   Conzelmann T. Towards a new concept of multi-level governance?, Working Paper, MLG Atelier, 10 September 2008.

It is no wonder, that the concept of Multi-level governance soon entered into the language of European and regional policy-makers – it clearly favoured these two groups at the expanse of the central state. "Hollowing out" the state by shifting its functions up or down was an idea that greatly empowered both the EU institutions and the regional actors.

2. Criticism of Multi-level governance

When Multi-level governance theory was taking its first steps, not everyone were enamoured with this new idea. It did offer a new point of view and was reacting better to the changes brought by the reforms of late 1980-ties – early 1990-ties, but its problem solving capacities were questioned almost from the get-go. Scharpf (1997) argued that Multi-level governance's effectiveness at different governance levels varied from one policy area to the other. He identified constraints on both national and European capacity in a range of policy domains, offering a two-dimensional conceptualization of multi-level problem-solving capacities.[284]

The original proponents of multi-level governance Marks and Hooghe (1996) offer a three pronged test for the validity of MLG. The first is that the intergovernmental European Council and Council of Ministers share "decisional authority" with the Commission and other supranational institutions. The second is that no one state can dominate collective executive decisions, and the third being that subnational actors utilise the European arena to influence and exert pressure on state executives.[285]

On the other hand, Stubbs concentrated his criticism on three aspects of Multi-level governance, that he called premature

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284   Scharpf F. W., Introduction: The Problem-Solving Capacity of Multi-level Governance, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1997, Vol. 4 No. 4, p. 520-38.

285   Marks G., Hooghe L. European Integration from the 1980s: State Centric v. Multi-level Governance. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34 No. 3, 1996, p. 342-378.

normativism, abstract modelling and multi-pluralism. Premature normativism is basically an attempt of Multi-level governance theory to judge normatively how well Multi-level governance works, which also leads to an increased reliance within the scientific discourse on questions about how "good" governance should work within the Multi-level framework.[286]

Multi-level governance is also criticised for its rehashed neo-pluralism, that is, that while concept of Multi-level governance acts as a counterpoint to "state-centric approaches" to governance, the danger is that fundamental questions about the structures of power relations, often over-emphasised in statist theories, are downplayed in multi-level governance approaches.[287]

The criticism of abstract modelling focuses on the difficulties caused by the close ties between Multi-lever governance literature and mainstream political science, which tend to make authors dismissive of the turn of "fashion" in the social sciences. The modelling approach to social policy and "welfare regime" theories in the Multi-level governance literature has some serious limitations that cause epistemological and methodological objections. Main one is that models tend to be only two-dimensional, with two variables, while it is unlikely that there are the only two possible axes.[288]

This criticism also touches the problem of universal applicability of Multi-level governance theory. As Bache and Flinders (2004) have stressed, there is a difference between "conceptual

286   Stubbs P. Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and the Politics of Scale in South East Europe. *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. VI, No. 2, 2005, p. 66-87.

287   Stubbs P. Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and the Politics of Scale in South East Europe. *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. VI, No. 2, 2005, p. 66-87.

288   Stubbs P. Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and the Politics of Scale in South East Europe. *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. VI, No. 2, 2005, p. 66-87.

travelling" and "conceptual stretching", that is, between success-
fully applying a concept to explain a different empirical struc-
ture than it was derived from, and artificially altering the model
to fit whatever empirical reality is being analysed. Main models
of typologies of multi-level governance, that were derived from
Western Europe, are less likely to be able to travel, to be effec-
tively applied to new cases, rather they are too often 'stretched'
and distorted, sometimes to the breaking point, at least when en-
countering governance forms in other parts Europe. The concept
of Multi level governance, because of its theoretical vagueness,
can travel, but the rigid modelling, theoretically far more precise,
cannot.[289]

Within the last decade there were attempts to apply Multi-lever
theory to broader decentralisation in South America and Asia
and proliferation of both governmental and non-governmental
international organisations, however, as this paper had already
discussed, methodological implications of Multi-level gover-
nance models make it hard to correctly apply it to different states
within the EU – not to mention other continents, that really
have no supra-national structure comparable to the EU, with its
deep economic and political integration and powerful supra-na-
tional decision-makers. This makes Multi-level governance a the-
ory that can mostly be applied only to EU, thus decreasing its
claims of legitimacy.

3. Actions and re-actions of the European institutions

It is established, that theory of Multi-level governance suffers
from lack of sustainable predictions, lack of universal applica-
bility, empirical and methodological implications and too great
a reliance of normativity. The last aspect of criticism ties directly

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289   Bache I., Flinders M. Multi-level Governance: Conclusions and Implications, in: Bache I.,
Flinders M. *Multi-level Governance*. Oxford: University Press, 2004, p. 195-206.

into the main problem of this paper – is the fact, that despite those considerable drawbacks, Multi-level governance continues to be widely discussed and very much a part of the scientific discourse, a proof that the theory has considerable merits, or does its popularity stem from its convenience to the fund-wielding EU institutions? Some scholars even go so far as to call MLG a favourite coat of the European political science wardrobe – worn so often as to become threadbare[290] – quite a feat for a theory that has little predictive power, no attempts at universal explanations and no real methodological implications beyond an imperative to pay attention to different levels of polity.

No-one can argue that Multi-level governance is a theory that supra-national actors can un-reservedly approve of. If we subscribe to the theory of institutional growth, all institutions desire broader powers, that bring not only political clout, but also larger budgets, more prestige, better qualified staff and real decision-making power. Thus, EU institutions and the bearcats that inhabit them undoubtedly should be supportive of broader and deeper economic and political integration. And Multi-level governance theory predicts just that in the concept of "hollowing out" the state. Furthermore, it gives the supra-national authorities a convenient ally – the sub-national actors that also wish to gain more power at the expense of the central national authorities.

In this context, European Union itself has explicitly sought to explore its own commitment to multi-level governance as a privileged and 'best possible' form of governance. [291]Increasingly, through its programmes of large-scale funding of network-based

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290   Stephenson P. Twenty years of multi-level governance: 'Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?' *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 6, 2013, p. 817–837.

291   Stubbs P. Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and the Politics of Scale in South East Europe. *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. VI, No. 2, 2005, p. 66-87.

social scientific research, the European Union has also contribut-
ed to this normativism and the dispersion of Multi-level gover-
nance within the social scientific research community.

One of the most obvious participants is The Committee of the
Regions, which organizes annual "ateliers", in order to bring to-
gether scholars and practitioners to celebrate – and in so doing
legitimize – multi-level governance and the theory that discusses
it. These Ateliers were launched in 2008 in order to further de-
velop the concept of multi-level governance. In this first cycle of
three Ateliers, scientists from throughout the European Union
and beyond with different academic backgrounds exchanged
ideas about possible strengthened multilevel governance struc-
tures for the future European Union, including topics such as the
new concepts, legal and political instruments and strengthening
the multi-level governance in the EU policies. In 2008 and 2009
the ateliers were specifically about Multi-level governance, while
in 2010-2011 their theme was less direct, but still concerning the
themes of Multi-level governance: "Co-governing Globalization:
What Role for Local and Regional Authorities?".[292]

These ateliers are quite prolific; they attract scholars from all over
Europe, who produce a considerable amount of normativistic re-
search on Multi-level governance and its practical applications – for
example, the ateliers led to the adoption of the Charter on Multi-lev-
el governance, by the Committee of the Regions. The Charter will
open on May 9 2014, and it calls public authorities of all levels of gov-
ernance (local, national and European) to use and promote multilev-
el governance (MLG) in their future undertakings. Charter signato-
ries will be invited to experiment with innovative policy solutions in
adherence with MLG principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and
partnership, and to promote the use of multilevel partnerships and

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292   The official site of The Committee of the Regions, http://cor.europa.eu/lt/activities/gover-
nance/Pages/cor-ateliers.aspx (accessed on March 28, 2014).

instruments for joint policy action. EU institutions and EU member states are also invited to apply Charter principles when drawing up, implementing and evaluating European strategies and policies, and associations and networks of local and regional authorities, together with political figures wishing to support this process are invited to declare their support.[293]

But the ateliers and the Charter on Multi-level governance are not the only actions by the Committee of the Regions designed to promote multi-level governance. It has also created the Scoreboard on Multilevel Governance – a tool to monitor on a yearly basis the development of MLG at European Union level.[294] Thus far two editions of the Scoreboard have been produced, covering the period 2010-2012. Each of these scoreboards provides a comparative assessment of the MLG performance at EU level under four priority policy strategies of the EU.

European Commission also did its part in promoting the concepts of Multi-level governance and encouraging the development of the scholarly discourse. The Research and Innovation General Directorate has established Connex – a network of research, dedicated to o the analysis of "Efficient and Democratic Multilevel Governance in Europe", with an overall goal of to enhancing knowledge essential to the future of Europe, based on independent fundamental research and building a Europe-wide research community.[295] Connex integrated and initiated research on governance in the multilevel system of the EU by bringing together a multitude of scholars and facilitating communication and cooperation irrespective of disciplinary boundaries, language barriers. It performed a systematic stock-taking exercise to disclose the wealth of already existing knowledge and made it more easily accessible for future research, aspired to contribute to a better

293   The official site of The Committee of the Regions, http://cor.europa.eu/LT/ACTIVITIES/ governance/Pages/Charter-for-MultiLevel-Governance.aspx (accessed on March 28, 2014).

294   The official site of The Committee of the Regions, http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/governance/Pages/mlg-scoreboard.aspx (accessed on March 28, 2014).

295   The official site of the European Commision, http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/ projects/221_en.html (accessed on March 30, 2014).

understanding of EU governance, also gave a science based input to institutional reforms. Consequently, CONNEX has engaged in co-operation with practitioners and in the dissemination of research insights. It also invested in the training of young scholars.[296] The network has produced an extraordinary amount of research – more than 700 papers were written within this project.[297] Such numbers show that The European Commission has shown considerable dedication to financing and promoting further research on Multi-level governance.

Conclusions

In conclusion it can be said that institutions of the EU – both advisory bodies like the Committee of the Regions, and real decision-makers like the European Commission – are quite enamoured with Multi-level governance and promote its spread. The theory is useful for them – it promotes concepts that empower the EU actors with greater power than they empirically have, finds them allies among the sub-national and civil society actors and empowers those allies through the widespread of partnership principle.

However, despite the fact that the EU institutions do support the further development and promotion of Multi-level governance theory within the scientific discourse, one cannot go as far as saying it has no standing by the merits of its own. It is a theory that quite elegantly describes the unique phenomenon that is the EU, although its methodological aspects remain lacking. The influence of EU institutions and their research funding might explain the over-reliance on normativism within the Multi-level governance body of work and the theory's great popularity, that does not seem to be much diminishing.

296   Connex Publishable final activity report, "Efficient and democratic governance in a multi-level Europe", Project no.: CIT1-CT-2004-506347, http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/fileadmin/reports/Publishable_Final_Report.pdf (accessedonMarch 30, 2014).

297   Connex Publishable final activity report, "Efficient and democratic governance in a multi-level Europe", Project no.: CIT1-CT-2004-506347, http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/fileadmin/reports/Publishable_Final_Report.pdf (accessedonMarch 30, 2014).

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15. The official site of The Committee of the Regions, http://cor.europa.eu/
lt/activities/governance/Pages/cor-ateliers.aspx (accessed on March 28,
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16. The official site of The Committee of the Regions, http://cor.europa.
eu/LT/ACTIVITIES/governance/Pages/Charter-for-MultiLevel-Gov-
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UKRAINIAN DREAM IN THE MIRROR OF EUROMAIDAN

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ABSTRACT

The idea of building a society based on European values – freedom, equality, and democracy – was developed in the independent Ukraine (from 1991), and after the events of the "Orange revolution" (2004) firmly established in the public and official discourses with a perspective of signing Association Agreement with the EU Member States in 2013. Sharp reversal of this course, which was produced solely by ex-president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, without prior consultations and public debates, has produced an immense dissatisfaction of civil society developing into the actions on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev. Both the meeting place for activists and the movement against political regime were called "Euromaidan".

In the paper, the specific structure of "sotni" ("hundreds" – military-territorial associations), general system of self-management (Council of Maidan), material resource management, as well as political representation of Euromaidan is overviewed.

Mythologization on the level of mass consciousness, analysis of stereotypes, sociological interpretations are further presented and analysed.

Keywords: Euromaidan, European Union, political protest, civil society, social institution, European integration, European values, self-identification, public discourse, official discourse

Introduction

Freedom has always been one of the major values of the Ukrainian society. That is why Ukrainians respect freedom of others as well: in the long run of its history Ukraine has never initiated a war of aggression, but only defended, more or less successfully, its territory and independence.

The idea of building a society on the basis of European values, such as freedom, democracy, equality in the eye of the law, received a stimulus for development in the independent Ukraine (since 1991), and after the Orange Revolution occupied its rightful place in public and official discourses. Undoubtedly, neither all the politicum, nor the whole society unanimously supported the course towards European integration and signing the European Union Association Agreement, planned for November 2013, declared by the Ukrainian authorities (according to the public opinion poll of the Ukrainians carried out before the Vilnius Summit, about 38% were not ready to vote for accession to EU at the hypothetical future referendum, however the same quantity would support accession to Customs Union[298] – formally only trade and economic, but in fact political union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan).

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298   Яким шляхом іти Україні — до якого союзу приєднуватись? (преференції населення за два тижні до Вільнюського саміту). – Режим доступа: http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr &cat=reports&id=204&page=4

It was that sudden turn of this course, produced individually by the ex-president V. Yanukovych, without preliminary consultations and public discussion, under obvious pressure of the political guidance of the Russian Federation, that discontented civil society. The first to express peaceful protest were students. After the military dispersed the people gathered in the main square of the capital of Ukraine, Maidan Nezalezhnosti (and adherent to it parts of the central street, Khreshchatyk), tens and then hundreds of thousands of people came out. Although subsequent protests were directed, first of all, against existing political regime, the place of activists' meeting and the movement itself got the name "Euromaidan". This neogenic notion became a kind of generalized symbol of European aspirations of Ukrainians, disappointment stemming from not signing the European Union Association Agreement at the Vilnius summit, and also hopes for power and significance of the central square of the country as a traditional place, where people can express their political protest.

In the paper, the specific structure of "sotni" ("hundreds" – military-territorial associations), general system of self-management (Council of Maidan), material resource management, as well as political representation of Euromaidan is overviewed. Mythologization on the level of mass consciousness, analysis of stereotypes, sociological interpretations are further presented and analysed.

1. Maidan– institutions and representatives

Practically at once Euromaidan became a veritable social institute of the Ukrainian society, an influential subject of political processes. Unlike "Maidan of the Orange Revolution", it was in part (quite a big part) generated "from above". There were clear signs of initiative and direct organizing activity by political parties of

the so-called democratic wing (for example, the central stage in Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv was officially leased by political forces, all agitation tents had clear party affiliation). However, the root of Euromaidan was the expression of active civil position of common people.

