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The Many Faces of Jean Monnet:

European Identity Projects in Scholarly Narratives

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INTRODUCTION

Thematic Grounding

'Identity' and 'narrative' are two concepts that have grown in relevance during the last decade of European Union politics. In the face of multiple challenges such as the constitutional crisis, the financial crisis, the eurozone debt crisis, the migration and refugee crisis, the crisis of British secession, and the overarching crisis of popularity and legitimacy, the EU was found lacking in powerful identities and narratives that could give the European polity the solidarity and cohesion necessary for decisive political action on a supranational scale. As Francis Fukuyama (2012) explains, in a time of major turmoil it becomes evident that the supranational project cannot function if the peoples of different European nation-states do not feel the obligations of solidarity towards each other. In the words of Jürgen Habermas (2003), "The citizens of one nation must regard the citizens of another nation as fundamentally 'one of us'".

This argument is increasingly accepted in political science: namely that the softer issues of identity, collective memory, and shared narratives are fundamental to the harder issues of politics, such as collective action, efficient governance and political development (Manners, 2011; Kølvraa, 2016). Therefore, Fukuyama (2012) tells us, the major challenge facing EU today is "to answer the question - in a more substantive sense - of what it means to be European". The interest in identities and narratives manifests most acutely when their absence is felt most strongly. "Utopian dreams of community, cohesion and holism which are all contained in the concept of identity",- Bo Stråth (2010, p. 20) explains: "are mobilized precisely in situations where there is a lack of such feelings". Just like the European cultural policy of the 1970's was grounded in the political

context shaped by the great oil crisis of 1973 (Kaiser, 2015), the present uncertainty over EU's future has reinvigorated discussions on the European "we feeling" and how it could be engineered.

On a political level, this newly found longing for community and cohesion was directly expressed by Commission President Barroso in his call for a 'New Narrative for Europe'. From April 2013 to March 2014, the European Commission appointed a 'Cultural Committee' to produce a 'New Narrative for Europe: The Mind and Body of Europe' (European Commission, 2014). Furthermore, May 2017 has marked the opening of the House of European History, a European Parliament financed museum on the history of European integration, with an aim to "convey, both cognitively and through an appeal to the emotions, a master narrative of European integration" (Rigney, 2012, p. 615). In the context of these initiatives, it is often argued that, despite the awarding of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the EU, the European peace narrative has largely exhausted itself, and the EU is now in search of new political narratives.

A political narrative is understood here as a historical narrative with political implications, a recounting of past events in a way that reinvents communal origins and connects them to new moral horizons of communal future (Kølvraa, 2016, pp. 170-171). The importance of political narrative (a concept that is often used synonymously with the concept of political myth) is usually explained by reference to its function in the construction of political communities. Drawing their theoretical models from the studies of nationalism, students of European identity typically argue that, if successful, investments in communal origin myths and symbols can "lead to the formation of overarching political loyalties and political identification" (Theiler, 2005, p. 21).

EU's crisis-ridden political context has given rise to a new wave of research on narratives and their political functions (Gilbert, 2008; Eder, 2009, 2011; Kaiser, 2011, 2015; Kølvraa 2012, 2016; Manners and Murray, 2016). Illustrative of the

new trend is the fact that, in 2016, the Journal of Common Market Studies hosted a special issue on 'Dissident Voices in Theorizing Europe', with narrative analysis as one of the issue's core topics. Explaining the decision to host this issue in what is normally a positivistically minded journal, editors Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (2016) argue that mainstream EU studies are having great difficulty grasping recent political processes. Readers of the issue's editorial are told that recent realities of EU politics seem to contradict the mainstream academic "premise that the EU is a neoliberal, state-like political system and that Europeanisation is a one-way process". The editors also point to the pitfalls of the "natural science "ontology of objectivism" and the "epistemology of positivism"" to which, according to Manners and Whitman, mainstream EU Studies are exclusively attached.

Manners and Whitman (2016, p. 4) use these alleged sins of the mainstream to "explain why the gap between theoretical scholarship and political realities has opened over the past decade". To address this mismatch, the contributors to this JCMS issue have called for a critical, normative, and narrative-based analysis. As the argument goes, narrativist epistemology holds the key to a better understanding of contemporary European challenges, to a more realistic theory of recent developments, and to a conceptualization of new European trajectories (Manners and Whitman, 2016, p. 3).

Concurring with Fukuyama's point, contributors argue that "the question of European identity today seems to be all the more pressing" (Kølvraa, 2016, p. 169), and that the need for a new European narrative is greater than ever (Manners and Murray, 2016). This group of authors assumes the scholarly task of tackling the "relative lack of narrative scholarship regarding the EU" (Manners and Murray, 2016, p. 185). Different techniques of narrative analysis are accordingly proposed to dissect different European narratives that have been communicated on a political level as platforms for an overarching European political identity: for example, the European peace narrative, the green Europe narrative, the social

Europe narrative, the economic Europe narrative, and the global Europe narrative (Manners and Murray, 2016, pp. 188-197). By looking at the origins, motives and structures of these narratives, contributors for this JCMS special issue explain what is it at stake in this highly competitive field of European narratives: the popular image of the EU, the European identity, and the direction which the European project may take after overcoming, or failing to overcome, the contemporary political crisis and political exhaustion amidst great external pressures and internal divisions. As Manners and Murray (2016, p. 199) predict, "the scholarly analysis of narratives in the European Union will be a burgeoning concern for some time to come".

