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THINKING OF DIFFERENCE IN M. HEIDEGGER AND E. LEVINAS

Summary of the Doctoral Dissertation

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The Reasoning and Research Agenda of the Dissertation

Difference in opposition to identity is found at the very beginning of the Western philosophical tradition. This is already shown in the controversy between Parmenides and Heraclites, as the opposition between permanence and change. Identity, and not difference, became the most important feature of the Western metaphysical tradition. It was taken as established and what explains reality, and difference was discarded.

Since Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of the metaphysical tradition most thinkers have tried to overcome or escape metaphysics. The questioning and re-thinking of the metaphysical tradition to which post-modern philosophy is attached is inevitably oriented by the destruction of identity and the One. Thinkers of difference such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and others, have tried to destroy the metaphysical tradition entirely, to its very roots, by giving difference priority over the principle of identity. In contemporary philosophy difference is usually taken as already given, assuming thereby that we have already freed ourselves from the logic of identity.

To speak about difference is popular today not only in philosophy but also in social, political and cultural discourses, which pay attention to the changes, variety, and differences, in a contemporary multi-cultural and increasingly globalized society, where it is now necessary in ordinary life to be open to such differences. In these discourses, thinking of difference very often becomes all-explaining, all-permissive and all-tolerant. These discourses are not the topic of and are not analyzed in this dissertation, which rather goes deep into the philosophical roots of difference. As well, the dissertation tries to question the apparent obviousness and the unexamined presupposing of difference in contemporary philosophy.

The problem of difference in the dissertation is taken as one possibility in order to be able to speak about the rupture of tradition - to pay attention to the priority of difference over identity. The history of difference, separation, distinction, and the like, though subordinate to the primary history of identity, also has a very long tradition in various forms in Western thought. In Western philosophical history many thinkers were grappling with differences of one kind or another, trying to systematize their thinking and make order of the real.

Despite these efforts, it is clear that *difference* itself had not become an explicit problem of philosophy. As long as difference is presented as a quality or as an opposition of components, then the differing of difference, the meaning of difference, or the way difference is given, is not truly thought. The dissertation analyses difference as a philosophical or conceptual problem, leaving aside, for the most part, the history of difference and distinction in the Western tradition. Nevertheless, the problem of difference in its conceptual basis and

genesis, and in its relation to philosophy, or as philosophy, is presented by means of analysis, comparison and contrast between the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas.

The dissertation is premised on the view that the problem of difference was first explicitly formulated in Heidegger's philosophy. A discussion of "ontological difference," the difference between Being [*Sein*] and entities [*Seiendes*], opens as well the possibility to rethink the conception of Western metaphysics and the effort to overcome it. One can recognize the transformation of Heidegger's difference in Derrida and Deleuze, for both of whom difference becomes the most important concept, although Gianni Vattimo shows that the difference found in these two thinkers is based on a repetition of the structure of difference in immanence, a simulacrum of difference, and that they don't pay enough attention to ontological difference. By putting Heidegger and Levinas side by side, analyzing each separately and comparing and contrasting their thought together, the dissertation leads to a broadening of the problem of difference to reveal its deepest dimensions. Both thinkers see metaphysics born from difference: in one case from difference which is real, and in the other case from the desire for the other person as difference. In the work of Levinas, the ontological difference in Heidegger's philosophy is overturned by being left, and left by a going beyond which finds the deepest sense of difference in ethical difference, a difference whose terms differ "otherwise" than ontological difference. Taking up the problem of difference enable us to speak about Heidegger and Levinas together, to show how these thinkers move away from one another, and to understand a profound shift in the meaning of difference itself.

Despite the fact that Heidegger and Levinas were very nearly contemporaries - Heidegger: 1889-1976; Levinas: 1906-1995 - and Levinas was a student of Heidegger in Freiburg in 1928-1929, we cannot say that their relation was dialogic. Heidegger never replied in any of his texts, at least all the texts that we know, to Levinas's many profound criticisms, which Heidegger certainly could have read. It is hard to believe that Levinas's critique was unknown to Heidegger. Levinas, just a few years after *Being and Time* was published, wrote a text *Martin Heidegger and Ontology*, in 1932, and remained very attentive to Heidegger's philosophy, certainly in all of his major philosophical writings, for the rest of his life. As Professor Rudi Visker has said, the Levinasian opposition to Heidegger was most likely the biggest and most important one, but did not receive enough attention; and that most Heideggerians considered Levinas either as a supplement to Heidegger, or as a critic of Heidegger accused of not understanding the thinking of being. This dissertation tries to show not just the relation of Levinas to Heidegger, but to show the original thinking of difference of Levinas.

Survey of Primary Sources

Because the dissertation is focused on Heidegger and Levinas, quite naturally the primary source materials for it are those of their writings which themselves focus on the issue of difference.

Heidegger's opus magnum *Being and Time* is utilized to show ontological difference as the perspective of thinking. The problem of ontological difference in this text is not yet explicitly or fully formulated but problems are analyzed having this difference in mind. As well, this is the book which is most proximate to Levinas and most important in his estimation of Heidegger's philosophy. In lectures from his Marburg period, published posthumously under the title *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger pays a lot of attention to ontological difference, naming and analyzing it, although it still remains not yet fully explicit and its relation to metaphysics is more presupposed than explained.

The problem of ontological difference is explicated in later texts by Heidegger, after his well-known "Turn." First of all there are the two volumes of his Nietzsche; especially the part entitled "European Nihilism," where Heidegger presents the ontological difference in relation to the history of metaphysics and the nihilistic meaning of that history. The texts *What is Metaphysics?* and *Overcoming Metaphysics* are very helpful for analyzing the notion of metaphysics. A later text, *Identity and Difference*, shows even more clearly the relation of ontological difference to metaphysics, and the notion of differing within difference.

A lot of attention is also paid to texts where Heidegger analyses problems of truth and ground, which analyses help to show the relation of ontological difference and metaphysics as forgetfulness of being. In the introduction to the text *On the Essence of Ground* for the first time the *problem* of ontological difference is named, which here is shown as a splitting of the path between ontic and ontological truth. The text *The Principle of Reason* shows the history of metaphysics as forgetfulness, as well as showing the relation between being, ground and non-ground. Ontological difference is also analyzed in the text *Contributions to Philosophy: from Enowning*, which some critics claim is Heidegger's most important, and others that it is second after *Being and Time*, while others reject it altogether as too unclear. In this dissertation this text is not analyzed because it was decided that the way the problem of difference was presented in it would lead to other lines of thought not relevant or important to the relation between Heidegger and Levinas. To be sure, there are other texts by Heidegger, which have been considered, but which are of lesser importance than those mentioned above.

Of Levinas's writings, all four of his integral books were considered: *Existence and Existents*, *Time and the Other*, *Totality and Infinity*, and *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, as were several additional articles. Although in Levinas's thought scholars have distinguished

two lines, one of Western thought and the other of Jewish thought, which intersect, in this dissertation the latter, the Jewish thought, is not analyzed. Nevertheless, we do not believe that this in any way diminishes the thoroughness and rigor of the dissertation because we share the view articulated by Professor Richard A. Cohen that both lines express, though in different idioms, the same central thought that governs all of Levinas's thinking, namely, the ethical priority of the other person. In the dissertation Levinas's argument with and polemic against the Western philosophical tradition are analyzed, but primarily they are analyzed insofar as this tradition finds expression, as Levinas shows, in Heidegger's thought. Early texts by Levinas – *Martin Heidegger and Ontology*, *On Escape*, and most particularly *Existence and Existents* – help to show his attempt to free himself from Heidegger's ontology and from ontological philosophical thinking in general. In *Existence and Existents* as well as in *Time and the Other* one sees the beginning of Levinas's positive alternative line of thinking, which is also, negatively, appears in his effort to free philosophy from being, which also means freeing it from ontological difference. The later books, and the articles in his collection dedicated to phenomenology, i.e., *Discovering Existence in Husserl and Heidegger*, were helpful to show the meaning of time as otherness. His magnum opus, *Totality and Infinity*, pays special attention to otherness and the other person. This book is important to show Levinas's relation to the Western philosophical tradition, his relation to metaphysics, as well as difference as separation, and a more radical escape or freedom from ontological difference going to ethical difference. *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* primarily analyzes the notion of subjectivity, though for our purposes it is a helpful text to show the ethical meaning beyond ontological difference.

Review of Secondary Literature

Heidegger's philosophy is analyzed using William's Richardson's *Heidegger: Thought Phenomenology to Thought*. In this book Richardson carefully presents the main texts of Heidegger and presents reliable and systematic readings of each separately and all together. Otto's Poggeler's *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking* was helpful to show the critique of metaphysics and forgetfulness of being in Heidegger. The researches of Thomas Langan, Thomas Sheehan, and Alexei Cherniakov, were useful because they concentrated on the problems of truth and time. This dissertation pursues a hermeneutic strategy, and not a mystical or poetic reading of Heidegger.

As reliable interpretations of Levinas the dissertation refers to books and studies by Theodorus De Boer, Roger Burggraeve, Cohen, and Adrian Peperzak. These authors rethink Levinas' relation to the Greek tradition and explicate his ethical interpretation. Cohen, in particular, analyzes two perspectives: ethics as first philosophy and Levinas's inter-subjective

notion of time as a novel interpretation of time and a radical critique of Heidegger's notion of ecstatic temporality.

Certainly, we pay most attention to studies where the problem of difference is analyzed in Heidegger's and/or Levinas's philosophy. One of these, by Jean-Luc Marion, the article entitled "A Question of Being or Ontological Difference," shows the development of ontological difference in *Being and Time* as well as in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. The research of Marion is especially important for the dissertation as well because he analyses Levinas's relation to Heidegger's ontological difference and its overcoming. It must be said that Levinas paid attention to Marion's critique, and later answered him. Vattimo's book *The Adventure of Difference*, even though it does not see Levinas as a thinker of difference, does review the problem of difference and related perspectives in general. This book, together with John Caputo's *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics*, along with the insights of Rita Šerpytytė, were most important in my own introduction to the philosophical problem of difference.

For analysis of ontological difference Ley Vail's *Heidegger and Ontological Difference* was also important. Vail mostly concentrates on ontological difference in the later Heidegger, and she takes the position that ontological difference does not appear in *Being and Time*. Caputo's book, mentioned above, and especially the chapter entitled "Heidegger's Difference and Saint Thomas' *Esse-Ens* Distinction," as well as Douglas L. Donkel's book *The Understanding of Difference in Heidegger and Derrida*, were used to write the third chapter of first part of the present dissertation where the deepest dimension of difference is shown. From De Boer's book *The Rationality of Transcendence* the chapter entitled "Ontological Difference (Heidegger) and Ontological Separation (Levinas)," analyses the notion of difference in Levinas and Heidegger paying special attention to the early writings of Levinas.

Visker's *The Inhuman Condition: Looking for Difference after Levinas and Heidegger* connects the thinking of difference in Levinas and Heidegger looking for ways to revive the problem of difference. Visker opposes metaphysics to multi-culturalism and the cosmopolitan society. He takes a critical position regarding Levinas, accusing him of an over-optimism which leads to a dead end. According to Visker, the other, despite Levinas's efforts, cannot be absolutely other, which is to say, not connected to the common social sphere. Visker overturns the Heidegger-Levinas relation, insisting that Levinas's ethics is insufficient and looks for humanism in Heidegger's philosophy, asking if in the ontological difference one might not find the difference which was not captured in ethical difference. This strategy of Visker seems close to Vattimo, to revive the problem of difference and ontological difference in the social and natural

sciences. Our strategy is slightly different, and furthermore, as we already said above, our inquiry is not into difference in the social-cultural sphere.