With its form Euromaidan ascends to ancient Greek and old Slavic traditions of direct democracy. "Veches" as regularly conducted meetings of the people, became one of such revived forms (traditionally, only in Kyiv about 30-50 thousand persons gathered at them, at peak moments of political tension – up to 500 thousand). The most important questions of Euromaidan strategy were put to the common vote: for example, opposition leaders' participation in/abstention from negotiations with existing authorities, formulating political demands, etc. In case of Euromaidan direct democracy also managed to effectively transform into a model similar to representative democracy with a concrete ramified organizational structure. There were "sotnias" (military-territorial formations) and the system of general management (headquarters, Council of Maidan, commandant of Maidan), "transparent" collection and distribution of charitable material aid, system of food supply, medical care, security, cleaning, communication service were all organized.

In spite of defending similar aims, Euromaidan has never been a homogeneous force. It was a situational alliance of different social and political associations, in peaceful time quite often unfriendly to each other. Their positions towards a number of questions raised by the "winter opposition" were distant from a compromise. For example, a radical right-wing All-Ukrainian association "Svoboda" (Freedom), up to 4-5 thousand people; this was the group that occupied the building of Kyiv regional state administration and was constantly present there in

December-February. There was also "Spilna Sprava" (Common Cause), up to 500 people; to a considerable degree "an intellectual association", not supporting radical right-wing moods, promoting the necessity of negotiations. There were "Cossacks", up to 500 people, in many positions supporting "radical right-wing members", "Right sector" and "Veterans of battle actions in Afghanistan" - 3-4 thousand and 400 people accordingly, showing most activity in fights in Grushevskogo and Institutskaya streets), "Automaidan" – protest "on wheels", and so on.

A special role in the institutionalisation of Euromaidan was played by "Virtual Maidan", namely:

    a) volunteering in the Internet through specially created groups in social networks of "VKontakte" and "Facebook". Groups in "VKontakte" at the beginning of the sharp phase of "winter opposition" in January already counted over 200 thousand members (Українська революція/Ukrainian Revolution, Євромайдан/Euromaidan). At the beginning of May they had 586 thousand members, Правий сектор/Right sector had 100 thousand members, and at the beginning of May this number had grown to 426 thousand members, ЄВРОМАЙДАН/EUROMAIDAN | ПРАВИЙ СЕКТОР/RIGHT SECTOR had 80 thousand members and at the beginning of May – 450 thousand members, not taking into account regional groups;

    a) websites – among the most well-known are "Euromaidan SOS" (a self-organised group of human rights activists, civil activists, journalists, giving legal support to suffering participants of Euromaidan, collecting and analysing information for defence of protesters, search of missing people), "maidan-help.org" and other;

    b) online on-the-spot commentaries.

Due to these informational channels Ukrainian society had an opportunity to learn urgent information (that was either hidden or presented in the distorted kind by authority-subordinate media), and activists carried out partial co-ordination of the actions.

In myths about Euromaidan, as in myths about any meaningful and new social institute, the structure became stronger in mass consciousness. Real research refuted the myth that mainly "idlers and tramps" participated in the protests: specialists of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, periodically, together with different organizations-partners, investigated the social and political processes of 2013-2014, the phenomenon of Euromaidan in particular. They found representatives of all social classes, middle class being represented especially greatly (for example, in December, 2013 Euromaidan consisted of 17% businessmen, 64% of people with higher education). The myth of the age of participants was also debunked – the average age of protesters was about 36 years old. Very few representatives of political parties, public organizations and movements appeared in the square (only 8%), the other 92% were common, unaffiliated people[299]. Another refuted myth about Euromaidan is that mainly the western region of Ukraine was represented there, whereas the South and East didn't show solidarity with Euromaidan. Really, such geographical division has political-ideological meaning for our country: the Western region (historically developed in the area of Magdeburg law, its territories referred to present Poland, Lithuania, Austria, Hungary) and the South-Eastern region (for a long time existing in the system of serfdom and mainly as a part of Russian empire) are not identical cultural segments, determining different vectors of political orientation. However, Euromaidan

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299   Від Майдану-табору до Майдану-Січі: що змінилося? – Режим доступа: http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=226&page=2

managed to unite interests of all the regions of Ukraine: socio-logical research showed no less than 45% people being from the Centre and the South East of the country by birth[300].

2. The reasons and the outcomes

The main reason compelling people to come out to Euromaidan (such questioning was conducted on December, 7-8) was, first of all, indignation at the hard repressive actions of the law en-forcement authorities (70% of the protesters pointed this out as their reason for coming). Putting a stop to the European inte-gration processes was in the second place (53,5%). 50% of partici-pants came out to protest in order change life in Ukraine for the better, and 39% – to promote the complete change of power in Ukraine[301]. Even if these percent correlations changed during the following months, the changes were not drastic – mainly, people turned toward radicalization and striving for greater activity.

Today, months after the end of armed collisions in the centre of Kyiv, it is possible to say for sure that Euromaidan, as a self-ordered and self-organized decisive "City in the city", played a key role in the overthrow of the corruption-oligarchic political system. Three times a compromise of the opposition with the authority were prevented by the protesters. Euromaidan sent its representatives to new dem-ocratic executive bodies, and also a few candidates to May election of the President of Ukraine. Many political scientists consider that Ukrainian civil society was born and got firmly established at Euro-maidan, not during the period of "the Orange Revolution".

Euromaidan is not only an organized form of political protest but also a special subculture, where the Ukrainian dream was splashed out

300 Від Майдану-табору до Майдану-Січі: що змінилося? – Режим доступу: http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=226&page=2

301 Майдан-2013: хто стоїть, чому і за що? – Режим доступу: http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=216&page=3

not only in pure political forms but also in installations, performances, painting on shields, musical concerts and improvisations, photo-exhibitions, lectures of the Open university of Maidan, enormous amount of creative content in the Internet. The content-analysis of these artefacts demonstrates the symbolic desire of Ukrainians to integrate to European Union, become part of the European culture.

The prime minister of Poland Donald Tusk has recently made an accurate observation, that Ukraine is the only country where people died for the idea of European integration. Certainly, during the last months the desire to become an inalienable part of European Union only got stronger in the consciousness of Ukrainians: in November 38% of population of the country were ready to support such course, but by the end of February this number grew to 44,5%[302]. In addition, that was on condition that the second poll of public opinion was only one day away from the beginning of military encroachment of the Russian militarized forces to Crimea. Taking into account that the population of Ukraine reacted negatively to the bringing of Russian troops to its territory (to various extent it was denounced by 83% of citizens; even in the Eastern areas there were 68% with whom the idea was unpopular[303]), it is not difficult to predict direct proportional dependence between further escalation of conflict from the side of Russia and height of popularity of the European integration idea, which in this case is contrasted with any alliances with the Russian Federation.

3. Not as European as it seems?

At the same time, it is necessary to understand that identification as a part of Western civilization and acceptance of the European

302 "Настрої України" – результати спільного дослідження КМІС та Социс. – Режим доступа: http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=227&page=2

303   Ставлення українців до рішення Росії про введення військ в Україну. – Режим доступа: http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=245&page=1

system of values in the conditions of sharp transformation of mass consciousness is not deprived of inner contradictions and stereotypes.

For example, it is obvious, that European integration is frequently understood as something abstract, quite separate from the concrete steps. For example, Ukrainians are not inclined to bind themselves to the very important structural reforms, aimed at the improvement of the electoral system, innovations in the judicial sphere, struggle against corruption, improvement of the condition of the environment. Though objectively this connection to European integration is obvious, and those steps are supported by 70% of the population, that is approximately twice as high as "abstract and obscure European integration".

Such "schematic", "empty" perception of the course of European integration allows the pro-Russian and ingeniously Russian media to prevail in the public discourse with their own interpretation of the essence of the European values. Their existence is either called into question or purposefully and intentionally misinterpreted as "propaganda of homosexuality", which stirs up the high level of homophobia already existing in the Ukrainian society.

It is obvious as well, that concerning a number of certain European values (to the admission of which Europe itself had to develop for centuries) there is no consensus in Ukrainian society – actually, a negative attitude towards them prevails. The most revealing example are questions of gender equality and freedom of sexual identity. The same Euromaidan, and in particular its basic structural groups and management organs, perceived the idea of creation of female sotnia named after O. Kobylianska ambiguously and sceptically. Not many were ready to reconcile to the fact, that a woman wanted to participate in the revolution in a way, different from making sandwiches and doing other activities aimed at serving men.

Another bright example is related to the religious activity at Euromaidan. The Ukrainian orthodox church of Kyiv patriarchy, with patriarch Philaret at the head, and the Byzantine-rite Catholic Church of the Ukraine, with Sviatoslav Shevchiuk at the head, as well as representatives of many other churches and religious communities united in support and defence of the protesting in Euromaidan and in the regions of the country. Every veche began and ended with not only the hymn of Ukraine but also a prayer for the country.

Participation of all basic Ukrainian churches and religious communities in the revolutionary events (which itself is an unprecedented event in the Ukrainian history) witnessed the fact, it was not simply a social protest, but a deeper process, that is a "Revolution of dignity". At the same time, we shouldn't forget that namely religious, and also pro-religious public organizations and movements accumulated purposeful activity of different vectors directed on discrediting of the ideas of gender equality and freedom of sexual identity in consciousness of Ukrainians. For example, they actively propagated the necessity of legislative limitation of women's right to abortion (that, by the way, found considerable support of population in all regions of Ukraine without any exception), which discursively conflicts with the modern pro-european vector.

Conclusions

This vector of movement of Ukraine is presently quite obvious, the question is only, how soon and at what price our society will start on a journey to the real cultural, political and economic European integration, and what role yet will be played herein by Euromaidan. In addition, today, when powerful self-organization of Ukrainians from "below", sincere mutual help and

volunteering demonstrate enormous potential for the real social transformations. The Ukrainian society has to search for answers to new non-trivial questions: do people have a right for a strike in case of anti-humanistic and criminal actions of the authorities, is the display of tolerance to those, who don't show tolerance in return and accomplish criminal, terrorist acts, possible, should the majority aimed at maintenance of the country go under the thumb of minority, destroying the state, atc. With greater evidence grows the understanding, that the "eurodream" of Ukrainians about life in just, legal, economically strong society has an enormous value not only for them, but also for the European Union and the rest of Europe. In fact, processes, actualized by the Ukrainian people already now assist the search of new internal identity of this region, comprehension of its value vectors of development.

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"EUROPE" DISCOURSES IN LITHUANIA, 1988-2014: META-NARRATIVE SKETCHES

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ABSTRACT

Discourses on "Europe" in Lithuanian political and media fields have been discussed.

Broad variety of contexts and meanings since the EU pre-accession debates has been shown. Mainly positive connotations in the mainstream political talks is contrasting with the particular negative aspects reflected in euro-sceptic campaigns, such as that of Ignalina nuclear power station referendum, and "Referendum on Land". Explanatory power of particular theoretical approaches, such as historic and discursive institutionalism, has been considered. As a supplementary approach, a meta-narrative explanation of what can be called content of "Europe", is discussed.

Introduction

In this article, a brief overview of "Europe" discourses is conducted in order to reconstruct the discourses of the last decades of Lithuanian politics (election and referenda campaigns included), employing meta-narratives of the media, academic community and everyday life in connection with them.

The ways of depicting and reflecting "Europe" in some, at least, aspects was overviewed in former works of mine and my co-authors, as well as in the works of other researchers. As Vivienne Schmidt depicted, discourses are to be reconstructed through "[…] frames, narratives, myths, collective memories, stories,

scripts, and more"[304]. Carvalho suggests notion of "discursive devices"[305]. Reconstructing "narratives" as devices is tightly connected with content analysis. Following similar analytical logics, Munnever Cebeci was trying to re-trace how the "ideal" European foreign policy is "internally" constructed[306]. However, the idea of employing "meta-narratives" was left rather aside of this analysis. "Meta-narratives" were critically interpreted by Lyotard[307] as anything "beyond narratives"; according to another interpretation, they would be "narratives of narratives"[308].

The core of this paper is the consecutive chronological analysis of "Europe" discourses in Lithuania, with division into periods. The first period began with the intrusion of Sajudis into the Communist mass media (departing point - Founding Congress of Sajudis, October 22-23, 1988) , and ended with the international recognition of Lithuania. The second one coincided with Lithuania residing in a "grey zone" in 1991-1992. The third one began with the appearance of Lithuania within the focus of European Communities, when it was began striving to become a Member State, and lasted until the EU accession referendum in 2003. And, finally, the last period compasses the years of Lithuania's EU membership, coinciding with flourishing and globalizing media

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space, and consolidation of virtual social networks. This latter decade is analysed through four analytical objects such as the referendum on Ignalina nuclear power station, referendum of selling land to the foreigners (we presume all these discourses marginal rather than mainstream), and European Neighbourhood Policy.

Within each period, this paper tries to provisionally accentuate one or a few meta-narratives.

Limits are implied by this kind of analytical logics, first of all, due to very changes and dynamism of the processes. For instance, actors such as politicians and parties were changing: there were only Sajudis and Lithuanian Communist Party in the beginning – now both of them had disappeared. The same is true regarding the media – both as an actor and purely "media".

As the latest developments in Ukraine show us, pro-Moscow discourses were probably written off: scenario of pro-Kremlin troops occupying Lithuanian TV in 1991 was successfully repeated in Ukraine in 2014. Had there been evidence of Kremlin propaganda beyond the line what was "mainstream" or "marginal" during all these years? Anyway, physical, technological, as well as structural, social, environment had changed challenging us to decide what was changing and what was stable. I do believe the genre chosen for this paper, that is, meta-narrative sketches, will facilitate this challenge.

1. Meta-narratives and "Europe" discourses: context of change

1.1. Period from 1988 to the international recognition of Lithuania in 1991

While trust in democratic principles, the importance of public opinion, the power of parliamentarian representation, (re)building of non-governmental sector were important ideational segments of Sajudis Movement since its very beginning, trust in

particular formal Western international structures as warrants of "soft" and "hard" security appeared later. Gradually, a "distance from the East" was formed[309]. It is rather difficult methodologically to define the "European" component, as through "deconstructing and constructing" historical processes, discourses are changing as well as meanings.

After the creation of "Sajudis Initiative Group" in June 1988, the first reaction was a fear of repressions, but "the release of discourse" is evident since August 1988 already. The meta-narrative made a crucial shift from "varnishing Soviet system" towards "the truth is indivisible", that is, part-truth is impossible. In August of 1988, elite consensus was established on a number of essential statements. Statements such as "did the secret protocols of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact exist", "they were hiding from us", "our loss of Independence" arose and the question of Independence became a central element of discourses. Recognizing the existence of these secret protocols "cut" the double or even the triple "knot" of value-based self-understanding: "the truth is not only indivisible, it is infinite". One cannot question Independence, neither as a historical fact, nor as an aim for the future, thus "the freedom must be unlimited", (a popular song of the time asks: *Why do we ask for freedom? Do free people behave like that?*). Delimiting "zones of influence" in the expense of the weaker implies total insecurity and thus is amoral in principle.