Academic Puzzle

In this monograph, I will look at the academic discourse as a distinctive site of European political narratives and European identity projects. While the emerging field of European narrative studies has mainly focused on political, public and literary sources of narratives and identities for Europe, as of yet there was no systematic attempt to determine whether the scholarly field of EU Studies itself is also complicit in engaging in the politics of narratives and identities.

The idea for this project was born out of reflections on a certain puzzle encountered in the body of EU Studies literature. As a way of presenting this puzzle, the reader is asked to imagine, for a moment, a citizen of some European country who wants to get a better grasp on European politics. This citizen has, by now, lost trust in traditional and social media sources. He has come to a conclusion that most people's views on the European Union are largely determined by the type of biased narratives they are exposed to in traditional and social media, as well as in their immediate environments. The citizen has also come to a troubling realization that these narratives are usually mutually irreconcilable, not only in their political judgments, but also in the facts presented. Having grown tired of

this shadowy world of fake news and post-truth politics, our citizen is determined to escape it, and to find truly reliable and trustworthy information about the European Union. The natural course of action for this knowledge-thirsty citizen is to turn to the academic literature on the subject-matter. And so, he does. Resolute to get to the bottom of the present political issues, he firsts wants to find out how it all started: why, how and with what consequences has the European polity come into being in the postwar period? And who was this man, Jean Monnet, who is so often credited as the founding father of the EU?

Unfortunately, after all his reading and studying, our citizen has grown even more troubled. He did not gain the knowledge he had sought. Instead he has encountered dozens of exciting and detailed stories about Jean Monnet and his role in the founding of the European Community, but – ant this is the puzzle - these stories were so radically different that they had to be judged as mutually contradictory. To the great astonishment of our citizen, the images of Monnet constructed in the academic narratives are so sharply different and mutually antagonistic that they simply cannot be referring to the same historical actor. The citizen was deeply puzzled by the fact that esteemed EU Studies scholars show irreconcilable differences when it comes to describing the key facts of Monnet's life and the key tenets of his political programme. And so, our citizen has nothing else left to do except wonder whether his academic sources are simply too poorly informed on their subject-matter to agree on basic historical realities, or whether there is some other driving force, besides the search for historical truth, that makes scholars disagree so sharply on what really has happened during the yearly years of European integration.

This is the academic puzzle. How can we explain such a sharp level of heterogeneity in the contemporary academic historiography of Jean Monnet? The content of the Monnet stories told by EU scholars, and their heterogeneity, will be explored in detail in the pages below. For now, it will suffice to say that the puzzle encountered in the pages of EU Studies literature stimulated a reflection

on broader questions pertaining to the political nature of academic works dealing with the origins of the European Union. In other words, the varying imagery of Jean Monnet in contemporary EU scholarship suggested that it might be reasonable to read the scholarly accounts of the EU as political narratives for the EU. And if such a reading proved to be productive, then we might well learn something important about the role of the academy in the politics of European identity. For, as it was argued in the pages above, political narratives function as carriers of political identities. If it is true that the period of political crisis in Europe has brought about a new intensity to the quest for European identity and European narratives, then perhaps the images of Monnet - the so-called *Father of Europe* - produced by EU Scholars in their narratives, could also be read as symbolic forms for competing projects of European identity?

Relevance

Given the popularity of the idea that scholars were instrumental in the construction of nation-states (Foucault, 1970, 1991) and national identities (Hobsbawm, 1996), it is surprising that so little academic attention has been paid to the reading of academic narratives *of* the EU as political narratives *for* the EU[1].

That such a reflection is necessary is also made evident by the provisions of financial support from the Commission for research that would "develop ideas on how the dialogue between European citizens can be strengthened in the light of the different memories and how a shared view on the past, present and future of Europe can emerge" (European Commission, 2009). A particularly telling reaction to this funding program came from Ann Rigney (2012, pp. 608-609) who argued that, while humanities scholars are rightfully protective of their independence, the new political situation ("resurgent right-wing nationalism",

[1] For exceptions, see Mudge and Vouchez (2012), as well as Klinke (2014).

"growing immigrant minorities", "democratic deficit") calls for their active engagement in the production of new European narratives. Also, worth mentioning in this context is the Jean Monnet Programme, a European Commission initiative that funds and stimulates "teaching, research and reflection on European integration at higher education institutions throughout the world". As part of this programme, the Commission also funds Jean Monnet Chairs and Jean Monnet teaching modules. Critical voices, including Jean Monnet Professors themselves (Wallace, 2009), have raised concerns about the political nature of this program, and the blurred border between analysis and advocacy in EU Studies. Such concerns seem all the more weighted when read against the background of a 2009 speech by the EU Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Youth who hailed Jean Monnet professors as 'ambassadors of European integration'.

