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
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**IMPACT OF THE LITHUANIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF LITHUANIA AND
EUROPEAN UNION**

Final project for Master degree

Supervisor
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KAUNO TECHNOLOGIJOS UNIVERSITETAS
SOCIALINIŲ, HUMANITARINIŲ MOKSLŲ IR MENŲ FAKULTETAS

Skaistė Naujokaitė

**LIETUVIŲ TAUTINIO IDENTITETO ĮTAKA LIETUVOS
IR EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS TARPTAUTINIAMS
SANTYKIAMS**

Baigiamasis magistro projektas

Vadovas
Prof. dr. Vilmantė Liubinienė

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Baigiamasis magistro projektas
Europos Sąjungos tarptautiniai santykiai (kodas 621L20016)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EI	European identity
IR	International relations
LGBT	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMS	New member states
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
WVS	World Values Survey

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SANTRAUKA

Tautinis identitetas yra esminis faktorius atliekantis ypatingai svarbų vaidmenį tarptautinėje politikoje. Būtent tautinis identitetas suformuoja šalį kaip unikalią veikėją tarptautiniuose santykiuose, todėl analizuojant šalies tautinį identitetą galima paaiškinti tos šalies elgesį, taip pat ir numatyti būsimus veiksmus. Šis baigiamasis magistro darbas siekia išanalizuoti abipusį Lietuvos tautinio identiteto poveikį Lietuvos bei Europos Sąjungos santykiuose. Tam, kad pasiekti tikslą, iškelti pagrindiniai uždaviniai: ištirti Lietuvos tautinio identiteto raidą, identifikuoti kultūrinius bei istorinius faktorius suformavusius Lietuvos tautinį identitetą, išnagrinėti Lietuvos užsienio politiką bei išsiaiškinti kokia Lietuvos tautinio identiteto įtaka Lietuvos bei Europos Sąjungos santykiams.

Šis magistro baigiamasis darbas susideda iš trijų, pagrindinių dalių. Pirmasis skyrius skirtas pagrindinių sąvokų bei teorijų analizavimui. Apibrėžiamos sąvokos, tokios kaip *tauta, tautiškumas, identitetas* ir galiausiai *tautinis identitetas*, aptariamas ryšys tarp tautinio identiteto ir tarptautinių santykių, identifikuojant pagrindines teorijas, tokias kaip konstruktyvizmas ir tarptautinių santykių teorija. Taip pat, šiame skyriuje apibrėžiama Europietiškojo tapatumo sąvoka. Antrasis šio baigiamojo magistro darbo skyrius skirtas apžvelgti identiteto srityje įvykdytus tyrimus tokius kaip Richard Lewis ir Geert Hofstede sukurti modeliai bei Ronald Inglehart pasauliniai vertybių tyrimai. Trečiasis skyrius analizuoja Lietuvos tautinį identitetą ir jo įtaką Lietuvos bei Europos Sąjungos santykiams. Visų pirma, šiame skyriuje atliekant antrinių duomenų analizę, identifikuojami kultūriniai bei istoriniai faktoriai atsakingi už suformuotą Lietuvos tautinį identitetą ir Lietuvos veiksmus tarptautiniuose santykiuose. Toliau, siekiant išsiaiškinti kokia Europos Sąjungos narė yra Lietuva ir koks Lietuvos požiūris į Europos Sąjungą, šiame skyriuje analizuojami Europos Komisijos dokumentai bei atliktos apklausos *Eurobarometer* įvykdytos skirtingais metais tam, kad aptikti pokyčius Lietuvos požiūryje ir vertybėse. Atlikta lyginamoji analizė tam, kad palyginti Lietuvos bei Europos Sąjungos vertybes ir išsiaiškinti ar Lietuvos ir Europinis identitetai konfliktuoja tarpusavyje. Galiausiai, šis skyrius taip pat nagrinėja kaip Lietuvos tautinis identitetas pasireiškia Lietuvos užsienio politikoje.

Šiame baigiamajame magistro darbe išsiaiškinta, kad Lietuvos tautiniame identitete atsispindi traumuojantys istoriniai įvykiai bei Sovietų Sąjungos įteigtos, bei kovojant už nepriklausomybę ir kalbos

laisvę įgytos vertybės. Tautinis identitetas ne tik formuoja Lietuvą kaip unikalią Europos Sąjungos narę, bet ir tiesiogiai įtakoja Lietuvos užsienio politiką. Unikalus Lietuvos tautinis identitetas formuoja Lietuvą kaip optimistiškiausią, labiausiai Europos Sąjungai pritariančią, šalis patyrusias panašius istorinius išgyvenimus užjaučiančią bei dažnai per stipriai savo tautinį identitetą ginančią šalį. Nepaisant to, kad Lietuva dėl savo post-sovietinio identiteto vis dar gali būti matoma kaip nepilnavertė Europos Sąjungos narė, Lietuva yra pereinamajame laikotarpyje: jaunoji karta su moderniomis vertybėmis pamažu keičia senąją, suvaržytą bei skaudžių prisiminimų apie Sovietų Sąjungą pripildytą kartą, todėl į Lietuvos ateitį galima žvelgti optimistiškai - šie pokyčiai galiausiai leis Lietuvai pasijausti pilnaverte Europos Sąjungos nare.

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SUMMARY

National identity is a substantial element which plays a significantly important role in international politics. National identity shapes the country as a unique player in international relations, therefore, analysis of the national identity of a specific country allows to explain the behavior as well as to foresee the future actions of that country. The aim of the research is to analyse the mutual impact that Lithuanian national identity has on relations with the European Union. In order to achieve this aim, the following tasks have been set: to investigate the evolution of Lithuania's national identity; to analyze Lithuanian national identity from cultural and historical perspectives; to consider how Lithuanian national identity is reflected in Lithuanian - EU relations; to perform an analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy and to investigate the impact of Lithuania's EU membership on its own national identity.

This thesis consists of three main chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to defining terminology and main theories related to the topic. In this chapter the concepts of *nation*, *nationalism* as well as *identity* and *national identity* are discussed. Further on, this chapter discusses the relation of national identity with international relations by identifying theories such as constructivism and International Relations theory. What is more, this chapter also explains the notion of *European identity*. The second chapter is devoted to introduction and discussion of the theories by Richard Lewis, Geert Hofstede, as well as Ronald Inglehart's World Values Survey. The third chapter aims at analysing Lithuanian national identity and its impact on Lithuanian – EU relations. First of all, this chapter analyses cultural factors shaping Lithuanian national identity based on secondary data analysis of the studies presented in the second chapter. In this chapter traumatizing historical experiences, especially the post-Soviet period, are also analysed as factors that contributed to the development of Lithuanian national identity. Further on, in order to investigate what kind of EU member Lithuania is and what is Lithuania's position towards the European Union, this chapter concentrates on the secondary analysis of Eurobarometer and other documents of the European Commission published in different years to grasp the changes of Lithuanian values and views towards the European Union. Comparative analysis is also used in order to compare European and Lithuanian values and to examine if there is a clash between Lithuanian and European identities. Finally, this chapter investigates how Lithuanian national identity is reflected in Lithuanian foreign policy and international behaviour.

In the case of Lithuania, its national identity reflects traumatizing historical experiences and the values that were infused by the Soviet Union, as well as the values that were reinforced by fighting for independence. Not only national identity shapes Lithuania as a unique member of the European Union, but it also directly influences Lithuanian foreign policy. Despite the fact that Lithuania with its post-Soviet identity might still appear to be not a complete and modern member of the European Union compared to other, more economically and politically developed European Union members, Lithuania, because of the specific factors shaping its identity, became a member that is the most optimistic and supportive of the European Union, as well as one characterized by a strong protection of its national identity and empathy for the countries that have had similar historical experiences. As the transition is still ongoing: younger generations with modern values in Lithuania gradually change the older, more restrained generations infused with harsh memories of the Soviet Union, therefore, Lithuania will gradually become a fully integrated member of the European Union as it makes progresses in the democratisation process it started after independence in 1990.

INTRODUCTION

In today's globalized world, international relations is the most relevant field to discuss and analyse in order to understand the recent developments in global policy. Wrong foreign policy decisions can lead a nation to catastrophic situations such as financial bankruptcy, internal political instability, endangering of its own national security or suffering from military conflicts. Even one of these situations in itself can trigger one or several of the others, creating a devastating domino effect. In the end, all of this can threaten a nation's existence.

It is therefore essential that measures are taken to ensure that wrong foreign policy decisions are avoided. For such an endeavour, it is fundamental to make predictions of the response that a foreign policy decision made by a nation triggers in another nation. This response, which in the end is another nation's foreign policy, is known to be the materialization of that country's national interests. At the same time, these national interests are shaped by a country's cultural values and historical experiences and struggles, which in the end construct the country's national identity. Therefore, national identity is an important factor that impacts the foreign policy, which in turn shapes international relations.

Lithuania is a clear example of this relationship between national identity and foreign policy. Lithuanian society infused with Soviet cultural values after decades of Soviet occupation, is since the independence of Lithuania in 1990 experiencing a transition of values from post-Soviet to modern and post-modern type of values, formed during the process of democratisation of Lithuania and its efforts to reach the closer European integration, characterised by higher degrees of protection of democratic values and of freedom of expression, and by more tolerant attitudes towards demographic minorities and individual personal choices. This process of European integration describes a set of foreign policy decisions taken by Lithuania after independence in an effort to protect its own existence as an independent nation, a clear case of foreign policy being shaped by national interests arising from national identity.

Scientific originality of the final project: despite the fact that plenty of studies focus on the concepts of national identity, foreign policy, and even the relationship between the two, very few studies have been published that cover in detail Lithuanian national identity. What makes the Lithuanian case a particularly interesting, is the fact that in Lithuanian society changes in cultural values are clearly visible across generations. This is related with the changes in the society, once infused with Soviet values, undergoing the process of European integration, while in the recent society there is still a strong remembrance of historical experiences and struggles that remind Lithuanians of those traumatising

events which make Lithuania a rather constrained, individualistic society with a constructed self-image that often translates into a low self-esteem and pessimistic mindset.

Practical significance of the final project: understanding how the process of society's cultural values have an impact on foreign policy making is fundamental not only to understand current realities, but also to be prepared to understand, analyze and even make predictions about future geopolitical events and changes. Particularly in the case of Lithuania, it is necessary to understand how Lithuanian national identity was formed in order to fully grasp the reasons that have led to the current geopolitical situation of Lithuania and its foreign policy making.

The **problem** examined in the research paper: how Lithuanian national identity impacts Lithuanian - EU relations.

The aim of the research: to analyse the mutual impact of Lithuanian national identity on relations with the European Union.

Research tasks:

- to investigate the evolution of Lithuania's national identity;
- to analyze Lithuanian national identity from cultural and historical perspectives;
- to consider how Lithuanian national identity is reflected in Lithuanian - EU relations;
- to perform an analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy;
- to investigate the impact of Lithuania's EU membership on its own national identity

Research object: Lithuanian - EU relations

Research subject: Lithuanian national identity

The following research questions are considered in order to achieve the findings exposed throughout this paper:

1. What is the role of national identity in international relations?
2. What are the factors shaping Lithuanian national identity?
3. Can Lithuanian national identity be responsible for the position of Lithuania in terms of Lithuanian - EU relations?
4. How national and European identities are related?

Structure of the final project: the project consists of three main parts. The first part provides theoretical background on the main concepts related to the topic. The second part of this thesis overviews the main

studies in the field of identity for further research. The third part analyses impact of Lithuanian national identity on Lithuanian - EU relations, as well as the cultural and historical factors contributing to the formation of Lithuanian national identity.

1. THEORIZING NATIONAL IDENTITY

This chapter aims at providing the main theories and terminology necessary to comprehend the topic. In order to define the ambiguous concept of national identity, the logical sequence of providing theory has to be followed. Firstly, this section defines nation and nationalism. Then, the concepts of identity and national identity are explained. Next, the role of national identity in international relations is identified. Finally, this section also conceptualizes the meaning of European identity in order to perform a comparative analysis of Lithuanian national identity and European identity as well as the compliance of values.

1.1 Defining nation and nationalism

A theoretical framework is needed in order to perform the research on Lithuanian national identity. A logical starting point would be the definition of the concept “nation”. Since the word “nation” has a Latin root *natio*, which means “people”, the concept of nation might be often confusing. The meaning of nation is far from physical: Benedict Anderson (1991) states that nation is imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (p. 133). Dictionaries such as *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (1998) state that nation refers to “a social collectivity, the members of which share some or all of the following: a sense of common identity, a history, a language, ethnic or racial origins, religion, a common economic life, a geographical location and a political base” (p. 27). Similarly, author Anthony D. Smith (1992), a representative of the essentialist approach, which emphasizes ethnic-cultural variables, provides several dimensions for the concept of “nationhood”:

- the territorial boundedness of separate cultural populations in their own ‘homelands’;
- the shared nature of myths of origin and historical memories of the community;
- the common bond of a mass, standardized culture
- a common, territorial division of labour, with mobility for all members and ownership of resources by all members in the homeland;
- the possession by all members of a united system of common legal rights and duties under common laws and institutions (p. 60).

These dimensions are quite distant from each other and separately might provide five different definitions for the concept of “nationhood”, therefore, author Anthony D. Smith summarizes all these five dimensions into a single, clear definition and finally conceptualizes “nation” as “a named human

population sharing a historic territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common economy and territorial mobility with common legal rights and duties for all members of collectivity” (Smith, 1992, p. 60). What all these definitions have in common, is that the definition of the concept of nation cannot be strictly limited to a very specific, unique idea, but a concept that must be understood as a set of characteristics that a group of individuals share together.