Interesting to mention is that at Warwick University a course was given in 2008/2009 by Darren Ambrose under the name "Philosophies of Difference: Heidegger and Levinas." The syllabus shows that most attention was paid to Levinas's ethical philosophy, together with the question of the status of ethics and the other in Heidegger's philosophy, though Heidegger's ontological difference and its relation to Levinas's philosophy do not seem to have been explicitly analyzed.

In Lithuania Heidegger's philosophy and Levinas's philosophy have received a great deal of attention. For our task in this dissertation, Šerpytė's research and her interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy were of decisive importance. She opened the perspective of the interpretation of nihilism as a speculative event, metaphysics as nihilism, and forgetfulness of being in Heidegger, which served as launching points for my own research.

Arvydas Šliogeris in his earlier studies presents the difference between being and entities, approaching Heidegger's philosophy with his own notion of "immanent transcendence," which is relevant to our own research. Many Lithuanian scholars (Jūratė Baranova, Mintautas Gutauskas, Dalius Jonkus, Arūnas Sverdiolas, Tomas Sodeika, et al.) have made Heidegger's thought one of their central philosophical interests, though a book length study dedicated exclusively to Heideggerian thought has not (yet) appeared.

In the research of Baranova and Nerijus Čepulis dedicated to the notion of ethics as first philosophy, they show Levinas moves from Heidegger's ontological problematic to his own ethical concerns. The relation between Heidegger and Levinas is also shown in articles by Nijolė Keršytė and Žukauskaitė. Though Levinas's relation to Edmund Husserl has received more attention in articles by Danutė Bacevičiūtė, Keršytė, Sodeika, and Jonkus, and his relation to Derrida in articles by Bacevičiūtė, Keršytė and Žukauskaitė. Levinas's consideration of Heidegger's ontology, especially Levinas's notion of existence without existents, is analyzed by Šerpytė in her monograph *Nihilism and Western Philosophy* and some articles.

Recently Levinas is one of the most studied and discussed philosophers in Lithuania. Studies of his philosophy have been presented in a variety of places: Logos (2005); Athenos (2006); an edited book, *A Century of Levinas* (2009), which is a collection of articles from the International Levinas Conference held at the University of Vilnius in 2006, on the centenary of Levinas's birth.

The research of Levinas's philosophy in Lithuania has taken several directions, dealing with several topics: ethical, subjectivity, otherness, otherness as absolute otherness, personal identity as responsibility, themes discussed in works by Bacevičiūtė, Baranova, Keršytė, and

Žukauskaitė. As well the Lithuanian reception of Levinas deals with ethical sensibility (Bacevičiūtė), inter-subjectivity (Keršytė), intentionality (Jonkus), and analysis of “saying and the said” (Gutauskas), and phenomenology (Sodeika).

The problem of difference is found in some scholars’ research as well. Šerpytė pays attention to nihilism and its relation to difference, presenting two interpretations of nihilism: nihilism as classical negativity meaning *Überwindung* (overcoming), and nihilism as close to the idea of *différance*.

As a thought imitating Heidegger’s ontic-ontological difference and the continuing dialectic of the difference between being and entities, Žukauskaitė presents Derrida’s *différance*. Difference as having priority over identity is also presented in relation to the thought of Deleuze in articles by Gutauskas, Sverdiolas and Žukauskaitė. Theological difference is analyzed by Sodeikos.

Aims and Objectives of the Research

The overriding aim is to show how the problem of difference is formulated and shifted in Heidegger and Levinas, and how these relate to the Western philosophical tradition.

To achieve this aim, two main objectives are the following:

- To reconstruct ontological difference in Heidegger’s philosophy.
- To reconstruct ethical difference in Levinas’s philosophy.

To achieve these two objectives, the more concrete objectives are the following:

1. To show the genesis of difference as a philosophical problem.
2. To show how in Heidegger’s philosophy the problem of difference appears.
 - a. To show the relation of ontological difference to the question of being.
 - b. To show ontological difference as the perspective of thinking.
 - c. Presenting the forgetful of ontological difference as a diagnosis of metaphysics.
 - d. To uncover the relation of ontological difference to problems of time, truth and ground.
 - e. To rethink differing as a deeper meaning of ontological difference.
 - f. To show ontological difference as the source of metaphysics.
 - g. To show the meaning of overcoming metaphysics.
3. To show how in Levinas’s philosophy the problem of difference appears.
 - a. To show how the early writings of Levinas formulated the task of escape from being and how the difference between being and entities is shifted.
 - b. To analyze the relation of separation from being and the origin of subjectivity.
 - c. To explain how Levinas’s philosophy links time, otherness and ethics.

- d. To show the overturning of ontological difference and the way beyond it.
- e. To show the meaning of ethical difference as a shift from ontological difference.
- f. To show what form of metaphysics operates in Levinas's philosophy and to show its relation to difference.
- g. To uncover the meaning of overcoming ontology.

Theses Defended

After analysis of the philosophies of Heidegger and Levinas, the following theses are defended:

1. The problem of difference as a philosophical problem is formulated for the first time in Heidegger's philosophy, which is interested in the meaning of difference itself in contrast to the difference between particular terms which differ.
2. Ontological difference is the perspective of *Being and Time* even if it is not explicitly named.
3. Ontological difference is not just a freeing from the possibility of forgetfulness of being but the as yet un-thought condition of metaphysics itself.
4. Thinking difference or ontological difference in Heidegger retrieves from difference some kind of poetic identity in the depth of difference.
5. The thought of difference in Heidegger's philosophy is not radical enough because in his concern to think difference as ontological difference other significant differences, such as ethical differences, as in the case of Levinas, and other characterizations of difference in other philosophers' metaphysical accounts as well, are ignored and/or misunderstood.
6. The philosophy of Levinas opens the possibility of freeing the thought of difference from ontology altogether, including, therefore, Heidegger's notion of being.
7. Difference in Levinas is not just an overturning of the ontological difference, claiming the priority of the existent over existence, but goes beyond the very logic of ontology.
8. Difference in Levinas is a caring for the otherness of the other person and derives from relation and its intrinsic ethical dimension.
9. In Levinas, difference is preserved not by thinking difference but through and as responsibility for the other person.
10. While the thought of difference in Levinas is radically opposed to Heidegger, his effort to overcome ontology may appear close to Heidegger's early efforts to "deconstruct" the history of philosophy, but in fact it remains far from these efforts which in Heidegger ended in a path oriented by "poetic thinking" far from Levinas's claim that ethics is first philosophy.

The Method of Research

Research is done through hermeneutic interpretation of texts, comparative analysis, reconstruction of arguments, conceptual criticism, and to a lesser extent the phenomenological method. Hermeneutic interpretation of texts was useful to have a full view of the problem of difference. So too, for clarification, it was useful to reconstruct philosophical premises, developments and conclusions in Heidegger and Levinas. In this research the principle of the hermeneutic circle often appears, introducing a problem, beginning an analysis, and then circling back to the same problem but taking advantage of analyses already performed. The critical comparative analysis was used to show the character of and the changes in of the problem of difference in each author's respective philosophy and their comparison. Doing a reconstruction of the ideas of difference in Heidegger and Levinas is done, as well as critical distance is taken.

Novelty of the Dissertation

While some Lithuanian scholars have made reference to Heidegger's ontological difference as well as thinking of difference in Heidegger and Levinas, the philosophical problem of difference, as it arises in and between these two thinkers, has not been deeply analyzed. Very often ontological difference is taken for granted and just mentioned in passing with regard to Heidegger's philosophical analysis. For otherness as well as for ethics in Levinas, as we have already indicated, there are many articles, but the meaning of otherness in the face of Heidegger's ontological difference has not yet been taken deeply into account. The same can also be said of Levinas's polemic against the radicalness of Heidegger's ontological difference. There is some research analyzing the problem of difference, though mostly it is presented as the viewpoint of Deleuze and Derrida, but without taking into account the deeper dimension of difference and the problem of difference in Heidegger and Levinas and their relation to the Western philosophical tradition. The present dissertation enters into these neglected but important areas of research.

Structure of the Study

The dissertation begins with an introduction, followed by two parts, the first on Heidegger and the second on Levinas, and ends with a conclusion. The main body of the dissertation, i.e., its two parts, is structured to provide maximum clarity to illuminating not only difference in Heidegger and difference in Levinas, but the shift from one to the other.

The introduction presents the agenda of the dissertation, its primary theses, objectives, primary sources and method.

The way the problem of difference is presented in the two main parts is chronological and developmental. Part one therefore begins with the Heidegger of *Being and Time*, and then moves to the post-“Turn” Heidegger, which is to say, it moves from the more phenomenological ontology of *Being and Time* to the ontology more sensitive to language and what Heidegger will call “the poetry of thought” in his later writings. In a similar manner, part two begins with Levinas’s early writings, focused on the escape from existence, and grappling with Heidegger’s ontological difference, and then moves to his major works, *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, to show the ethical character of difference in Levinas, and its explicit departure from Heidegger’s ontological difference. The dissertation pays attention to those later writings of Heidegger and Levinas which provide commentaries to their earlier texts. As well we can see that some terms change and have more or less different meanings. Even the title of the present dissertation moves chronologically and developmentally, from Heidegger to Levinas, in contrast to the monograph of Visker which moves in the opposite direction.

The first part is dedicated to Heidegger’s notion of difference. First I present premises to show why the problem of difference before Heidegger was not explicitly formulated. Then doing an analysis of *on*, the relation of being and ontological difference is shown. Through the analysis of *Dasein*, temporality, and the different ways of being of entities, ontological difference is shown to be the perspective of thinking in *Being and Time* from which perspective the question of being is raised. The second chapter of this part shows how Heidegger formulates in an explicit way the ontological difference and how the relation to the history of metaphysics as the forgetfulness of being may be seen. This is accomplished by doing an analysis of problems such as truth and ground. Presenting the Heideggerian notion of metaphysics we see the critical distance Heidegger takes to more traditional notions of metaphysics, as well as the relation of ontological difference to metaphysics as nihilism. The third chapter deals with overcoming metaphysics in relation to ontological difference, showing the latter as the premise of metaphysics itself. Also shown is the non-metaphysical identity of being and entities in the depth of difference itself, differing in difference, and the perspective and meaning of poetical thinking.

The second part deals with difference in Levinas. Recalling Heidegger’s polemics with the history of metaphysics, this part begins with Levinas’s polemics with Heidegger and the Western philosophical tradition. First discussed is ontological difference as a possible starting point or access to Levinas, showing where Heidegger and Levinas disagree. The shift of the problem of difference at first is presented by showing that Levinas criticizes Heidegger for making a distinction but not a separation between being and entities. The second chapter deals

with separation from anonymous being as the manner in which the individual as egoistical arises. The analysis of time as event of difference helps to open the field of ethical difference. In doing an analysis of ethical difference the notion of otherness is presented, as also is the structure of metaphysical desire and a different notion of metaphysics. The last chapter shows the way beyond ontological difference and its meaning, showing beyond Heidegger ethical concern for the other person as philosophically primary. An analysis of moral responsibility shows difference as non-indifference.

Contents

Thinking of Difference in Heidegger

To think difference in Heidegger is to concentrate upon ontological difference. In relation to the mission of philosophy, Heidegger makes clear that it is the ontological difference that makes possible or enables philosophy itself understood as the science of being and possibility of raising the question of being. To think being which has been forgotten in all metaphysics is the same as thinking ontological difference.