The ideas above are connected with Europe only indirectly, in its deeper meaning. The very word "Europe" is hardly found when analysing this period. The search for "Europe" in various discourses of that period, such as renewing education system, environment, religion, ethnic relations, and even geo-political

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309   Mažylis L. Lithuania's European Identity during the post-Soviet period. In: Hoffmann S. M., Buhr R. *Lithuanian and Belarusian National Identity in the Context of European Integration*. Kaunas, Vytautas Magnus University, 2013, p. 124-138. ISBN 978-995512-949-3; e-ISBN 978-995-12-948-6.

insights, is rather disappointing. "West" is connected sponta-neously with America, satellites of USSR are not "Europe" as well. Close analysis of the speeches of delegates of Sajudis Found-ing Congress shows that "Europe" was conceptually and literally counter-posed to "Asian" culture only in one speech of a poet Sigitas Geda (although it also touched upon the dimension of in-dividual freedom). "[...] *Who came to us through Russia, from the dark, cruel, two-faced, if not ten-faced Asia* [...]", and: "*If there ever was a place in the world, where an independent person was cherished and valued, it was in Europe* [...]"[310].

Further insights of Sajudis époque might be connected with a meta-narrative of a feeling of "insecure space", that developed through the process of constantly distancing oneself form Russia as "the other" power and proving its danger and threat not retro-spectively, but physically in the new circumstances. The conflict with Moscow in 1988-1991 was fresh and persisting. Physical vic-tims of January 13, 1991, had just recalled the historical conflict of the times of World War II. I insist that this was process not only the formed the identity but also was a direct proposition of geo-political choices. Narratives, and subsequently meta-narra-tives, were pre-occupied with the insecurity, felt not only through memories of previous decades: new resounding narratives from very fresh memory were much more convincible.

Later, Lithuania had to cross three "circles of insecurity". The first one was the Soviet economic blockade (1990), another – the protracted process of state constitution (1991-1992), and the third one – revenge of Communist "nomenclature" in 1992-1993. A new wave of "feeling insecurity" came in 2014, inspired by Rus-sian activities in Ukraine.

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310   Geda S. speech. In: Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sąjūdis. Steigiamasis suvažiavimas. 1988 m. spa-lio 22-23 d. Vilnius, Mintis, 1990, p. 86.

When attempting to reconstruct literal narratives of "Europe" in the 1990, it is quite hard to detect any concrete forms of it[311]. However, subtext of intuitive European self-understanding of Lithuanians is rather evident. Growing conflict with Russia forms "vacuum of security", that naturally brings a search for security, as well as stability and prosperity, in the West. At the same time, geopolitical circumstances were changing. The Soviet international system was destroyed, as well as USSR itself. State independence of Lithuania was recognized in 1991.

Shortly resuming, the word "Europe" itself came to the documents of the analysed period rather late. The strive for leaving the insecure space became essential in the political, as well as media, discourses in Lithuania. This choice matured, grew to a huge critical mass for further choices: to never belong to any post-Soviet structures but rather to the Western/European ones. But European values should evidently to be reconstructed as main power of dynamics of deep shifts of formation of national identity.

1.2. "Grey zone" ("strategic pause"), 1992-1993

As Archer states, after total international recognition of Lithuania it appeared in "almost impossible" position[312]. The Independence had to be defended practically in the country's own resources, in absence of any guarantees of security form aside. It was impossible to influence events in Russia, even though these events were very important for the trajectory of further developments. In this situation internal discourses of Lithuania became an important factor for gravitation towards the Western structures. When the

311   Mažylis L. Lithuania's European Identity during the post-Soviet period. In: Hoffmann S. M., Buhr R. *Lithuanian and Belarusian National Identity in the Context of European Integration.* Kaunas, Vytautas Magnus University, 2013, p. 124-138. ISBN 978-995512-949-3; e-ISBN 978-995-12-948-6.

312   Archer C. Security Considerations between the Nordic and Baltic Countries. In: *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997.* Danish Institute of International Affaires, 1997, p. 871-100.

majority of Western states were reluctant, Nordic states – Denmark probably most eagerly – found the space for their activities. The choice of Denmark was to "limit activities" of USSR (later Russia) instead of "harmonizing positions". The choice was a political one, and arguments very universal: democracy, human rights, international law, and sustainable development. This was in resonance with Lithuanian priorities such as "security is indivisible" (compare to "truth is indivisible", and "freedom is unlimited"). Success of Denmark in prioritizing this political course became a "success story" for Lithuania to copy when assuming and actively positioning its role within European Neighborhood Policy. Did Lithuania adopt the idea of "pushing" the center of Europe Eastwards?

All in all, pro-European self-understanding was crystallized during the "strategic pause". Moreover, a push for new dynamism formed within both "soft" and "hard" dimensions of strategic direction Westwards. Russia's doctrine of "closed neighborhood" was announced too late and it was not convincing neither for Nordic and Western, nor for Baltic States. Instead, Lithuania "with the delay of a half of a year" was consequently approaching IMF, WB, and Council of Europe[313]. Russian military troops were removed without any concessions and conditions, and Lithuania applied for NATO membership in early 1994.

1.3. Towards EU accession, 1993-2004

Lithuania was mentioned in 1993 in Copenhagen European Council as a country already in the focus of European Communities. But this fact appeared in national discourses as rather cloudy: there were a lot of different aspirations at once, such as membership in the Council of Europe, NATO perspective, and a number of others.

313   Landsbergis V. *Lūžis prie Baltijos*. Vilnius, Vaga, 1997, p. 302-337.

The accession process of almost 10 years was full of peaks and hollows, and, finally, was ended with a referendum of May 2003. Referendum discourses and meta-narratives related to them would serve us as items depicting this particular period.

In the referendum campaign the basic statement was to stress on "national security and European identity". This is easy to re-construct from the literal expressions of the documents on the governmental referendum campaign strategy. Main slogan suggested (rather constructed, than re-constructed) was "Let's be Europeans!" to imply the referendum is an action rather than an emotion. YES vote was suggested to stimulate "fatal geo-political motivation" without any alternative and understandable for everyone: "West instead of East", more precisely, not a "love to the West" but "non-love to the East": "towards stable democracy", "into the secure geo-political space". The slogans meet meta-narratives almost literally. Another strand of YES arguments in the referendum campaign was purely economic: "towards stable market economy", "membership will be economically beneficial". The mix of these two strands, combination of two types of arguments was fully successful as the results of referendum showed[314]. M. Cebeci would probably argue here on "implementing theory in the praxis".

There were practically no Eurosceptic discourse segments, or only marginal ones. All mainstream parties were in favour of Lithuania's EU membership. There was just "exit criticism" of media on the action of *VP Market* proposing beer for 1 centas for these who had participated in referendum.

Thus, the meta-narratives of the Lithuanian EU accession referendum somehow resound the end of fairy tale of Hauf about

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314   Mažylis L., Jurgelionytė A., Skirmantienė A. *Nemeilė Neeuropai. Europos Sąjungos ketvirtosios plėtros bangos referendumai.* Kaunas, Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas, 2004, p. 49. ISBN 9955-12-024-X.

Labakan and Omar. Both were pretenders to the Abasid throne, one legitimately, another not. Both were rewarded fairly. One who chose "honour and truth" (proper prince as proved) was granted with the inheritance of the throne. Another, who preferred "happiness and wealth" (tailor impostor) was given the thing we would call today "automatic sewing needle". Similarly, in the referendum of 2003, it looked like "Europe" proposed all four goods of Hauf's fairy tale[315]: honour and truth, and happiness and wealth. A vast part of Lithuanians was strongly convinced, and voted YES.

In contrast with evident deep rethinking of values and strong value shift towards "European" values (although not everywhere even used as the very word "Europe") as commented in in the chapter 2.1, here, approaching EU membership date, "Europe" was "naturally understandable".

1.4. Decade of EU membership, 2004-2014 m.

When analysing, for instance, the Eurobarometer poll data, the "physical" presence of Lithuania in the European Union little changed in Lithuanians' positions toward "Europe". Little changes appear in mainstream "European" discourses – political, media, and everyday life ones.

However, when looking closer, a new meta-narratives related to "Europe" seem to have appeared in the campaigns I tend to call "marginal".

1.4.1. Ignalina nuclear power station referendum, 2008

A consultative referendum on prolongation of work of Ignalina nuclear power station looks like a curiousity in terms of formal

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315   Haufas V. Pasaka apie netikrą karalaitį. In: *Pasakos*. Vilnius, Valstybinė grožinės literatūros leidykla, 1962, p. 102-127.

political logic. The Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania initiated consultations with citizens on whether to violate or not to violate an irrevocable condition of Lithuania's EU membership – to stop the workings of an insecure Ignalina nuclear power station. The result of all the process is twice curious. Lithuanian elites were happy to have successfully coped with the situation: a referendum was organized (at the same time as parliamentary elections), thus the nation was addressed. The will of these who participated in referendum was clear: NOT to stop the Ignalina nuclear power station. But this will was ignored due to formal microscopic argument: formally, the turnout was insufficient, lacking 1.5 per cent to make the 50 per cent turnout institutionally required. Institutional manipulation is more than evident. Announcing the referendum might be explained, as the intention of government was to form an additional context for parliamentary debates. Through that, the campaign of referendum itself would become "second-order" as it was in an event. The referendum campaign was positioned as "less important" and "supplementary" to the main one, of parliamentary elections and through that marginalized[316].

What is interesting for our theme, new kinds of meta-narratives apparently emerged in connection with campaign discourses.

"Cheap electricity is good for us when they are trying to lessen competition".

There were efforts of balancing between an attitude, acceptable for a majority of nation, that prolonging the work of the Ignalina nuclear power station is "a good thing", and at the same time, arguments, that it is dangerous and it is to be closed. In terms of social psychology, one can look for cognitive dissonance here.

316　Mazylis L., Jurgelionyte A. The Lithuanian Referendum on Extending the Working of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station: The Rationality of Actors Within (Un-)Changing Structures. *Baltic Journal of Law and Politics*, 2012, p. 117-136.

Thus value normative space is formed as a primitive one. Other possible value dimensions, such as safe environment, obligations to use EU funds for closing of station properly, or simply following international obligations provided in the Accession Treaty, were removed from the campaign argumentation.

Here, position towards the European Union as not us, strange power was reinforced by a way rather typical for euro-skeptical campaigns in different EU states. However, the object is rather specific: could the nuclear reactor of Chernobyl type symbolize "our national electricity"? Formulating YES-NO counter-position in such a "poisoning" way, the debates lost their content. Contradicting ideas were practically simply absent in this campaign. Efforts of elites to play the game with formal institutional referendum rules allowed to proclaim the referendum invalid due to insufficient turnout.

Despite the marginality of referendum campaign, there is a feeling the attitude "there is no need to follow all the international obligations", that was consolidated within an appropriate segment of society (see further 2.4.3).

1.4.3. Referendum on selling land to the foreigners

During the Lithuania's EU membership negotiations one long transition period was agreed upon in a negotiations chapter called "Free movement of capital": due to understandable reasons Lithuania asked to delay the fulfilling warranties to possess the land ownership for foreigners on equal foots with Lithuanian persons, as one of the essential conditions of free movement of capital. Transition period of 10 years was negotiated, ending on May 2014. Approaching this date, in the end of 2013, a referendum initiative group was formed to stop the possibility of selling land for foreigners, that is, persons from other EU states. 300 thousands of signatures were successfully collected, and the referendum was

announced. According to Vytautas Sinkevicius, former judge of the Constitutional Court, this referendum initiative is not appropriate because of a number of aspects of constitutional law. Despite that, meta-narratives in relation to this campaign are worth analysing.

The meta-narrative on "land as a special treasure" and even "sanctity of land" can be proved as strong and having special impact. Every child in Lithuania knows the meaning of the proverb "Silent as having sold the land". By that we may observe another example of "empty" – in terms of value normative discussion – campaign: one must be a sacrilegiously dull person to start disputing "sanctity". Moreover, "strangers" will buy it all. Thus once again we have a marginal object of the referendum. In addition, "Europe" might be depicted as "stranger". Subsequently, European values and even basic principles of law ("agreements to be followed") are devaluated.

1.5. Meta-narratives – stable or changing?

Meta-narratives such as values and interests, solidarity and criminal pragmatism, honour and truth, and happiness and wealth, and a number of others are recognised in the discourses of the time period analysed. They are dynamic and subject to change – and because of that it is hard to re-create them. They also display some qualities of stability and are quite constant – and because of that they might be not noticed.

One day we may come back to the conceptualization tradition of haiku (formed by Basho in 1680) as fueki-ryuko, that is, the idea of "unity of stability in change"[317].

Conclusions

Instrumental analytical value of meta-narratives looks quite problematic. "Meta" seems like signing a "beyond", thus

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317   Бреславец Т. Фуэки-рюко. В кн.Ч Поэзия Мацуо Басё. Москва, «Наука», 1981, с. 59-66.

"meta-narrative" should be accepted as a "narrative of a narrative" and even constructed artificially in order for the narrative to work. This terminological intricacy raises problems of epistemology and further research operational problems: do we intuitively catch what we want? Though it seems rather acceptable when challenging a brief sketch, such as this review of "Europe" in discourses through decades. Going through periods from a literal "absence of Europe" in 1988 through its invasion into mainstream political, media, and society discourses, to "persisting Europe", it is crucial to recognise what is mainstream and what is marginal. It allows us to consider the change of the stable and the stability of the changes.

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LEADERS OF LITHUANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES: BERLUSCONIZATION AS A EUROPEAN WAY OF PERSONALIZED LEADERSHIP?

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ABSTRACT

Political leadership is neither new nor an undiscussed concept in Europe. Even more – for the past twenty years, the concept of political leadership has been widely discussed within the political science and especially the sphere of political communication. The analysis of political leaders can be described with different '-*zation*' concepts, such as personalization, Americanization, mediatisation, modernization, professionalization, scientificization, presidentialization and lately Berlusconization. All these concepts have in common the importance of media and the growing importance of the role of leaders' personalities.

Another important aspect, related to these concepts in regard of personalized leadership analysis, is the shift from American trends to European ones. Earlier, Americanization was one of the most popular concepts analysing the relations between media and politicians in elections, campaigns and daily communication matters. Because these strategies were successful in the United States, they were carefully observed and consequently copied in other countries. Today we can see that another - European concept, called Berlusconization has emerged.

The aim of this paper is twofold: at first, to discuss the concept of Berlusconization, its European way and its differences from the Americanization concept. The second purpose of the

paper is more related to the Lithuanian case analysis. As in some aspects Lithuania can be seen as similar to Italy (catholic, highly conflicting political culture, multiparty systems) it is important to evaluate the Berlusconization aspects in Lithuanian political parties' leaders' communication through the media as: building appealing images; establishing a direct an emotional link with voters; creating media events and going personal.