On the other hand, is nation really just a population unified by certain cultural elements? According to Herbert C. Kelman (1997), a nation, in which “communication is smoother and more comfortable among individuals within than across these boundaries” cannot develop unless “its members share important aspects of culture” (p. 169). However, Kelman argues that these aspects of culture may vary in different nations: “no one aspect is crucial to the definition of a nation; there are a variety of elements that are functionally equivalent as bases for communication” and that “a group may constitute a nation even if its members do not share the same language and religion, as long as they share other important values and experiences that provide a ready-made basis for communication among them” (Kelman, 1997, p. 169). Kelman exemplifies his statement with Switzerland and Germany, which unarguably both are nations, despite Switzerland having linguistic division within it or Germany, despite its religious differences. If not specific cultural elements, then what makes nation a nation? Kelman emphasises that the most significant element which constitutes a nation is “the consciousness of being a nation”, consciousness that “these cultural elements represent special bonds that tie them to one another” (Kelman, 1997, p. 169). The same idea was also expressed long before in Floyd Allport’s *Institutional Behavior* (1933):

The main criteria of nationality are psychological. There are certain traditions, historical perspectives, and principles possessed in common by members of every national group which are both the evidence and the substance of their nationality. If an individual shares these ideas with the others of his group, and like others is loyal to them, he belongs to their nation; otherwise, he does not belong to it, even though he may be of the same race of his fellows, speak the same language, and live in the same territory. [...] Individuals belonging to a certain nation are aware that they belong to it and, furthermore, this awareness is an essential part of nationality itself (p. 138).

Like Kelman, Allport highlights cultural elements as the basis for the definition of nationality, going further to specify them: traditions, historical perspectives and shared principles. The conclusion that can be extracted from the analysis of the elements that define nationality and those that do not, with abundant real cases throughout the world supporting this notion, is that nationality is not necessarily a tangible element, such as a territory, or even a language or a religion, but psychological elements that are collectively nurtured through shared values and experiences, forming a sense of a common cultural identity across the members of these collectivities.

It is also important to discuss the difference between nation and nationality. Both of the words have a Latin root meaning *birth* and *origin*, therefore, these two concepts might be confusing, resulting in mistaken reference to nationality as citizenship, however, there is a thin line which draws a distinction between the concepts of nation and nationality. Carlton J. H. Hayes in *Essays on Nationalism* (1962) defines nationality as “a group of people who speak either the same language or closely related dialects, who cherish common historical traditions and thus constitute a distinct cultural society” (p. 5). What is more, Hayes points out that “a nationality by acquiring political unity and sovereign independence becomes nation state” (Hayes, 1962, p. 5). In line with this definition, the difference between nationality and nation lies within the political status of the collectivity in question. If that collectivity has its own sovereign state, it is a nation, but if on the other hand it belongs to a wider political organization and has no complete sovereignty of its own, it is a nationality. From this understanding of the concepts nation and nationality, appears the idea of a nation-state that can encompass several nationalities within it. It is important to point out, however, that there is not a wide academic consensus over the definition of these concepts, and as previously mentioned, the concept of nation is often simply used as a synonym of sovereign state, and the concept of nationality is simply used as a synonym of citizenship.

The ambiguity of terms such as nation can be noticed for instance in the case of Lithuania. During the period in which Lithuania was part of the Soviet Union, it lacked complete sovereignty of its own, yet it was widely conceived as a nation by its own population. It is therefore logical to define the concept of nation beyond the strict definition of a nationality with a sovereign state, and widen it to encompass those nationalities that, despite not being sovereign states by themselves, aspire to achieve a sovereign status and perhaps eventually, if under that sovereignty they choose to, become independent nation-states.

While speaking of nationalism, “the movement that brings nations into being” (Triandafyllidou, 1998, p. 595), which can be seen as inseparable to nation, it is worth mentioning Hans Kohn (1891-1971), a philosopher the most famous for his contribution to nationalism studies and analysis of two different types of nationalism – civic/Western and ethnic/Eastern. As political scientist Craig Calhoun states, Hans Kohn was “the most influential source of both the opposition of civic and ethnic nationalism and of its association with a parallel opposition between western and eastern varieties of modernity” (Calhoun, “Foreword” in Kohn, *Idea of Nationalism*, ix). In Kohn’s view, “Western nationalism had a social base in civic institutions and a bourgeoisie. In contrast, in the East the absence of these institutions and social classes meant that its nationalism was more ‘organic’ and reliant upon intellectuals to articulate a national idea” (Kuzio, 2002, p. 22). Kohn lists the following main differences between civic/Western and ethnic/Eastern nationalism:

- In the West nationalism was a political phenomenon and was preceded by the launch of nation-building, or coincided with it;
- In the East nationalism arose later, in conflict with existing states and within the cultural domain;
- Nationalism in the West did not dwell on historical myths whereas the opposite was true of nationalism in the East;
- Nationalism in the West was linked to individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism whereas in the East the opposite was the case (Kuzio, 2002, p. 15).

Kohn's perspective illustrates that the difference between Eastern and Western nationalism is mostly politically based, since it is precisely the political realities that lead each nation towards one kind of nationalism or the other. To illustrate Western nationalism, which originated in England in the eighteenth century, Kohn provides five cases: France, Netherlands, Switzerland, United States and the United Kingdom, and explains, that in these countries, "the rise of nationalism was a predominantly political occurrence; it was preceded by the formation of the future nation state, or, as in the case of the United States, coincided with it (Kohn, 1961, 329). Kohn continues to point out that "nationalism in the West arose in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and the struggles of the present without too much sentimental regard for the past" while in the East, "nationalists created often out of the myths of the past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any immediate connection with the present and expected to become sometime a political reality" (Kohn, 1961, p. 330). Therefore, Kohn clearly separates Western and Eastern nationalism depending on whether the national political aspirations are shaped by current social struggles in the first case, or by an idealized political and social future scenario in the latter.

However, the explanation for the origins of nationalism received different perspectives than that of Hans Kohn. Authors such as Ernest Gellner (1983), agrees on the division of nationalism to the Western and Eastern dichotomies but argues that in the West, nations were linked by "fully effective high culture", which only needed "an improved bit of political roofing", while in the East, nationalism was "active on behalf of a high culture not as yet properly crystallised" and was "in ferocious rivalry with similar competitors, over a chaotic ethnographic map of many dialects, with ambiguous historical and linguo-genetic allegiances, and containing populations which had only just begun to identify with these emergent national high cultures" (p. 99-100). In conclusion, the basis for Eastern nationalism arose from ethnic related factors, mostly due to the fact that there was not a completely established high culture creating a cohesive enough environment for it to generate by itself a sense of a shared identity among the members of a collectivity, while the basis for Western nationalism, given the fact that there was a

better established high culture, partly due to a better defined distinction between social classes and a well-established bourgeoisie, did not need to rely upon ethnic related factors, and in and of itself that high culture was able to generate a sense of a shared identity linking together a collectivity, allowing Western nationalism to be nurtured under social struggles of each period of time.

Despite this seemingly opposing views, Kohn's perspective pointing out that the difference between Eastern and Western nationalism is mostly political, and Gellner's perspective stressing that the difference between these two types of nationalism is mostly cultural, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact, the cultural scene is inherently bound to the cultural values of a society, which in turn these cultural values shape the political scene. The same is true viceversa, as political events and struggles influence and motivate the cultural scene of a nation. Given this correlation, the difference between Eastern and Western nationalism can be understood both as a cultural and as a political phenomenon.

1.2 Defining identity and national identity

Identity, on the other hand, has many various types but is based on two levels: individualistic, which derives from "interpersonal relationships and interdependence with specific others" and collective, deriving from "membership in larger, more impersonal collectives or social categories" (Brewer & Gardner, 1996, p. 83). The concept of identity at first might seem clear and understandable, but if asked, not everyone could provide a clear definition to this notion. As a matter of fact, identity is a complex phenomenon, studied and discussed by many researchers and sociologists, given the fact that there are many distinct definitions as well as theories related to identity. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the origin of the concept of "identity" dates back to the late sixteenth century and owns a Latin root "identitas", from Latin idem "same". To draw logical connections from the origin of the concept of "identity" to the meaning of it, author Richard Jenkins provides two essential meanings:

- the sameness of objects, as in A1 is identical to A2 but not to B2;
- the consistency or continuity over time that is the basis for establishing and grasping the definiteness and distinctiveness of something (Jenkins, 2014, p. 18).

Richard Jenkins then draws the conclusion that the "notion of identity involves two criteria of comparison between persons or things: similarity and difference" and adds that the verb "to identify" is "a necessary accompaniment of identity, which allows us to identify our similarities and differences to others, and finally ourselves" (Jenkins, 2014, p. 18). analysing the origin of identity and the reasons for its existence, Jenkins defines identity as "our understanding of who we are and who other people are, and reciprocally, other people's understanding of themselves and others (which includes us)" (Jenkins,

2014, p. 19). Author Jeffrey Weeks also supports the idea of similarities and differences while analysing identity but adds that identity is also about a sense of belonging:

Identity is about belonging, about what you have in common with some people and what differentiates you from others. At its most basic it gives you a sense of personal location, the stable core to your individuality. [...] At the centre, however, are the values we share or wish to share with others (Weeks, 1990, p 88).

Moreover, David Buckingham (2008) the author of *Youth, identity and digital media* argues that identity is not only about similarities, differences and belonging, but that “identity also implies a relationship with a broader collective or social group of some kind“ and adds, that “when we talk about national identity, cultural identity, or gender identity, for example, we imply that our identity is partly a matter of what we share with other people. Here, identity is about *identification* with others whom we assume are similar to us (if not exactly the same), at least in some significant ways“ (Buckingham, 2008, p. 1).

Given all these definitions, the concept of identity, regardless of the type of identity considered, can be summarized as the notion an individual or a set of individuals have of their belonging to a collectivity with which they share certain elements such as values, goals, struggles or experiences. Hence, the specific case of national identity, could be summarized as the notion that individuals have regarding their belonging to a larger group of people with whom they share to a certain degree elements like the ones mentioned. In this case, these would include historical experiences, ethical or moral values, common political grounds and others.

However, as discussed previously, nation is a “social collectivity”. For this reason, this thesis will focus specifically on national identity as a collective phenomenon. As this study has already defined nation and identity separately, it is finally possible to define the concept of national identity. If identity is defined as a sense of belonging to a certain group, then national identity is about a sense of belonging to a certain nation. Ilya Prizel (1998) points out that “nations may derive their sense of identity from common language, religion, geographic location, collective memory, cultural practices or a myth of common ancestry”, however, “it is the interaction with the outside world, namely the acceptance or rejection of “the other” that allows polities to develop a sense of national uniqueness” (p. 16). Despite many theories and differences, sociologists agree that for national identity, firstly it is essential to be aware of the difference between “us” and “them”, just then it is possible to concentrate on what makes us “us” and what factors contribute to the formation of national identity.

Analysis of specific national identity is challenging to perform since identity is a constantly changing matter. While John Joseph (2004) states that “identity is in fact fixed and given, is imposed on us by birth and does remain essentially unchanged there-after” (p. 119), David H. Kaplan (1999) argues that “despite its seeming fixity, national identity is extraordinary fluid. It changes over time,

incorporating different groups, different territories, and different geographical imaginations.” (Kaplan, 1999, p. 32) Kaplan continues to point out that “a given national identity cannot be essentialized, it cannot be containerized, it is always a subject to modification, and is always conceived differently by those groups within it” (Kaplan, 1999, p. 32). For this reason, to analyse a specific national identity, it is necessary to investigate what elements influence the formation of national identity the most. Anna Triandafyllidou (1998) identifies several elements that construct national identity: “cultural traits, myths, traditions, historical territories form an integral part of the distinction between ‘us ’ and ‘them’ ” (p. 597). The author explains that these elements “give to the contrast between the nation and the ‘others’ a concrete form and, at the same time, they are shaped by this contrast so that they further reinforce it” (Triandafyllidou, 1998, p. 597). However, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama identifies three elements important for the formation of national identity: “nation-building goes further and involves a shared sense of national identity, built on elements that tie people together - such as shared culture, language, and history - that cannot be imposed from without” (Powell, 2012). Consequently, analysis of Lithuanian national identity will be specifically based on these three elements. As it will be later revealed in this study, language, history and culture had a significant effect in shaping Lithuanian national identity and developing Lithuania as a unique actor in international relations.

However, there are several factors which pose a threat to national identity. One of these challenges could be identified as globalization. The concept of globalization, which is defined as “increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information, and culture” (Held et al., 1999, p. 16), according to Gal Ariely (2012), puts national identity at risk: “globalisation is seen as undermining national identity because, put briefly, the cross-border flow of information makes it harder for any single national identity to retain its unique significance and distinguish itself from other national identities“ (p. 462-463). What is more, even though globalization and European Union are two distinct matters, Ariely states that there are also similarities between them like “the increasing communication beyond the national borders that led research to expect the decline of national identity“ and that “the emergence of the European Union led to growing interest in the question of its impact on the national identity of citizens in the member states“ (Ariely, 2012, p. 465). Therefore, European identity and European integration might have an impact on national identity, phenomenon that is further analyzed in this thesis.