The thinking of difference in Heidegger's philosophy, however, does not appear in one univocal meaning. On one hand, it is the perspective from which specific problems are discussed, such as Dasein, identity, ground, truth, being, time, and so on, while on the other hand it is its own problematic.

Ontological difference as a phenomenological problem can be found in *Being and Time* and in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. While the ontological difference does not appear explicitly in *Being and Time*, it nevertheless is thought there. This perspective can be recognized, for instance, through the ambiguity of the Greek term *on*, which allows seeing being and time together and separately. *On* helps not just to see the origin of ontological difference but the origin of Western metaphysics as well. By questioning the ambiguity of *on*, we are able, for our part, to see more clearly Heidegger opening the possibility of raising in a new way the question of being. Though the question of being raises the perspective of ontological difference, in *Being and Time* it also expands that perspective by means of an analysis of Dasein and the meaning of being.

In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger names the ontological difference as the main phenomenological problem which enables separating or distinguishing various fields of ontological research. By seeing being and entities together a phenomenological aspect is given to the metaphysical tradition which avoids traditional errors.

Understanding ontological difference in Heidegger depends on Dasein reaching the thinking of it, which occurs when Dasein thinks authentically hidden difference [*Unterschied*] as

itself becoming the understanding of ontological difference, that is, as *Ontologische Differenz*. From this point of view we can say that in *Being and Time* ontological difference was more hidden than thought.

Opening the difference between being and entities leads to showing the meaning of being of Dasein as a relation to time. Ontological difference is reached by experiencing authentic anxiety before death, which opens not just the finitude of existence but the experience of nothing. This is because the meaning of being for Heidegger is given through temporality. The meaning of being appears through temporality because temporality makes possible the separation of being and entities. Dasein becoming authentic is what enables moving from the hidden or implicit difference to the thinking of difference.

In his later writings Heidegger is more explicit and precise, moving from the early Dasein analytic to an explicit of being and the truth of being. Indeed, after the "turn," the ontological difference becomes the main concern of Heidegger. In the history of metaphysics there were many differences and distinctions made, but the problem of difference itself was not explicitly raised. In other words, Heidegger's discussion of the difference between being and entities is original and beyond previous distinctions of metaphysics. Attachment to propositional truth and a finite ground are the main characteristics - and limitations - that Heidegger sees in previous metaphysics. The forgetfulness of being both separates ground from grounded and interprets both "object" and "subject" as entities, and in this way turns being into an entity.

Showing the relation between the ontological difference and metaphysics, we see the two aspects of this relation: metaphysics as the history of forgetfulness of the ontological difference and the ontological difference as the possibility of metaphysics. Heidegger engages in a "destruction" of the ontological tradition in order to raise the question of being in the right way. So the step back from metaphysics is a step forward to thinking ontological difference. Claiming that metaphysics had forgotten being means for Heidegger that it forgot ontological difference. Though all metaphysical problems had been formulated by trying to explain or define being, and in this sense were aware of the problem of being, they did so from the essentially inadequate point of view of a metaphysics of entities.

When Heidegger turns from the question of the meaning of being to the truth of being or the question of the truth of being, the problem of ontological difference is now related to the problem of truth. The conception of truth is seen to be basic to metaphysics. If the conception of truth is wrong it follows that all ways of dealing with philosophical problem will be misleading as well. The concept of truth which comes from Leibniz is enrooted in primary truth, that is, pre-predicative truth, and by questioning this conception of truth Heidegger shows that truth

separates into two sorts, ontic and ontological. Ontological difference is seen here in terms of the difference between ontic and ontological truth.

In the discussion of the problem of ground we can see the workings of ontological difference. On one hand it shows the difference between the ontic and ontological spheres, and on the other hand it leads to difference as play, showing the “logic” of difference itself. Metaphysics can be named the history of forgotten ground. The way it raises *Grundfrage* was actually not a question of ground but rather as “main question,” *Leitfrage*, since it only asks what entities are. The history of the principle of ground Heidegger relates to the history of being, *Geschichte*. The possibility of this relation follows from the above-named distinction between the ground and the grounded, where ground must be understood as being, so the history of the principle of ground is the same as the history of being.

In *The Principle of Reason* Heidegger shows the problem of ground as the problem of being and the principle of ground as the principle not of entities but of being itself. The identity of being and ground is the main thesis of this book. Being and ground are seen as the same by means of a linguistic analysis of the basic claim of the principle of sufficient reason, namely, in German, *Nichts ist ohne Grund*. For Heidegger, this identity is not a metaphysical identity and the principle is not a metaphysical principle. As long as being is what grounds, it is “non-ground” (*Abgrund*). By seeing being as non-ground ontological difference can be renamed the difference between ground and grounded, and because being as ground is non-ground we reach the difference between ground and non-ground.

As long as ground belongs to being, ground belongs to play. The notion of being as non-ground and play leads Heidegger to radical freedom. Freedom itself becomes the ground of ground in the way that it both gives and withdraws from ground. In this case freedom in Heidegger is attached not to humans but to being itself. Joining being as unconcealment (*aletheia*) and freedom as ground enables us to recognize a basic unity in Heidegger’s thought. Humans depend upon being, not being upon humans.

Ontological difference as the difference between ground and non-ground in another way could be formulated as the difference between entities and nothing. Heidegger’s sees the *Grundfrage* as implying a real and not an imaginary possibility of nothing. Nothing is not in opposition to being but the way being is given. Being, ontologically different from entities, and understood as ontological difference, enables us to see being as nothing. In this case we reach the identity of being and nothing as in Hegel’s philosophy, but because here it is ontological difference it is not abstract. If being, as Heidegger claims, in contrast to Hegel, is not infinite, then the difference with entities remains.

Šerpytytė's research suggests that being as nothing relates to metaphysics as nihilism. She shows multiple meanings of the phenomenon of nihilism, and claims that in Heidegger's thinking nothing and the notion of nihilism meet up, such that forgetting the difference between being and entities leaves nothing to be said about being. Because the essence of being as nothing is not thought, nihilism arises. Metaphysics is nihilist if it cannot say anything about being, though this nothing is rooted in a more primary Nothing.

Heidegger, however, does not end with the nihilism of metaphysics, but moves to the overcoming of metaphysics. This task of overcoming metaphysics includes, on the one hand, moving away from metaphysics, and on the other, including metaphysics in thinking in a new changed way. Furthermore, Heidegger rejects the very terms "philosophy," "fundamental ontology," and "ontological difference," and other more traditional philosophical terminology. By interpreting and expanding the frontiers of philosophy, Heidegger tries to overcome its limitations, trying to find a way of speaking that is not metaphysical but more like poetics.

Ontological difference is no longer important just to define the meaning of being and truth, but for the possibility of questioning metaphysics itself. As Heidegger claims: "The reference to the ontological difference identifies the ground and the 'foundation' of all ontology and thus of all metaphysics."

Heidegger tries to find the source from which metaphysics arises, or, to put this otherwise, he wants to find the condition of the ontological difference. The history of being is the special way that ontological difference appears. Taking metaphysics as the paradigm of thinking would mean that for Heidegger ontological difference is not just the construction of mental representation but is 'real.' The difference between being and entities is seen as that which determines the possibility of metaphysics, its development, and its beginning, keeping in mind here that "beginning" for Heidegger means arriving into something's essential being. Heidegger's thinking of ontological difference goes deep into the essence of metaphysics, though expanding metaphysics and explaining it anew to itself. Heidegger also takes the radical step of trying to overcome it, though in this case it appears that ontological difference enables seeing the essence of metaphysics. Therefore, in view of this sort of going beyond metaphysics, one can ask whether Heidegger does or does not remain within the structure of ontological difference.

Heidegger rejects the idea of overcoming as Hegelian *Aufhebung* not by returning to the idea of overcoming in the sense of *Überwindung* (elimination of differences), but rather as *Verwindung*. The overcoming of metaphysics as the overcoming of the forgetfulness of ontological difference leads not just to thinking ontological difference but to asking as well what enables this difference. And what does enable it, in the depth of ontological difference, is

what Heidegger calls *Austrag*, a term difficult to translate, but one which he articulates through poetic language. Difficult as this notion is to clarify, we can say about it that in contrast to the previous priority given to differing in the ontological difference between being and entities, Heidegger now emphasizes their unity. So there is a primary unity by which they hold together as well as move apart. Heidegger moves not to metaphysical identity but nevertheless gives priority to some kind of unity. *Austrag*, as the deeper dimension of ontological difference, shows that being and entities differ because all the time there is permanent differentiation happening. So *Austrag* in *Differenz* is not invented, added or represented by humans, but arises from being itself. From Heidegger's analyses we see that difference is not outside of time or "eternal," but occurs as an outbreak, or tearing, or ripping open of difference. Difference is not an abstract or theoretical relation. It escapes representation because it is never "present" but as *Ereignis* makes presence possible, and, furthermore, is always part of the destiny of being forgotten.

Levinas and Ethical Difference

Heidegger's contribution to the formulation of the problem of difference and the thinking of difference is of great importance. In post-Heideggerian philosophy it is obvious that the thinking of difference does not always mean an explication of or even attentiveness to ontological difference. Vattimo in his book *The Adventure of Difference* draws a distinction between the French approach to thinking difference and Heidegger's ontological difference. He claims that works by Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault show that the problem of difference fades away. That the French approach has turned away, according to Vattimo, does not signify the decline of ontological difference. Heidegger's own philosophy, inspired by nostalgia for being, already contains within itself the moment of self-overcoming. Vattimo sees the possible renewal of ontological difference in a general theory of communication, information theory, studies on the pragmatics of communication, systems theory, and the like.

In Levinas's philosophy, however, though it is not mentioned by Vattimo, we find an alternative to ontological difference, and one which remains in critical dialogue with it. It is neither a repetition of the ontological difference nor a reformulation of it, but while perfectly aware of it, Levinas presents a radical alternative. While Levinas deals with ontological difference, and can be seen as overturning the place of difference, he really goes beyond it by approaching difference in an altogether different way. His thought represents a shift away from the centrality of ontological difference to the priority of ethical difference. In his own way, then, Levinas returns to transcendence and metaphysics, but without falling prey to the sorts of criticisms raised by Heidegger.

Ontological difference and the verbleness of the verb "to be," are the most important moments in Heidegger for Levinas, though he does not follow Heidegger's ontological intention or direction of thinking. Levinas's own thought can be seen not as an overturning of traditional thinking or a simple reversal or rejection of it, but as a radical re-evaluation of it and as such the source of a deeper reading.

Keeping in mind that thinking of difference for Heidegger and Levinas is one of the main concerns of philosophy, we can say that this issue joins them together. Both can be called thinkers of difference. Yet Levinas's direction is so radically different than Heidegger, that we can also say that the problem of difference is the issue that separates them the most.

The overcoming of ontological difference and the move to ethical difference is already implicated in Levinas's early writings. Levinas as well as Heidegger asks about being, but at the same time, in a very different way than Heidegger. For Heidegger, as we have seen, being is his main concern and for him the main concern of Western spirituality as a whole, while for Levinas it is one area of interest in philosophy but in no way is it the central or primary dimension of philosophy. One might even say that where Heidegger ends, Levinas starts, except that Levinas's thought represents a shift away from Heidegger and is in no way a continuation or development of his thought. Thus Levinas rejects even the most fundamental moves of Heideggerian thought, namely, the priority of being over entities, the subordination of entities to being, of existents to existence. Obviously, then, Levinas, by shifting from the problematic of the origins of ontology to the significance of the primacy of ethics, has his own original conception of philosophy.