Such examples of the interconnection between the European political field and EU studies substantiate the need for a systematic investigation of academic discourse as a distinctive site of European identity projects. This monograph is meant as an attempt to fill this academic void by tackling in detail the question of the relationship between the politics of European identity and the academic study of the European Union.

Playing Field

The relationship between EU politics and EU Studies has received its fair share of academic attention. The interest is double-edged. On the one hand, there are works that investigate the degree to which EU decision-making is guided by the ideas shaped in EU studies (e.g. Jonathan White's (2003) inquiry of the influence of the neo-functionalists on the Walter Hallstein commission). On the other hand, there are works in the sociology of knowledge tradition that look at the political agendas of European integration as an extra-academic source of influence on the contents of scholarly production (e.g. Stuart Woolf's (2003) inquiry of the political motives of EU's historians).

EU Studies is often perceived as a field with a weak disciplinary structure, a relatively weak disciplinary autonomy, and close interconnections with political activity. Stephanie Lee Mudge and Antoine Vauchez (2012, p. 451) acutely observe that "those who participate in the construction of theories of Europe are often invested in multiple sorts of professional arenas - academe; national governments, parties, and politics; international organizations and financial institutions; and European political and technocratic careers". As the argument goes, this conjuncture results in weak incentives for producing knowledge about EU for the sake of knowledge, and high incentives for producing knowledge that can be useful politically. Now, Mudge and Vauchez argue that historically EU scholars have been successful in this second role, and that such crucial political redefinitions of Europe as a "Community of Law" and later as a "Single Market" were scholarly inventions. Another important observation is that "European academic flora […] exhibit an unusually large nonacademic presence" (Mudge and Vauchez, 2012, p. 461), meaning that entry control is weakly regulated in the field of EU studies.[2]

My research questions are motivated by an interest in both dimensions of the scholarly-political nexus: the impact of EU studies on the European political field, and the impact of the European political field on EU studies. But they are also narrowed down and delimited by a specific focus on European identity and European narratives. I share White's (2003, p.1) premise that the "relationship between scholarly theory and its subject matter is dialectical" (White, 2003, p. 1). That is to say that the relation of EU Studies to European political field is both active and passive. In this study, I am directly interested in the passive element, namely the question of whether and how the field of EU studies internalizes the contemporary battles fought in the European political field over Europe's

[2] The dialectical relationship between the European political field and EU studies has recently been covered in a 2015 *European Integration Journal* special issue 'Making Europe: The Sociology Knowledge Meets European Integration'.

political identity. However, what makes such an investigation relevant is a potential feedback relationship. The study is grounded in an understanding that, due to its unique position vis-a-vis the European political field, the field of EU studies exercises a profound influence on the political agendas of the EU and on the very definition of what Europe is. In this respect, I share the claim made by Mudge and Vauchez (2012, p. 456) who view "the intersection of the political and scholarly as the key site of Europe's construction".

By extension, can it also be argued that the intersection of the political and the scholarly is a key site for the construction of European identity? And if so, what is the specific relationship between the politics of European identity (*Europe's political field*) and the scholarly debates over the origins of the European Union (*Europe's academic field*)? These are the questions of the monograph.

The questions are new and old at the same time. In what was a path-breaking article for the emerging field of European narrative studies, Klaus Eder (2009) has shown that EU represents a completely different environment as compared to national spaces of communication. In Eder's view, the relationship between European political field, European narratives and the formation of European identity is yet to be scrutinized. Eder's observation on the lack of systematic research on this matter applies even more so to our understanding (or lack of it thereof) of the role scholarly discourse plays in advancing politically informed origins stories and identity projects. Following Eder's (2009, 2011) redefinition of the European identity concept, I will attempt to elucidate the relationship between the academic study of the European Union (EU Studies, European studies, European integration studies) and the conflict-ridden quest for European identity emanating from Europe's political field.

However, while this relationship is clearly lacking in-depth examinations, scholars have, of course, offered general reflections on the problem. There are two

main currents of thought on this relationship. We will call the two positions the 'Handmaiden' position, and the 'Pure knowledge' position.

The 'Handmaiden' position claims - in terms that can be more or less straightforward - that the field of EU studies performs a handmaiden role to the agendas and identities advanced by EU institutions. The entire academic field is often reduced to this handmaiden role:

"Treating academic discourse as a privileged - more or less reliable - discursive source would obscure the - often unconscious - 'complicity' between mainstream (European) politics and academia, two discursive domains which, in a typically modernist fashion, are interimplicated in the formulation and reproduction of a particular standpoint vis-a-vis European identity" (Stavrakakis, 2005, p. 81).