Keywords: personalized leadership, political communication, political parties, Berlusconization, Americanization, Lithuania

Introduction

Political leaders and elections are important to every aware citizen, but for political science researchers it is more important why and how political leaders arise and attract voters. Personalisation, Americanization and Berlusconization of politics and political communication are the key concepts in today's comparative politics and political communication researchers' analyses. Some scholars claim that some of these aspects are not only new but sometimes dangerous for the societies – "the "Berlusconization" of the political arena is on its way all over Europe and the Central-European countries are not alone in this disease. This kind of populism is to be observed from Belgium to Austria".[318] Despite the relevance of new political communication trends in Western Europe and America, in Lithuania personalization, Americanization and Berlusconization as current trends of political leaders' communication and campaigns are under researched. So the main research question of this paper is how to name a political communication of the political leader which at the first sight has many features in common with S. Berlusconi and his political communication. Can Lithuanian political leaders, specifically V. Uspaskich and his political communication be called as

318 Weisskirchen G., Conference Paper. Central European University, Budapest. March 9, 2011.

Berlusconized? The object of the research is the communication of Labour Party leader V. Uspaskich in two Lithuanian news websites: www.delfi.lt and www.lrytas.lt in 2012. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate V. Uspaskich's communication made in electronic media using the Berlusconization concept by looking into four elements typical to Berlusconization: communication which builds appealing images, establishes direct emotional link with the voters, creates media events and goes personally in electronic media. For this research scientific literature analysis, quantitative and qualitative content analysis research methods were applied.

The first part of the paper discusses the concepts of personalisation, Americanisation and Berlusconization, as the latter can be seen as somewhat European way of personalized politics and leadership. The second part of the paper, describes the context of V. Uspaskich leadership, presents the methodology and dataset of empirical analysis and reveals the findings of empirical research, made by evaluating the communication of V. Uspaskich in electronic media.

1. Personalization, Americanization and Berlusconization as Current Trends of Political Leaders Communication

Personalization, Americanization and Berlusconization are the concepts used to analyse political communication and political leadership. Each of these concepts argue for the importance of media but also they have some important differences, i.e. how political leaders communication is understood, by which methods it is created and finally how it should be analysed. Americanization and Berlusconization refers to the personalization of politics, but is personalization always connected to Americanization or Berlusconization?

1.1 Personalization of Political Parties' Leaders

Regarding the concepts describing the trends of political communication, personalization comes to the fore because this concept emphasizes the importance of a politician's persona in today's politics.[319] The definition of personalization of leadership makes sense only if one takes into account, and indeed gives a major emphasis to, a rapport between leaders and citizens, based on feelings such as the appreciation of qualities and defects of the persons concerned, including the ability on the part of the leaders to transmit messages that are emotionally loaded and not merely tapping a 'rational' chord.[320] Recently the process of personalization and the rapport between leader and voters is empowered not only by the charisma or special competences of the leader, but usually personalization is empowered by the media and expressed by the means of media. Moreover, the media has profoundly modified the nature of politics and the contact between party leaders and voters takes place by means of media only. That is why leaders of major parties now figure prominently in the media coverage of parliamentary elections[321] and election campaigns become campaigns of political communication.[322] If one is looking for personalized leaders, they can be found in many European countries especially since the 1980s: Spain, Britain, and Italy with S. Berlusconi, is the clearest direct example of

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319 Isotalus P., Almonkari M. Current Trends in Political Communication and Criteria for Political Leaders. Perspectives of the Finish Press and Party Leaders. *Leadership and New Trends in Political Communication*. Selected Papers. Roma: Luiss CMCS 2011, p. 112.

320 Blondel, J, (ed.) Thiébault, J. L., Czernicka K., Inoguchi T., Pathamand U., Venturino F. *Political Leadership, Parties and Citizens: The Personalization of Leadership*. London and New York: Routledge. 2010, p. 5.

321 Mughan A. *Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections*. London: Macmillan. 2006.

322 Farrell D., M., Webb P. Political Parties as Campaign Organizations. In: Dalton R.J., Wattenberg M.P., (eds.) *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000.

the emergence of the case of a personalised leader who created a large, indeed a ruling party.[323] 'Today the impact of media led to a stronger personalisation of leadership, although it is stronger in presidential or semipresidential systems than in parliamentary systems, but it occurs even in the latter, as some refer to the presidentialisation of parliamentary governments'[324], that is why the personalization of politics is a significant and prevailing trend in a current politics.

The second question, closely connected to the definition of personalization is the categories and methods, that is, how can personalized leadership be analysed? J. Blondel analysed the personalisation of political parties' leaders' by analysing the discourses which parties leaders develop in order to attract citizens to support them and their party. According to J. Blondel, J. L. Thiébault et.al, there can be three types of discourses: preservation (politician delivers a conservative discourse, where the leader may wish to introduce some changes, but in order to preserve the status quo better), 'savior' (leaders who are able to solve a major problem facing the political system when in government) and populist (leaders direct their discourse not just to party sympathisers, but to all voters, to the whole people) discourses.[325] While analysing these discourses, attention is paid to evaluate, how leaders communicate with voters and how they create their personalization by the means of TV, the media and directly. Other scholars, i.e. A. Langer, analysed how prime ministers are described in newspapers and how many references to their personal lives there

323   Blondel, Thiébault et.al. Op. cit. 2010, p. 3.

324   Crewe I., King A., Are British Elections Becoming More Presidential? In: Jennings K., M. Mann, E., (eds.) *Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in Honour of Warren E. Miller.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1994.

325   Blondel J. *Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis.* London, Beverly Hills, Newbury Park, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1987.

are.[326] P. Isotalus and M. Almonkari analysed the personalization of Finish party leaders by paying attention to such categories as professional competence, communication skills, maintenance of political relations, characteristics of behaviour and inspiring confidence.[327] All these researches have in common the emphasis on media, which report leaders' communication to the society; and they all used qualitative and quantitative research methods.

1.2 Americanization and Personalization of Politics

Americanization means that campaigning in democracies around the world is becoming more and more Americanized as candidates, political parties, and news media takes cues from their counterparts in the United States. Many campaign methods and practices that have been adopted by other countries developed first in the United States, so Americanization is suggesteds as an easy characterization of this pattern of innovation.[328] The definition of Americanization can be described as a modern media-orientated political campaign which consists of such elements as personalization and scientificization of politics; detachments of parties from citizens; autonomous structures of communication and changes from direct personal involvement to spectatorship.[329] So Americanisation and personalization have in common only the feature that personalization of politics and leadership is only one of the elements of modern American election campaigns. This shows that the personalization used in the definition of Americanization is created for a short time period (elections)

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326   Langer A. A Historical Exploration of the Personalization of Politics in the Print Media: The British Prime Ministers (1945-1999). *Parliamentary Affairs*, No. 60, 2007.

327   Isotalus, Almonkari. Op cit. p. 115.

328   Swanson D., Mancini P. (eds.) *Politics, Media and Modern Democracy*. New York: Praeger, 1996, p. 4.

329   Ibid, p. 14-17.

only and politicians do not keep personalisation as an on-going trend of their communication with society. What is interesting is that even the first Berlusconi campaign was called as Americanised[330], but lately this concept of campaigning and especially political communication with voters is being called by the name of Berlusconi – Berlusconization. According to this example, it is clear that even though at the beginning Berlusconi's political campaign was deemed as Americanized, lately it became Berlusconization, because the notion of Berlusconization is broader in the terms of political communication and reflects more communicational than campaign features.

1.3 Berlusconization as a Personalization of Politics

Definition of Berlusconization emerged together with S. Berlusconi getting into the power in 1994 Parliament elections in Italy. Since then what we think of as Berlusconization of politics is the trend of using any kind of political behaviour that is in the style of Berlusconi, in order to gain and keep the political power.[331] As M. Castells points out, the government of Berlusconi produced a mostly original model of public-private partnership, he leveraged his media power from television networks to be elected Prime Minister.[332] Even today, there is no one explicit and common definition of Berlusconization: researches who analyse political communication according to the concept of Berlusconization pay attention to four most characteristic elements of Berlusconi's

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330   Mazzoleni G., Patterns and Effects of Recent Changes in Electoral Campaigning in Italy. In: Swanson D., Mancini P. (eds.) *Politics, Media and Modern Democracy*. New York: Praeger. 1996, p. 194.

331   Degirmenci N. Berlusconization Process of Politics in Turkey: Political Parties, Individual Politicians and Media. *Leadership and New Trends in Political Communication*. Selected Papers. Roma: Luiss CMCS 2011, p. 188.

332   Castells M. *Communication Power*. Oxford University Press. New York. 2009, p. 109.

political behaviour and communication: building appealing images; establishing a direct an emotional link with voters; creating media events and going personal.[333]

Building appealing image means using propaganda techniques. In the age of Berlusconization, politics have become more visual and focused on political images, the image of leaders i.e. a good family farther, an honest businessman, and a patriot, young, rich.[334] How can a direct emotional link with voters be established? According to O. Croci, Berlusconi "sold" his personality through a discourse which is full of religious and sports metaphors.[335] Emotional link can be achieved by establishing an emotional connection. 'Effective leaders keep people's attention because of their ability to grab hold of people's emotions'.[336] Creating media events or pseudo-events is another characteristic element to the notion of Berlusconization as a personalisation of politics. Events are identified as "newsworthy" when they satisfy certain rules. 'To emphasize the leadership, media events have to be leader centred, that is, that the leader must be placed at the centre stage'.[337] The final aspect is 'going personal' and the purpose of this action is to encourage the establishment of a trust relationship between the leader and the voters that bypasses the traditional intermediary role of parties. The element of going personal is established by various means i.e. presenting news about family, hobbies, inviting journalist to one's home, appealing to every and each voter of the country. 'Talking about family

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333   Campus D. Mediatization and Personalization of Politics in Italy and France: The Case of Berlusconi and Sarcozy. The *International Journal of Press*. *Politics.* Vol. XX(X). Sage Publications. 2010, p. 220.

334   Degirmenci. Op. cit. p. 190.

335   Croci O. Language and Politics in Italy: from Moro to Berlusconi. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*. No. 6:3. 2001. P.366.

336   Newman B. *The Mass Marketing of Politics*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 1999, p. 90.

337   Campus. Op. cit. p. 223.

and friends, passions and hobbies are supposed to "humanize" the image of leaders and elicit the public's sympathy'. [338] Berlusconization means political communication and behaviour by the leader who seeks to maintain power and be appealing person to the society. Moreover, this is done not only during election campaigns but continues when the leader is in power as well. Thus, the latter aspect can be seen as a biggest difference from Americanization concept.

2. Berlusconization and Political Communication of Lithuanian Political Parties Leaders in Electronic Media

In Lithuania, political communication analysis is popular, especially as it concerns as political campaigns and strategies, but still there is a lack of analysis where the political communication of political leaders would be evaluated before, during and after the elections. This article is a first attempt to do this. Taking into account that the concept of Berlusconization as a way of political communication to create personalized politics and leadership is under researched but not necessarily underdeveloped in Lithuania. The Berlusconization theoretical approach was used to evaluate the political communication of the Labour Party (today it is called Labour Party (Labourites) leader Viktor Uspaskich. The decision was made to analyse the most characteristic example of Berlusconization – with the example of Labour Party's former and de facto (but not official anymore) leader – V. Uspaskich, because of his brazen efforts to hold power at all costs within the party and the government. At the first sight it looks that V. Uspaskich is the most similar to S. Berlusconi or even might be called the Lithuanian Berlusconi, as usually he is presented as charismatic, telegenic, religious, very wealthy man and is entangled in cause célèbre. Someone can argue that V. Uspaskich does not own a personal TV or

338   Ibid.

media channels, but as G. Bosetti's content analysis shows, there is no major difference between public and private television channels in the formula underlying political reporting under Berlusconi.[339] Berlusconi used this media domination to conduct his personal fights against the judges and parliamentarians who unsuccessfully tried to bring him to trial.[340] So it is believed that even if V. Uspaskich does not personally own television or media channels, media still plays an important role in reporting his communication, presenting his image to the public.

The period for the chosen analysis is the year 2012, because during this period V. Uspaskich announced his running for national Parliament election (since 2009 he was a member of the European Parliament) and also the year 2012 can be seen as pre-election, election and post-election period, and it is believed that the communication and presented messages by political party leader should be different during these particular periods. Moreover, when in 2012 V. Uspaskich decided to run in national Parliament elections he needed to remind people about himself and to renew his links to his voters, i.e. during the period when he was in the European Parliament there were three times less articles mentioning V. Uspaskich in electronic media.[341] The analysis was made by using qualitative and quantitative content analysis.

2.1 Methodology of the Research

The purpose of this research was to find out whether V. Uspaskich's communication in electronic media was similar to the concept of Berlusconization. First of all, the decision was made to select the channel delivering news and presenting communication of political leaders. Electronic media news websites were chosen because of the easiest

339   Bosetti G. *Spin: Trucchi e Tele-imbrogli Della Polķtica*. Venice: Marsilio. 2007, p. 62. Cited from Castells. Op. cit. p. 225.

340   Castells. Op. cit. p. 225.

341   During 2009-2011 period 673 articles mentioning V. Uspaskich were found in delfi.lt and 512 articles in lrytas.lt while during 2012 there were 637 articles in delfi.lt and 506 articles in lrytas.lt

access to the past communication. Two Lithuanian news websites were chosen – www.delfi.lt and www.lrytas.lt , which are the most popular news websites and give an opportunity to read archival articles, while others Lithuanian news website do not provide that. Using the keyword 'Uspaskich*' in delfi.lt and keyword 'Uspaskich' in lrytas.lt more than 1100 articles were found (www.lrytas.lt – 506 articles and www.delfi.lt – 637 articles) in 2012. The dataset was analysed by qualitative content analysis in order to identify key themes and patterns in data and 279 articles, which contained V. Uspaskich's opinion, when he was interviewed or articles which he wrote to the websites himself, were selected for the further analysis (159 in delfi.lt and 120 in lrytas.lt). That is to say, that articles, which only mentioned, criticised or commented on V. Uspaskich, were not coded or used for further analysis. The communicational articles were coded into four different categories: building appealing images, establishing a direct emotional link with voters, creating media events and going personal. All articles linked to one of these categories were classified and evaluated qualitatively according to the keywords and are analysed in the following pages of this article.

2.2 Findings of the Research

Analysis of these two news websites showed (see table 1) that all four types of communicational categories (building appealing images, establishing a direct emotional link with voters, creating media events and going personal) appeared in both news portals – delfi.lt and lrytas.lt. Another common trend is that from January to October – until the very Election Day (which was on the 14th of October and the second round on the 28th of October) – V. Uspaskich's communication was not as intensive, as during the election month and after the election. For example, there were only 39 articles expressing V. Uspaskich's communication from January to the end of September in lrytas.lt, while there were 29 articles in October, 29 in November and 23 in December, which means that 81 out of 120 articles had been published in

three months' period and all these articles were important in the regard of communicational content in them. V. Uspaskich's communicational appearances seem to be steadier in delfi.lt - during the period of January-July there were 40 articles (25% of all articles of 2012), where V. Uspaskich got the ground to talk. Since August, the amount of articles where V. Uspaskich talks, comments and criticizes increased. It reached 13 in August, 19 in September and the peak of 33 articles in October, 29 in November and 25 in December. Nevertheless, the more important aim is to categorize articles, according to their content, into four categories: building appealing image, establishing direct emotional link to the voters, creating media events and going personal.