Heidegger's insight that being is possible only as the being of entities, for Levinas is not radical enough, because for Levinas this indicates a distinction but not a separation. In the Heideggerian belonging together of being and entities, Levinas sees ontological difference functioning as a common ground or center, whereas Levinas moves from that kind of difference to a complete or radical separation of existents from existence. Existence without existents, the 'il y a,' or "there is," Levinas sees as the "experience" of pure anonymous and meaningless existence, where existents lose their individuality or, in the case of humans, their very subjectivity.

Anonymous being, not having the generosity of Heidegger's *Es Gibt*, is not a positive phenomenon, but rather that from which the existent, as an existent, escapes. Here we are faced not only with a different ontology, but with a different phenomenology as well. The experience of the 'il y a' opens the horror of being, which, quite different than Heidegger's *Angst*, does not show ontological difference but threatens to eliminate the independence of the existent itself. Rejecting the experience of nothing, Levinas claims that what we experience is rather the horror

of being itself, its heaviness. Both the horror of existence without existents, and the existent escaping such anonymity, can be seen as the first alterity in Levinas's philosophy. The move from anonymous alterity to the concrete alterity of the other person, a move from totality to infinity, appears, for our concerns, as the first step of an overcoming or deliverance from the ground or non-ground of ontological difference.

Levinas is attentive to the question of being not because of a nostalgia, and not because he is attached to being, but rather because he shows the necessity of escaping from it, which necessity comes not from a lack of being but from another surplus, a non-ontological surplus. If philosophy is more than the raising of the question of being, and no one except Heidegger has really ordered that it cannot be, it need not, then, answer the question of being but may go beyond it. In fact, escape from or going beyond being, which Levinas names "separation" from being, is how the subject or existent emerges. For Heidegger the problem of difference is discussed for the purpose of a care for being, to go from forgetfulness to answering the question of being, while for Levinas, to the contrary, one must first move from anonymous being to even begin to grasp the significance of entities, and most especially, to the "hypostasis" of the separate or independent subject. In contrast to Heidegger's thought which is always a return (or, in truth, the never successful attempt to return) to the "always already" givenness of ontological difference, Levinas's thought engages the emergence and novelty of meaning in terms of the emergence and nobility of human being.

The escape from anonymous being, however, is only the first step toward alterity, and also, of course, a first step toward difference in a different sense than ontological difference. After the '*il y a*', Levinas thought takes up the significance of the world, which is that into which the existent escapes. The world is seen as a partial escape, however, and not a final or the most radical encounter with otherness. We will see that Levinas's account has three distinct spheres: *il y a*, being-in-the-world, and the face-to-face. So even if in being in the world we see already difference, a difference which is openness the transcendence, the latter is only fully reached in the face-to-face.

So there is a difference between the difference of separation, the separation from anonymous being by being-in-the-world, and the alterity of full transcendence, the encounter with the other person in the face-to-face. Subjectivity originates, as a separate being, not from contemplation, as with Descartes, nor from transcendental consciousness, as with Husserl, nor from instrumentality, as with Heidegger, but from the way the subject enjoys the world. Contrary to Heidegger, where the subject is enrooted in being, for Levinas the subject is free from being. Enjoyment (*jouissance*) shows the basic structure of subjectivity and as well refers to a breaking free from totality, both of which in *Totality and Infinity* are more rigorously

explicated. The subject which emerges by way of enjoyment separates from anonymous being, though this separation, while necessary, is not its final purpose. Enjoyment by itself does not lead to the relation with other persons, but rather ignores others, is egoist and self-enclosed.

Some critics such as Jacques Rolland, Jean Luc Marion and Tina Chanter, claim that Levinas's early perspective only represents an inversion or reversal of Heideggerian logic and therefore remains bound up in the ontology it claims to escape. We think, rather, that it is not a matter of simply changing places between being and entities, or existence and the existent. More important, Levinas gives to this relation a new meaning that cannot be explained following Heidegger's logic and terms. It is rather a new beginning which is accomplished precisely by going outside and beyond ontological difference, despite the counter claims - unsubstantiated, as it seems to me - made by those who defend what they believe to be the unshakeable absoluteness of ontology.

Because Levinas does not follow the Heideggerian distinction between being and entities, this brings him to Husserl's problematic of otherness. But Levinas criticized the ego-logy, and the symmetry and adequateness which follow from ego-logy, in Husserl. Levinas sees that Husserl's intentional theory is based on adequate and symmetrical relations between *noema* and *noesis*, and shows as well that intentionality in Husserl remains too close to representation. In representation we can always find correspondences, whereas in Levinas the other person transcends consciousness and its horizons and appears radically other. The surplus of the other for Levinas cannot be reduced to identity. So Levinas not only expands phenomenology but recognizes the structure of totality limiting it. Levinas seeks to find non-cognitive relations to the other. The face-to-face relation is beyond phenomenological consciousness. Levinas moves from Husserl's intentional phenomenology to a new phenomenology of ethical relations with the other.

One of the basic phenomena allowing the appearance of difference is time. Time is already attached to the first step of overcoming ontological difference, the separation of the existent from existence. The existent's separate existence through hypostasis breaks through anonymous neutral existence in the time of the now. Though as Levinas shows it does not mean that such a subject is fully temporal. In time Levinas looks for transcendence which escapes from intentional and representational consciousness. Relating time not to being, as in Heidegger's case, but to inter-subjectivity, to the other person, Levinas shows that the other person not only makes the subject free from the heaviness of existence, by disturbing the subject, but as well by giving a new temporality. The relation of time and the other also shows a radical difference which cannot be reduced to identity, and so it can even be said that time is the possibility of all differences. Time in Levinas is also presented by an analysis of paternal

and maternal relations, from parent to child, that is, across generations. Death, for Levinas, contrary to Heidegger, is interpreted also as a relation to otherness like the otherness of another person. Facing death the subject is passive in a fashion similar to the passivity of the subject in the face of the other person. Of course for Heidegger facing one's own death puts the subject into its authentic being, while for Levinas what really disturbs the self is not death but the other, the other person. The time of the other is never my time: I am always too late for the other. This shows not only difference but the condition of responsibility and guilt. Thus the ethical relation in Levinas is the time of "diachrony." Through the diachronic deformation of time we see that ethical subjectivity is otherwise than the ego-logical transcendental subject. The Levinasian notion of time, by showing that temporality comes from outside, from otherness, from inter-subjectivity, moves away from classical notions of time, and thus can be seen to question all of the Western philosophical tradition.

Levinas's orientation to transcendence enables modifying the structure of intentionality to an account of metaphysical desire. Levinas opposes the Parmenidean principle of unity. By claiming, in contrast to it, that metaphysics begins from separation, he opposes the long tradition in which separation and interiority were taken to be irrational, were totalized, rejected, excluded, and eliminated. Through the latter intellectual maneuvers the genuine essence of metaphysics, as Levinas understands metaphysics, was hidden. Levinas makes clear that separation coming from need must not be confused with separation coming from desire. Coming from unsatisfied needs, separation is a fall, a temporal split in totality. Metaphysical desire, in contrast, moves to radical otherness. The totalization of transcendence can be avoided only by acknowledging the ethical priority of the other person. Metaphysics is higher than ontology, better than ontology, in an ethical sense. This contrasts with Heidegger, for whom ontology is higher than ethics.

Ethical relations in contrast to ontological relations are able to preserve metaphysical transcendence through responsibility which is not adequate to its obligations or duty. Metaphysical desire for the other becomes an orientation to infinity and transcendence. By expanding or using the structure of the Cartesian notion of infinity, Levinas shows that the otherness of the other person exceeds my idea of the other. Even if limited separate being is the necessary condition for infinity and exteriority, Levinas claims that infinity is not an opposition to finitude. If infinity would be just an opposition then exteriority would disappear in a dialectic play. The relation of the finite to the infinite is not cognitive, but ethical, such that Levinas's idea of infinity is a social relation which arises in the encounter with the other person. Seeing infinity in the face of the other does not denigrate finitude but rather is shown, in its difference, as the subject's non-indifference to the other. Infinity refers not to lack but to

surplus, to metaphysical desire, which by desiring does not become empty but increases in desire. Having taken into account Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics, and the so-called "end of metaphysics," Levinas nevertheless returns to metaphysics. In contrast to most post-modern critics of metaphysics, Levinas does not seek its destruction or deconstruction, but instead to find a positive meaning of metaphysics. In contrast to Heidegger, Levinas claims that the mistake of metaphysics was not a matter of asking about being in the wrong way, but rather that the question of being is itself is not the basic or sole concern of philosophy. Thus the basic difference from which the tradition begins is not ontological difference but ethical difference, so other questions have priority over the question of being, the problem of ground, and the essence of truth. Ontological difference remains indifferent; it does not even reach and actually excludes the ethical problematic. But in Levinas's case metaphysics is directed toward and by ethics.

The Levinasian critique of the Western philosophical tradition can thus be named, analogously to Heidegger, "forgetfulness," but instead of forgetfulness of being it would now be forgetfulness of the otherwise than being. Levinas shows that if we see the other in the way of being the other is stripped of otherness. Criticizing the Western philosophical tradition as "allergy" to otherness, Levinas sees that from Parmenides to Heidegger otherness was reduced to identity, systematics and sameness.

The most explicit or complete way of going beyond ontological logic and language is found in Levinas's last book length work, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. Here being is also named "essence," having in mind its Heideggerian sense. While acknowledging the significance of the distinction of being and entities or what he calls the "amphibology of being and entities," Levinas argues that it is not of central or exclusive importance, as one might think from reading Heidegger's writings about this. Levinas shows that for him the ontological difference remains on the same level as being or ontology. Ontological difference is criticized because as a form of understanding or what Heidegger calls "thinking," it remains imprisoned in *logos*. The way to escape this logic is by moving from the "said" to "saying."

"The statement of being's *other*, of the otherwise than being," Levinas writes, "claims to state a difference over and beyond that which separates being from nothingness - the very difference of the *beyond*, the difference of transcendence." This refers as well to the "good beyond being" which is also infinity, and which for Heideggerian thought is impossible. It is not denying, negating or dropping being as essence, but occurring otherwise than it, as being-for-the-other. Being for the other, goodness, cannot be explained through negativity. The main philosophical problem becomes not that of Hamlet or Leibniz, torn between being and nothing, but concern regarding the right to be. Otherwise than being is not an opposition but an escape

from being which Levinas sees in the nobility of ethics, the main moment of which is responsibility for the other person, concern for the suffering of the other, in the singularity of a responsibility which is non-indifference. This non-difference for the other avoids the indifference of the ontological difference. Instead of a cognitive relation, whether scientific-representational or poetic-hermeneutic, Levinas introduces the relation of sincerity, proximity, which overcomes the indifference toward others of ontological difference.