The same argumentation reduces EU historiography to an ideology that "serves to legitimate current European policies" (Mitterauer, 2006), or an attempt - orchestrated by the Commission - to counteract the hegemony of national histories and to tackle the emotive deficit of EU's symbolic appeal (Shore, 2000; Wolf, 2003; Calligaro, 2015). The critical argument is repeatedly made in numerous sources critical of the alleged alliance between EU politics and EU studies/EU historiography (McGowan, 2009; Heffernan, 1998; Calhoun, 2003). For Calhoun (2003), European Studies should be seen as 'an ideological-pedagogical project' that supports 'a European self-understanding supportive of the EU'. Klinke (2014) discusses the "intellectual homogeneity in European Studies" which conforms to the hegemonic discourse underlying EU policy. Klinke, therefore, proposes to think of EU Studies as a soft power tool of the European Union. The critique is summarized by Giandomenico Majone who claims that most EU scholars "are not detached observers, but convinced supporters of European integration" (Majone, 2009, p. 2-3).

The ‘Pure knowledge’ position is diametrically opposite to the ‘Handmaiden’ position. This position, which is usually implicit, divorces the academic field from any role it could possibly play in identity construction or European politics in general. The field’s relationship vis-a-vis European politics is purely scientific: the objective is “the development of testable hypotheses and theoretical causal claims” (Lynggaard, Löffgren and Manners, 2015 p. 8). No intended feedback impacts on the political field are acknowledged. This is the implicit position in much of the mainstream political science literature on European integration. Manners (2006) characterizes this literature as an attempt to impose ‘normal science’ over EU studies. To consolidate the separation of this ‘normal science’ from political demands, EU studies scholars are encouraged to avoid messier questions like ‘what is Europe?’ (Manners, 2003, p. 72), and messier problems such as the “contestations over meaning and identity, disintegrative and fragmentary political trends, and the existence of multiple perspectives on the important issues of the day” (Rumford, 2008, p. 23). The ‘Pure knowledge’ position takes a related, yet somewhat different form in the humanities. Here it is often argued that students of the EU are self-reflective enough to take precautions against producing anything akin to the master-narratives produced for the purposes of nationalism by their colleague predecessors, especially when “post-colonial studies of all kinds” are carefully monitoring the field of EU studies against any signs of Eurocentristic tendencies (Kaiser, 2011b). To sum up, while our postmodern age no longer believes that social scientists and historians can be completely immune from political influences, the ‘Pure knowledge’ position concedes very little of this immunity.

This - I surmise - is the playing field. On the one hand, we have the ‘Pure knowledge’ approach which divorces sound scholarship from the concerns of European identity. On the other hand, we have a critical approach which has it that most of what passes as the production of impartial knowledge about the EU is actually a disguised form of advocacy for the EU, and for European identity in the form it is imposed from the Union’s political centre.

Research Question, Thesis and Propositions

While both the 'Handmaiden' and the 'Pure knowledge' positions have their merits, and offer valuable insights into the structure of motives that are driving the academic study of the EU, I believe that both are too simplistic to be of value in grasping the essence of our problem in its complexity. Both positions presuppose a unity of purpose, whereas I want to argue that it is conflict, rather than unity, that is at the core of the field's relation to the politics of European identity. In other words, while I do subscribe to the politicization thesis, I argue that the top-down impact of 'Brussels' on the academic accounts of the EU is overestimated, and a more complex structure of Europe's political field – and the politics of European identity – needs to be acknowledged.[3]

Hence, this is the main **research question** of the monograph:

What is the specific relationship between the contemporary politics of European identity and the scholarly debates over the history and trajectory of the European Union, expressed in competing origin narratives of the European Union?

As a way of answering the research question, I defend the following **thesis**:

I argue that different scholarly accounts of EU's origins constitute a battlefield of competing projects for European identity, and that this battlefield reflects the key contemporary conflicts and ambiguities of the European political field: the ambiguity of economic paradigm, the ambiguity of sovereignty, the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity.

[3] The meaning of the two concepts – 'European identity politics' and 'European political field' will be elaborated and clarified in parts One, Two, and Three of the monograph.

Each of these political ambiguities - or cleavages - has produced at least two influential political positions with a corresponding framework for European identity:

- The ambiguity of economic paradigm represents the conflict between 'Social Europe' and 'Economic Europe'.
- The ambiguity of sovereignty represents the competition between federalism, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism as the organizing principles of EU governance.
- The ambiguity of political method represents the tension between visions of European technocracy and European democracy.
- The ambiguity of ethnicity and belonging represents the conflict between nationalism, post-nationalism and euro-nationalism as alternative visions competing over EU's political stance vis-à-vis different national identities and their possible displacement.

Some of these identity frameworks may correspond to the official standpoint of the EU, and others may not. That is beside the point. The point is precisely that it is not the singular top-down engineering influence of EU's political center, but rather the conflict-ridden structure of the European political field that explains the ideological and moral contents of political narratives produced by EU scholars.