Table 1. Number of Categorized Articles in delfi.lt and lrytas.lt in 2012.

Communicational Categories	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	Total
Building Appealing Images (delfi.lt)	2	3	6	1	5	2	-	10	10	23	16	11	**89**
Building Appealing Images (lrytas.lt)	-	1	6	-	2	2	3	3	3	19	10	7	**56**
Establishing a Direct an Emotional Link with Voters (delfi.lt)	2	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	**7**
Establishing a Direct an Emotional Link with Voters (lrytas.lt)	-	3	1	-	2	1	1	1	-	2	6	3	**20**
Creating Media Events (delfi.lt)	-	3	6	3	-	3	1	1	3	8	12	11	**51**
Creating Media Events (lrytas.lt)	-	1	1	2	1	1	-	1	1	7	12	10	**37**
Going Personal (delfi.lt)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	3	2	1	3	**12**
Going Personal (lrytas.lt)	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	3	**7**
Total (delfi.lt)	4	7	12	4	5	6	2	13	19	33	29	25	**159**
Total (lrytas.lt)	-	6	8	2	5	4	5	5	4	29	29	23	**120**
Total	4	13	20	6	10	10	7	18	23	62	58	48	279

Source: Prepared by author.

The beginning of the year can be seen as a vague period in terms of trying **to build appealing image** of V. Uspaskich communication, because only four messages in the news portal delfi. lt were published, where it was reminded to everyone what a good businessman V. Uspaskich is and that he is going to be the best prime minister ever. In February V. Uspaskich, being a member of European Parliament, announced his intention to run in the National Parliament election and even more – to compete against a strong opponent in a single-member constituency because that is what a strong leader does. These messages, creating a strong and appealing image of the leader, were strengthen by adding repeated sayings that V. Uspaskich will be a prime minister or that he is a successful businessman. Furthermore, in lrytas.lt V. Uspaskich promised to fix the Lithuanian economy. In March, V. Uspaskich's political communication increased in both websites, compared to January and February. Delfi.lt and lrytas.lt presented messages, where V. Uspaskich started to speak about the future manifesto of Labour Party and did not avoid the pronoun "I" by presenting himself as a high-minded and sure politician. In April, V. Uspaskich was not very active in political communication and only one article appeared (delfi.lt) presenting him as a strong politician who is going to fight for the implementation of his party election manifesto. In May, V. Uspaskich showed up on two occasions – in regard to building an appealing image he took an advantage of his image as a successful businessman (delfi.lt and lrytas.lt) and he used the future coalition between Labour Party (LP), Lithuanian Social Democrats (LSDP) and Order and Justice (OJ) by talking to the media as the possible leader of the future coalition, whereas the other two leaders of LSDP and OJ were more quiet. In June and July, V. Uspaskich stood up on a few occasions: when the future coalition between LP, LSDP

and OJ collapsed, he asserted himself as a leader who would not let his party be treated as an obedient party to LSDP. Secondly, he appeared as generous person who organized the town festival in Kėdainiai and in his home town Urdoma (lrytas.lt only).

August presented a much more active communication on building an appealing image on delfi.lt compared to lrytas.lt (respectively 10 and 3 articles). V. Uspaskich used delfi.lt in presenting various messages which strengthened his image as a leader. First of all, V. Uspaskich continued presenting himself as a successful businessman and rescuer, who knows how to arrange the economy of Lithuania, as well as how to deal with the economic crisis. Secondly, he strengthened the image of the Labour Party by presenting it as a strong power with him on the top, which will make the lives of Lithuanians easier and more dignified. In the meantime, lrytas.lt has shown V. Uspaskich as the leader of a strong political party, which is going to win the elections.

In September, V. Uspaskich's communication was similarly intensive as in August, but only one type of messages was displayed in regard to the creation of an appealing image – it is the leader of the Labour Party talking about the importance of implementing his party's manifesto and how it will change the lives of every Lithuanian. Lrytas.lt presented a very different communication of V. Uspaskich – there were published articles, where V. Uspaskich's talks in first person and uses "I", "I think" while objecting to the President.

The election month – October – was exceptional, because of the intensiveness of V. Uspaskich's communication. This month can be divided into two periods: before the Election Day (the 14th of October) and after. Until the Election Day, the communication of V. Uspaskich was the continuation of September: it was the image of a successful businessman, a strong party leader, seeking to implement his party's

manifesto to improve life in Lithuania. But the moment the primary election results were announced and the talks about future coalitions between LP, LSDP and OJ started, V. Uspaskich took the leading role and talked for the future coalition, showing that he is the most important leader. Even more, lrytas.lt announced V. Uspaskich's sayings that he wants to be the prime minister and he will be the best PM.

In November, V. Uspaskich continued emerging in articles as a successful businessman. This can be explained as it was his clear wish to become the Minister of Economics. In addition, he strengthened his image as the leader of LP (he chooses the candidates to the ministers), but not as the leader of the new coalition. This change was determined not by V. Uspaskich's choice, but by claims of the Lithuanian President D. Grybauskaitė, who said that she does not want to see LP in governing coalition.

In December, the number of messages containing the content of building appealing image has decreased by more than half, compared to October. However, the most obvious message from V. Uspaskich was his leadership in the party by selecting candidates to the ministers and talks about the implementation of LP manifesto. V. Uspaskich kept the most important message going – that he is the most powerful man in the party.

Establishing a direct an emotional link with voters seems to be more occasional than planned in the communication by V. Uspaskich. The number of events is not high – delfi.lt presented only 7 and lrytas.lt presented 20 articles which can be classified as articles where V. Uspaskich establishes a direct emotional link with voters. Most of them were connected to V. Uspaskich's statements that the present Government does not know how to work. Second trend was to show the need to increase the living standards of all Lithuanians, the need to rebuild the trust in democracy, the importance of the dignity of the people. V. Uspaskich appealed

thus to the new politics of LP and presented the knowledge on how to deal with the economic crisis. Looking at this point it can be claimed that direct emotional links were created by appealing to the values of justice, dignity, and in the end of 2012 – to the sacrifice of LP to give up on certain LP's candidates in order to create the Government. V. Uspaskich also used religion, sometimes he presented himself as a politician treated unfairly by the President, when the will of the people was ignored.

Creation of media events was a more frequent way of communication by V. Uspaskich. Hence 51 articles were found showing this aspect of communication in delfi.lt and 37 articles in lrytas.lt in. Indeed it can be said that the trend of the intensiveness of communication is similar to other messages as the biggest amount of articles appeared in the period from October to December – 31 out of 51 in delfi.lt and 27 out of 29 in lrytas.lt. What were the media events created by V. Uspaskich? First of all, he actively commented on the Presidential Elections in Russia, stating that there had been no law violations and the democracy in Russia is working. These messages were appreciated by many pro-Russian voters and politicians. The second trend in creating media events in order to get attention was much more consistent and continued during the pre-election, election and postelection period and was more connected to the pseudo-events, which led V. Uspaskich to be seen as a victim of the situation when LP was charged for illegal bookkeeping. V. Uspaskich talked about false allegations against him, his colleagues and the LP; claimed that the case was political but not legal; called it a tool to exclude him and LP from Lithuania's political life. V. Uspaskich and LP even created a demonstration against the legal system of Lithuania, against its corruption and its bias in favour of the governing parties in March. The greater activity of media events from October until December is clearly

connected to another scandal – a case was started, claiming that LP bought votes before the National Parliament elections. This gave ground for V. Uspaskich to repeat all the slogans said earlier on the LP case. It has to be said that V. Uspaskich managed to be seen as a victim of the situation, in fact his popularity rating increased (while ratings of LP decreased) (see table 2).

Table 2. Labour Party's and V. Uspaskich's Popularity in 2012 (in percentage).

Source: Prepared by author according to the 'Vilmorus' survey data published in the website www.lrytas.lt.

The last aspect of the leaders' communication on building personalized leadership is **going personal**. Only 19 articles (out of 279) where found with a content of trust and personal relationship with voters. During the first half of the year only one article was coded as containing this content, where V. Uspaskich gave his opinion about his party, talked that he cares about beautiful women in his party. From the beginning of July until the end of December, messages containing content of what is called 'going personal' were published more consistently – lrytas.lt presented 7 articles with these messages and delfi.lt published 12 articles.

Both websites published V. Uspaskich's speeches about his holiday plans, his talks about spending time with family, about his sauna, spare time, about his experience of exile, about his personal characteristics such as determination and cheerfulness.

As the analysis shows, the greatest amount of communication made by V. Uspaskich was targeted to build an appealing image of a leader and this is more than a half of all articles which contained communication content. It can be explained that V. Uspaskich seeks and remains to be the most powerful man in his party. Also, this can be explained by the fact that the LP can be called a "one man party" and when the leader decides to leave politics, usually such parties break up. The second most often message from V. Uspaskich was the creation of media events and this can be explained by his and his party's wish to be seen as victims in the lawsuit against LP, as an image of a victim is better than admitting that you have broken the law. It is believed that if LP had not been involved in this case, the creation of events would have been lower, as almost no other types of media events were made. Finally, establishing a direct emotional link and concept of going personal was the least expressed in the communication of V. Uspaskich. But analysing this, attention has to be paid to the Lithuanian political culture and cultural moderation, and, despite the fact that V. Uspaskich did not do a lot by establishing a direct emotional link or going personal, it still can be said that he is one the politicians who in comparison to others are being personal.

Conclusions

The analysis of personalization, Americanization and Berlusconization revealed the importance of media in political communication of political parties' leaders. Even if there is a high variety of definitions of 'personalization', the analysis showed that personalization of politics and

leadership means that political leaders create a direct rapport to the voters by communicating on media. The concept of Americanization showed its concentration on political campaigns, where personalization is only one concept of media related modern political campaigns. The term of Americanisation is broader than just personalization, as it pays attention to scientificization of politics; detachments of parties from citizens; autonomous structures of communication and changes from direct personal involvement to spectatorship. In contrast, Berlusconization is a quite narrow term as it refers to one man's – S. Berlusconi's political communication and political behaviour, and the most characteristic elements of his political communication are building an appealing images, establishing direct emotional links with voters, establishing media events and going personal by the means of media. As Berlusconization is 'established' in Europe and other European countries' political leaders took over this trend of political communication and behaviour, it could be called a European way of personalized politics or leadership by exploiting communication on media.

The case analysis of Lithuanian Labour Party leader V. Uspaskich revealed that V. Uspaskich's communication to his voters on electronic media could be included under the umbrella of Berlusconization, as this leader exploits media to build an appealing image and creates media events. Even though elements of establishing a direct emotional link with voters and 'going personal' were used quite vaguely, it is believed that it was still much more frequent compared to other Lithuanian political parties' leaders. This is a clear limitation of this analysis, where future researches should fill this gap by analysing political communication of other political parties' leaders, also more attention should be paid to analysing Lithuanian political parties' election campaigns and comparing them not only to each other but also to Eastern and Western Europe.

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EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORMS

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ABSTRACT

European integration is based on European Convergence, which has a dual component. The duality of the European convergence processes means that it could be defined both as: (i) homogenization and as (ii) a mutual influence. Practical implementation of the EU policy for Central and Eastern countries was carried out through the public administration reforms, trying to incorporate them into the common European administrative space. This kind of reform was expected to take the path of homogenization, but empirical research revealed that European convergence of public administration reforms sometimes took the path of mutual influence.

Keywords: European convergence, Europeanization, European integration, public administration reforms

Introduction

European integration proceeds every day and constantly changes the face of the European Union. The process became even more important after the accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the EU. The debates on the Europeanization of the Central and Eastern Europe have recently changed its object while focusing its attention to the study of post-accession developments in the new member states. The enlargement of the Union, however, influenced not only the new member states. It had a great

impact on the whole EU as a political system as well. Having this in mind, the process of European convergence becomes a very important element. The accession to the EU played the role of the catalyst for many public administration reforms in the new member states. Not all of these reforms, however, succeeded. The question is raised, then, about the reasons of these failures: why did not all of the reforms succeed? What determined the failures?

Theoretical and empirical analysis of the European convergence may help clarify the situation. The article starts with propositions about possible types of European convergence that may be detected in public administration reforms initiated by the EU. The analysis of these processes can explain unexpected scenarios of the EU initiated public administration reforms.

1. Metamorphosis of European convergence

The concept of European convergence does not receive enough attention at the theoretical level. More often than not only a one-sided approach is presented. European convergence in the EU integration process, however, is a more complex process than it may seem at a first glance.

Theoretical approach of Europeanization, however, is only a part of European convergence. Despite the increase of the amount of works trying to clarify the main peculiarities of Europeanization, it is generally recognized that the study of Europeanization is still developing, and the terms used in the research are often not exhaustive enough and lack conceptual discussions. According to K. Maniokas, one thing is usually widely accepted – Europeanization is generally related to the European integration processes and the outcomes of the EU, together with all its formal and informal institutions and decisions impact on the member states, or even non-members.[342]

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342   Maniokas K. *Europos Sąjungos plėtra ir europeizacija: Vidurio ir Rytų Europos valstybių įsijungimas į Europos Sąjungą.* Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2003, p. 2.

It is useful to distinguish Europeanization as a process and as a result. R. Leadrech introduced definition of Europeanization as a process that shifts the direction of national policy and shapes changes in a way that the political and economic dynamics of the EC influence national politics and policy-making and become part of its organizational logic.[343] So basically this is a case of Europeanization processes that change the member states, in adapting them to the EU. Otherwise, Europeanization can be understood as a result. Europeanization could be described as homogenization, standardization, which significantly reduces the models of thinking, behavior and diversity-organization.[344] The concept of *Europeanization*, thus, is the final result of the processes, where a member state is framed under the EU standards and starts to live according them. The integration process, however, is not so primitive. Standards come from practical experience, certain precedents, and incorporation of new member states creates and changes the rules. The duality of European convergence conceptions, therefore, is possible: (1) Europeanization as homogenization, where process occurs gradually as a kind of standardization, (2) and those cases where there was no smooth integration and similarity. One can distinguish two forms of European convergence: (1) the convergence as a *homogenization*, and (2) the convergence as a *mutual influence* (Figure 1).

It must be recognized that in most cases associated with the Europeanization, the concept of convergence precisely takes the form of homogenization (Figure 1. A). It is best described by the *fusion* theory of European integration, which according to W. Wessels reveals the integration processes of trying to create

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343   Ladrech R. *Europeanisation of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France.* Journal of Common Market Studies, 1994, Vol. 32, *No*. 1, p. 69–88.

344   Maniokas K.. *Europos Sąjungos plėtra ir europeizacija: Vidurio ir Rytų Europos valstybių įsijungimas į Europos Sąjungą.* Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2003, p. 8.

a single European level parties, became stuck between two alternatives – a federal supranational cooperation or a state-type structure, but no particular construct was chosen and a third way was sought out. It was realized that in order to successfully solve the problems true collaboration was needed and it could be done by integrating specific procedures.[345] *Fusion* theory states that integrating states must adopt certain common standards and, thus, differences between countries are decreasing.