Another element that has an influence on national identity is immigration. Clara Sandelind (2015) states that “national identity and immigration are interdependent concepts, meaning that changes in how national identity is understood may also change how immigration affects national identity“ (p. 4). Sandelind continues to point out that “those individuals who understand their national identity as foremost civic are more positive to admitting immigrants than those with an ethnic identity“ (Sandelind, 2015, p. 4), since the immigrants might possibly not have the same shared values than those mainly held

in a nation with an ethnic national identity. An example of, as one could say, excessive protection of national identity related to immigration can be seen in Brexit: an opinion poll conducted 8 years before Brexit referendum revealed that “almost two-thirds (60%) of the young people surveyed in the poll by the British Council thought the presence of foreign immigrants was “diluting” their sense of national identity“ (Mail Online, 2008). Interestingly however, it was the vote of the elder part of the British people, which balanced the result of the Brexit referendum towards the option of leaving. This is possibly due to the growing open-mindedness of younger people and a stronger attachment and protection of national identity of the older ones. This fright to lose national identity is likely to have been a determining factor that led British people to vote in favour, although by a very small margin, of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, and at the same time a mobilising factor of certain individuals and groups of extremists within the country who took racism motivated actions such as discriminating and even using violence against people in Britain belonging to demographic minorities despite their citizenship or birth place, or even the killing of a Member of Parliament, Jo Cox, who campaigned during the referendum in favour of the United Kingdom remaining inside the EU. This is a clear example of how promoting a particular perspective over national identity, for instance by promoting fear through an alleged risk of losing national identity, can put a nation’s stability and social cohesiveness at risk.

1.3 Relation between national identity and international relations

In order to understand what is the relationship between international relations and national identity, a theoretical framework needs to be presented. International relations (IR) theory focuses precisely in analyzing this relationship. Authors Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (2008) argue that state and IR theory are significantly related:

The state is central to the study of international relations and will remain so in the foreseeable future. [...] States decide to go to war. They erect trade barriers. They choose whether and at what level to establish environmental standards. States enter international agreements, or not, and choose whether to abide by their provisions, or not (p. 41).

According to Jonathan Cristol, international relations theory is “often thought as a theory that seeks both to explain past state behaviour and to predict future state behaviour” (Cristol, 2011). The author furthermore explains that “traditional IR theories can generally be categorized by their focus either on humans, states or the state system as the primary source of conflict” and that realism, liberalism and constructivism are the three main theories of IR theory. (Cristol, 2011) Jack Snyder (2004) in his work *One World, Rival Theories*, provides detailed explanations for these three theories. Snyder states that the core of realism is “the belief that international affairs is a struggle for power among self-interested states” (p. 55). Liberalism theory is about “spread of democracy, global economic ties” and the belief that

“international organizations will strengthen peace” (Snyder, 2004, p. 59). However, the theory which focuses not only on the relationship between the state and international relations but also on the role of nation identity in international relations is constructivism, which claims that cultural and social factors construct international relations: “Constructivists view nations and national identities as constructs, forged by elites to achieve various socio-political and economic objectives” (Mole, 2012, p. 5). Moreover, constructivism states that “international politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities” (Adler, 1997, 319).

What is more, anarchy is an essential concept in IR theory. A political scientist, one of the most well-known IR constructivists, Alexander Wendt, in *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) develops a cultural theory of international politics complementing constructivism and provides three “cultures of anarchy”, which explain the interaction between states. These are Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian (Wendt, 1999, p. 257). Wendt links the concept of “culture” to “a subset of social structure, socially shared knowledge” (Wendt, 1999, p. 141). He explains that the Hobbesian culture is the one in which states view each other as enemies. According to Wendt, “enemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self” (Wendt, 1999, p. 260). States try to conquer or destroy the ones they view as enemies and power becomes “the key to survival” (Wendt, 1999, p. 262). The Lockean culture is based on rivalry as a role structure. Wendt explains that “like enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect to violence”, however, the states who view Others as rivals, do not try to conquer or destroy them because “these representations are less threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their “life and liberty,” as a right” (Wendt, 1999, p. 279). Finally, the view as friends of each other is stated in Kantian culture. Wendt explains that “friendship is a role structure within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules” (Wendt, 1999, p. 298). These rules are “the rule of non-violence”, which means that “disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war” and “the rule of mutual aid”, when states “will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party” (Wendt, 1999, p. 298-9). These three “cultures of anarchy” are fundamental to fully explain and understand the concept of constructivism, as they help to avoid the ambiguity that its general definition can possibly generate, and to thoroughly explain the three main different perspectives that all together form the concept.

Why then, national identity is important for international relations? According to Xintian Yu (2004), “in constructivism theory, national interest is directly instituted by national identity” and “interest that is defined by the actor’s identity shapes its behaviour” (p. 71). Xintian emphasises that identity and interest have no meaning if they exist separately: “identity is combined with interest to

construct an actor's action. Without interests identities have no motive and without identities interests have no direction" (Yu, 2004, p. 71). Furthermore, Alexander Wend states that interests, which depend on identities can also explain behavior: "interests are dependent on identities and so are not competing causal mechanisms but distinct phenomena - in the one case, motivational, in the other, cognitive and structural - and, as such, play different roles in explaining action" (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Another author, William Bloom (1993), reveals that national interest "can be perceived as being a part of national identity and thus is capable of triggering mass mobilization to defend or enhance it" (p. 83). Coming back to Ilya Prizel's words that "it is the interaction with the outside world, namely the acceptance or rejection of "the other" that allows polities to develop a sense of national uniqueness", it is visible that national identity has a significant effect on foreign policy. Correspondingly to William Bloom, Prizel states that "foreign policy, with its role as either the protector or the anchor of national identity, provides the political elite with a ready tool for mass mobilisation and political cohesion" and that "all countries frequently use national identity to articulate their foreign policies and in turn, rely on foreign policy as a foundation of their legitimacy" (Prizel, 1999, p. 19). As suggested by these authors, national identity is crucial for international politics: it significantly influences foreign policy, which is a crucial element that materializes national interests. What is more, national identity can also be used to explain a certain nation's behaviour and responses to actions in international relations.

Interestingly, some scholars refer to national identity as state identity. Maxym Alexandrov (2003) explains that national identity and state identity "often, if not always overlap to a certain degree" (p. 36), but these concepts are not equal: "the shared narratives of national identity that bind the "imagined community" together do also relate this community to other nations, while state identity understood as shared beliefs about the Self and the Other can play an important role in sustaining "we-ness" of national community" (Alexandrov, 2003, p. 36-7). The author points out that this confusion arises because of the contrasting research objectives: "to a certain degree this distinction results from the different theoretical concerns and research priorities across the disciplinary fields of political science and international relations" and that "those scholars concerned with domestic politics, nationalism or ethnic conflict see identity as "national", while scholars of foreign policy and international relations discipline emphasize the external dimension of identity" (Alexandrov, 2003, p. 37).

Maxym Alexandrov provides a figure summarizing theoretical approaches to national, or so to say, state identity in IR theory:




Figure 1. The main directions of research of identity in international relations theory. **Source:** Maxym Alexandrov, (2003), *The Concept of State Identity in International Relations*

As seen in Figure 1, and as discussed previously, most theoretical approaches agree that culture and norms shape state identity, while state identity shapes state's interests and state's interests directly influence state action, which manifests in state's foreign policy. By researching national identity, it is possible to understand and explain a nation's specific actions and, possibly, even draw future predictions.

The interconnection between the concept of state identity and national identity is therefore evident, as national identity creates a state's image in relation to other states, which in itself creates state identity. Likewise, the consolidation of that state identity gives coherence and provides the cohesiveness that strengthens national identity.

1.4 The concept of the European identity

European identity as an idealistic idea was kept alive by such politicians as Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein and others, but it was first implemented only in 1973 in the Copenhagen European Summit, where nine member states of the European Union defined European identity (EI). Fundamental elements of EI are "rich variety of national cultures", "same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual", determination to defend "the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice" and "respect for human rights" (Declaration on European identity, 1973). Some authors (Ramanauskas, et al. 2000), despite the complexity of the term, attempted to provide a description of the concept of European identity:

a) it does not have the attributes of the national identity (such as common culture, language, history, religion, etc.), and therefore European identity and national identity are qualitatively different and do not overlap;

b) European identity is based first of all on common values typical of a democratic society, and therefore applicable in every nation (though there might arise a question of what are the typical European values);

c) European identity does not exclude cultural, lingual and other differences among nations, accepting their distinctiveness (p. 11).

Therefore, even though European identity cannot be equivalent to national identity because of the absence of a common language, religion or history, the European union still shares “common features as of a democratic society”, altogether with “living in one continent” and “tolerance and respect for individuality and distinctiveness” (Ramanauskas, et al. 2000, p. 11)

It might seem that European identity is rather an idealistic goal viewed through rose-tinted glasses because of the European Union consisting of many value systems that are all unique and one of a kind. Then how is it possible to implant this single value system, common identity that would embrace the values that are older and closer to the member states constituting the European Union? This aim being difficult to achieve, the European Union seeks to implement this single common identity through politics, by infusing values into the areas of economy, law, education and other spheres. However, there is still a distinguishable line between historical experiences and the perception of geopolitical threats between Eastern and Western societies.

For instance, while countries in Western Europe have had during long periods of time a good relationship with Russia, as their geopolitical and financial interests were favourable to seeing Russia as a good ally, and even looking to the other side when Russia was being widely accused of abusing human rights during the Chechen wars, Eastern European countries that were former Soviet Republics that had gained independence, saw Russia as an aggressor and as a threat to their own existence.






























However, as pointed out in the previous definitions, European identity and national identity are not mutually exclusive concepts. In fact, they complement one another. Regardless of the differences that make each national identity unique, European identity provides on top of each national identity the sense of belonging to a wider group of nations that have in common a set of democratic values that they are supposed to cherish and protect.

Author M. Kohli (2000) argues that this European identity creates a “sense of a direct opposition between (Western) Europe and the outside world” (p. 128). Kohli then points out that “Immigrants from other Western European Countries are not seen as ‘foreigners’ in the ethnocentric sense any more” (Kohli, 2000, p. 128). Interestingly, as Kohli suggests, the European Union has created a sense of a

European identity that sets the European Union as a united entity and sets it apart from the rest of the world, and at the same time changes national perceptions from EU populations of citizens of an EU member state who immigrate into another EU member state. As a matter of fact, the following table shows this distinction in perceptions of populations from EU member states of those immigrants who are citizens of other EU member states, and those who are citizens of non-EU countries:

Table 1. The view of European member states towards immigrants. **Source:** Eurobarometer 86 (2016)

QB4 Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you.
(%)

		Immigration of people from other EU Member States					Immigration of people from outside the EU				
		Total 'Positive'	Aut 2016 - Sp.2016	Total 'Negative'	Aut 2016 - Sp.2016	Don't know	Total 'Positive'	Aut 2016 - Sp.2016	Total 'Negative'	Aut 2016 - Sp.2016	Don't know
EU28		61	▲ 3	33	▼ 2	6	37	▲ 3	56	▼ 2	7
EURO AREA		61	▲ 3	33	▼ 2	6	37	▲ 1	56	=	7
NON-EURO AREA		62	▲ 7	32	▼ 5	6	37	▲ 5	56	▼ 4	7
BE		60	▲ 3	39	▼ 2	1	39	▼ 1	59	▲ 1	2
BG		61	=	28	▲ 1	11	15	▼ 3	77	▲ 5	8
CZ		45	▲ 1	51	▲ 2	4	14	▼ 3	82	▲ 5	4
DK		62	▼ 1	31	=	7	31	▲ 1	63	=	6
DE		71	▲ 9	23	▼ 9	6	40	▲ 5	53	▼ 5	7
EE		69	▲ 5	26	▼ 2	5	14	▼ 1	81	▲ 4	5
IE		81	▲ 4	16	▼ 3	3	57	▲ 4	38	▼ 4	5
EL		61	▲ 6	36	▼ 7	3	27	▲ 3	70	▼ 3	3
ES		69	=	22	=	9	52	▲ 2	36	▼ 3	12
FR		55	▼ 1	39	▲ 3	6	35	▲ 1	57	=	8
HR		66	▲ 2	28	▲ 3	6	41	▼ 1	53	▲ 8	6
IT		42	▼ 3	51	▲ 5	7	24	▼ 3	69	▲ 4	7
CY		43	▲ 4	54	▼ 4	3	22	▲ 1	75	▲ 1	3
LV		46	=	49	▼ 2	5	14	▲ 3	83	▼ 3	3
LT		72	▲ 2	25	▼ 1	3	26	▲ 2	71	▼ 1	3
LU		82	▲ 1	14	▼ 2	4	49	▼ 4	46	▲ 6	5
HU		57	▲ 3	38	▼ 5	5	15	▲ 1	81	▼ 2	4
MT		60	▲ 5	33	▼ 3	7	23	▲ 3	69	▼ 2	8
NL		66	▲ 3	31	▼ 1	3	44	▲ 1	53	▲ 2	3
AT		62	▲ 2	31	▼ 2	7	36	▲ 1	56	▼ 2	8
PL		69	▲ 7	25	▼ 3	6	28	▲ 4	64	▼ 1	8
PT		68	▲ 2	25	▼ 2	7	48	▲ 3	44	▼ 2	8
RO		57	▲ 6	37	▼ 2	6	35	▲ 8	59	▼ 5	6
SI		68	▲ 7	28	▼ 7	4	28	=	68	=	4
SK		54	▲ 9	42	▼ 7	4	17	▲ 6	79	▼ 5	4
FI		76	▼ 1	22	▲ 2	2	38	▲ 3	59	▼ 2	3
SE		83	▲ 5	16	▼ 4	1	64	▲ 2	34	▼ 2	2
UK		58	▲ 9	35	▼ 10	7	49	▲ 8	43	▼ 10	8

As the table shows, the percentage of citizens from a given EU country viewing positively immigrants from other EU countries is higher than the percentage of citizens from that same EU country viewing positively immigrants coming from outside the European Union. In the case of Lithuania, for instance, it can be noticed that the percentages of people having a negative or positive view of immigrants from the EU is nearly inversely proportional to the negative or positive view of immigrants from non-EU countries.