The thesis is established by way of advancing and defending five propositions:

1. **European identity is multiple, it is expressed in competing identity narratives, and its origins lie in the social, political, economic, and cultural complexity of the European polity**. Unlike singular national identities, Eu-

ropean identity is expressed in a battlefield of competing and mutually-antithetical narratives which are reflective of the underlying social relationships and power dynamics of the European polity. This new sociological understanding of the European identity concept is developed in the first part of the study by drawing from the research program that has been variously labeled as 'Many Europes', 'European imaginaries', 'European multiplicity' and 'Narrative network'.

2. **The academic field of EU studies is a site of European identity politics, understood as a communicative battlefield between competing and mutually-antithetical narratives which are reflective of the underlying social relationships and power dynamics of the European political field**. In other words, I argue that the sociological-pluralistic interpretation of European identity applies not only to political, public or literary discourses, but to academic discourses as well. More than that, I argue that the 'Many Europes' approach (elaborated in part One) is not only justified, but also explanatorily superior to the other two dominant accounts ('Handmaiden' and 'Pure knowledge') of the relationship between the politics of European identity and the academic production of EU Studies scholars.

3. **Different and mutually-antithetical scholarly accounts of EU's origins reflect the key contemporary conflicts and ambiguities of the European political field: the ambiguity of economic paradigm, the ambiguity of sovereignty, the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity.** The four ambiguities are derived from David Marquand's (2011) account of the contemporary European debate in his 'The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe'. These specific ambiguities are employed as an operationalization of general terms such as "boundaries", "cleavages", "underlying structure" and "power dynamics" that are used – in the sociological theory of European identity - to describe the complex struc-

tural basis of the politics of European identity. The third proposition is a specification of the second proposition. The defense of both of these propositions rests on the following two propositions.

4. **The representations of Jean Monnet advanced in the scholarly discourse offer a suitable case for a study of the above proposition.** Jean Monnet has been described as "a center piece of the EC's ambitions to forge something like a European identity, the central father-figure around which a communal symbolic law was constructed" (Kølvraa, 2012b, p. 84), and as one of the few emotionally charged symbols of the European project. Furthermore, Monnet is remembered not only as a 'Founding father' of the European Union, but also as an important figure in the development of European integration scholarship. Drawing from the perspectives developed in collective memory studies (Schwartz, 1985), it is reasonably safe to predict that academic narratives on the EU will tend to be most politically motivated and politically biased when representing a figure as symbolically charged and mythologized as Jean Monnet. That is why the scholarly representations of Jean Monnet offer a suiting case for an investigation of the relationship between the academic study of the European Union and the constructions of a European identity.

5. **The historical and theoretical literature on the EU has produced a rich variety of competing and irreconcilable images of Monnet, and the pattern of this variety is shaped by the embeddedness of respective scholarly narratives in the structure of EU's key identity divisions as it was described in the third proposition.** That is to say that disagreements over Monnet's historical image are shaped by presentist political concerns, and most of the variation between the different representations can be accounted for by referring to political conflict over one or several of the four ambiguities: the ambiguity of economic paradigm, the ambiguity of sovereignty, the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity. This proposition is tested and defended by means of a narrativist analysis of

Jean Monnet stories recounted in academic works belonging to historical and theoretical body of literature on European integration.

Case Study

With the last two propositions, we zoomed in on the empirical subject-matter of this monograph: the representations of Jean Monnet in historical narratives told by EU Studies scholars. While it is perhaps premature to talk of 'Monnet studies' as a distinctive field of study, the figure of Jean Monnet has commanded great academic interest. Monnet is almost universally recognized for having played an important role in both conceptualizing and putting into action - with the Schumann Declaration and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community - the idea of European integration in the years after WWII. It is also a well described fact that, after his death in 1979, Monnet's image as a political hero and a 'Founding father' became one of the main building blocks in the Commission's new plan to attract mass support for European integration by way of creating emotionally charged symbols and narratives. This much can be said without taking a side in the debates on who Jean Monnet really was, what he aimed for, what he accomplished, and how he influenced the European polity as it is today.

Now, academic interest in Monnet can be either primary (claims about Monnet), or secondary (claims about claims about Monnet). Academic works in the first category constitute the subject-matter of this study: these are stories told by students of the EU that include accounts of Jean Monnet and his impact on the European project. Academic works in the second category form part of the academic discussion which I am intervening into. Claims about claims about Monnet typically refer to the use of his image in the production of 'political myths'. However, as we learn from Chistoffer Kølvraa (2010, p. 9), these secondary claims can also be of two very different kinds: they can either attack the "myth" of Monnet and his great deeds on the grounds that it does not correspond to

"historical reality" (*positivistic judgement*), or they can be built on an understanding that "what is interesting about myth is not its relationship to "fact," but the function it serves for the community which recounts it" (*sociological understanding*).