Conclusions

1. For both Heidegger and Levinas the problem of difference serves as the basis for fundamental criticism of the Western philosophical tradition. Heidegger names the tradition metaphysics, and argues that metaphysics has forgotten the primacy of the ontological difference between being and entities. Levinas names the tradition ontology, and argues that ontology has forgotten the primacy of the ethical difference of the other person.
2. Both thinkers also see the positive manner of going beyond the limitations of the Western philosophical tradition by means of difference, in one case ontological and in the other ethical.
3. Both Heidegger and Levinas regard difference as lying at the origin of the Western philosophical tradition. For Heidegger it is the givenness of ontological difference while for Levinas it is desire for otherness. Therefore raising the problematic of difference is return to the origin of the Western philosophical tradition. Heidegger does not simply reject metaphysics, and Levinas does not simply reject ontology; both overcome what they oppose by including and transforming it according to their proper thought. Heidegger thinks the essence of metaphysics. Levinas places ontology within an ethical context.
4. The shift from ontological difference to ethical difference is a shift from abstract and morally indifferent discourse to concrete, personal and ethical discourse. From this point of view, Levinas's philosophy can be considered as a more radical critique and positive alternative in relation to the Western philosophical tradition.
5. Because Heidegger is never able to find the origin of ontological difference he faces difficulties thinking difference in relation to identity. In the depth of difference he finds a non-metaphysical "belonging together" of being and entities which can only be vaguely understood as some sort of poetical identity. For Levinas, time shows the subject as non-identical with itself. The subject's identity comes from the other as a being-for-the-other. Therefore identity haunts even from the thinking of difference.

6. Putting Heidegger and Levinas in conjunction allows us to see ethical difference in the light of ontological difference and vice versa. This comparison enables seeing the deeper dimensions of both, but most importantly, it enables seeing the ethical indifference of the ontological difference. Also this conjunction retrieves ontological difference from its own tendency to abstraction, as evident in the later poetical thinking of Heidegger, as it also prevents paradoxical and even comical accounts of otherness blind to its ethical significance.
7. Ontological difference is seen as non-indifference for being, and ethical difference is seen as non-indifference for the other person. But from the latter perspective, ontological difference is indifferent "letting-be," poetical-aesthetic difference, far from ethical obligations.
8. Both thinkers open avenues for more thought, though these avenues are radically divergent. Heidegger's thought leads to a poetical differentiating, an aesthetic path. Levinas's thought leads to question of justice, and to political and religious questions.
9. Analysis of Heideggerian thinking of ontological difference shows a hermeneutical understanding of difference by making the hidden explicit, revealing the essence. In Levinas's case the concern is not with thinking the other, or with the essence of the other, but with proximity with the other. In his philosophy it is not thinking that is radicalized but alterity. While for Heidegger difference is given, and needs to be found by the thinker, for Levinas alterity is approached through the permanent striving of the responsible subject.
10. Seeing the problem of difference as one of the most important of philosophical problems, it is certain that the present research cannot exhaust the entire problematic but leads to further questions, such as the following: Does raising the problem of difference after Heidegger and Levinas retain and continue nostalgia for the tradition or are such roots completely cut? What would it mean to cut such roots? Is it possible? Is it desirable? On another score: Is difference able to serve both as an internal critique of the Western philosophical tradition and as a positive alternative to it? Or again: Can contemporary discourses which concretely engage in social and political issues, e.g., gender rights, animal rights, post-colonialism, find a productive and nourishing attachments to Levinas's ethical philosophy? What would those attachments look like? Could they, in return, offer productive ways to reassess, to adjust or even to revise Levinas's project?

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Temos pagrindimas

Skirtis kaip tapatybės opozicija aptinkama pačioje Vakarų filosofinės tradicijos pradžioje. Jau Parmenido – Herakleito kontroversija išryškina tapatybės, pastovumo ir skirties, kismo opoziciją. Tačiau būtent tapatybė, o ne skirtis ilgainiui tapusi svarbiausiu Vakarų filosofinės metafizinės tradicijos bruožu. Tapatybė laikoma tikrovę steigiančiu ir paaškinančiu aspektu, o skirtis galiausiai panaikinama.

Friedricho Nietzsche's raštuose išreiškiama kritika Vakarų tradicijos atžvilgiu ir nuo to laiko mąstytojai nuolat siekia pergalėti metafiziką. Metafizinės tradicijos užklausimas ir permąstymas, su kuo save ir sieja postmodernistinė filosofija, neišvengiamai yra orientuotas į tapatybės ir vienio suardymą. Skirtumo mąstytojais įvardijami Jacques'as Derrida, Gilles'is Deleuze'as, Michelis Foucault'o ir kt., iš pagrindų siekdami sugriauti metafizinę tradiciją, drauge įtvirtina ir skirties pirmumą tapatybės atžvilgiu. Šiuolaikinėje filosofijoje skirtumas dažnai laikomas „įvykusi“, tariamasi jau išsivadavus iš Vakarų tradicijos tapatybės logikos.

Apie įvairius „skirtumus“ populiariau kalbėti ne tik filosofiniame, bet ir socialiniame, politiniame, kultūriniame diskursuose, fiksuojant šiuolaikinės visuomenės kismą, įvairovę, nuolatinę būtinybę atsiverti „kitokiems. Taip skirties mąstymas dažnai tampa visa paaškinančia ir visa leidžiančia perspektyva. Disertacijoje šie „įvykusi“ skirtumo rezultatai neaptariami ir neanalizuojami, o bandoma gilintis į filosofines skirtumo mąstymo ištakas. Taip pat siekiama užklausti skirtumo įvedimo ir jo teigimo šiuolaikiniame kontekste savaimę suprantamumą.

Disertacijoje skirtumo problema svarstoma kaip viena iš galimybių kalbėti apie tradicijos lūžį – fiksuoti skirties, o ne tapatybės mąstymo pirmumo išryškinimą. Skirties, atskyrimo, įvairių perskyrų istorija turi galias tradicijas Vakarų kultūroje ir įvairiais pavidalais driekiasi per visą mąstymo istoriją. Pačioje Vakarų filosofijos istorijoje dauguma mąstytojų brėžė vienokius ar kitokius skirtumus, taip sistematizuodami savo mąstymą bei įvesdami tvarką tikrovėje.

Tačiau, manytume, filosofine problema pats *skirtumas* taip ir netampa. Kol skirtumas pristatomas kaip kokybinis skirtumas, kol mąstomi du opoziciški nariai, tol nėra mąstomas pats skyrimasis skirtume, pati skirties prasmė ar jos davimo būdas. Disertacijoje susitelkiama būtent į skirtumo kaip filosofinės problemos analizę, atsiribojant nuo skirtumų ir perskyrų Vakarų filosofinėje tradicijoje aptarimo. Skirtumo kaip filosofinės problemos genezė bei jos prasminiai lūžiai pristatomi atliekant lyginamąją Martino Heideggerio ir Emmanuelio Levino filosofijos analizę.

Laikomasi nuomonės, kad būtent Heideggerio filosofijoje suformuluojama filosofinė skirties problema. Ontologinio skirtumo, skirtumo tarp Būties [*Sein*] ir esinių [*Seiendes*],

svarstymas drauge atveria Vakarų metafizikos permąstymo galimybę ir metafizikos įveikos pastangą. Heidegeriško skirtumo transformaciją galime atpažinti Derrida, Deleuze'o darbuose, kur skirtumas tampa viena svarbiausių šiuos mąstytojus apibūdinančių sąvokų. Tačiau kaip parodo Gianni Vattimo, jų koncepcijoje skirtumai paremti nuolatinio skirtumų struktūros kartojimu imanencijos plotmėje, skirtumo simuliakriniu pobūdžiu ir neišlaikomas dėmesingumas ontologiniam skirtumui. Levino ir Heideggerio gretinimas praplečia skirtumo sampratą ir parodo gilesnę paties skirtumo dimensiją. Abu mąstytojai mato metafiziką kaip gimusią iš skirtumo – vienu atveju iš realiai esančio skirtumo, antruoju – geismo Kitam kaip skirtumui. Levino filosofijoje skirties samprata pakinta apverčiant ontologinį skirtumą, o galiausiai išeinant anapus ir atrandant gilesnę skirties dimensiją etiniame skirtume, skirtumą, kurio nariai skiriasi *kitaip* nei ontologinio skirtumo dėmenys. Skirties problema disertacijoje leidžia apie Heideggerį ir Leviną kalbėti greta, o taip pat padedanti išryškinti šių mąstytojų radikalų nutolinimą nuo vienas kito ir pačios skirtumo sampratos pokytį.

Nepaisant to, kad Heideggeris ir Levinas iš dalies yra amžininkai – Heideggeris (1889-1976), Levinas (1906-1995), o Levinas taip pat buvo Heideggerio mokinys Freiburge (1928-1929), jų santykio neina įvardinti dialogišku. Heideggeris į išsamią Levino kritiką neatsakė nei viename iš šiuo metu žinomų veikalų, nors sunku būtų manyti, jog jis su šiais Levino tekstais buvo nesusipažinęs. Tuo tarpu Levinas, praėjus vos keliems metams po *Būties ir laiko* pasirodymo, paskelbė tekstą *Martinus Heideggeris ir ontologija* (*Martin Heidegger et l'ontologie*, 1932) ir liko dėmesingas Heideggerio filosofijai visoje savo kūryboje. Kaip teigia Rudi Viskeris, leviniškas Heideggerio perskaitymas yra bene vienintelė reikšminga kritika, tačiau susilaukusi palyginti menko dėmesio. Daugeliui heidegeristų Levinas tapo tarytum Heideggerio papildymu arba kritiku, nepakankamai supratusiu „būties mąstymą“. Disertacijoje bandoma ne tik parodyti Heideggerio – Levino santykį, bet išryškinti ir paties Levino originalų skirties mąstymą.

Skirtis ir Kitas

Šiuolaikiniame diskurse, apimančiame tiek filosofiją, tiek meną, tiek sociologiją yra įprasta kalbėti apie nepanaikinamą skirtumą, absoliučią kitybę. Terminų, nusakančių skirtingumą ir kitybę, tradicija yra ilga. Jų ištakų galime ieškoti Herakleito fragmentuose, nurodančiuose į *tēkmę, vaidą*. Platonas *Sofiste* pavartoja *tauton* [tas pats] ir *to heteron* [kitas] terminus, kurie negali būti suvesti vienas į kitą, o *Timajuje* kalba apie „maišymui nepaklūstančią skirtingumo prigimtį“. Tačiau, manytume, tik po Heideggerio apie skirtumą galima kalbėti ne kaip besiskiriančių dėmenų opoziciją, ir tik po Levino galima kalbėti apie Kitą, turint omenyje žmogišką kitą, kaip skirtumą. Kitas nebūtinai gali būti traktuojamas kaip

skirtingas – daugeliu atveju jis yra *alter ego*. Net jei ir atpažįstama Kito išorinė mano sąmonės atžvilgiu, kaip nurodo Husserlis, jo skirtumas problema netampa. Tuo tarpu būtent Levino filosofijoje Kito ir skirtumo terminai susitinka – Kitas yra pats skirtumas.

Lietuvių kritinėje literatūroje vartojami įvairūs terminai *skirtumui* nusakyti. Terminas *ontologinis skirtumas* yra labiausiai nusistovėjęs, tačiau pakeičiamas ir *ontologine skirtimi* (Keršytė, Sverdiolas), ir *ontologine perskyra* (Sodeika), ir *ontologine skirtybe* (Maceina). *Skirties* terminas atrodytų parankesnis dėl lakoniškumo ir numanomo įvykiškumo momento, tačiau šiame darbe terminai *skirtis*, *skirtumas* daugeliu atvejų vartojami sinonimiškai. Terminas *perskyra* pasitelkiamas parodyti levinišką ontologinio skirtumo kritiką. *Skirtybę* kartais vartojame leviniškame kontekste, norėdami pabrėžti kitybės kaip skirtumo aspektą. Pagrindiniai Levino filosofijos terminai lietuviškame kontekste taip pat vartojami įvairiai. Tarkim, Čepulis siūlo *Kitko* terminą, tačiau mes pasirinkome *autre* versti *kitas*, o *Autru* – kaip *Kitas asmuo* arba tiesiog *Kitas*. Reikia turėti omenyje, kad pats Levinas šiuos terminus vartoja gan nepreciziškai, taigi dažniausiai stengiamės atsižvelgti tiesiog į prasmę.