2. OVERVIEW OF THE THEORIES RESEARCHING IDENTITY

Despite the difficulty in limiting the scope of a concept that can be relatively ambiguous, several theories and models could be further discussed which help to understand the importance of cultural dimension and the system of values in particular, while researching identity. The common approach in many of those theories is the research of cultural values. The result might be helpful, in a context of international relations, to predict and determine possible behavioural models related to foreign policy decisions.

2.1 Richard Lewis model and dimensions of state behaviour

As discussed previously, culture is an important factor shaping national identity. Therefore, analyzing Lithuanian culture allows us to investigate the attributes of Lithuanian national identity. Richard Donald Lewis, a social theorist, is mainly known for his “Lewis Model of Cross-Cultural Communication“ where he classifies the cultures into Linear-Active, Multi-Active and Reactive. Lewis explains the importance of culture shaping national identity and consequently nations’ actions in international relations: “people of different cultures share basic concepts but view them from different angles and perspectives, leading them to behave in a manner which we may consider irrational or even in direct contradiction of what we hold sacred” (Lewis, 2005, p. xvi). What is more, the author explains that “by focusing on the cultural roots of national behavior, both in society and business, we can foresee and calculate with a surprising degree of accuracy how others will react to our plans for them, and we can make certain assumptions as to how they will approach us“ (p. xvi). Therefore, Lewis suggests that a nation can plan its international relations with another nation by taking into account that other nation’s cultural values, as on them will depend the other nation’s response to the first nation’s foreign policy plan, allowing for a calculation of the other nation’s response before it even takes place.

Table 2. Lewis classification of cultures. Source: Lewis, R., (2005), *Leading across cultures*.

LINEAR-ACTIVE	MULTI-ACTIVE	REACTIVE
Talks half the time	Talks most of the time	Listens most of the time
Does one thing at a time	Does several things at once	Reacts to partner's action
Plans ahead step by step	Plans grand outline only	Looks at general principles
Polite but direct	Emotional	Polite, indirect
Party conceals feeling	Displays feelings	Conceals feelings
Confronts with logic	Confronts emotionally	Never confronts
Dislikes losing face	Has good excuses	Must not lose face
Rarely interrupts	Often interrupts	Does not interrupt
Job-oriented	People-oriented	Very people-oriented
Sticks to facts	Feelings before facts	Statements are promises
Truth before diplomacy	Flexible truth	Diplomacy over truth
Sometimes impatient	Impatient	Patient
Limited body language	Unlimited body language	Subtle body language
Respects officialdom	Seeks out key person	Uses connections
Separates the social and professional	Mixes the social and professional	Connects the social and professional

As seen in the table 2, the three types are very distinct from one another. Evaluating the three from an emotional intelligence perspective, that is, by their capacity to control their emotions in their responses, a state with a Multi-Active culture would be the one with the least emotional intelligence, as it has traits such as confronting emotionally rather than logically, is impatient and often interrupts, therefore, acts impulsively. A state with a Reactive culture would be the one with the most emotional intelligence, as it shows traits such as a preference for listening over talking, not interrupting, avoiding confrontation, hence, preferring diplomacy in all cases and working for de-escalation of conflicts. Finally, the state with a Linear-active culture would have a level of emotional intelligence in between the levels of the other two types, since its behaviour shows traits that are sometimes more diplomacy-oriented, but in other occasions the reactions are more impulsive and emotionally uncontrolled.

What is more, Lewis created the color coding scheme which allows to determine the cultural type of a specific country. According to Cross Culture website founded by Richard Lewis, the colors in the scheme have a specific purpose: “blue is a cool colour denoting calm factual planners, discreet but in control. Red signifies warmth, emotion, loquacity, perhaps passion. Yellow indicates soothing harmony,

sought by courteous, accommodating listeners” (Lewis, 2017). This color coding scheme will be later used in this thesis to analyse Lithuania from a perspective of cultural behavior.

2.2 World Values Survey on how human development may lead to democracy

Another research related to values is World Value Survey (WVS). WVS is a global project first conducted in 1981, which sought to analyse countries according to their values and beliefs. This study performed by various social scientists is based on surveys in almost 100 different countries, and allows to measure such factors as the impact of globalization, attitudes towards politics, national identity and others. What is more, WVS is a project widely used by governments, students, journalists, as well as in policy making to build a better society while taking into account the wide diversity of cultures. Political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel analysed the data of WVS and created a map where they classified countries according to the values and beliefs prevailing in each country regardless of its geographical position. Scientists distinguish two major dimensions for countries to be assigned to: traditional versus secular-rational values and survival versus self-expression values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010, p. 553). Traditional versus secular-rational values reflect the contrast between the countries based on the importance of religion. What is more, countries assigned to traditional values are the ones with a low tolerance for phenomena such as abortion, divorce and euthanasia. However, these countries place a significant importance on traditionally conservative views on the concept of family, relations between parent and child, together with a possible self-characterization as a nationalist country. (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010, p. 553) Countries assigned to secular-rational values are opposite to the countries having traditional values. Not only secular-rational countries have a high tolerance for phenomena such as gay marriage, abortion and others, but also, they place less emphasis on religion and traditionally conservative views on family. Secular-rational countries place a significant importance on environmental protection and participation related to decision making in both economic and political life. Survival versus self-expression values portray the shift from the emphasis on economic and physical security to the importance of the subjective well-being and quality of life. While countries with survival values emphasise hard work in order to survive, countries with self-expression values highlight such factors as imagination and tolerance towards values that are necessary for children’s education. (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010, p. 553)

The economic growth of the past decades in most western countries has meant a shift in which younger generations take survival for granted and adopt self-expression values in which tolerance and respect towards demographic minorities such as the LGBT community or foreigners prevail. It is precisely this shift towards self-expression values that creates societies more politically concerned with

social and environmental issues. This political activism often contributes to the democratization of societies.

2.3 Geert Hofstede and six dimensions of national culture

Geert Hofstede is a Dutch social psychologist which developed a cultural dimension theory. He argues that the core element of culture is precisely values. Hofstede (2010) explains that “our own culture is to us like the air we breathe, while another culture is like water - and it takes special skills to be able to survive in both elements“ (p. 23). Hofstede created six dimensions based on values in order to understand cultural differences. This study based on “various paper-and-pencil questionnaires” that were developed to find out “people’s preferences among alternatives”, was performed taking into account common problems prevailing in different societies (Hofstede, 2010, p. 28). These were as follows:

- Social inequality, including the relationship with authority
- The relationship between the individual and the group
- Concepts of masculinity and femininity: the social and emotional implications of having been born as a boy or a girl
- Ways of dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity, which is related to the control of aggression and the expression of emotions (Hofstede, 2010, p. 30).

Geert Hofstede at first created four dimensions related to these problems: power distance, collectivism versus individualism, femininity versus masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. However, later, long-term orientation vs. short-term orientation and indulgence versus restraint were added as two additional dimensions resulting in the six-dimensional model (6-D) (Hofstede, 2010)

The first dimension, **power distance**, is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally“ (Hofstede, 2010, p. 61). The higher level of power distance, the more people accept the hierarchical order, where every person has a social structural role they must accept, while the low level of power distance shows that society is unhappy with inequality of power.

Another dimension provided by Hofstede is **individualism** versus **collectivism**. As Hofstede explains, individualism “pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him- or herself and his or her immediate family“ while collectivism “pertains to societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 92) Therefore, in an individualistic country, a person’s identity can be less impacted by peer

pressure, as that person is not necessarily promising “unquestioning loyalty” to a social group. These countries prefer tasks over relationships and are characterized by independence and personal opinion. Oppositely, in a collectivist country, identity is much more impacted by the pressure of the surrounding social system and opinions are influenced by social groups. What is more, a collectivist country emphasizes harmony within a group and considers relationship more important than tasks.

The third dimension is identified as **masculinity** versus **femininity**. Hofstede states that a society can be considered as masculine “when emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life“, while feminine society is “when emotional gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life“ (Hofstede, 2010, p. 140) Therefore, according to Hofstede in a masculine society there is a predominant and noticeable emotional disparity between genders and more predefined established gender roles, while in a feminine society there is a less emphasized emotional divergence between genders, and gender roles are not as predominant or relevant as in a masculine society.

The fourth dimension according to Hofstede is **uncertainty avoidance**. A description for this concept provided by Hofstede is as follows: “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations“ (Hofstede, 2010, p. 191). Therefore, societies with low index of uncertainty avoidance are flexible and the ones not fearing to take risks. This type of society is more relaxed and its average stress level is not as high. Oppositely, a society with a high index of uncertainty avoidance is filled with anxiety and stress, strictly follows the rules and laws and strongly believes in knowledge rather than in common sense.

Another dimension Hofstede identified is **long term orientation** versus **short term orientation**. Hofstede explains that long term orientation “stands for a society in which wide differences in economic and social conditions are considered undesirable“, while short term orientation “stands for meritocracy, differentiation according to abilities“ (Hofstede, 2010, p. 246). A society characterized as having short term orientation values norms and time-valued traditions altogether with prioritising quick results over long term benefit. This type of society also views societal change with suspicion. On the other hand, a society having long term orientation emphasizes education as a way to prepare for the future and has the ability to adapt traditions according to changed conditions.

Finally, the last dimension of 6-D model is **indulgence** versus **restraint**. According to Hofstede, a society with a high score of indulgence has “a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun“, while a restraint society reflects “a conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms“ (Hofstede, 2010, p. 281) This means that an indulgent society has a weaker control over its impulses than a society

which is restraint, while a society that is restraint in some ways does not allow itself to feel gratified. As it will later be seen in this thesis, Lithuanian historical experiences and fear to lose national identity are visibly reflected in Hofstede's research.

3. ANALYSIS OF LITHUANIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ITS IMPACT ON LITHUANIAN – EU RELATIONS

The importance of the concept of identity lies within its usefulness to understand the mindsets and the idiosyncrasies found in a collectivity of people. Through finding these, a picture can be formed of the cultural values of a society, which, altogether with the nation's historical experiences and struggles, creates a national identity. At the same time, this national identity is essential to understand not only the internal politics of the nation, but also its attitudes and behaviours in regards to its foreign policy. Given Lithuania's membership to the European Union, the shaping of Lithuania's foreign policy through its national identity implies that the power of influence that Lithuania has to shape European Union policies is impacted by Lithuania's national identity. Likewise, the impact of all national identities of European Union member states creates a set of common values of the European Union which reciprocally impacts Lithuania's national identity and therefore the cultural values of the Lithuanian society.

3.1 Methodology of analysis

A country's history and cultural values are reflected in its national identity. In turn, that national identity shapes the country's national interests and policy making decisions, not only at a level of internal politics, but also at a level of foreign policy. This correlation between national identity and foreign policy making implies that a country's cultural values and historical experience shape its international relations with other countries. The aim of this thesis is to analyse the way in which this correlation takes place and the implications it has in international relations, in order to examine how Lithuania's national identity shapes its relation with the European Union, and how that relationship itself impacts Lithuanian national identity.

Systematic data analysis was used to provide the theoretical background on the topic and define the terminology necessary to comprehend the topic and the aim of research.

Secondary data analysis was used in order to find out the attitudes of Lithuania towards the European Union, what historical and cultural factors contributed to Lithuanian national identity formation and their effect on international relations.

For the secondary data analysis the following data sets are used:

- 1) The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (1998, 2004);
- 2) Eurobarometer survey on European Union Citizenship (2012, 2016);
- 3) WVS data set (1996, 2015) provided by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel;
- 4) Hofstede data set on six dimensions of national culture (1991).

Comparative analysis was used in order to check if Lithuanian national identity and values comply with European identity and its values. For this analysis the following data set was used:

- 1) Standard Eurobarometer on the values of Europeans (2012).

As the research on identity is difficult to perform due to the ambiguity of the concept, the first logical step in the analysis of how a nation's national identity impacts international relations, is to examine the national identity of the country itself. Based on the theoretical foundation provided in this thesis, the variables allowing to grasp a country's national identity are culture and values, altogether with historical experience. To analyse Lithuanian national identity, several authors have been taken into account.

The Lewis model classifies countries into three distinct types according to their behaviour rather than on nationality or religion. This research performed by Richard Lewis (2005) is significant because Lewis explains what to expect from each country and how to communicate with it in international relations because of its specific cultural type.

Values, being one of the most important element of culture, have a significant impact on a nation's national identity formation. Ronald Ingehart and Christian Welzel maps (1996; 2015) based on World Values Survey (WVS) is a research project devoted to mapping out the countries according to their values and beliefs. This project observes how these values and beliefs change over time and how they influence social and political areas altogether with culture, diversity, support of democracy, tolerance and others. WVS distinguishes countries according to traditional versus secular-rational and survival versus expression values.

Geert Hofstede (2010) is widely known for his "cultural dimensions theory". Hofstede's work is relevant as it describes how national values differentiate one country from another based on six dimensions Hofstede created.

What is more, this study focuses on Lithuania's position towards the European Union which is influenced specifically by Lithuanian national identity. To grasp the change of Lithuanian national identity and values after the post-Soviet period, Eurobarometers of different years (1998; 1997; 2004; 2009; 2012; 2016) have been analysed. This thesis also focuses on the relationship of Lithuanian values and national identity with European values and identity. The secondary data analysis of Standard Eurobarometer (2012) is used in order to support the facts and claims.