Figure 1. Types of European convergence (made by the author)

A. *European convergence as a homogenization*

B. *European convergence as a mutual influence*

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
345   Wessels W. An Ever Closer Fusion? A Macropolitical View on Integration Processes. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 1997, Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 289–290.

However, European convergence process is much more complicated and not limited only by homogenization based on one-side influence. According to T. Plumer and Ch. J. Schneider the concept of convergence could be applied to policies, political institutions, constitutions, political preferences, policy outcomes, and so on. It is important to stress the differences between convergence and convergence processes. Convergence itself is an observable outcome and exists if and only if some observable dissimilarity between independent units of observation declines. Processes of convergence, on the other hand, may be at work even if convergence is not observed directly, because, for example, other factors at the same time cause a trend to dissimilarity.[346] However, in addition to all these common conditions, which are imposed to the countries on integration process, there also exist invisible and unconditional processes that promote unconditional European convergence. This form of convergence is close to J. K. Galbraith idea of relationship between state and market where both elements influence each other (Figure 1. B).[347]

A less noticeable and poorly analyzed dimension of European convergence assumes that ongoing integration creates new results that did not exist previously. Thus a *sui generis* European Union is born. European convergence may occur in number of forms: as a homogenization or as mutual influence. It can be founded in public administration reform implicated by the EU area.

2. European convergence relation with public administration reforms

Processes of European integration (in an *open ended* way) change not only public policy and administrative systems of the member states, but the face of the EU as well. It is because European convergence not always works like homogenization.

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346   Plümer T., Schneider Ch. J. The analysis of policy convergence, or: how to chase a black cat in a dark room. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2009 16:7 October, p. 991.

347   Galbraith J. K. *The New Industrial State*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967, p. 389–392.

Practical implementation of the policies of the European Union was carried out through public administration reforms. Without a doubt, the most changes in the countries' public management systems were made in the pre-accession stage, but the integration is a never-ending process and it is still going on now. Ordinarily, reforms have to be implemented through homogenization, but it is not always so.

Public administration reforms are being implemented using Europeanization mechanisms. C. M. Radaelli draws on organizational institutionalism and presents the mechanisms of (1) coercion, (2) mimetism and (3) regulationary competition. The first mechanism starts to operate when the European Union regulations (a positive integration of the area) are passed on the shoulders of the partner country. This country is experiencing an adaptation pressure; the volume of it is determined by the degree of institutional compliance. The method of mimetism occurs when the state has the ability to choose – to take or not to take the policy model established within the European Union, but it might be affected by the European Union as a center of gravity and a "force of attraction". The third - regulatory competition – is a negative mechanism, when the European Union does not form any model for candidate countries.[348]

It can be said that the second and the third Europeanization mechanisms are close to European convergence by mutual influence, but these mechanisms are not so widespread and not as important as the first type. Therefore it is important to look into mutual influence in public administration reforms which should work by homogenization. One of such was the European civil service reform, which was born from the European administration space.

348   C. M. Radaelli. *Whither Europeanization? Concept streching and substantive change*. European integration online papers (EloP), vol. 4, 2000.

3. European convergence: case of European civil service reform

Is it possible to create a single European administrative space? Maybe a lot of public administration reforms implicated by the EU lost continuity because European convergence based on homogenization was not always possible. Johan P. Olsen drew attention to the fact that the development of the administrative model is based on the continental European tradition of public administration. Europe has a number of important characteristics that can go through the process of administrative convergence and create a common European administrative space, but also there are some obstacles that impede this trend. One of them is a number of strong and different public administration traditions. [349] It is important to draw attention to the fact that a large group of Central and Eastern European countries joined the European Union in 2004. This group of member-states has its own public administration heritage as well. Adaptation into the new administrative space, therefore, is quit complicated.

The European principles of administration cannot easily be operationalized to derive a detailed checklist for civil service reform in accession countries. Nevertheless, the minimum standards applied to a member state civil service can be grounded into 10 domains of civil service policy. Subsequently, they can serve as bench-marks for the assessment of post-accession developments in the new member states. (1) The standards of the first domain of European Union civil service policy concern the adaptation and implementation of civil service law in order to ensure principles such as impartiality, legal accountability and legal predictability. (2) European Union policy included the establishment of an administrative unit that was responsible for the central coordination and management of civil service policy. (3)

349   Olsen J. P. Towards a European administrative space? *Journal of European Public Policy*. 2003, 10 (4), p. 508–516.

European Union policy required the establishment of a system of open competition for entry to the civil service in order to ensure principles of openness, effectiveness, and equal access to the civil service. (4) European Union policy expected the establishment of standardized written examinations that are mandatory for all new entrants of the civil service and that allow appeal for unsuccessful candidates, in order to guarantee principles of merit recruitment, fair, and equal treatment. (5) European Union policy paid particular attention to the professionalization and depoliticization of the senior ranks of civil service in order to ensure principles of impartiality and political neutrality. (6) Related to the previous point, European union policy promoted measures to protect civil servants from political and other forms of discretionary dismissal in order to support principles of political neutrality and impartiality and to contribute to the stabilization of civil service. (7) European Union policy demanded the design of transparent and predictable salary system. (8) European Union policy expected the establishment of fair transparent performance evaluation system. (9) European Union policy was concerned with the establishment of training programs and the participation of civil servants in training in order to strengthen the effectiveness and professional competence of civil service. (10) Finally, European Union policy required the regulation of civil servants rights and duties in order to ensure European principles such as professional integrity, political neutrality, and impartiality.[350]

European Commission and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development program SIGMA (Support for Improvement in governance and Management) in 2009 has submitted a report "Sustainability of Civil Service Reforms in Central and Eastern

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350   Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling. The Durability of EU Civil Service Policy in Central and Eastern Europe after Accession. *An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions,* 2011, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 237–240.

Europe Five Years after EU Accession". That paper examined the fate of civil service reforms that Central and Eastern European countries undertook in order to prepare themselves for the European Union. It concentrates on describing the current situation in eight Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004. The empirical analysis revealed that there are different results in trying to implement European civil service reforms in these countries after accession (Table 1).

Table 1. *Fit with European Principles of Administration : Comparison across Countries[351]*

Current Fit & Post-accession pathways	High fit	Medium to high fit	Medium fit	Medium to low fit	Low fit
Constructive continuation of reform	Lithuania	Latvia Estonia			
Constructive reform reversal			Hungary Slovenia		
Destructive reform reversal				Slovakia Poland	Czech Republic

It is important, thus, to find out the causes of these results and to identify the character of European convergence. There are many predictions about the causes of reform results in Central and Eastern European countries. One of the causes may be the limit of the powers of the European Union to the new member states after accession. The second cause may be politization of civil service and its inactivity. Post-Soviet reform progress is often determined by inactivity and politicization of local politicians and civil servants, their inability to communicate with each other properly, various stakeholders' influence and so on.[352] The third possible reason is discrepancy of civil service admin-

351   Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling. 2009. Sustainability of Civil Service Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe Five Years After EU Accession, *Sigma Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing. p. 71.

352   Dimitrova A. L. The new member states of the EU in the aftermath of enlargement: do new European rules remain empty shells? *Journal of Europen Public Policy.* 2010, Vol. 17, No. 1. p. 137–148.

istrative models. What is worth noting in the present context is that modernization in the sense of creating a managerialist administration along the lines of New Public Management models have, so far, hardly featured in the discourse of Central and Eastern countries' reform.[353]

It can be stated that the previously divided systems of European public service are increasingly converging. However, European civil service reforms implemented by homogenization did not bring expected results. It clearly shows that European convergence of public administration reforms can be carried out as a mutual influence.

Conclusions

The concept of Europeanization usually means the final result of the processes where a member state is formed by the EU standards and starts to live according to them. But in an empirical way the integration process is not so primitive. European integration is based on European convergence. It is possible to determine the duality of European convergence: (1) Europeanization through homogenization, where process occurs gradually as a kind of standardization (*homogenization*), (2) and those cases where integration and similarity are not so smooth (*mutual influence*).

Practical implementation of the EU policy for countries of Central and Eastern Europe was carried out by public administration reforms. Using Europeanization mechanisms it was planned to implement public administration reforms and incorporate Central and Eastern countries to the common European administrative space. European convergention sometimes, however, took the path of mutual influence.

One of this kind of public administration reforms was the European civil service reform. Empirical analysis shows that there

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353   Goetz K. H. Making sense of post-communist central administration: modernization, Europeization or Latinization? *Journal of Europen Public Policy.* 2011, Vol. 8, No. 6. p. 1034.

are different results in trying to implement the European civil service reform in countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Historical heritage and many other reasons, such as politization of civil service, inactivity, discrepancy of civil service administrative models etc. lead to escaping the European convergence by homogenization. Previously divided into position and career systems, today the European public service systems are increasingly converging and this clearly shows that European convergence of public administration reforms sometimes may be carried out through mutual influence.

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2014 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION CAMPAIGNING AND COVERAGE IN THE MEDIA: CASE OF LITHUANIA

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ABSTRACT

The European Parliament (EP) Elections represent a rather interesting case for election analysis. As Strömbäck J., Maier M., and Kaid L. L. (2011) pointed, they are both national and European at the same time. However, despite the massive changes from the first direct EP elections in 1979, there remains one constant: the relative unimportance of the European elections. The EP elections research data shows that parties and candidates, as well as the media and voters tend to treat EP elections as *second order national* elections. The second-order nature and lack of European content in EP elections is related to the failure of political parties to campaign on European issues (Norris, 1997). By campaigning weakly, parties contribute to second-order patterns such as the decreasing turnout in EP elections. By focusing their campaigns on domestic rather than on European issues, parties turn these elections into national (Jalali and Silva, 2011).

In 2014 Lithuania holds the third EP elections (the first were held in 2004 and the second in 2009). The first two election campaigns confirmed the theory of *second order national* elections. Lithuania, having the experience of 10 years' membership in the EU, may expect some changes in campaigning. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to answer the research question – what issues dominate the EP campaign and whether the Lithuanian political parties' and candidates' campaigns in 2014 EP elections focus more on national issues

and actors, rather than on European issues. In order to answer the question, analysis of information published in news media portals is performed by focusing the analysis on the media coverage of EP elections and opinions and advertisements of the candidates to the EP, posted on the political parties' websites and presented in the media. The coverage should provide the information on how active is the EP Elections campaign, and positioning of the issues should reveal what issues – national or European – dominate in the campaigning.

Keywords: European Union, European Parliament, elections

Introduction

Democracy and political communication are inextricably linked, on the local as well as the regional, national, and transnational level. As suggested by Blumler and Gurevitch[354], "if politics is about choice, then information flows clarifying alternative policy options must circulate to those concerned with decisions, whether as their shapers or as consumers of their consequences". Similarly, "if politics is about popular participation or the representation of the will of the people, then participation ultimately consists of, while the representation of people requires, communication"[355]. This is true between and during election campaigns, when parties and candidates increase their efforts to communicate with the electorate. The outcome of the political communication during campaigns may be of great importance, because it will help shape people's votes, which in turn will decide the allocation of power and policymaking over the next term.

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354 Blumler, J.G., Gurevitch, M. Towards a comparative framework for political communication research. In: S.H. Chaffee (ed.), *Political Communication: Issues and Strategies for Research.* Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975, p. 167–168.

355 Strömbäck J., Maier M., Lee Kaid L. Political Communication and Election Campaigns for the European Parliament. In: Kaid, L., Stromback, J., Maier, M. (ed.) *Political Communication in European Parliamentary Elections*. Ashgate, 2011, p. 3.

The European Parliament (EP) Elections represent a rather interesting case for election analysis and particularly for analysis of political communication of campaigning. As Strömbäck J., Maier M., and Kaid L. L.[356] pointed, they are both national and European at the same time. These elections are about the same representative European body, and to some extent the campaigns and elections take place under rules that are common across countries. For example, the date range for Election Day is the same across countries, and a proportional electoral system is now mandatory. However, despite the massive changes from the first direct EP elections in 1979, there remains one constant: the relative unimportance of the European elections. The EP elections research data shows that parties, as well as the media and voters, tend to treat EP elections as second order national elections. The concept of second-order national elections was originally developed by Reif and Schmitt[357] who suggest that "the most important aspect of second order elections is that there is less at stake", particularly with respect to the allocation of power at the national level and in terms of government formation. That is why parties are not very active in campaigning and allocation of big sums of money for advertising during these elections. Reif and Schmitt suggest three basic characteristics of second order national elections: lower turnout than in national elections, national government parties may suffer losses in European Parliament elections; larger parties are not as successful as smaller parties.

As Pippa Norris argues[358], the second-order nature and lack of European content in EP elections is related to the failure of po-

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356 Ibid, p. 5.

357 Reif, K., Schmitt, H. Nine second-order national elections – A conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results. *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 8(1), 1980, p. 9.

358 Norris P. Second-Order Elections Revisited, in *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 31, 1997, p. 109–14.

litical parties to campaign on European issues. By campaigning weakly, parties contribute to second-order patterns such as the decreasing turnout in EP elections. By focusing their campaigns on domestic, rather than on European issues, parties turn these elections into national[359]. "First-order" campaigns focusing on the EU itself differ in their effects compared to "second-order" campaigns, in which national topics, actors and conflicts are featured. First-order campaigns foster citizens' involvement with the EU, form an attitude towards the EU and political participation, when compared with second-order campaigns.

What is the situation in Lithuania with EP elections? In 2014 Lithuania held the third EP elections (the first were held in 2004 and the second in 2009). The first two election campaigns confirmed the theory of *second order national* elections. They were demonstrating lower turnout 48.38% (2004), 15.68% (2009), losses of government parties and national issues dominating the European ones. This paper tries to find the answer, whether 2014 European Parliament elections in Lithuania have the basic characteristics of second-order elections. Lithuania, having experience of 10 years membership in the EU, may expect some changes in campaigning. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to answer the research question – what issues dominated the EP campaign and whether the Lithuanian political parties' and candidates' campaigns in 2014 EP elections focused more on national issues and actors, rather than on European issues. In order to answer the question, analysis of information published in news media portals is performed by focusing the analysis on the media coverage of EP elections and on opinions and advertisements of the candidates to the EP, posted on the political parties' websites

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359 Jalali C., Silva T., Everyone Ignores Europe? Party Campaigns and Media Coverage in the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections, in: Kaid, L., Stromback, J., Maier, M. (ed.) *Political Communication in European Parliamentary Elections*. Ashgate, 2011, p. 111-128.

and presented in the media. The coverage should provide the information on how active is EP Elections campaign, and the positioning of the issues should reveal what issues – national or European – dominate in the campaigning. In addition, election results will be presented in order to assess the second-orderliness of elections.