Šaltinių apžvalga

Disertacijoje koncentruojamasi į tuos tekstus, kurie pasirodė parankesni atskleisti skirtumo problemą, tai pat parodyti pačių autorių vidinę logiką bei išryškinti skirtumo problemos pokytį nuo Heideggerio pereinant prie Levino.

Būtyje ir laike (*Sein und Zeit*, 1927) ontologinio skirtumo problema nėra suformuluota, tačiau šis veikalas parankus ontologinį skirtumą pristatant kaip mąstymo perspektyvą. Taipogi tai tekstas, kuris savo pobūdžiu yra artimiausias ir reikšmingiausias Levinui. Marburgo laikotarpiu skaitytose paskaitose *Pamatinės fenomenologijos problemos* (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, 1927), Heideggeris ontologiniam skirtumui skiria gan daug dėmesio, tačiau pati problema dar nėra aiškiai suformuluota, o santykio su metafizika prasmė yra veikiau numanoma, nei išreikšta.

Ontologinio skirtumo problema yra eksplikuojama vėlesniuose Heideggerio tekstuose, po jo mąstymo *posūkio*. Visų pirma, tai veikalas *Nietzsche*, konkrečiai tekstas *Europietiškas nihilizmas* (*Der europäische Nihilismus*, 1940), kuriame Heideggeris ontologinį skirtumą pristato santykyje su metafizikos istorija ir metafizikos nihilistine prasme. Tekstai *Kas yra metafizika?* (*Was ist Metaphysik?*, 1927) bei *Metafizikos įveika* (*Überwindung der Metaphysik*, 1936-1946) padėjo analizuojant metafizikos sampratą. Vėlesnio laikotarpio iš dviejų paskaitų sudarytame kūrinyje *Tapatybė ir skirtumas* (*Identität und Differenz*, 1955-57) parodomas dar skaidresnis ontologinio skirtumo ir metafizikos santykis bei plėtojama skyrimosi pačiame skirtume samprata.

Daug dėmesio taip pat skyrėme tekstams, kuriuose Heideggeris aptaria tiesos ir pagrindo problemas. Šių problemų analizė paranki išryškinant ontologinio skirtumo ir metafizikos kaip būties užmaršties santykį. Teksto *Apie pagrindo esmę (Vom Wesen des Grundes, 1929)* 1949 metais parašytame įvade pirmą kartą įvardijama ir pati ontologinio skirtumo *problema*, kuri čia parodoma kaip ontinės-ontologinės tiesų išsišakojimas. Tekstas *Teiginys apie pagrindą (Der Satz vom Grund, 1955-56)* buvo parankus parodyti tiek metafizikos kaip būties užmaršties istoriją, tiek išryškinti būties, pagrindo ir bepagrindybės santykį. Ontologinis skirtumas yra analizuojamas ir tekste *Įnašas į filosofiją (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), 1936-38)*. Kai kurių kritikų šis veikalas laikomu pačiu svarbiausiu, kai kurių – antru po *Būties ir laiko*, o kiti jį linkę apskritai atmesti kaip neaiškų. Mes savo darbe nuo šio teksto analizės atsiribojame, nes pasirodė, jog tai, kaip čia pristatoma skirtumo problema išvestų į kitą plotmę, kuri nėra svarbi Heideggerio – Levino skirtumo santykiui atskleisti. Parodant Heideggerio skirtumo sampratą kitais tekstais remtasi kiek mažiau, todėl čia jų neminėsime.

Levino filosofija analizuota pasitelkiant keturias jo publikuotas knygas – *Nuo egzistencijos prie egzistuojančio (De l'existence à l'existant, 1947)*, *Laikas ir Kitas (Le temps et l'autre, 1947)*, *Totalybė ir begalybė (Totalité et infini. Essai sur l'extériorité, 1961)* bei *Kitaip negu būtis, arba anapus esmės (Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, 1974)*, taip pat keletą įvairiuose leidiniuose publikuotų straipsnių. Levino mąstyme susikerta dvi paradigmos – vakarietiškoji ir žydiškoji, tačiau pastaroji perspektyva disertacijoje neliečiama. Čia pasiremiama Richardo Coheno išsakyta nuomone, jog Levino skirtingas raštų pobūdis yra veikiau kreipimasis į skirtingas tradicijas, teigiant tą pačią žinią – etinį Kito asmens pirmumą. Disertacijoje sekama argumentacija, polemizuojančia su vakarietiška filosofine tradicija, kuri, kaip parodo Levinas, sutelkiama Heideggerio filosofijoje. Ankstyvieji Levino tekstai – straipsniai *Martinus Heideggeris ir ontologija (Martin Heidegger et l'ontologie, 1932)* bei *Apie pabėgimą (De l'évasion, 1935)*, o ypač knyga *Nuo egzistencijos prie egzistuojančio* padėjo išryškinti Levino siekį išsivaduoti iš heidegeriškos ontologijos ir iš ontologinio mąstymo apskritai. Knygose *Nuo egzistencijos prie egzistuojančio* ir *Laikas ir kitas* galima atsekti Levino originalios minties plėtotę bei pastangą pabėgti iš būties, drauge reiškiančią ir išsivadavimą iš ontologinio skirtumo. Pastaroji knyga, kartu su fenomenologijai skirtais straipsniais knygoje *Atrandant egzistenciją su Husserliu ir Heideggeriu (En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger, 1949)* padėjo aiškinantis laiko kaip kitybės prasmę. Reikšmingiausiu Levino veikalu laikomoje *Totalybėje ir begalybėje* daugiausiai dėmesio skiriama būtent Kitam bei kitybei. Šis veikalas taip pat svarbus parodant Levino santykį su Vakarų filosofine tradicija, metafizikos sampratos pokytį, o taip pat ir skirtumo kaip atsiskyrimo sampratą bei dar radikalesnį išsivadavimą iš ontologinio skirtumo pereinant prie etinio skirtumo. *Kitaip nei būtis, arba anapus esmės* skirtas subjektyvumo

sampratai atskleisti, tačiau analizuojamos problemos kontekste gali būti traktuojamas ir kaip prasmės anapus ontologinio skirtumo aptikimas.

Tyrinėjimų apžvalga

Heideggerio filosofijos analizei parankus fundamentalus Williamo Richardsono veikalas *Heideggeris. Nuo fenomenologijos prie mąstymo*. Šiame veikale Richardsonas nuosekliai aptaria pagrindinius Heideggerio kūrinius ir pateikia patikimą bei sistematinį perskaitymą. Otto Pöggelerio veikalas *Martino Heideggerio mąstymo kelias* pravertė išryškinant metafizikos kritikos, būties užmaršties momentus Heideggerio filosofijoje. Taip pat Thomo Langan, Thomo Sheehano, Alexei'aus Cherniakovo tyrimai paakino atkreipti dėmesį į tiesos, laiko problematiką. Skaitant Heideggerį buvo priimta hermeneutinė – fenomenologinė strategija, siekta kiek įmanoma rekonstruoti mąstytojo mintį ir ją išgryninti, atsiribojant nuo poetinio-mistinio Heideggerio perskaitymo.

Kaip patikimi Levino filosofijos interpretacijos veikalai laikyti Theodoro De Boero, Rogerio Burggraeve, Coheno, Adriano Peperzako studijos. Šiems autoriams būdinga tai, kad giliai permąstomos Levino sąsajos su graikiškąja tradicija ir pateikiama plati jo etinės metafizikos interpretacijos panorama. Coheno tyrimai apjungia tiek žydiškąją, tiek vakarietiškąją perspektyvas, išlaikydami dėmesingumą etikai kaip pirmajai filosofijai bei analizuodami Levino laiko intersubjektyvumą kaip Heideggerio ekstatiško laiko kritiką.

Tačiau vis tik šiam darbui svarbesnės yra tos kritinės studijos, kuriose išryškinama skirtumo problema Heideggerio ir/ar Levino filosofijoje. Čia pasitarnavo Jean-Luco Mariono darbai, ypač straipsnis *Būties klausimas ar ontologinis skirtumas*, kuriame parodoma ontologinio skirtumo plėtotė *Būtyje ir laike* bei *Pamatinėse fenomenologijos problemose*. Mariono tyrimuose taip pat aptariamas ir Levino santykis su ontologiniu skirtumu bei jo įveika. Atkreiptinas dėmesys ir į tai, jog Levinas reagavo į Mariono išsakytas pastabas dėl jo santykio su ontologiniu skirtumu. Vattimo knyga *Skirtumo nuotykių*, nors ir neištraukia Levino į skirtumo mąstytojų gretą, tačiau apžvelgia skirtumo problemos tendencijas ir perspektyvas apskritai. Ši knyga, greta su Johno Caputo knyga *Heideggeris ir Akvinitis: esė apie metafizikos įveiką* bei Ritos Šerpytės išvalgos labiausiai pasitarnavo formuluojat pačią prieigą prie filosofinės skirtumo problematikos.

Ontologinio skirtumo analizei svarbus Ley Vail veikalas *Heideggeris ir ontologinis skirtumas*. Vail daugiau koncentruojasi į ontologinio skirtumo pobūdį vėlesniuose veikaluose, laikydamasi nuomonės, kad *Būtyje ir laike* ontologinis skirtumas nepasirodo. Caputo knyga *Heideggeris ir Akvinitis: esė apie metafizikos įveiką*, o ypač skyrius *Heideggerio Diference ir šv. Tomo Esse-Ens perskyra* bei Douglas L. Donkelio knyga *Heideggerio ir Derrida skirtumo samprata*

buvo parankūs rašant pirmos dalies trečią skyrių, kuriame išgryninama skirtumo gilesnė dimensija. De Boero knygos *Transcendencijos racionalumas* skyriuje *Ontologinis skirtumas (Heideggeris) ir ontologinė atskirtis (Levinas)* analizuoja Levino ir Heideggerio skirtumo sampratas, labiausiai susitelkdamas į ankstyvąjį Levino filosofijos etapą.

Viskeris knygoje *Nežmogiškumo būklė: ieškant skirtumo po Heideggerio ir Levino* apjungia Levino ir Heideggerio skirtumo mąstymą, ieškodamas skirtumo atgaivinimo galimybes. Viskeris metafiziką priešpastato multikultūrizmui, kosmopolitinei visuomenei. Laikydamasis kritinės pozicijos Levino atžvilgiu, tyrinėtojas Leviną kaltina pernelyg dideliu ir į aklavietę vedančiu optimizmu. Knygoje Viskeris apgręžia Heideggerio – Levino santykį, konstatuodamas Levino etikos nepakankamumą ir humanizmo ieškodamas Heideggerio filosofijoje bei užklaudamas ar ontologinis skirtumas gali aptikti skirtumą, kuris išsprūdo etiniam skirtumui. Ši Viskerio skirtumo atgaivinimo programa gali pasirodyti kažkiek artima Vattimo, konstatuojančiam skirtumo problemos išsisėmimą ir ontologinio skirtumo atgaivinimą numatančiam socialiniuose ir tiksluosiuose moksluose. Mūsų pasirinkta strategija kiek kitokia ir kaip minėjome pradžioje, skirtumo „rezultatų“ ar skirtumo veikimo socialinėje, kultūrinėje plotmėje neaptarinėsime.