Examples of *positivist judgement* include Chris Shore's (2000) attack on EU officials who would overestimate the historical importance of figures like Monnet, Spaak, Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer at the expense of the "leaders of the resistance or the wartime Allies", or Alan Milward's revisionist historiography in which he downplayed most of the personality-focused historical accounts of EU origins as politically motivated and historiographically sub-standard "hagiographies" (Milward, 2000, p. 318). A more recent example is a debate in the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, wherein Yannis Karagiannis (2016) used and interpreted historical data in an attempt to falsify Constantin Chira-Pascanut's (2014) proposition that Monnet's ideas and actions had been a necessary condition for the Schuman declaration of 1950. Karagiannis labours to show that Chira-Pascanut's claims about Monnet should be read as attempts to construct a popular hero for the nascent euro-mythology.

Examples of *sociological understanding* include the analysis (sometimes, *psychoanalysis*) of the linguistic ways in which EU Commissioners invoke the memory of Monnet - who is presented as an infallible 'Founding father' to whom Europeans owe their peace and prosperity - to legitimate contemporary EU policies and values (Petterson and Hellstro□m, 2003; Kølvraa, 2012a). Another example is Kølvraa (2012b) and Kaiser's (2001a) investigations of identity construction in the Jean Monnet House in Houjarray, France (a museum financed by the European Parliament). The questions of these authors are sociological, not historical: they are not interested in the historical reality of postwar European integration *per se*, and thus refuse to contribute to either constructing or debunking of the Founding fathers story. Their interest lies in the instrumental function of founder stories in the building of communal identities.

Both approaches offer important insights into the workings of EU's political attempt at a top-down sedimentation of European identity, yet therein also lies the most important limitation of the existing secondary literature on Monnet. Both approaches - positivist myth-busting and sociological myth-analyzing - have as of yet been exclusively focused on 'Monnet myth' conceived singularly. What this means is that both approaches share an implicit premise that the only important source of political influence on claims about Monnet is located in the official political center of the EU. This means, therefore, that claims about *academic* claims about Monnet typically reinforce the "Handmaiden" interpretation of EU studies.[4]

What I intend to do is address this limitation by investigating the many faces of Jean Monnet produced in what I see as a highly competitive and conflict-ridden field of EU studies, rather than just the one sterile face of Monnet created in the official discourse of the EU and reproduced in some of the academic works, and most semi-official textbooks. Following the principle of *sociological understanding* as opposed to *positivistic judgement* (Pūras, 2014, p. 74-75), our interest will lie not in the truth value of the narratives under investigation, but in their relationship vis-à-vis the political community. If we intend to arrive at a better understanding of European identity politics and the role of the academy in it, it is far less important to inspect the scholarly narratives for the historiograhpical sins of anachronism, misinterpretation, oversimplification and neglect of context (Stocking, 1965), than it is to understand the political context underpinning those sins.

The monograph is not only an argument about the politicization of EU studies, but also about the specific nature of European identity. In essence, I am arguing

[4] The handmaiden role can also take explicit forms. For instance, while questioning the historical validity of claims that overemphasize the importance of Monnet's ideas and actions in the causal mechanisms behind the origins of the European Coal and Steel Community, Karagiannis (2016, p 247) advocates the use of Monnet as an effective symbol in the official euro-mythology: "As a matter of policy, I think that Jean Monnet is as good a hero as we can find - at least as long as Adenauer, Blum and Schuman are not forgotten".

against what has been - in EU identity studies - a dominant focus on the official identity politics of 'Brussels', a focus which had led to an overestimation of the capacity of the political center to function as monopolistic 'regulator of meaning' (Sonntag, 2011) in a complex polity like the EU, and to the underestimation of other regulators of political meanings which may support, challenge or modify the official identity project.

It must be stressed, however, that the set of authors, whose portrayals of Monnet are analyzed in this paper, is not meant to cover all the influential conceptions articulated in the field of EU studies. Some major authors like Andrew Moravcsik and Craig Parsons are absent from this analysis, and some lesser-known theses are included. Furthermore, I embrace the Mudge and Vauchez's (2012) definition of EU studies as a weak field with blurry boundaries that includes the works of both credentialed academics and self-understood scholars. No privileged treatment is offered to the reputed giants of European integration theory or historiography, whose works are analyzed on the same terms as works in the tradition of popular-academic genre. For, as I will argue, both genres can be equally prone to painting Monnet in the colors of specific agendas. The set of scholars was constructed to include examples of all the positions relevant to the contemporary European debate and its key dividing lines. However, I also hold the set of included positions to be reflective of the general power dynamic inherent to EU Studies. The set of authors analyzed in this monograph includes historians, political scientists, and sociologists. What is common to all the works analyzed is that all of them are concerned with the macro dimension of European integration. These works are all broad academic reflections on the general state of the Union, its trajectory, and the historical roots of the Union's current situation.