1. 2014 EP elections: participants, campaigning and media coverage of the EP elections

These 2014 EP elections had a rather small number of participants – 9 political parties and coalitions participated in the elections, having 215 candidates in the lists (in comparison, 15 parties participated in 2009 EP elections in Lithuania; 18 party and coalition lists participated in parliamentary elections in 2012). This number of election campaign participants indicates diminishing interest of political actors in EP elections.

The 2014 EP election campaign in Lithuania started at the end of April, one month before the elections. We may divide campaign period into two parts. Both parts lasted about two weeks. For the first two weeks campaigning was very passive, without any visible advertising and discussions in the media. It seems that the candidates and parties only organized meetings with various groups of voters. The second part of campaign, which started two weeks before the election, changed dramatically. The public spaces were full of agitating materials, posters; internet and news media portals were presenting advertisements; debates on EP elections started in the media the last week. Though at the beginning of campaign the researchers, political analysts were worrying about the turnout and passivity of candidates in mobilizing voters, the last weeks already showed a rather interesting and active campaign, promising also higher activity of voters on

the Election Day. These hopes were also inspired by the double campaign- Lithuanian Presidential elections had two rounds and the second round was planned for the same day, as the EP elections. People usually are more active in Presidential elections. That is why the most important aim for the parties was to mobilize their own electorate, instead on just inviting to the elections. How the parties performed these functions and how helpful was news media in mobilization and giving relevant information for the voters?

News media portals analysis results

The media constitutes one of the most important sources of information and channels of communication in all kinds of elections, including European ones. The media, however, not only reflects the agendas and priorities of political parties and candidates. Increasingly, the media themselves help shape the election campaigns, thus influencing both political parties and candidates and the voters. Thus, in analysing the EP campaign in Lithuania, at first analysis of the news media portals was performed, looking at the coverage of the EP elections – how much information is provided; evaluating the tone and content of this information. The time period of analysis was 1 month before the official information campaign and two first weeks of election campaign. Two news media portals were analysed: *delfi.lt* and *15min.lt*.

The analysis shows that Lithuanian news media portals during campaign provided some information on EP elections. *Delfi.lt* had the special rubric "Balsuok 2014" (Vote 2014) where information and articles on the two elections – EP and Presidential – were posted. The majority of information was devoted to the coming Presidential elections. However, articles on EP elections were not rare as well. From the period 1st of March to the 6th of

May, more than 30 articles (1 in two days) were found in the portal. Analysis of the content of the articles shows that a negative, cynical view to the elections dominated the media. The following topics were presented:

- Lithuanian EP members are among the worst
- Lithuanian votes are swimming to another country
- The portrait of the candidate to EP: 48 year old millionaire with university degree
- Competition for 21 thousand LTL salaries: who is going to succeed?
- Double elections agents games
- Why a quarter of the Seimas is competing for going to the Brussels.

Only five articles held a positive view or discussed the main issues of EP elections:

- the thoughts of Lithuanians why they vote in EP elections – competition for best arguments;
- information about casting lots by the parties for choosing the numbers;
- the good news for the social democrats;
- Whom to vote for – user manual.

Similar situation was in the other news media portal 15min.lt. It had a special rubric "Europos parlamento rinkimai 2014" (European Parliament elections 2014). The amount of information presented on EP elections campaign was more or less the same – 33 articles. Majority of topics were concentrating on campaign events or discussed the privileges of EP members, or the reasons why Parliament members are likely to change their mandates to EP member mandate, who is going to get more votes etc. The

messages were more concerned with the events of the parliamentary races, rather than discussing the ideas. Consequently, they were likely to foster negative views to the EP elections, instead of mobilizing the voters.

The mentioned numbers of the articles and listed topics of media information confirm the thesis of second order elections. EP elections in Lithuanian were not a priority topic for the media. Media paid little attention to the activities of campaign, practically did not provide information for the voters on the ideological differences of the parties, there was no analysis of the manifestos and candidates' suggested topics for discussion. Majority of the messages were not helpful in rising popularity of EP elections and mobilizing the voters. Instead, a lot of messages raised scepticism and even promoted cynical views towards EP elections and candidates. The discussion of big salaries, of ineffective work of EP members created a bad image of the European parliament and politicians trying to become its members. People had no intention to come and vote for the people "who do not work effectively and just go to have a rest or to earn more money" as declare the articles. The Lithuanian media tends to present elections in the American style – not to care too much on the issues and substance, instead focusing on the horse race, competition and revealing only the negative, entertaining and cynical news, which does not mobilize, but are likely to demobilize the electorate and in a long period of time even to alienate them from politics.

The overview of information on EP elections reveals, that the most important aim of politicians organizing their EP elections campaigns is to be visible in Lithuania, instead of talking directly about the elections and topics related to them. This is most often enough to be elected. Thus, for ordinary person, it might seem that in principle, there are no elections to the European

Parliament in Lithuania. In the media during the first part of campaign, we may find only one or two sentences and an insignificant reminder that not only presidential elections will take place in Lithuania, but the other elections as well.

As points A. Krupavičius, "The sad side of the European Parliament elections in Lithuania is that even parties and politicians do not try to engage the public".[360] Instead of directly talking about the elections, politicians are trying to enlist other topics that would help them to enter the EP. R. Vilpišauskas argues, that many politicians use presidential elections (standing as candidates); exploit the initiative for a referendum restricting land sales to foreigners and the debate on the necessary number of signatures to initiate referendum, but avoid talking more on European issues.[361] Analysis of news media portals and candidates' activities in the media shows that candidates are more likely to talk about national issues. Radical parties especially are mainly talking about national issues. Here we may notice the paradox of elections to the European Parliament – candidates and voters still are interestied more in what is happening in their country. In all countries, candidates for the European Parliament are more likely to talk on non-European and national issues. Thus, Lithuania follows the European path.

Analysis of politicians' views or opinions presented in special rubric shows, that the candidates are likely to write articles, but they combine national issues with European issues. The last opinions were connected with the 10-year EU membership anniversary. The topics discussed were as follows: the choice of being part of Europe, security issues, federalization of Europe. Special attention was paid to the European values – democracy, freedom and

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360 Čergelienė R. Dvigubų rinkimų "agentų" žaidimai. delfi.lt: http://www.delfi.lt/news/balsuok2014/ep-2014/dvigubu-rinkimu-agentu-zaidimai.d?id=64563356, accessed 5ᵗʰ May, 2014.

361 Ibid.

safety, peace. It was possible to notice that more European issues are discussed in the articles of EP members who at the moment were working in the Parliament. Traditionally, R. Morkūnaitė writes on environmental issues, V. Blinkevičiūtė – on social policy issues (pensions, illegal work), M. Povilionienė – on gender equality. The other candidates are more likely to discuss basic EU integration aspects or national issues.

The results of political parties' websites information

During the first part of the campaign the majority of parties had no information presented in an attractive way about the EP elections. Only some slogans, portraits and biographies could help decide whom to vote for. These were presented in the major political parties' websites, but not as central, most important information. The voters looking for information had to spend a lot of time searching for the necessary information.

Indirectly, all major parties were seeking voters' attention and in particular, they tried to use the Presidential election. The candidates in the Lithuanian President's political campaign had a special desire to get more votes in elections to the European Parliament. The main feature of the last elections to the European Parliament in Lithuania was the use of presidential campaign for EP elections. It would include at least a few candidates. V. Tomasevskis or Z.Balcytis were primarily seeking to be elected to the European Parliament. They, on the one hand, wanted to indirectly grab the voters' attention, but at the same time it was clear that they did not plan to debate on European issues, on the Eastern Neighborhood Policy, on the European Union Strategy for the 2020 implementation, on the progress of the internal market and the progress of similar issues or crisis in the euro zone. They spoke of what is important in elections to the position of President, thus hoping to be elected to the European Parliament.

2. The 2014 EP election results

The results of previous voters' turnout and activities of last campaign indicated that in order of importance the EP elections are in the fourth place order after the Parliament elections, the Presidential and municipal elections. The parties which had more loyal voters, such as Lithuanian Polish election action (LLRA), Lithuanian conservatives (TS-LKD) or Lithuanian social-democrats (LSDP), have usually little interest to get more voters involved. They have enough loyal voters to get one or several mandates to the European Parliament. Among the above-mentioned parties, only LSDP can grab more undecided voters. Social Democrats, which had significantly higher ratings than the other party before the elections, were favourable to higher voter turnout.

The voting day showed that voting turnout of the voters was higher than it might be expected from looking at the campaigning of the parties and candidates (passivity at the beginning and activity just during the last two weeks). The turnout of the 2014 EP Elections in Lithuania was 47, 35%. This result was influenced by the second round of Presidential elections. Only this helped to mobilize the voters for EP elections. Without the national elections, we would have much worse results. Parties did not present clear messages to the voters, which would be helpful in choosing the party. That is why it seems that voters were electing the candidates, personalities, instead of parties. Good image of the candidate helped him attract the voters. It was the case of personality helping the party, instead of the party helping the candidate.

The final results were of great interest because they were not predicted by the public opinion pools. In total, seven parties got representation in the EP. Four parties got two representatives each and three got just one (in total 11 EP members). The elections were successful for the opposition parties – liberals and

conservatives. This confirms the thesis of second-order national elections, which mentions one of the characteristics – the loss of votes for the governing parties.

Conclusions

2014 Elections to the European Parliament in Lithuania might be treated as second-order national elections. All three basic characteristics of this election model were present in the Lithuanian case. First, the campaign was very calm and practically invisible at the beginning of the campaign. Later it was activated, but mainly due to the second round of Presidential elections. The parties were not very active and showed low interest in the elections, avoiding to present clear arguments on EU policies and mainly discussing national issues. Second, the turnout was higher than predicted by the passive campaign, but this activity was not a result of EP election campaign activities, but the effect of Lithuanian Presidential elections. Turnout still was lower than in national Parliamentary elections or about the average of these elections. Third, the success of smaller parties was visible, shown by the result that 7 from 10 participating parties got representation in the EP.

Analysis of media coverage revealed the passivity of news media in mobilizing the voters and presenting them information that would be helpful when choosing among the candidates. The media was aimed at demobilization and transmtted cynical news on the EP elections. There was no possibility for the voter to make an informed decision just relying on the news media messages.

The political parties' advertising strategy was to concentrate ads at the end of campaign instead of providing the information in a consistent and constant way. The candidates were campaigning by using visibility and well-known personality, instead of presenting ideas and visions on EU policies and integration issues.

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DIFFERENT INTERESTS OF EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES AND THE PROSPECTS OF EU EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY

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ABSTRACT

The European Union is a union based on liberal values with relatively strong supranational institutions. Such principles as subsidiarity, proportionality, solidarity and better regulation are the basis of EU policy making. However, when it comes to energy security and policy, member states are much more likely to follow their national interests, rather than the values and principles of the Union. In this paper I would argue that it is the nature of energetic security that makes states unwilling to risk their short-term energy interests for the sake long-term common goals. Difficult formalization of EU external energy policy and Member States' unwillingness to assign more competences in this sector to supranational institutions implies that we should analyse EU energy security and policy in the context of the realist approach.

Keywords: energy security, EU external energy policy

Introduction

The European Union is a union based on liberal values with relatively strong supranational institutions. Such principles as subsidiarity, proportionality, solidarity and better regulation are the basis of EU policy making. However, when it comes to energy security and policy, member states are much more likely to follow their national interests, rather than the values and principles of the Union. In this paper I would argue that it is the nature of energetic security that makes states unwilling to risk their short-term energy interests for the sake long-term common

goals. Difficult formalization of EU external energy policy and the member states' unwillingness to assign more competences in this sector to the supranational institutions implies that we should analyse the EU energy security and policy in the context of the realist approach.

This paper is organized into four main sections. First the concept of energy security and its compatibility with the realist approach is discussed. Second section is the overview of EU energy security and its main problems. In the third section main problems to a successful implementation of EU external energy policy are discussed. And in the fourth section two possible tools to strengthen external dimension of EU common energy policy are presented.

1. The realist approach to energy security

Energy security is recently one of the most popular topics in both political and academic spheres. Everyone seems to agree that each state's priority is to secure a stable, continuous and cost-effective energy supply. However, there is no common definition of what energy security really is. According to Felix Ciuta, on the one hand, the spread of energy security discourse legitimized the connection between energy and security, but on the other hand, it prevented deeper theoretical analysis of the concept of energy security[362]. Özgür Özdamar also supports this notion, according to him there is a considerable lack of scientific literature exploring theoretical and methodological foundations of energy security[363]. Literature devoted to energy security is more of a practical nature and lacks intellectual debate. The main problem is that the concept of energy security is very broad - it covers infrastructure, supply chain

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362 Ciuta, F. Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security? *Security Dialogue* Vol. 41, No. 2, 2010.

363 Özdamar, Ö. Energy, Security, and Foreign Policy. *International Studies Encyclopedia.* Ed. Denemark, R., A., Blackwell Publishing, 2010.

vulnerability, war, robbery or natural disaster. According to Felix Ciuta, "energy security" means the security of all - the resources, manufacturing, power, transportation networks, distribution networks, and even consumption fluctuations; security everywhere - in the drilling, pipelines, power plants, processing plants, houses, etc.; and security from everything /everyone - decline of recourses, global warming, terrorism, and so on. [364]

One of the most commonly used definitions of energy security is the one given by the International Energy Agency: "Energy security refers to the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price". This definition is quite "depoliticized" and based on an economic logic. Energy in this case is more of a commodity bought and sold on the free market, rather than a public good. Following this logic, most of the energy security issues can be resolved simply through market forces. However, such definition, based purely on economic principles, does not capture true nature of energy security. Energy security is a multidimensional concept[365], and we should take in to account geopolitics, domestic and political security, environmental issues etc.

Due to this complexity of the concept, there have not been many attempts to theorize energy security. Although it is generally recognized that energy security is an integral part of modern international relations discipline, there has been no significant progress in incorporating it into a theory of international relations. However, according to Ronald Dannreuther, most of the literature applies the realist theoretical approach to energy security. Independent variables such as geopolitical distribution of power, the geographic pattern and value of resources are more important in this approach, than the connections between states

364   Op. Cit. Ciuta, F.

365   Baumann, F. Energy Security as multidimensional concept. Research group on European Affairs. Nr. 1, 2008.

and companies. [366] Realists emphasize the importance of structure, rather than the importance of institutions and are rather sceptical on the influence of international or regional organizations. Thus, according to Dannreuther, basic aspects of energy security could be:

- Access to natural resources and their control. Energy in this case is the most important resource which is one of the key elements of power, and thus at the same time and one of the main interests of the state
- Energy resources are running low, so insecurity is increasing.
- States will increasingly compete for access to these scarce resources and their control.
- The wars for energy resources are becoming more likely. [367]

Energy is closely related to power and ensuring energy security is of vital importance to states' national security. Power is a state's guarantee of survival, and energy has become an integral part of power. In the case of war or military conflict a sufficient energy supply is necessary - even the most modern military technologies are of no use if there is no fuel to ensure their operation.