Because of national identity directly influencing foreign policy, this research project will also perform an analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy in order to detect how Lithuanian national identity

constructed by cultural and historical factors reflects in decisions and behavior of Lithuania as a member of the European Union.

The findings and results of all these research projects have proven to be vastly useful to make the hypotheses and reach the conclusions available throughout this paper regarding the impact of Lithuanian national identity on the Lithuanian - European Union relations.




Figure 2. The sequence of analysis of Lithuanian national identity and its impact on international relations (created by author)

As seen in figure 2, this thesis argues that Lithuanian national identity is shaped by the historical and cultural factors. Next, Lithuanian national identity shapes Lithuanian national interests which then construct Lithuanian foreign policy. Therefore, it is visible that Lithuanian national identity directly influences Lithuanian foreign policy. Primarily, analysing the factors that shape Lithuanian national identity, it is then possible to investigate Lithuanian actions in international relations and Lithuanian foreign policy, and to grasp those specific features of Lithuanian national identity that are responsible for the specific behaviour of Lithuania. This sequence of analysis allows to define Lithuania as a member of the European Union and explain the current actions of Lithuania as well as to foresee further developments.

3.2 Factors shaping Lithuanian national identity

The question that remains essential in national identity research might be identified as “what are the variables for measuring national identity?”. Are Lithuanians defined and recognized by others just by Lithuanian passion for basketball and beer? Or are Lithuanians viewed by others as a pessimist, constrained and conservative post-soviet nation? How to tell if these identifications are not just artificial stereotypes? Furthermore, how does national identity affect international relations? To answer these questions, an analysis on national identity needs to be performed to a greater extent.

3.2.1 Cultural factors shaping Lithuanian national identity

Culture is a part of national identity and is also about a sense of belonging: Author L. Robert Kohls (2001) reveals that culture is “an integrated system of learned behaviour patterns that are characteristic of the members of any given society” (p. 25). What is more, culture refers to “the total way of life or particular groups of people” and includes everything that a group of people thinks, says, does and makes - its system of attitudes and feelings” (Kohls, 2001, p. 25). Kohl continues to point out that culture is “learned and transmitted from generation to generation” (Kohls, 2001, p. 25). Brooks Peterson (2004) adds that values take an important part in shaping identity: “culture is a relatively stable set of inner values and beliefs generally held by groups of people in countries or regions and the noticeable impact those values and beliefs have on the peoples’ outward behaviors and environment” (Peterson, 2004, p. 17). Therefore, analysing a nation’s cultural aspects, for instance its values, allows an understanding of its national identity, since that national identity is majorly composed precisely by those cultural values.

Author Richard Lewis assigns countries into three different categories according to their cultural types, designates a color to each category type the warmth of which being related to the characteristics of each culture, and creates a series of tonalities between these color assigned categories to designate the cultural types with features that are in between two of the three main cultural types:




Figure 3. Lewis coding scheme for cultural types. **Source:** Source: Lewis, R., (2005), *Leading across cultures*.

Countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg, being widely perceived as punctual, task-oriented and organised planners are classified as Linear-Active cultures. In fact, considering again the parallelism with emotional intelligence, these countries are, according to Lewis, “calm factual planners, discreet but in control”, attributes that denote high levels of emotional intelligence. Italy, Spain, Brazil, Mexico and others belong to the Multi-Active type and possess characteristics such as emotionality, impatience and talkativeness, attributes that Lewis associates with “warmth, emotion, loquacity, perhaps passion”, features that denote impulsiveness and therefore lower levels of emotional intelligence. Finally, Vietnam and Japan are Reactive countries and are identified as listeners, introverts and the ones concealing feelings, values that Lewis associates with “soothing harmony, sought by courteous, accommodating listeners” and which denote higher levels of emotional control and hence less volatility in their decision-making. Lithuania is in between Linear-Active and Multi-Active cultures, although leaning more towards a Multi-Active type, which implies that it has some characteristics associated with higher levels of emotional intelligence, but also on some occasions reacts in a more impulsive manner.

Interestingly, Lithuania is not on the same side of the previous graphic as Latvia and Estonia. As Lewis (2006) points out “Lithuanians, an emotional and grandiloquent people, feel more at home with Slavic Poles and Russians than they do with Latvians and Estonians” (p. 356). As a matter of fact, despite

sharing a common part of their recent history as former Soviet republics, Lithuania has some historical heritage that sets it apart from its Baltic neighbours. For instance, while Latvians and Estonians were nations that had Lutheranism as the most common religious practice, Lithuania was a nation that had Catholicism as its main religious practice. Moreover, Lithuania was part of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, while the other two Baltic nations had stronger influence from the Finnish in the case of Estonia, and from German colonizers in the case of Latvia. This divergent historical heritage helps explain the difference in cultural values between the three Baltic republics, and why Lithuania is considerably different from its Baltic neighbours. In fact, considering the classification suggested by Lewis, it can be observed that while Latvia and Estonia are grouped next to each other and close to Finland and Germany, Lithuania is grouped together with Poland, France and Hungary. Each of the coloured circles groups together countries that share historical resemblances such as main religious practices. The proximity between these coloured groups in the graphic is proportional to the resemblance of their cultural values.

Table 3. Lewis identification of Lithuanian values. **Source:** Lewis, R., (2005), *Leading across cultures*.

Preservation of national identity	Hospitality
Generosity	Family
Catholicism	Spontaneous attitude
Strong historical consciousness	Sentiment
Music (esp. choirs) and dancing	Morality
Love of nature	Romanticism

These cultural values, identified by Lewis as Lithuanian values, are shared to a greater extent with the previously mentioned nations that Lewis groups altogether with Lithuania, or that he places to other groups close to the group in which Lithuania is placed in the previous graphic.

Another researcher, Geert Hofstede (2010) has performed a deeper analysis of the values prevailing in the country and followingly has extracted these values into the 6-dimensional model, which are significantly useful in defining national identity of a specific country, and in this case, of Lithuania.




Figure 4. Lithuania according to Hofstede’s 6-D model. **Source:** Geert Hofstede’s 6-D model (2010)

As seen in figure 4, with a score of 42 of **Power Distance**, a low score that implies that the Lithuanian society has a low acceptance of the idea that the less powerful within the Lithuanian society must expect and accept an unequal distribution of power favouring the most powerful. Therefore, Lithuanians favor equality in governance and decision-making.

At a score of 60 of **individualism**, the Lithuanian society scores highly in an index that measures whether a society is defined by close ties (lower levels of individualism) or loose ties (higher levels of individualism) between social groups going beyond individual families. Therefore, the Lithuanian is a society characterised by loose relationships between individuals and between different family units, which is often translated into a stronger cohesion within each family unit and by an attitude of respect to privacy between different families.

The **masculinity vs femininity** index measures societies by their prevalence of values associated to “achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material rewards for success” in the case of masculinity, as opposed to a prevalence of values associated to “cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life” in the case of femininity (Hofstede, 2017). With a low score of 19 in masculinity, Lithuania is therefore portrayed as a society in which prevails cooperating and consensuating among members of society over competitiveness.

The **Uncertainty Avoidance** dimension defines societies by their level of tolerance towards the unpredictability of the future. Higher levels in the Uncertainty Avoidance index implies the preference for rigid structures that avoid as much as possible uncertain scenarios, therefore a society with a high

level is uncomfortable with change, while a lower Uncertainty Avoidance index portrays societies that are more flexible to changing scenarios, applying pragmatic solutions over rigid structures that avoid changing scenarios. With a high level of 65%, the Lithuanian society is portrayed precisely as one that is uncomfortable to possible and actual changes, therefore having lower tolerance of ideas that are unconventional compared to those prevalent in the Lithuanian society. Therefore, the society adheres strongly to its principles and is slow to adapt them to an ever-changing environment of global changes. An example of this is the slow changing mindset towards acceptance of demographic minorities such as the LGBT community in Lithuania.

In the **Long Term Orientation** vs **Short Term Normative Orientation** dimension, societies are measured by the way they react to social changes that challenge established traditions. A higher index of Long Term Orientation implies that a pragmatic approach prevails in adapting the social behaviour to better confront the challenges of the future, from the encouragement to financial savings to a modern educational approach. In opposition, a lower Long Term Orientation index implies a stronger adherence to historical traditions and a reluctant attitude to confront the challenges of the future. With a high level of 82 of Long Term Orientation, the Lithuanian is portrayed as a society that has willingness to be prepared to upcoming challenges, promoting austerity to deal with possible financial problems and facing an evolving world through modernising its educational system.

Finally, the **Indulgence** vs **Restraint** dimension portrays societies regarding their approach to allowing gratification. Higher levels of indulgence imply a generalized social acceptance to gratification, while lower levels imply a social attitude that in a way promotes a constrained behaviour in individuals. With a low score of 16, Lithuania is portrayed as a very constrained society, in which values such as hard work are socially promoted in detriment of life enjoyment activities.

Stereotypes often encountered since the times of the Soviet Union categorize Lithuanians as pessimistic regarding their own self-image. Anecdotal evidence suggests Lithuanians frequently describe themselves as conformists and frustrated about their daily lives. Even sarcastic anecdotes have arisen from these negative stereotypes in which Lithuanians are portrayed as “the ones who laugh when their neighbor’s house is on fire”. While some of the stereotypes might be considered as true, most of them are not. However, these derogatory stereotypes construct negative images about Lithuanians both by Lithuanians’ themselves and by foreign nationals. According to a survey performed by A. Čiužas and V. Ratkevičienė in 2005, which sought to identify the features of Lithuanian national identity, 60% of Lithuanian respondents defined themselves as angry, jealous, selfish, apathetic and antisocial. Only one third of respondents identified themselves with features such as honesty, diligence, intelligence, hospitality and ability to save up (Čiužas, Ratkevičienė 2005, 236).

It should be noted that these previously analyzed models partly contradict these constructed stereotypes Lithuanians often have about themselves. It is true that the models suggest that Lithuanians are not keen on allowing gratification, which in part confirms the stereotypes of a pessimistic and restraint post-Soviet society, and that Lithuanians are individualists and as such, social ties are very loose, explaining the antisocial self-image the previously mentioned survey describes. However, it is also true that the models suggest that Lithuanians, unlike the picture painted by the previous survey, are featured as a hospitable and generous society in the Lewis model, and according to Hofstede's dimensions, as a society that values an equal distribution of power, with a high level of femininity implying a cooperative and caring society, and a social culture with a high Long Term Orientation score, indicating a society that is willing to be prepared to tackle challenges of the future, thus contradicting the constructed self-images that show a small amount of Lithuanians being hospitable or a large amount of Lithuanians considering themselves selfish or apathetic.

As previously described, national identity is constructed mainly through cultural values and historical experiences. All these analyzed factors describing the social culture of Lithuanians, and also the historical experiences that have contributed to Lithuanians' pessimistic views on their own self-image, in the end construct Lithuania's national identity.

3.2.2 Historical factors shaping Lithuanian national identity

Historical experiences and struggles have a high relevance in the construction of a nation's identity. In general, without the acknowledgement of these past experiences, it is not possible to get a clear picture to fully understand the present. In the particular case of national identity, analyzing these experiences helps to understand the current values, attitudes, behaviours and the mindset of a society that in essence constructs its national identity.

In the map version of 1996 created by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Lithuania is assigned to the cluster of Ex-Communist countries. Unlike its Baltic neighbours, Lithuania is grouped in the Catholic Europe group, given the historical religious differences that sets it apart from Latvia and Estonia, historically mostly Lutheran.




Figure 5. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel cultural map, (1996). **Source:** World Values Survey, wave 4

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel's cultural map categorizes countries regarding the elements that predominantly shape their cultural values. On the one hand, there is the aforementioned value of the religious historical background of each country. On the other hand, the cultural values of a society are predominantly defined over two main dichotomies: the Survival vs Self Expression values, and the Traditional vs Secular-Rational values. Lithuania according to this map based on the cultural context of the year 1995, is defined as a country with secular-rational values but with deeply ingrained Survival Values as opposed to Self Expression Values. That positions Lithuania along with its Baltic neighbours, unsurprisingly given their recent historical ties regarding decades of Soviet Occupation and a common struggle for independence.

As a matter of fact, ties between the Baltic nations remain strong over time after the post-Soviet era. Such is their closeness in cultural values, that in the Inglehart and Welzel's map culturally based on the context of the year 2015, they are grouped together as Baltic nations instead of grouping them according to their religious background.




Figure 6. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel cultural map, (2015). **Source:** World Values Survey, wave 6

It is worth noticing that, while essentially all the Baltic countries remain as societies with predominantly Secular-Rational and Survival values, Estonia and Latvia, with higher scores of Survival values than Lithuania in the 1995 version of the cultural map, are in the 2015 version placed beyond Lithuania in terms of Self Expression values. The comparison between the 1995 and the 2015 maps demonstrates that essentially in terms of cultural values, all the Baltic nations have remained in the same side of the dichotomies presented by the model of Inglehart and Welzel, which at the same time allows for the conclusion that two decades working for European integration, even though the process has yielded results in terms of social progress impacting their national identity, have not supposed the disappearance of the core cultural values of these nations.