Methodological Approach

I approach the scholarly works by way of a narrative analysis that is informed by a double definition of political narrative. One the one hand, a political narrative is an account of the past with a moral conclusion for the future (White, 1980, pp. 24–26), a moral story with interrelated cosmogenic and eschatological properties (Kølvraa, 2016). On the other hand, a technical-linguistic definition holds a narrative to simply be a 'choice of specific linguistic technique to report past events' (Labov, 1997, p. 395). Combining these two definitions, we come to an understanding of a political narrative as a text by a given narrator who begins to tell a story with the prior knowledge of how it is going to culminate, and then devices a plot that structures past events in such a way as to accomplish this end. William Labov (2006) uses a notion of *narrative pre-construction* to describe this process.

Political narratives of (and for) political communities typically have the same "fundamental schema of beginning (prior state) – middle (event) – ending (new state)" (Kølvraa, 2016). The perceived character of the 'prior state' and the 'event', as well as the happenings leading from the 'prior state' to the 'event', depend on the narrator's moral evaluation of the 'new state', or the present. This is why, in narratives, textual emplotment becomes inseparable from political meaning: "it is the identity of the story [the plot] that makes the identity of the character' (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 147).

What I am going to do is investigate the emplotment techniques of authors in the field EU studies who use Monnet as a key figure in their accounts of the EU, typically 'playing' him as the main protagonist in the 'event' (typically, but not necessarily, the Schuman Plan or the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community) that transformed the 'prior state' into the 'new state' (the European Union as we know it today). The method of narrative analysis will uncover how

these authors select, arrange and interpret events to arrive at what is usually presented as an impartial description of what the EU is today, and of the direction the European polity is going. The point of this exercise is to show that the seemingly chaotic plurality of the Monnet narratives is shaped by and embedded in the structure of the European political field.

Structure

The structure of this monograph derives from the structure of the five propositions. The first part of the study explores the new wave of pluralistic and sociological thinking about European identity, and the politics of European identity. Reviewing the works of Klaus Eder, Albrecht Sonntag, William Biebuyck, Ian Manners, Chris Rumford, Didem Buhari-Gulmez, Anne Bostanci, Gerard Delanty, and others, I explain a recent shift in the theoretical understanding of the European identity concept. While the old theory of European identity was modeled on nationalism studies and perceived European identity in terms of a top-down sedimentation of centrally constructed political symbols, the new theory conceptualizes European identity in fluid, plural and processual terms. What emerges from this conceptualization is the view of *European identity* as *European identity politics*, a process in the making in which different European narratives compete against each other, reflecting and reinforcing the complex underlying power structure of the European political field in which the identity battles are embedded. The first part also deals with conceptual elucidation: because the new wave of thinking about European identity has ascribed a new meaning to the concept of identity, the first part is concluded with a careful differentiation between the different uses of the word 'identity' throughout the rest of the monograph. I also explain why I reject, for the purposes of this monograph, the commonplace analytical distinction between the concept of 'European identity' and 'European Union identity'.

The second part grounds the second proposition of the monograph. Here I argue that the new wave of thinking about European identity could also shed light on our understanding of the role of EU scholarship in reflecting and reinforcing competing European identity projects. I introduce the concepts of *intrafield* analysis and *interfield* analysis to differentiate my approach from scholars in the 'Many Europes' research program who have looked at the academy as a distinct source of European identity, but who have not analyzed differences that are internal to the field of EU Studies. Only an *intrafield* approach can grasp the embeddedness of the scholarly discourse in the conflict-ridden politics of European identity. The objectives of the monograph are situated in the broader academic discussion, and differentiated from competing 'Handmaiden' and 'Pure knowledge' positions.

In the third part I clarify and specify the meaning of the term 'European political field' as it is used in this monograph. This specific meaning is derived from British philosopher David Marquand who explains the great issues of European politics by reference to a number of 'great ambiguities' which are responsible for the divisions that cleave the European polity. For the purposes of this monograph, I focus on four ambiguities, namely the ambiguity of economic paradigm, the ambiguity of sovereignty, the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity. These ambiguities serve as an operationalized meaning of Europe's dynamic power structure against which I later analyze the political narratives constructed by EU scholars.

Before undertaking this analysis in the fifth part, the fourth part of the monograph offers some background information on Jean Monnet and his reputation. Such contextual backgrounding is necessary to explain why Jean Monnet stories told by EU Studies scholars constitute a suitable case for a study of the embeddedness of scholarly narratives in the structure of European political field. I draw on insights from diverse fields (European history, sociology of heroes, historiography of science, etc.) to explain why Monnet's privileged status in European

political imagination renders his image susceptible to manipulation by authors who are invested in European narratives.

Finally, in the fifth part of the thesis I employ the method of narrative analysis to interpret different Monnet stories told by EU Studies scholars as political narratives informed by specific political standpoints vis-a-vis the four ambiguities. I focus on the academic works of Trygve Ugland, Michael Burgess, Giandomenico Majone, John Gillingham, Richard Swedberg, Catherine Guisan, Alan S. Milward, Christopher Booker and Richard North, Wolfgang Wessels, Martin Holland, Alessandro Isoni, Hungdah Su, Philomena Murray, Francois Fontaine, Robert Marjolin, Luciano Levi, and others.