The realist concept of energy security would include bilateral agreements between countries. Close bilateral relations between countries provide greater certainty for energy supply and at least minimal control of this process. An example of such relations could be cooperation of the United States and Saudi Arabia – the U.S. supports the Saudi regime, and in exchange receives a guaranteed supply of crude oil.

As even short disruptions of oil and natural gas supply can weaken the state both economically and militarily, from a realist perspective, states should not risk their short-term energy

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366 Dannreuther, R. International Relations Theories: Energy, Minerals and Conflict. POLINARES working paper, 2010.

367 Op. Cit. Dannteuther, R.

security for the sake of long-term common goals. That makes close international cooperation in the energy field very unlikely. According to Deese, The 1973 oil crisis has shown that energy can be used as a weapon, and it is more effective than any other tool of economic pressure[368]. Thus, energy security is a top priority; it is unlikely that a sufficient supply of energy resources could be sacrificed for the sake of some other goals or values.

2. Energy security of the EU

Energy security definition in the European Union is broader, covering more than just the economic aspects. It can be defined as "sustainable energy and security of supply of services to consumers at an affordable price, in accordance with the EU's wider social and environmental objectives."[369]

One of the biggest problems in the EU energy security is dependence on fossil fuels - oil and natural gas. Despite significant investment in technology development, the EU (especially in the transport sector) dependence on oil remains very high (in 2013 over 81% of crude oil was imported, about 30% was imported from Russia), since this energy resource is very difficult to replace.[370] Natural gas is in second place in the terms of energy consumption. Moreover, consumption of natural gas is expected to grow in the future, since it is more environmentally friendly than oil or coal. It is being increasingly used not only in industry, but also in households. However, the diversification of natural gas supply is far more difficult, as they are supplied through

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368   Deese, A., D. Energy: Economics, Politics, and Security. *International Security*. Vol.4, No. 3, 1980.

369   Cherp A, Jewell J. The three perspectives on energy security: intellectual history, disciplinary roots and the potential for integration. *Current Opinion in Environment Sustainability* 3:1.

370   Bahgat G. Europe's energy security: challenges and opportunities. *International Affairs*. 82:5, 2006.

pipelines, on long-term contracts between the exporting and the importing countries. Currently, two main natural gas suppliers to the EU are Russia (29%) and Norway (24%).

It is quite difficult to reduce the dependence on imported fossil fuel. Even though the EU has relatively large coal deposits, environmental liabilities makes this resource less usable. Nuclear energy could be an answer, but Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and recent Fukushima incidents significantly reduced the popularity of nuclear energy in the eyes of European public. Renewable energy is one of the most acceptable ways to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. The EU has set itself ambitious targets for 2020 - reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20%, raising the share of the EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20%, and improving energy efficiency by 20%. However, renewable energy is quite expensive and also poses a technological challenge, thus the dependence on fossil fuels in the EU will remain.

Thus, the EU energy security involves many variables, such as ensuring supply and demand, reliability of external suppliers, physical protection of infrastructure, supranational energy policy, etc. Still, Nowak suggests that there are two main dimensions in the EU energy policy - internal, which is related to the single energy market and the competitiveness, and external, which is related to the energy supply from the third countries[371].

3. Common energy policy

Even though energy policy has been at the heart of European integration from the beginning, with European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom treaty, which provided specific energy policy tools to supranational institutions, subsequent treaties (Single European Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties) did not provide any

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371   Nowak B. Forging the External Dimension of the Energy Policy of the European Union. *The Electricity Journal* Vol. 23, Issue I., 2010.

legal basis for the creation of a common European energy policy. For a long time Europe did not have any energy strategy, it was an internal matter of the member states and supranational institutions had no influence on energy policies. The European energy strategy was evolving as a response to energy crises such as the 1973 oil embargo. That is why creating a common EU energy policy is a fairly new initiative. The first treaty which had an article solely for energy was the Lisbon treaty. The inclusion of energy in the Treaty as an area of shared competences can be viewed as an interest of greater transparency in this field. Transferring some competences from national governments to the EU institutions could have a very positive effect on efforts to create a common energy policy. The European Commission was one of the most active institutions in creating the Common EU energy policy[372], especially the external dimension – in 2006 it proposed the Green Paper, in 2008 - EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan, in 2011 - Communication "EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners Beyond Our Borders". All these documents prompt member states to strengthen the external dimension of European energy policy - speaking with one voice, sharing information, including EU institutions in bilateral negotiations with third countries etc.

However, neither these documents nor the Lisbon Treaty, have fundamentally changed the situation. A definitive version of the Lisbon Treaty is quite moderate compromise on the division of powers in the energy policy between the member states and the supranational institutions[373] and has a very limited effect the overall EU energy policy making. Energy policy development should be based on the same principles as other EU policies – subsid-

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372   Maltby, T., European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commision policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism. *Energy Policy*, 2013.

373   Andoura, S., Hancher, L., Van Der Woude, M. Towards a European Energy Community: A Policy Proposal. Notre Europe, 2010.

iarity, proportionality, solidarity, better regulation, etc. And even though energy policy framing involves a wide array of different actors (national authorities, regional bodies, industrial associations, consumers, non-governmental actors, etc.), according to Kanellakis, Martinopoulos and Zachariadis, in the end the member states are ultimately responsible for their national energy mix, and energy is a national, not European, resource[374].

Formalizing the common European energy policy is a very difficult process and member states are not inclined to assign the formation of external energy policy to supranational institutions. One of the main reasons for that is a very different energy situation and interests of member states[375]. Although Western European countries depend on imported resources, usually the dependence not more than 30 percent from a single supplier, while in the Central and Eastern European countries, dependence on a single supplier can go from 65 to 100 percent. Even though everybody seems to agree on the need of a common energy policy, the distribution of power among the EU institutions is difficult. Moreover, as Harsem and Claesnote, it is not only the power struggle between the Commission and the member states that that is a challenge to common energy policy, but also a lack of coherence among member statesre garding how to deal with external energy suppliers[376]. It would seem that the most problematic is a common position on the main natural gas supplier, Russia.

Some political scientists[377] use the term "asymmetric interdependence" to describe EU-Russia energy relations. Basically that

374 Kanellakis M., Martinopoulos G., Zachariadis T. European Energy Policy - A Review. *Energy Policy*. No. 62, 2013.

375 Baran Z. EU Energy security: Time to End Russian Leverage. *The Washington Quarterly* 30:4, 2007.

376 Harsem O, Claes D. H. The Interdependance of European-Russian Wenergy Relations. *Energy Policy*. No.59, 2013.

377 Op. Cit. Harsem, Claes.

would mean that the EU is more dependent on energy imports from Russia than Russia is dependent on energy exports to the EU. This is an unfavourable situation, and dependency on external suppliers is always on the EU energy security agenda. According to Simon Blakey, CERA Senior Director "the broad conclusion is that the sustainability, efficiency, and security of European energy supply will best be achieved not by hastily deciding to reduce dependence on Russian gas, but through the creation of a carefully and cooperatively managed 'interdependence' between Europe and Russia."[378] However, to achieve such interdependence, common approach to energy policy and especially common approach to external energy suppliers is essential. However as Kratochvil and Tichy notes, bigger member states still prefer bilateral agreements with Russia, rather than a common approach. [379] Nord-stream pipeline between Germany and Russia, negotiation on South-stream pipeline between Italy and Russia are prime examples of such bilateralism.

The European Commission on Foreign Relations has distinguished five main policy approaches to Russia:

"Trojan Horses" (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions;

"Strategic Partners" (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a 'special relationship' with Russia, which occasionally undermines common EU policies;

"Friendly Pragmatists" (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who maintain a close relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above political goals;

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378   Cited from http://fb.eage.org/publication/content?id=27658

379   Kratochvil P., Tichy L., EU and Russian Discource on Energy Relations. *Energy Policy*. No. 56, 2013.

"Frosty Pragmatists" (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behaviour on human rights or other issues;

"New Cold Warriors" (Lithuania and Poland) who have an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with Russia."

So far, the lack of coherent external energy policy allowed Russia to sell energy based on bilateral agreements with individual countries (Austria, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria). Common EU energy policy and the emergence of a strong domestic market would significantly weaken Russia's monopoly position, and should lower natural gas prices. Nevertheless, many of the EU member statesprefer bilateral agreements. Sometimes these agreements can even be harmful to other members, for example the Nord-Stream gas pipeline[380], which in turn further complicates creation of consistent common energy policy.

Solidarity is an essential condition for a successful implementation of the EU external energy policy. According to Molis, without solidarity an effective external energy policy is almost impossible, and at the moment EU fails "to speak with one voice" on energy issues[381]. This is supported also by B. Nowak, according to him, current member states(especially large ones) are not likely to transfer power to negotiate with energy suppliers to the EU institutions[382]. Such promotion of national interest and neglect of the common goals often lead to tension between the member state sand further reduce

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380   Umbach F. Global energy security and the implications for the EU. *Energy Policy*. Vol. 38, 2010.

381   Molis. A. Rethinking EU-Russia energy relations: What do the Baltic States want? SPES Policy Papers, 2011.

382   Op. Cit. Nowak, B.

the possibility of a successful agreement. Long-term bilateral contracts are signed between states and external suppliers (Nord-Stream between Germany and Russia, South-Stream between Italy, Bulgaria and Russia, various liquefied gas transactions between France, Spain and Algeria). However, small states are in a far worse position to negotiate with external suppliers and seek "solidarity" in the energy related issues. Yet, according to A. Molis, "solidarity" in this case is perceived quite differently. The largest EU members perceive solidarity as short-term actions during a crisis, when a state is supported during the energy supply shortages. Therefore, energy companies of larger members are not keen to invest in unprofitable, politically based energy projects. In Central and Eastern Europe "solidarity" is perceived as a long-term strategy and the harmonious development of a common energy policy[383]. Due to these different approaches to solidarity, it is really difficult create a common external energy policy. Under the current legal framework, an agreement between large and small member states is unlikely. The current system is favourable to the large German, French and Italian energy companies, that are competing in the internal market for better terms with outside suppliers. These companies were able to negotiate an access to Russian energy resources and it is unlikely that they would easily give their powers to the EU institutions, such as Commission.

4. Strengthening Solidarity

European Commission in its latest Communication "EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners Beyond Our Borders" suggests two basic tools for enhancing solidarity - the exchange of information and legal support to member states in the field of energy supply.

Exchange of information

383   Op. Cit. Molis, A.

Bilateral agreements between member states and third countries have a significant impact on the development of energy infrastructure and energy supply in the EU and the Commission's goal is a full compatibility with EU law. Disclosure of information about the planned negotiations with third countries should significantly contribute to a more unanimous position towards the external suppliers. This approach is particularly important for smaller EU members dependent on a single supplier[384]. The largest EU members, such as Germany and France, have better relations with the Russian Federation, and thus are able to negotiate more favourable bilateral agreements. Meanwhile, long term supply contracts with Central and Eastern European countries are often used as a tool for political pressure.[385] Since most of the CEE countries are completely dependent on one energy supplier and their domestic energy markets are small and insignificant (compared to Germany or France) the level of energy security in these countries is low and the only way to improve it is trough common EU energy policy.

Under the information exchange mechanism, any member state would be obliged to inform the Commission about all bilateral energy agreements prior to signing them and the Commission would assess its compliance with the EU law. The most important fact is that the member states would have to report on the bilateral agreements before signing[386], that would give the Commission the opportunity to influence the on-going process, and not only to express an opinion on an already signed agreement. Information about bilateral agreements could be disclosed not

384   Polianskaja, J. Išorės ES energetinės politikos plėtros poveikis ES-Rusijos energetiniam bendradarbiavimui. *Energetinio saugumo akcentai*. Nr. 7, 2011.

385   Buchan, D. Expanding the European dimension in energy policy: the Commission's latest initiatives. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2011.

386   Marini, A. A Single European Energy Policy? 2011.

only to the Commission, but also to other member countries. This step would promote common energy policy even further, because it would allow evaluating bilateral agreements not only in the context of EU law, but also in the context of EU common energy interests. Such developments would be more favourable to smaller members, because it would at least theoretically allow them to influence potentially harmful energy agreements of other member countries.

Exchange of information would make EU energy policy more transparent[387] and energy pricing would be based more on economic rather than on political motives. However, in order to make the exchange of information mechanism work, the EU institutions (especially the Commission) should be given more power over the European energy policy. It must be very clear what the Commission can do and what the Commission cannot do in a case of violation. Should it be able to block the agreement completely, or only make suggestions to change it?

Legal support

If a member state requested it, the Commission could join energy related negotiations with third countries as an observer. This would increase the role of the European Commission in the energy policy formation, and strengthen coordination between the EU member states. In a sense, it is quite closely related to the first proposal for information on bilateral agreements. Under the mechanism of information exchange, the Commission has to be familiar with the terms of the agreement (as it must be informed about it in advance), thus would be very easy to join the negotiations at any moment. The effectiveness of such mechanism was proven in practice. In 2010 Poland requested EC assistance in negotiations with "Gazprom", and EC involvement let Poland to

387   Op. Cit. Polianskaja, J.

achieve some critical points[388] - access to the Yamal gas pipeline passing through the territory of Poland, the right to re-export Gazprom gas, and re-import gas from Germany.

Even with the implementation of information exchange and legal support mechanisms, Commission would have more of an advisory role. In order to ensure a coherent and unanimous external energy policy, the EC should get at least some decision-making powers in this field. However none of the bigger members (Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain etc.) are willing to grant such competences to supra-national institutions.

Conclusion

While the EU can be described as a union based on liberal values with relatively strong supranational institutions, in the sphere of energy security the member states act as sovereign entities and are not willing to transfer more powers to the EU institutions. Rather unsuccessful attempts to form a coherent common EU external energy policy show that most of the member states are pursuing their own interests, without putting too much emphasis on shared values such as solidarity . Even the fact that smaller member states are in favour of a common EU energy policy does not mean that they have large over-confidence in supra-national institutions, but rather the fact that the creation of common energy policy is broadly in line with their energy security interests. The German-Russian agreement on the construction of the Nord-Stream pipeline and the opposition of Central and Eastern European countries to this project is a shining example of a zero-sum game. In this case, Germany reserves the reliable supply of energy resources, while the Central and Eastern European countries' energy security is reduced, because the pipeline bypasses their territories. Losing the status of the transit countries

388   Op. Cit. Buchan, D.

has a greatly negative effect for their energy security level. Thus, even within the EU, member states are competing among themselves for access to energy resources.

Complex and not very successful EU external energy policy-making process demonstrates the importance of energy in each country's national security. Member states are not likely to sacrifice short-term energy security, even for potential medium or long term gains.

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This book concentrates the efforts of researchers from Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, and their neighbours. The research object is also dictated by the region – Lithuanian, Polish, Ukrainian and Russian discourses of "Europe". Researchers published here systematically examine the specifics of construction and spread of what is called "Europe" in this region, and in a broader geographical context. The total scope of this book looks at the phenomenon of constructing "Europe" through different lenses and makes a comparison of particular nations and particular governmental levels.

CONSTRUCTING "EUROPE" AND SPREAD OF EUROPEAN VALUES

Selected articles