History is an essential factor contributing to the formation of national identity. British professor, Anthony F. Upton (1999) states that “there cannot be a nation without a national history.” (p. 153) Author continues to point out that history defines nation:

This will show, by illustration, what the defining characteristics of the nation are and will confer legitimacy on the nation by describing its origins and development over time and in the process will define the nation’s place in the world alongside, and in competition with, other nations. History will define the friends and enemies of the nation and illustrate the conditions necessary for its survival and prosperity. It will suggest the values that have contributed to success and the failings that have endangered its well-being. History tells the nations what kind of people they are, what

sort of policies they must pursue if the nation is to survive, and it delivers graphic warnings about nations which fail to read the lessons of history aright, which lose sight of their national destiny and perish as a consequence. For a nation, the knowledge of its history is held to be a matter of life and death. (Upton, 1999, p. 153)

What is more, author Ilya Prizel continues to point out that “a polity’s national identity is very much a result of how it interprets its history – beliefs and perceptions that accumulate over time and constitute a society’s “collective memory” (Prizel, 1998, p. 14). Prizel and Upton confirm the idea that, apart from cultural values, national identity is constructed also through a nation’s history. As a matter of fact, cultural values and historical experiences are inherently intertwined, as the analysis of the first has indicated that they are partly the result of the second. Indeed, in Lithuanian national identity formation, history plays an important role. Lithuania, territorially the biggest country of the Baltic states, was the first mentioned in 1009 in the German chronicle named *Annals of Quedlinburg*, recording the death of Christian missionary named Bruno (Kasekamp, 8). Even though more than a thousand years have passed since Lithuania was born, the path to independence and freedom has been a difficult one. To this day, Lithuania is still widely associated with the Soviet Union. Even though Lithuania experienced different forms of relationship with Poland and Germany throughout its history, it was the period when Lithuania was under the influence of imperial Russia that gave rise to Lithuanian nationalism.

It all began after World War I, when the Lithuanian geopolitical situation and advantageous international circumstances allowed it to seek for independence. Therefore, on February 16th, in 1918 the Council of Lithuania declared independence. In December of the following year, Soviet armed forces invaded the borders of Lithuania and the war between Lithuania and the Soviet Union began, and was followed by two decades of tensions with Germany, Poland and the Soviets. According to Nazi-Soviet treaty, which was regulated by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in September 28th of 1939, Lithuania, together with Latvia and Estonia, was passed into the “Soviet sphere of influence”. (Senn, 1990) From this point in history, the Soviet Union’s efforts to put Lithuania under its influence reached its climax. In order to weaken Lithuanian nationalism, the Soviet Union arrested and sent to prison political activists, intelligentsia and other figures that were considered “enemies of the people”. What is more, forced settlements in the Soviet Union began. As Timothy Snyder (2003) states, around “20,000 Lithuanians had taken up arms against Soviet rule, of whom most were killed in action or sent to Siberia” (p. 95). Snyder also points out that “between 1945 and 1953 about 120,000 inhabitants of Soviet Lithuania, or 5 percent of the republic’s population, were deported. Among the deported were many of Lithuania’s leading writers and scholars and 1,000 of Lithuania’s 1,300 Roman Catholic priests” (Snyder, 2003, p. 95). However, these events fuelled Lithuanians to fight for their country and national identity.

As a result, Lithuanian partisans and other anti-Soviet groups such as Forest Brothers emerged. The main reason partisans fought against the Soviet Union and did not fear to sacrifice their lives during 1944-1953 was the desire to restore Lithuania's independence (Gaškaitė, 1996). Author Nijolė Gaškaitė emphasizes that it was not only partisans who fought against Soviet Union. Partisans also inspired Lithuanian civil disobedience against the Soviet Union, and as a result, many Lithuanians disobeyed the will of the occupier by boycotting military, political and economical requirements of the occupation regime (Gaškaitė, 1996). Partisans created this motivational energy which stimulated Lithuanians to seek the goal of wanting to belong together and together cater for one another, and at the same time, to defend Lithuania's national identity.

However, the Soviet Union sparked nationalism not only in Lithuania but also in the two other Baltic states suffering its occupation: Latvia and Estonia. On the 50th anniversary of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, on 23rd of August, in 1989, "the Baltic republics organized one of the most effective publicity campaigns ever held" and resulted in "up to two million people, holding hands, created a human chain, from Vilnius, through Riga to Tallinn" (Dreifelds, 1996, p. 34). In this way, these three countries sought to draw global attention to the fate of the Baltic states. Successfully, "this emotionally captivating scene was widely described not just by the Baltic media but also abroad." (Dreifelds, 1996, p. 34) This event is a great example of previously discussed Anthony Upton's quote stating that "history will define the friends and enemies of the nation and illustrate the conditions necessary for its survival and prosperity" (Dreifelds, 1996, p. 153). Indeed, Lithuania until nowadays cherishes a close, brotherly relationship with Latvia and Estonia. Despite the further attempts of the Soviet Union to maintain Lithuania under its influence, Lithuanians overcame the struggles and on March 11th, 1990, Lithuania was the first one of the Baltic states to declare independence.

According to Klumbytė (2003) Lithuanian identity in the early post-Soviet years was defined mostly as "the one who was Catholic, who spoke the Lithuanian language, and was of the common Lithuanian descent and culture" (p. 287). On the one hand, catholicism in Lithuania represented not only the most common religion practised in the country, but it also represented a symbol of defiance to Soviet occupation. A proof of that is the history of the Hill of Crosses, a spiritual place in Lithuania that was born precisely from this defiance towards Soviet occupation, a hill in which, in a back and forth manner, religious crosses were placed by Lithuanians and later taken down by Soviet soldiers in an attempt to suppress a part of Lithuania's identity, its major religion, different from that of the most common religious practices in the Soviet Union or lack thereof. This fact in itself already portrays that Lithuania's post-soviet culture was deeply affected by decades of Soviet occupation. On the other hand, as

Klumbyte's quote shows, Lithuania's identity had an ethnic component to it, as it was partly defined by an individual's Lithuanian ancestry.

However, despite the strong nationalism and Lithuania's wish to belong to one nation, it is undeniable that this tension between Lithuania and the Soviet Union influenced Lithuanian national identity. Being under pressure of the Soviet Union for such a long time, mostly against its will, Lithuania was infused with foreign values, attitudes and culture. This can be seen in the survey performed by F. Björklund and V. Liubinienė (2004), where the authors sought to determine if the process of democratisation is related to the values change. The authors also performed cross-national comparison in order to confirm or deny the hypothesis raised by Ronald Inglehart, which states that the more democratic the country is, the more modern values prevail in it. This survey compares the three Baltic countries: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Table 4. Cross-national comparison of the Baltic States. **Source:** Björklund & Liubinienė, (2004).

Country	Lithuania			Latvia			Estonia		
Age	18–29	30–49	50–75	18–29	30–49	50–75	18–29	30–49	50–75
Phenomena: Euthanasia	6.53	6.8	4.73	5.57	5.42	3.92	6.0	5.78	4.86
Divorce	5.78	5.78	4.21	6.04	6.05	5.34	6.7	6.43	5.96
Abortion	4.81	4.83	2.80	4.82	5.11	4.3	5.21	5.66	4.82
Avoiding fares on public transport	3.72	3.27	1.97	5.1	3.94	2.44	4.66	3.73	2.58
Homosexuality	3.66	2.38	0.97	3.05	2.18	0.91	4.08	3.03	1.74
Prostitution	3.38	3.23	1.44	2.96	3.23	1.54	3.65	3.13	1.77
Buying stolen goods	2.14	1.33	0.83	2.53	1.38	0.69	2.18	1.3	0.83
Suicide	1.97	2.04	1.43	2.38	2.23	1.76	2.5	2.33	1.66
Accepting bribes	1.8	1.63	0.82	1.58	1.1	0.69	1.74	1.33	0.78
Claiming social benefits	1.82	1.48	1.2	2.89	1.98	1.27	2.56	1.61	1.19
N	268	430	438	241	436	424	268	439	407

As seen in the table above, age is the main factor revealing certain values inherent for a specific age group. In all three Baltic States, and especially in Lithuania, it is visible that the people of older age groups prefer traditionally conventional order and are against phenomena increasingly tolerated in a modern world such as abortion, divorce or claiming social benefits. According to the authors, and as discussed previously in this thesis, this might be due to the fact that Baltic States fall in the cluster of post-Soviet countries: “the existence of phenomena such as “homosexuality” or “prostitution” was denied in the Soviet Union” (Björklund and Liubinienė, 2004, p. 41). The denial during the Soviet Union of these issues that regardless of the lack of public acceptance of their existence were part of society that

had to be kept in clandestinity, explains why the current younger generations, who formed their system of values mostly not under Soviet occupation but during the post-independence period of democratisation in which these issues became increasingly discussed publicly, are more tolerant of them.

Another element that contributed to Lithuanian national identity formation is language. John Joseph (2004) reveals that “a consistent theme within studies of national identity over the last four decades has been the central importance of language in its formation” (p. 94). However, the two variables, language and history are interrelated in shaping Lithuania as the EU member it currently is. The fight for Lithuanian language throughout history has been long and tough. Every threat and attempt to eliminate the Lithuanian language resulted in a growing Lithuanian perseverance to preserve it. For example, when the Soviet Union made efforts towards a process of Russification of Lithuania, it specifically targeted the Lithuanian language, because Soviets viewed language as a central element of Lithuanian national identity. Also in the period of 1864-1904, the printing in Lithuanian language, altogether with Latin and Samogitian dialect were forbidden by Tsar Alexander II. What is more, education and the import of printed matter in Lithuanian was also banned. Even though the Soviet Union put considerable efforts to erase Lithuanian national identity, these actions only fuelled Lithuanian willingness to resist the Russification. Lithuanians established underground schools called “daraktorių schools“, where their children could read, write and be educated in Lithuanian language. Another phenomenon known as “knygnešystė“ emerged. Lithuanian book smugglers, not fearing of fines, being deported to Siberia or even being killed if caught by Soviets, would secretly transport Lithuanian books printed in Latin alphabet in Prussian Lithuania to the remaining Lithuanian speaking areas. As Terry D. Clark (2006) explains, “the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union and the replacement of Lithuanian with Russian as the language of political and economic discourse in 1940 once again presented the Lithuanian nation with a challenge to the survival of its identity“ (p. 165). The author points out that Lithuanian national identity survived because of “the period of the national reawakening and independence struggle“ (Clark, 2006, p. 165). However, despite “the efforts to protect the nation from Polish cultural domination and Russian political domination“ it was “the strong attachment to the national language and the determination to protect it“ which allowed Lithuanians to protect and save their national identity (Clark, 2006, p. 165).

This strong attachment of Lithuania to its national language plays an important role in shaping Lithuania as the actor of international relations. Lithuania’s behaviour such as the elimination of factors threatening national language could be seen as the consequences of traumatizing history and the fear to once again feel as if national identity is in danger. This could be seen particularly in the relationship between Lithuania and Poland. While currently the Polish minority in Lithuania constitutes approximately 6% of the population, Lithuania still fails in forgetting the unpleasant events prevailing

the past such as the disagreement over the Vilnius region. Furthermore, in 1989 Lithuania took the steps towards gaining independence, “the Gorbachev regime sought help from the Polish minority – one that would presumably be threatened by Lithuanian independence – to rally against it (Fearon & Laitin, 2006, p. 4). As authors James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin explain, “Poles were a disaffected minority, but the Soviets promoted Polish cultural life within Lithuania” (Fearon and Laitin, 2006, p. 4). Therefore, Poles became a tool for the Soviet Union to divide and then conquer Lithuania. Fearing of possible Lithuanisation and the ban of their own language, Poles supported the Soviet regime and strongly opposed Lithuanian independence. However, after Lithuania regained independence in 1990, the conflict related to Lithuanian/Polish issues arose once again: “Lithuanian nationalists sought to restrict the Polish minority and Lithuanize them” (Fearon and Laitin, 2006, p. 5). Even though “the constitution of Lithuania adopted in 1992 guarantees cultural minority rights and prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity” (Budraitytė & Pilinkaitė-Sotirovič, 2009, p.7), in 2001, the United States Department of State in a report named “Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor“ stated that “members of the Polish Parliament criticized the Government in February over alleged discrimination against the Polish minority” (United States Department of State, 2001). The tension prevailing in Polish – Lithuanian relations were regarding the Lithuanization of Polish surnames and restricted Polish education in Lithuania. Even after Lithuania joined the EU, it did not ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. These political decisions are an element that makes it evident that Lithuanian national identity, still immersed in fears from the past, materializes into what some might consider over-protective legislation and foreign policy. In the end however, this demonstrates the impact that national identity has over foreign policy.

3.3 Analysis of Eurobarometer - Lithuania and EU

Right after regaining independence, in 1991, September 17th, Lithuania joined the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Could it be that specifically the history and the fear to lose Lithuanian national identity had a significant effect on influencing Lithuania to join the European Union? In 1998, the European Commission performed a research, based on a “survey over the national identities and attitudes to European integration in the ten applicant countries in central and eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia; Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria (CEECs)” (Unit, 1998, p. 5). This research sought to prove whether “the dimension of national identity, closely connected to the perception of sovereignty, will have a direct bearing of the applicant countries’ attitudes to European integration and the acceptance of the principles and obligations of EU membership by their elite and public” (Unit, 1998, p. 5). While countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic “considered themselves as always having been part of mainstream Europe and having contributed to its development”, on the contrary, national identity in Lithuania and

other Baltic states is “connected to the survival of the independent state”, therefore EU membership is “viewed as part of series of linkages to the western world considered necessary to ensure the continuation of their national independence” (Unit, 1998, p. 5). This survey on national identity draws a main conclusion that “because the applicant countries’ national identities have been forged on the basis of (often) difficult, (sometimes) dramatic, historical experiences, and that in many cases the process is far from finalised, it can be expected that the identity-dimension will take a special importance in the eastern enlargement of the EU“ (Unit, 1998, p. 5). Indeed, in 1995, Lithuania, with security being one of the main drivers, applied to join the EU. And in 2004 Lithuania joined both the European Union and NATO.