Įdomu pastebėti, kad Warwiko universitete (Didžioji Britanija) 2008/2009 metais Darreno Ambrose'o skaitytas kursas *Skirtumo filosofijos: Heideggeris, Levinas*. Kaip matyti iš kurso aprašo, daugiausiai dėmesio skirta Levino etinei filosofijai, drauge analizuojant etikos ir Kito statusą Heideggerio filosofijoje – į šį kursą Heideggerio ontologinio skirtumo permąstymas ir jo sąsaja su Levino filosofija nėra įtraukiami.

Lietuvoje tiek Heideggerio, tiek Levino filosofija susilaukia nemažai dėmesio. Disertacijoje išsikeltai užduočiai įvykdyti svarbiausi yra Šerpytės darbai ir jos pateikta Heideggerio filosofijos interpretacija. Šerpytės atverta nihilizmo kaip spekuliatyvaus įvykio interpretavimo perspektyva, metafizikos kaip nihilizmo perskaitymas ir Heideggerio būties užmaršties interpretacija yra šios disertacijos išėties taškas.

Heideggerio išryškintą būties ir esinio nesutapimą pristato Arvydas Šliogeris knygoje *Žmogaus pasaulis ir egzistencinis mąstymas*. Heideggerio filosofijos apibūdinimas „imanentinio transcendentto“ samprata taip pat nurodo į mūsų tyrimui artimą lauką. Būdinga tai, kad dauguma tyrinėtojų (Jūratė Baranova, Mintautas Gutauskas, Dalius Jonkus, Arūnas Sverdiolas, Tomas Sodeika ir kt.) Heideggerį įtraukia į savo interesų lauką, nors išsamios studijos, skirtos tik šiam mąstytojui, ir nėra.

Tai, kad Heideggeriui rūpinti ontologinė problematika Levino filosofijoje įgyja etinį pobūdį, nagrinėjama Baranovos, Nerijaus Čepulio tyrimuose, skirtuose etikai kaip pirmajai filosofijai. Heideggerio ir Levino filosofijos sąsajos nužymimos Nijolės Keršytės, Audronės

Žukauskaitės darbuose. Vis tik daugiausiai Levino filosofija analizuojama santykyje su Edmundu Husserliu (Danutė Bacevičiūtė, Keršytė, Sodeika, Jonkus) arba Derrida (Bacevičiūtė, Keršytė, Žukauskaitė). Į Levino atidumą Heideggerio ontologijai, ypač „egzistencijos be egzistuojančiojo“ supratimui atkreipia dėmesį ir Šerpytė straipsnyje *Tragedijos tragedija – ar įmanoma išeiti anapus nihilizmo* bei monografijoje *Nihilizmas ir Vakarų filosofija*.

Pastaruoju dešimtmečiu Levinas yra vienas labiausiai tyrinėjamų mąstytojų Lietuvoje. Nežinia, ar tai įtakoja tai, kad Levinas kilęs iš Lietuvos, ar jo filosofijos patrauklumas. Levino filosofija pristatoma keliuose leidiniuose - 2005 metais išleistas *Logos* nr. 40, o 2006 metais *Athenos* nr. 2 - abu leidiniai skiriami Levino filosofijos recepcijai Lietuvoje, o iš dalies ir užsienyje bei rinktinė anglų kalba *Šimtmetis su Levinu: totalumo griuvėsiuose*, parengta 2006 metais to paties pavadinimo tarptautinės konferencijos pagrindu, pristato reikšmingiausius Levino filosofijos tyrinėjimus Lietuvoje, o taip pat ir užsienyje.

Levino tyrinėjimai Lietuvoje vyksta keliomis kryptimis: etikos, subjektyvumo ir kitybės analizės. Kito kaip absoliučiai skirtingo ir steigiančio bei apibrėžiančio asmens tapatybę per etinį santykį, atsakomybę ir nepakeičiamumą, aptariama daugelio Lietuvos tyrinėtojų darbuose (Bacevičiūtės, Baranovos, Keršytės, Žukauskaitės). Lietuviški Levino filosofijos tyrimai taip pat paliečia etikos juslumo prielaidų analizę (Bacevičiūtė), Levino intersubjektyvumo sampratą (Keršytė), intencionalumo pobūdį huserliškos fenomenologijos kontekste (Jonkus), Gutauskas atsižvelgia į sakymo ir to kas pasakyta perskyrą, Sodeikai rūpi Levino filosofijos fenomenologinis matmuo.

Skirtumo problema vienu ar kitu aspektu iškyla įvairių autorių tyrimuose. Šerpytė atkreipia dėmesį į nihilizmo ir skirtumo problemos artimumą. Pristatydama dvi nihilizmo interpretacijas, autorė pabrėžia, jog artimas klasikiniame neigime nihilizmas reiškia *Überwindung* (peržengimo, įveikos) teoriją. Tuo tarpu antrąją prasme suprastas nihilizmas steigiasi iš „neklasikinio“ neigimo ir yra artimas *différance* idėjai.

Kaip imituojančią Heideggerio ontinį-ontologinį skirtumą bei pratęsiančią būties ir esinio skirtumo dialektiką Žukauskaitė pristato Derrida *différance* sąvoką. Skirtis kaip pirminė tapatybės atžvilgiu ir skirtis kaip tapatybės sąlyga yra svarstoma kitam mąstytojui - Deleuze'ui - skirtuose tekstuose (Gutauskas, Sverdiolas, Žukauskaitė). Teologinio skirtumo analizė sutinkama Sodeikos darbuose.

Tyrimo tikslas ir uždaviniai

Darbo tikslas - ištirti, kaip Heideggerio ir Levino filosofijose formuluojama ir pasikeičia skirties problema, koks šios problemos santykis su Vakarų filosofine tradicija ir kokia jos prasmė.

Siekiant šio tikslo, keliami du pagrindiniai uždaviniai:

- Rekonstruoti ontologinio skirtumo plėtotę Heideggerio filosofijoje.
- Rekonstruoti etinio skirtumo plėtotę Levino filosofijoje.

Šiems uždaviniams spręsti suformuluoti konkretesni uždaviniai.

1. Parodyti skirtumo kaip filosofinės problemos genezę.
2. Išnagrinėti, kaip Heideggerio filosofijoje pasirodo skirties problema.
 - a. Parodyti ontologinio skirtumo ir būties klausimo ryšį.
 - b. Atskleisti ontologinio skirtumo kaip mąstymo perspektyvos prasmę.
 - c. Išsiaiškinti ontologinio skirtumo užmaršties kaip metafizikos diagnozę.
 - d. Ištirti ontologinio skirtumo, pagrindo, laiko ir tiesos problemų ryšį.
 - e. Permąstyti skirties kaip gilesnės ontologinio skirtumo dimensijos prasmę.
 - f. Atskleisti ontologinio skirtumo kaip metafizikos ištakos sampratą.
 - g. Parodyti metafizikos įveikos prasmę.
3. Išnagrinėti kaip skirtumo problema vystoma Levino filosofijoje.
 - a. Parodyti, kaip ankstyvajame Levino filosofijos etape formuluojama pabėgimo nuo būties intencija ir kaip pakeičiamas būties – esinio skirtumas.
 - b. Išanalizuoti atsiskyrimo nuo būties ir subjekto steigties ryšį.
 - c. Ištirti, kaip Levino filosofijoje skirties problema siejasi su laiko, kitybės, etikos temomis.
 - d. Atskleisti ontologinio skirtumo apvertimo ir išėjimo anapus jo pobūdį.
 - e. Parodyti perėjimo nuo ontologinio prie etinio skirtumo prasmę.
 - f. Ištirti, kokia metafizikos samprata Levino filosofijoje bei parodyti metafizikos ir skirtumo problemos santykį.
 - g. Parodyti ontologijos įveikos prasmę.

Atlikto darbo pagrindu ginami teiginiai

Ištyrus skirties mąstymą Heideggerio ir Levino filosofijoje ginami tokie teiginiai:

1. Heideggerio filosofijoje pirmą kartą suformuluojama skirtumo kaip skirtumo problema, kadangi jam rūpi pats skyrimasis ir jo prasmė, o ne tik tos perskyros dėmenys.
2. Ontologinis skirtumas, nors ir neįvardintas, yra *Būties ir laiko* perspektyva.
3. Ontologinio skirtumo mąstymas yra ne tik išsivadavimo iš būties užmaršties galimybė, bet ir pačios metafizikos neapmąstyta sąlyga.
4. Pačios skirties (ontologinio skirtumo) prielaidų apmąstymas Heideggerio filosofijoje nuo skirties grąžina prie tapatybės skirtumo gelmėje mąstymo (poetinės tapatybės).

5. Skirties mąstymas Heideggerio filosofijoje nėra pakankamai radikalus, kadangi pastanga mąstyti ontologinį skirtumą užslepia ir ignoruoja kitus skirtumas, o ypač, žvelgiant iš Levino perspektyvos, etinį skirtumą.
6. Levino filosofija atveria galimybę skirties mąstymui išsivaduoti iš ontologijos ir heidegeriškos būties sampratos.
7. Levino įvedamas skirtumas yra ne tik ontologinio skirtumo dėmenų apvertimas, privilegijuojant egzistuojantįjį, o ne egzistenciją, bet ėjimas anapus šio skirtumo logikos.
8. Skirtumas Levino filosofijoje yra puoselėjantis Kito asmens kitybę ir ateina iš santykio, taip drauge atverdamas etinę dimensiją.
9. Levino filosofijoje skirtumas išsaugomas ne teigiant skirtumo mąstymą, o kaip atsakomybė už Kitą.
10. Levino skirties mąstymas yra radikaliai priešingas heidegeriškajam, bet pati ontologijos įveikos pastanga gali pasirodyti artima ankstyvojo Heideggerio filosofijos istorijos dekonstrukcijos pastangai. Tuo tarpu vėlesnio Heideggerio „poetinis mąstymas“ juda kita kryptimi nei Levino etikos kaip pirmosios filosofijos įtvirtinimas.

Tyrimo metodai

Tyrimas atliekamas pasinaudojant hermeneutiniu teksto interpretavimo, lyginamosios analizės, rekonstrukcijos ir kiek mažiau fenomenologiniu metodu. Hermeneutinis teksto interpretacijos metodas parankus tiek siekiant susidaryti pačios skirtumo problematikos vaizdą, tiek rekonstruojant analizuojamų autorių filosofijos prielaidas, vystymąsi, išdavas. Darbe dažnai remiamasi hermeneutinio rato principu, tai yra grįžtama prie tos pačios problemos ėimant jau atliktos analizės rezultatus. Lyginamosios analizės metodas parankus siekiant parodyti tiek skirtumo problemos pokytį kiekvieno autoriaus filosofijos viduje, tiek jų atliekant jų tarpusavio palyginimą. Pristatant skirtumo sampratos plėtotę Heideggerio ir Levino filosofijose, atliekama jų idėjų rekonstrukcija, taip pat įvedamas ir kritinis matmuo.