Just before Lithuania’s accession into the EU, the European Commission in a report including Lithuania in 2004, “The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer“, argued that “the European Union was perceived as a political and security safeguard against the perceived Russian threat as well as a guarantee for social and economic stability“ (EC, 2004, p. 2). Lithuanian history is traumatising, full of torture, conquering and laws which resulted in Lithuania not having breaks of independence between wars and occupations from 1940. However, in order to preserve Lithuania’s independence, restored after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lithuanians took the risk and decided to belong to a union again. This time, unlike the belonging to the Soviet Union, in a sovereign manner instead of through a violent occupation, the Lithuanian people chose to become part of the European Union. What is more, the survey performed by the European Commission has shown that Lithuania was, among the ten New Member States (NMS), the one that had “the largest number of the EU supporters“, while “the most sceptical are residents of Estonia (31%) and Latvia (33%).“ (p. 8) This might be due to the “intense process of Russification of the population in Latvia and Estonia, mainly by the way of deportations of the Balts and settlements of Russians” resulting in 28% of Russians in the Estonian population and even 30% of Russians living in Latvia, while Lithuania is “populated by 8% Russians and 9% Poles” (Unit, 1998, p. 14). Coming back to the survey of 2004, Lithuania also appeared to be one of the NMSs to have the “greatest expectations of advantages to be brought about by the EU membership” (EC, 2004, p. 8).

However, if before 2004, Lithuanian future prospects in the EU seemed idealistic, the report of the European Commission on “European Citizenship” in 2012 revealed contradictory results. It appears, that Lithuania is among the countries who identify themselves with the European Union the least. The report states that “a fifth or more of respondents in the United Kingdom (22%), Lithuania (21%) and Hungary (20%) spontaneously said that they expected nothing of the European Union” (EC, 2012, p. 6). What is more, “the countries where respondents are the least attached to the EU are the United Kingdom (27%), Finland (33%), Cyprus (33%), Lithuania (34%), the Netherlands (35%), Sweden (37%) and Greece (37%)” (p. 8). Lithuania is also among the countries that are not strongly attached to the symbols of the European Union: “the countries where respondents identify the least with the European flag include the

Netherlands (29%), Finland (32%), Sweden (35%), Lithuania (35%) and Denmark (35%) (EC, 2012, p. 42). While respondents in the United Kingdom (60%) are “particularly likely to define themselves only by their nationality; this mirrors the low European citizenship score recorded in the UK (42% of UK respondents feel that they are citizens of the EU, the lowest percentage in Europe)” (EC, 2012, p. 24), “the nationality-only option was also frequently mentioned in Lithuania (56%) and Ireland (52%), despite the high European citizenship score of 60% or above in those two countries (60% and 69% of respondents respectively see themselves as citizens of the EU)” (EC, 2012, p. 24). Interestingly, even if the citizens of Ireland similarly to the ones from the UK defined themselves by their nationality, the UK decided to exit the European Union while Ireland opposed this decision. This might be due to a different understanding of the concept of nationality in Ireland. What is more, Ireland had a stronger sense of belonging to the EU, therefore, the strong attachment to nationality did not stand in the way of Ireland’s desire to belong to the European Union: a poll performed by European Movement Ireland claims that “88 per cent of Irish people agree that Ireland should remain a part of the EU” (European Ireland Movement, 2017).

What raises concerns is that Lithuania has become a country belonging to EU, but is it feeling a complete member of the European Union? Lithuanian national identity and its position towards the European Union has experienced an evolution from the days it did not belong to the EU until now. Andrius Bielskis in the article “The European Union: A danger to the nation state and national identity?” (2003) stated that at least in 2003, before Lithuania joined the EU, there was a “widespread concern about a possible decline of the nation-state and national identity within the European Union in contemporary Lithuania” (p. 1). What is more, Bielskis discusses that “despite the fact that the majority of the Lithuanian public approves of its country joining the EU, it is still often perceived as a danger to national culture, national identity and independence” and that this is due to the fact that “any multinational political union still reminds the Lithuanians of the oppressive regime of the Soviet Union” (Bielskis, 2003, p. 1). However, even though six years of Lithuanian membership in the EU had passed, Lithuanian politician and philosopher Leonidas Donskis in 2010 stated that Lithuanians still live under the influence of Russia: in the field of Russian information and in the zone of Russian language rather than in the European and democratic, multilingual world. Leonidas Donskis (2010) continues to point out that Lithuania is a country manipulated by Russian special forces and therefore, the Lithuanian model of governance gradually becomes similar to the Russian one, rather than corresponding to the governing model of the neighbour countries situated in the north. Author states what is visible in the analysis of the polls and Lithuanian values: Lithuania is in the conflict with itself while balancing between the Western and Russian identification. Lithuania exists in tension: while Lithuanian political rhetoric could be considered Western, forces in both owned and international fields are weak regarding Western values.

Lithuanian political and administrative practices have progressed not much more than the Russian ones (Donskis, 2010). Lithuanian self-consciousness and ambitions are almost Western, while the line between the Russian and Lithuanian administrative and bureaucratic mechanism gradually becomes thinner. What is more, even though nowadays there are no possibilities for Russia to retrieve Baltic states by force, Russia still manages to prevent them becoming complete members of the European Union by buying local media and overpowering the sphere of information and in this way, affecting national identity and transferring the Russian system into a specific nation (Donskis, 2010). This results in Lithuania stuck in an endless cycle: it could be supposed that Lithuania is not becoming a Western nation because it is not capable of completing integration to the EU and its intellectual and political spheres, but the complete integration of Lithuania to the EU is prevented by the inner tensions which Lithuania is not capable of solving.

Another important factor to mention while discussing how national identity affects Lithuanian – EU relations is the fact that Lithuania prioritises national identity over the European one. Interestingly, Lithuania could be seen as a country which is in the middle of a conflict: supporting EU but not feeling a part of the EU. According to a Eurobarometer (2016), Lithuania is one of the countries which support the European Union the most. In 2016, 58% of Lithuanians trusted the EU, while 23% did not. This result was the most positive among all the members of the EU. 74% of respondents claimed to be supporting the membership in the EU. Interestingly, Lithuanians of a younger age, better economical position and having a higher education, support the membership of Lithuania in the EU more. (EC, 2016, p. 23) However, only 32% of Lithuanians identify themselves with the EU, while national identification is prioritized by 78% of Lithuanians. The 8% percent of Lithuanians that do not identify themselves with the European Union at all mainly consist of older and unemployed people (EC, 2016, p. 16) Is this because of the fear of European identity threatening national one? Tibor Navracsics, EU commissioner for education, culture, youth and sport argues that European identity does not pose a threat to a national identity. He insists that European identity is “not threatening the identities we already have, but complementing and supporting them“, furthermore, Tibor emphasizes that we have to “put young people at the heart of this“. (Navracsics, 2016) While discussing the meaning of identity, Tibor Navracsics also remembers the case of Brexit stating that “many people in Britain and elsewhere in the EU seem to feel that different identities compete with each other. That a European identity indeed threatens the national one, as well as regional, local, cultural, ethnic, religious identities. And as a result they reject the European identity.“ (Navracsics, 2016) However, Tibor expresses his opinion that he rather believes that we can have multiple identities “enriching our existence” (Navracsics, 2016).

One of the reasons of this low identification with the European Union might be due to the fact that Lithuania, being isolated from the West for decades of Soviet occupation and having a common history

with Latvia and Estonia, strongly identifies itself with the Baltic region. According to “New Baltic Barometer“ (1997), 57% of Lithuanians identified themselves with Balts, together with 64% of Estonians and 57% of Latvians. A significant number of 85% of respondents prioritised Baltic identity over European identity, the latter being prioritised by only 1% of respondents (Rose, 1997). Even though this study was performed over 20 years ago, before Lithuania joining the EU, and Lithuanian attitude towards the EU constantly evolves, it is worth to mention that Lithuania might still be considered as a young state where the older generations still remember the tough days of the Soviet occupation.

Interestingly, Lithuanian national identity was also affected by the European integration. According to Eurobarometer (2004), “after regaining the independence, Lithuanians almost for 10 years were considered to be one of the most pessimistic and sceptic European nations“, however, the situation changed significantly because of Lithuania’s accession to the European Union. As the European Commission states, “Lithuanians have become not only the most optimistic among the three Baltic States, but also have found themselves among the most optimistic nations in Europe” (EC, 2004, p. 2). The European Commission reveals that this is the result of “progress in economy, diminished threats for the East and hopes for the better future stimulate not only the positive future outlook but personal responsibility as well“ (EC, 2004, p. 2). The results found in the Eurobarometer (2004) indicate that the optimism of Lithuanians regarding Lithuania’s political and social situation, specifically elements such as the financial status, employment conditions and threats to national security, is proportional to their acceptance of the European Union, as this progress towards better living conditions is partly associated with Lithuania’s membership to the EU.

In order to examine if there is a clash between the Lithuanian and the European identities it is necessary to compare the values that are important for Lithuania and those important for the rest of the European Union. For this investigation, a figure has been created according to the Standard Eurobarometer 77 (2012):




Figure 7. Comparison of the average of European and Lithuanian values. **Source:** Created by the author gathering data from the Standard Eurobarometer 77 (2012)

As a matter of fact, the 2009 Eurobarometer points out that for Lithuanians “the European identity should first of all be based on two keystones: democratic values and a high level of social protection”, while the average citizen of the European Union “attaches the same importance only to one of the elements cited: democratic values” (EC, 2009, p. 6). It is evident that for Lithuanians, the European Union is a project the aim of which is not only to promote democratic values, but also to ensure social protection. Therefore, the EU is perceived by Lithuanians as an important element to improve Lithuania’s standards of living.

As seen in figure 7, the European Union and Lithuania prioritize values differently. Both the European Union and Lithuania prioritize as values human rights and respect for human life, but while the European Union as a whole places higher preference to the values of democracy, peace and equality, Lithuania prioritizes as a value individual freedom. The reasons that might lead Lithuanians to place individual freedom in a higher priority level than the average European Union citizen, are likely to be related to the recent historical experiences of Lithuania, given the fact that Lithuanians endured decades of Soviet occupation during which they had experienced a strong repression of individual freedoms such as the freedom of information, freedom of speech, and even the restriction of essential individual choices due to the nature of the functioning of the Soviet Union.

It is noticeable that Lithuanian national identity has experienced an evolution: from being the most optimistic country about joining the European Union, to the country which is among those member states that identify themselves in terms of nationality with the European Union the least. In the case of Lithuania however, supporting politically the European Union the most, its overall position towards the European Union is rather positive. The difference in values and in the position towards the European Union between Lithuania and older EU members can be explained by Lithuania's slower transition towards adopting values of a modern Western country. While the recent negative historical experiences result in Lithuania still focusing more on security and individual freedom, Lithuania has to catch up with those countries that already went through this phase and can focus on feeling a fully integrated member of the European Union in terms of mainstream values found in the older member states. It is undeniable that Lithuanians still strongly identify themselves primarily by their nationality because the transformation towards Europeanization in Lithuania is still an ongoing process. However, the trust and identification with the EU has grown significantly compared to the first years of Lithuania belonging to the European Union.

3.4 Impact of Lithuanian national identity on Lithuanian foreign policy

Lithuania's foreign policy decisions after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of the independence of Lithuania and the subsequent international recognitions of the Republic of Lithuania as an independent state, were precisely based on and inspired by the events that had taken place in its immediate recent history. Basing foreign policy decisions on recent historical experiences implies that there will be a certain degree of correlation between foreign policy and national identity, since the latter, as argued in previous sections of this thesis, is also constructed through historical experiences and struggles.

One of the most relevant international actors in which Lithuania's foreign policy has focused on is the European Union. European integration was a priority in Lithuania's foreign policy after its independence, a process that proved to be successful with Lithuania's accession to the European Union in 2004. This European integration, however, was not limited to accession to the European Union, but it was also characterised by a strengthening of relations with Lithuania's neighbouring countries. The path to accession to the European Union required political changes in Lithuania to adapt the country to European standards, and the system of values in Lithuania, until then vastly influenced by decades of Soviet occupation that had strongly impacted Lithuanian society with a set of values that to a major degree had been common throughout the Soviet Union and its satellite states, was now progressively - and somewhat slowly - being replaced as major social values, especially visible in the attitudes of the younger generations of Lithuanians, by the values that were majorly present to a smaller or greater

degree throughout the members of the European Union. These changes in social values, many still ongoing up to the current day, ranged from the early social implications of a dramatic change from the Soviet communist economy to a globalising capitalist system, to the growing movements in western European democracies such as those for greater levels of respect and tolerance towards demographic minorities such as the LGBT communities or racial or religious minorities, for gender equality and greater integration of women into the workforce and the political life, and for greater levels of respect for democratic principles and rights such as political transparency, freedom of expression and freedom of information.

These ongoing changes in Lithuanian society contrasted greatly by those present throughout the Soviet Union, which implied radical changes felt in many aspects of the life of Lithuanians. These changes in social values of the Lithuanian society, at the same time, signified a progressive change in Lithuania's national identity, which in the end, shapes the national interests of Lithuania. It is precisely through foreign policy that these national interests are represented and defended, and it is also through foreign policy that engagements with international actors happen that shape the social values of the Lithuanian society, thus making evident the impact of national identity on foreign policy and vice versa.

Lithuania's original will of accessing the European Union and NATO were partly aimed at guaranteeing its survival as an independent small country in front of a greater military force that, previously in the form of the Soviet Union, had occupied its territory and imposed its rule, and that was now perceived as a threat to the newly independent republic. It is clear that the fear to that threat and the traumatising experiences of recent history had become ingrained in Lithuania's national identity and, in turn, that national identity was shaping foreign policy decisions.

Nonetheless, that experience as a former Soviet republic becoming independent and going through the process of European integration, placed Lithuania in a position where it could take a leading role in assisting other eastern European countries that had relatively similar historical backgrounds, especially countries that had been under strong influence of the Soviet Union, and that now wished for closer integration or better relations with the European Union. Such a position for Lithuania was an opportunity to give direction to its foreign policy. At the same time, this allowed Lithuania to be a leading voice within the European Union itself regarding issues related to these eastern European countries. For instance, in the most recent conflict in Ukraine erupting from the Euromaidan movement and resulting in the occupation of Crimea by Russian troops and the deadly conflict in eastern Ukraine, which worsened relations between the European Union and Russia to a historical critical low, Lithuania's foreign policy had an important role in shaping the policy making of the European Union in regards to its relations with Russia, showing how Lithuania's vision due to its recent historical experiences, in essence constructing its national identity, impacts and is manifested through its foreign policy.

Historical background constructed Lithuanian national identity in a way that Lithuania became empathetic to the countries that were under the influence of Russia. As Henning Boekle, Jörg Nadoll, and Bernhard Stahl state, national identity reflects on foreign policy discourse. The concept of discourse according to the authors is defined as “the term discourse here refers to a communicative interaction that argumentatively seeks to link the elements of identity and behavioural preferences in accordance with the societally accepted logic of appropriateness, based on national identity” (Boekle et al, 2001, p. 6), what is more, authors reveal that “by means of discourse analysis, it can be shown which values and elements of identity are basic for a society’s self-conception and which values or elements of identity are significant in certain contexts” (Boekle et al, 2001, p. 8). An example of national identity manifestation in political discourse can be seen in the speech of a former Lithuanian president. Despite the controversial past while being a Lithuanian president, Rolandas Paksas is an indelible part of Lithuanian history. Just before Lithuania’s accession to the European Union, former president Rolandas Paksas in his speech on European integration emphasized empathy as a significant feature of Lithuanian national identity:

The prospect possibility of membership of the European Union and the prospect of closer association with the Union should become the instruments helping Ukraine and all the other countries willing that express willingness to enhance relations with the Union to move successfully towards achieving the set goal. We know this from our own experience. (H. E. Mr. Rolandas Paksas at the European Conference, 2003)

As Paksas suggests, it is Lithuania’s own experience, which in essence evokes its national identity, that helps it understand the circumstances of countries with relatively similar background to Lithuania such as Ukraine that are considering taking a path towards european integration that Lithuania has already taken in the past. Hence, demonstrating that national identity clearly plays a role in the direction a country takes in regards to its foreign policy.

Another considerably important idea can be extracted from Paksas’ previous speech. He mentions the importance that the “prospect of membership” to the European Union has on the countries considering or undergoing a path towards closer european integration. Paksas’ speech hints at the idea that merely this willingness towards european integration can already become an instrument helping these countries improve certain national levels and standards of living. Therefore, it is noteworthy to emphasize the notion that not only national identity shapes national interests thus giving direction to foreign policy, but also that national interests shaping foreign policy, such as the ones in play in a path towards european integration, also have an impact on a society’s values and in consequence on national identity.

The idea that a country's fears and struggles from past experiences, ingrained in its national identity, is often readily visible in the way it conducts its foreign policy, can be noticed for instance in the speech by Lithuania's president Dalia Grybauskaitė in the United Nations:

“The world's attention is now focused on North Korea and other regions, but the same methods of blackmail, bullying and aggression are being used by Russia in Ukraine and along NATO's eastern border. As we speak, around one hundred thousand Russian troops are engaged in offensive military exercise “Zapad 2017” on the borders with the Baltic States, Poland and even in the Arctic. The Kremlin is rehearsing aggressive scenarios against its neighbours, training its army to attack the West. The exercise is also part of information warfare aimed at spreading uncertainty and fear. Even more disturbingly, the Zapad exercise is just one symptom of the Kremlin's inability to finally end its hatred towards the West.” (Grybauskaitė, General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, 2017)

It is noticeable how Lithuania's president focuses her concerns almost entirely in Russia, and tries to draw the focus of attention from the United Nations to the topic that, due to Lithuania's recent history, and revived by Russia's attitude and involvement in the latest Ukrainian crisis, is an essential issue of concern for Lithuania as a country that finds itself empathetic to the situation of Ukraine due to the historical similarities of a country that, like Ukraine, was a former Soviet republic that underwent a process of European integration and tried to escape the sphere of influence of the successor of the Soviet Union, Russia. This attempt at shifting the United Nations focus of concern towards Russia partly shows the direction of Lithuania's foreign policy in recent years given its own concerns arising to a degree from its national identity and exacerbated by currently ongoing events.

In previous sections of this paper, it has been described how one of the types of relations between states is the one in which these states view themselves as enemies. A state who sees another state as an enemy, perceives that state, as political scientist Alexander Wendt describes, as “an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self” (Wendt, 1999, p. 260). The way Lithuania perceives Russia falls to a certain degree to this type of relations, a perception based on Lithuania's recent historical experiences and concerns worsened by actions like the Russian occupation of Crimea.

Lithuania has experienced a progressive shift in directions in its foreign policy since its independence:

Table 5. Evolution of Lithuanian foreign policy

Period	1991-2004 ³⁰	2004-2009	2009-current ³¹
Foreign policy conception	Membership in the EU and NATO	Democratization of European Eastern neighbours	Balance between the East and the West
	Good neighbourhood	Regional leader role	Interests based policy
	Focus towards Western European community	Focus towards Central-Eastern Europe	Focus towards Baltic sea region and Nordic states

Source: Sima Rakutienė, (2013) in Identity and the Construction of Lithuania's Foreign Policy in the Post eu-Period.

As this table describes, while at the early stages after independence the focus of Lithuania's foreign policy was in seeking closer integration with the Western European countries, after this policy proved successful by Lithuania's accession to the European Union in 2004, there was a shift in foreign policy aimed at using that previous successes as an opportunity to take a leadership role in the Eastern European region where it could use its experience to guide countries with historical backgrounds similar to Lithuania's and that wished for a closer European integration. Another shift can be noticed by the year 2009, in which Lithuania's foreign policy became more oriented towards Lithuania's own interests rather than simply building good relations with its neighbours, as Lithuania had already matured its position in the international and particularly in the European community, and it found important to focus its energies on the issues that matter for its national interests. These shifts reflect to a degree the changes that through these periods of time, the Lithuanian society was experimenting: from a process of dramatic changes after independence while seeking closer European integration, to the early successes in achieving this integration, and to the achievement of greater degrees of integration after the accession to the European Union that gave the Lithuanian society a sense of maturity in regards to its European integration, allowing the focus of national interests to shift progressively from a conception of European integration to a conception based on the defense of those national interests themselves shaping international relations, thus changing the foreign policy discourse.

3.5 Generalization of Lithuanian national identity and its impact on EU-Lithuania relations

Analysis of theoretical literature revealed that national identity is an ambiguous concept which is widely studied and continues to be researched due to the abstractness of this notion. Based on the provided theoretical background, national identity is defined as the common sense of belonging to a specific nation based on historical experiences, language and culture. Theories such as constructivism and International

Relations theory explain the impact of national identity on international relations: national identity shapes national interests and according to these interests, the nation shapes its behaviour in international relations, precisely in foreign policy. Therefore, analysing the national identity of a specific country it is possible to understand what kind of international actor that country is and what is possible to expect from it in the future.

The overview of the theories researching identities has helped to provide the understanding necessary to later analyse Lithuanian national identity. Analysis of cultural factors shaping Lithuanian national identity allowed to explain the position which Lithuania has taken in the European Union. Lewis model has revealed that despite the fact that due to the historical experiences the Lithuanian relationship with Poland and Russia are in tension, and despite the fact that Lithuania often identifies itself with its Baltic neighbours, it actually is closer to Poland and Russia according to its cultural type. According to the Lewis model, Lithuania is placed in between Linear-Active and Multi-Active cultures, leaning more towards a Multi-Active type, therefore it has a more unconstrained emotional level than Latvia or Estonia, which often might result in impulsive and spontaneous behaviour. This can also be seen as a feature of courage in Lithuanian national identity which results in not fearing to resist Russian influence and supporting the countries with similar historical experiences despite of the possibility of fuelling tensions in relations between Lithuania and Russia. Analysis of Geert Hofstede's six-dimensional model has shown that Lithuania is a country which prefers equality and, being a feminine country, feels uncomfortable receiving praise and rather undermines its achievements. What is more, Lithuania is an individualist country even though it still has difficulties opening up and rather chooses to remain reserved. Hofstede's analysis also shows that Lithuania has a propensity to worry about the world around it, and therefore the Lithuanian society needs rules and laws that makes it feel safe. Finally, analysis of this research has confirmed that Lithuanians are cynical, pessimistic and find themselves feeling guilty if enjoying the pleasures of life.

Analysis of these historical experiences also helps to understand Lithuanian position in the European Union. Lithuanian national identity is shaped by traumatizing historical experiences, specifically by fighting for independence and for the Lithuanian language during the Soviet occupation. Historical experiences defined Lithuania's allies and enemies, resulting in close relationship with Latvia and Estonia, support for countries suffering Russian interference, and still viewing Russia as a threat to Lithuania's own existence as an independent country. Lithuanian national identity, shaped by a dramatic history, is now resulting in a sometimes possibly exaggerated protection of Lithuanian language affecting Lithuanian relationship with Poland and the European Union itself. Analysis of Lithuanian values allowed to realise that Lithuania, during the Soviet occupation, was infused with Soviet values and attitudes. However, this is present mostly in the older generations, and currently Lithuania is

experiencing a transition from traditional values to modern ones, which will eventually allow Lithuania to feel a complete member of the European Union.

Analysis of Eurobarometers of various years has helped to visualise Lithuania as a member of the European Union. This analysis has revealed that Lithuanian national identity has gone through significant changes and that Lithuania, led by the wish to maintain its independence and national identity, acted courageously and right after disengaging from the Soviet Union, joined another, the European Union, this time however voluntarily in a sovereign manner and not through occupation. Joining the European Union also affected Lithuanian national identity – while Lithuania was one of the most pessimistic countries during the Soviet occupation, Lithuania has become the most optimistic member towards the European Union. Comparative analysis of values revealed that Lithuania and the rest of the European Union prioritize values differently. Due to the historical experiences and specific national identity, Lithuania does not emphasize democracy and peace as highly as the European Union but rather views security and individual freedom as more important values. Even though Lithuania still lacks strong identification with the European Union and defines itself mostly by its own national identity rather than by European citizenship, analysis of various publications of Eurobarometer surveys has shown that despite the fact that the transition of Lithuania to a completely modern Western country is still ongoing, Lithuania is the country which is the most optimistic and supportive of the European Union.

Investigation of Lithuanian foreign policy allowed to visualise Lithuanian national identity manifesting in Lithuanian behavior and actions taken in international relations. Because of the search for security, Lithuania joined organizations such as NATO and the European Union. Examination of foreign policy discourses enabled to grasp features of Lithuanian national identity such as empathy and support for the countries that are under the influence of Russian interference and the courage to openly identify Russia as the main threat to Lithuania.

CONCLUSIONS

The present investigation of the impact of Lithuanian national identity on Lithuanian – EU relations has revealed that national identity indeed has a significant role in impacting international relations. The following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Cultural, as well as historical factors play a crucial role in shaping the country as a player of international relations. In the case of Lithuania, traumatizing historical experiences, especially during the Soviet Occupation, as well as the values infused by the Soviet Union and the values gained while fighting for Lithuanian independence and language, were crucial elements that contributed to the formation of Lithuanian national identity.
2. Lithuanian identity results in the overly strong protection of its national identity which followingly results in specific actions taken in international relations. The fight for the Lithuanian language during the Soviet occupation left deep scars in Lithuanian national identity and the fear to once again feel as if Lithuanian national identity is in danger remains, which even resulted in disrespecting Polish minorities in Lithuania and undermining European law by Lithuanization of Polish surnames and restricting Polish education. These overly protective actions result in tensions of Lithuanian - Polish relations.
3. Lithuanian priorities in values differ from the European average. Even being a member of the European Union, Lithuanian national identity comes to the surface: Lithuania does not emphasize democracy and peace as much as the rest of Europe does, it rather views individual freedom and national security as the most important values, which makes Lithuania an individualistic country that might be seen as the one still not feeling and behaving like a complete member of the European Union.
4. Even though Lithuania appears not to be as modern member of the European Union as other more economically developed and tolerant members of the European Union, Lithuania is currently experiencing the transition from values held predominantly by the older generations who lived infused by the Soviet regime, to the post-Soviet modern values held by younger generations formed during the democratization period after independence. This transition allows to draw predictions of Lithuania gradually becoming more European rather than a country whose identity and values still bear the shade of historical experiences.
5. Because of Lithuanian national identity, actions taken in foreign policy and foreign policy discourse reveals that Lithuania still views Russia as a potential threat and feels empathy and supports the countries that have had the same historical experiences, or in the case of Ukraine, still are under the influence of Russia.

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