Mokslinis disertacijos naujumas

Lietuvos filosofijos tyrinėtojų ir filosofų tekstuose pasirodo nuorodų į Heideggerio ontologinį skirtumą, o taip pat ir į Heideggerio ir Levino skirtumo mąstymą, tačiau pati skirtumo problema nėra detaliau išanalizuota. Daugeliu atveju ontologiniu skirtumu pasiremama kaip savaimė suprantamybe ir sudėtine Heideggerio filosofijos dalimi. Levino Kito ir kitybės analizei, etikai, kaip parodėme, skiriama daug dėmesio, tačiau stokoja darbų, išryškinančių Kito prasmę Heideggerio ontologinio skirtumo priešstatoje, o taip parodančių Levino polemiką su ontologiniu skirtumu. Taip pat, nors yra tyrimų, analizuojančių pačią

skirties problematiką, tačiau dažniau tai atliekama pristatant Deleuze'o ir Derrida skirtumo sampratą, tuo tarpu gilesnė skirties dimensija ir skirtumo problema Heideggerio ir Levino filosofijose bei šios problemos santykis su Vakarų mąstymo tradicija, nėra apmąstyti. Ši disertacija atkreipia dėmesį į šiuos, mūsų manymu, svarbius, bet ignoruotus momentus.

Darbo struktūra

Darbą sudaro įvadas, dvi dalys – pirmoji skirta Heideggerio filosofijai, o antroji – Levino – bei išvados. Tokia disertacijos struktūra pasirinkta kaip geriausiai padedanti įgyvendinti išsikeltą tikslą – parodyti ne tik skirtumo problemos plėtotę Heideggerio ir Levino filosofijose, bet taip pat ir skirtumo problemos pokytį.

Įvade pristatomas pats darbo sumanymas, pagrindžiama tema, aptariami šaltiniai bei tyrinėjimai. Taip pat pristatomas tikslas, uždaviniai, darbo metodas bei ginamieji teiginiai.

Tai, kaip pristatoma skirtumo problema iš dalies yra ir probleminis, ir chronologinis žvilgsnis. Pirmoji dalis pradedama Heideggerio *Būties ir laiko* analize, vėliau susitelkiama prie vėlesnių veikalų po *posūkio*, kuriuose Heideggeris nuo *Būties ir laiko* fenomenologinės ontologijos pasuka link poetinio kalbėjimo. Analogiškai, antroji dalis pradedama nuo Levino ankstyvųjų veikalų analizės, kuriuose pristatomas pabėgimas nuo egzistencijos, susirėmimas su Heideggerio ontologiniu skirtumu. Pereinant prie pagrindinių veikalų – *Totalybės ir begalybės* bei *Kitaip negu būtis, arba anapus esmės* analizės, parodomas skirtumo etinis pobūdis bei nutolimas nuo Heideggerio ontologinio skirtumo. Taip pat atsižvelgta ir į tai, jog tiek Heideggeris, tiek Levinas nevengia autokomentarų ir paaiškinimų savo ankstesniems tekstams. Keičiasi ir atskirų terminų vartojimo prasmė – lyginant su ankstesniais kūriniiais, tie patys terminai įgyja kiek kitokią prasmę. Chronologiškumu galima būtų laikyti ir pačią temos formuluotę – Heideggerio ir Levino filosofijoje. Tuo tarpu, Viskeris, kaip minėjome, savo monografijoje parodo šio santykio apgręžimo galimybę.

Pirmoji disertacijos dalis skirta Heideggerio skirties mąstymui aptarti. Pirmiausiai pristatomos tyrimo prielaidos, pagrindžiama, kodėl laikomasi nuomonės, jog skirtumo problema iki Heideggerio suformuluota nebuvo. Atliekant *on* analizę, išryškkinamas būties ir ontologinio skirtumo ryšys. Per štai-būties, laikiškumo, esinių skirtingo buvimo būdų analizę parodomas ontologinis skirtumas kaip mąstymo perspektyva *Būtyje ir laike*, iš kurios Heideggeris kelia būties prasmės klausimą. Antrame pirmos dalies skyriuje pristatoma, kaip pats Heideggeris eksplikatyviai suformuluoja ontologinio skirtumo problemą ir kaip tai susieja su metafizikos kaip būties užmaršties diagnoze. Tai analizuojama aptariant tiesos, pagrindo problemų sklaidą Heideggerio filosofijoje. Heideggerio kritika metafizikos atžvilgiu parodoma pristatant heidegerišką metafizikos sampratą bei atskleidžiant ontologinio skirtumo artimumą

metafizikos kaip nihilizmo diagnozei. Trečiasis pirmos dalies skyrius skirtas aptarti metafizikos įveikos ir ontologinio skirtumo santykį, ontologinį skirtumą parodant ir kaip pačią metafizikos prielaidą. Taip pat išryškinama nemetafizinė būties ir esinių tapatybė skirtumo gelmėje ir skyrimosi pačiame skirtume bei poetinio mąstymo perspektyva bei jo prasmė.

Antrojoje darbo dalyje analizuojama Levino skirtumo samprata. Jei disertacijos pirmoji dalis buvo skirta Heideggerio polemikai su metafizika, šioje pristatoma Levino polemika su Heideggeriu ir jo asmenyje – su visa Vakarų filosofine tradicija. Ontologinis skirtumas aptariamas kaip Levino filosofijos išeities taškas, išryškinat ir Levino nutolimą nuo Heideggerio filosofijos. Skirtumo problemos pokytis pirmiausiai pristatomas parodant Levino kritiką dėl nepakankamo būties ir esinio skyrimo ir būtinybę „pabėgti nuo būties“. Antrame šios dalies skyriuje analizuojama atsiskyrimo nuo būties kaip individo steigties sąlyga, drauge išryškinant šio atsiskyrimo egoistinį pobūdį. Laiko kaip skirties įvykio analizė padeda atverti etinio skirtumo tyrimo lauką. Analizuojant etinį skirtumą, aptariama Kito samprata Levino filosofijoje, metafizinio geismo struktūra bei pakitusi metafizikos samprata. Paskutiniame šios dalies skyriuje išryškinama išėjimo anapus ontologinio skirtumo pastanga ir prasmė, parodant, priešingai Heideggeriui, etinį, suinteresuotą šio skirtumo pobūdį. Moralinės atsakomybės analizė skirtumą parodo kaip neabejingumą, išryškinant artumo ir nuoširdumo santykį.

Išvados

1. Skirties problema tiek Heideggerio, tiek Levino filosofijoje iškyla Vakarų filosofinės tradicijos kritikos kontekste. Heideggeris metafiziką pamato kaip užmiršusią ontologinį būties ir esinio skirtumą, o Levinas teigia, jog ontologija užmiršusi etinį Kito skirtumą.
2. Mąstytojai išsivadavimą iš Vakarų filosofinės tradicijos ribotumo bei mąstymo logikos numato būtent per skirtumo mąstymą, tačiau tam skirtumui suteikdami kitokią prasmę – vienu atveju ontologinę, antruoju – etinę.
3. Taipogi abu mąstytojai skirtį įžvelgia kaip tokį Vakarų mąstymo „pradą“, iš kurio kilęs pats šis mąstymas. Heideggeriui tai ontologinio skirtumo duotis, o Levinui – kitybės geismas. Tokiu atveju skirties problemos kėlimas yra „prisimenantis“ mąstymas. Taigi galima teigti, jog tiek Heideggeris, tiek Levinas ne tiek paneigia metafiziką (Heideggeris) ir ontologiją (Levinas), kiek ją įveikia „įimdami“. Heideggeris atsigręžia į patį metafizikos esmės permąstymą, o Levinas ontologiją interpretuoja etiniame kontekste.
4. Pasirinkta tyrimo kryptis nuo ontologinio prie etinio skirtumo taip pat parodo, jog skirties mąstymas pastūmėjamas nuo abstraktaus ir moraliai abejingo diskurso prie konkretaus

asmeninio santykio ir etinio diskurso. Tokiu atveju, Levino filosofija gali būti laikoma radikalesne Vakarų filosofijos kritika ir drauge jos pozityvia alternatyva.

5. Heideggeris, ontologinį skirtumą palikdamas iki galo neišaiškinta prielaida, susiduria su sunkumu mąstyti skirtumo ir tapatybės santykį. Skirtumo gelmėje aptinkama nemetafizinė pirminė būties ir esinio tapatybė kaip jų savitarpio priklausomybė, kuri gali būti suprasta kaip tam tikra poetinė tapatybė skirtumo gelmėje. Levino atveju matome, jog laiko modusas parodo subjekto nesutapimą su savimi, tapatybė yra steigama negatyviai, per kitą. Taigi galima teigti, kad tapatybė vis tik nėra visiškai pašalinama iš skirties mąstymo.
6. Levino ir Heideggerio skirties mąstymo sugretinimas leidžia etinį skirtumą pamatyti ontologinio skirtumo perspektyvoje ir atvirkščiai. Toks persidengimas išryškina šių skirtumų gilesnę dimensiją bei parodo etinį ontologinio skirtumo nesuinteresuotumą. Šis gretinimas taip pat leidžia išvengti ontologinio skirtumo abstraktumo, išryškėjančio Heideggerio poetiniame mąstyme, o taip pat išvengti ir paradoksalių ar net komiškų kitybės paieškų, išleidžiančių iš akių etinį reikšmingumą.
7. Ontologinio skirtumo mąstymas pamatomas kaip neabejingas būčiai, o etinis skirtumas – neabejingas kito žmogaus kitybei. Tačiau žvelgiant iš Levino perspektyvos, ontologinis skirtumas pamatomas kaip abejingas „leidimas būti“, poetinė/estetinė skirtumo išraiška, nutolusi nuo etinio įsipareigojimo.
8. Abu mąstytojai atveria kitas, radikaliai skirtingas, minties perspektyvas. Heideggerio kelias veda link išveda estetikos, poetinio kalbėjimo link. Tuo tarpu Levino mintis veda link teisingumo, politinių, religinių klausimų svarstymo.
9. Atlikta Heideggerio skirties mąstymo analizė parodė, kad mąstytojas siekia išryškinti hermeneutinį skirtumo supratimą, iš užslėpto skirtumo išeiti į skirties mąstymą. Tuo tarpu Levinui svarbu ne Kito mąstymas ir Kito esmė, bet artumas Kitam. Jo filosofijoje palaipsniui radikalizuojama pati kitybė, o ne skirtumo mąstymas. Taip pat išryškėja, jog Heideggeriui skirtumas yra išankstinė duotis ir mąstytojas turi jį aptikti, o Levinui kitybė yra nuolatinė atsakingo subjekto pastanga.
10. Skirties mąstymą laikant viena iš pagrindinių filosofinių problemų, akivaizdu, kad atliktas tyrimas visos problematikos neišsemia, bet veda prie tolimesnių klausimų: ar skirtumo problema po Heideggerio ir Levino išlaiko nostalgiską ryšį su Vakarų filosofine tradicija ar šis ryšys jau yra galutinai nutrauktas? Kokia būtų šio atsitraukimo prasmė? Ar tai yra įmanoma, ar geidžiama? Kita vertus, kiek skirtumas yra vidinė Vakarų filosofinės tradicijos kritika, kiek – jos pozityvi alternatyva. Ar šiuolaikiniai socialiniai, politiniai diskursai (lyčių

studijos, gyvūnų teisės, post-kolonializmas ir pan.) gali aptikti prasmingų ir produktyvių sąsajų su Levino etine filosofija? Kokios tai galėtų būti sąsajos? Kita vertus, ar šie diskursai gali pasiūlyti būdų, kaip pritaikyti, persvarstyti ar net pervertinti Levino projektą?

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