PART I. EUROPEAN NARRATIVES: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

The first proposition of this monograph states that **European identity is multiple, it is expressed in competing identity narratives, and its origins lie in the social, political, economic, and cultural complexity of the European polity**. In essence, the first proposition summarizes the central idea behind the new wave of thinking about European identity. To understand this new focus on *multiplicity* and *social embeddedness* of European identity, we first must look at an earlier mode of thinking and its shortcomings.

1.1. Away with Official Symbols

One of the most important recent developments in the studies of European Identity has been a revolt against official EU symbols, and their reception as measured in identification surveys, as the essential subject-matter for European identity research (Eder, 2009; Stravrakakis, 2005, Sonntag, 2011). Scholars have been increasingly doubtful whether such symbols as the European flag, anthem, motto, buildings and the Euro coins are the only, or the most meaningful, carriers of European identity. On the contrary. Sonntag (2011), for instance, argues that the use of political symbolism by the EU institutions might have even had a counterproductive impact on the dispositions of the European citizens. This requires some contextual backgrounding.

Based on the success of the nationalist model, the top-down identity politics of the EU institutions were supposed, in the expectations of certain political, cultural, and academic elites, to "lead to the formation of overarching political loyalties and political identifications" (Theiler, 2005). However, while the communication environment of the nineteenth century was hospitable to suchlike con-

structions of national identities, this is not the case in the contemporary environment of the EU. In the nation-state model, in many cases the political center could function as the hegemonic 'regulator of meaning', that is, an actor who is perceived as being authorized to impose legitimate interpretation on the questions important to the political community (Braud, 1996). This circumstance was crucial in sedimenting national symbols and meanings. The European symbols, however, face a very different communication environment characterized by a multitude of these 'regulators of meaning' (Sonntag, 2011, p. 119):

The sheer plurality - if not shrill cacophony - of the array of mass media, now doubled by unchained an aggressive blogosphere where everybody becomes a 'regulator of meaning' in their own right, no longer allows for the steady drip-drip of sedimentation […] Launching, sustaining and patiently sedimenting any political symbol in this new environment is a difficult, if not impossible, endeavor.

In fact, Sonntag argues that forceful attempts to impose the centrally produced European symbols must often be counterproductive. Because of past European experiences of collectivism that has led to a strengthened sense of awareness and reflexivity, many 'regulators of meaning' now tend to challenge the symbols transmitted by the EU as 'propaganda' (Sonntag, 2011, p. 119). Symbols are considered too direct and straightforward as a form of identity transmission to be effective in shaping popular attitudes. This helps explain the stable results of the predominant research program in European identity studies: "the substantive result of the research on identification with symbolic representations of European political institutions is that they continuously show a weak sense of belonging with regard to Europe, much less than exists in the nation-state" (Eder, 2009).

Do the low levels of identification with the European symbols point to the weakness of the collective identity of the Europeans? In many ways, this is a legitimate conclusion. However, what Eder and other authors are now arguing is that this may altogether be a wrong way to think about European identity, because it is an entirely different beast as compared to national identities. The old way of thinking, and measuring, European identity derives from too direct an analogy between the national identities and the European identity, as well as their respective formation processes. According to Klaus Eder, "the questions asked in these [Eurobarometer] surveys seem to refer to a reality that does not coincide with the reality mediating the social relations of the Europeans" (Eder, 2011, p. 41).

If we want to understand European identity, Eder (2009. p. 433) argues, we should look at the expanding space of communication in the EU and the proliferation of European stories, which are told *by* storytellers other than the official EU institutions, and which are not necessarily *about* the EU political institutions. These are qualitative changes that do not reflect in the poor results of the so-called identification surveys. Explaining why the results of those surveys might be a poor indicator of people's true levels of identification with Europe, Eder argues that "the social space that links the Europeans with each other might be mediated by different symbols and narratives than those we use to describe the national social space" (Eder, 2011, 41).

In other words, Eder wants the students of European identity to put aside, at least for a while, the European flag, European anthem, and such empirical problems like how Europeans respond when asked to tell the date and explain the significance of Europe Day. Instead we should focus on how Europeans communicate outside the frames of official EU discourse and EU's sterile official symbolic universe. In this new wave of thinking about European identity, most important is the focus on organically emerging European meanings in multiple sites of meaning production. This is a key feature in the emerging research program on European identity.

The research program has been variously labeled as 'European Multiplicity', 'Many Europes' 'Many Europes', 'European Imaginaries' and 'Narrative Network'. Reacting to the recent proliferation of works in this vein, Rumford and Buhari-Gulmez (2014, p. 3) described the 'Many Europes' program as the 'hottest' and trendiest subfield in contemporary European studies. Let us take a closer look at the key tenets of this program and how it can add to our understanding of identity formation processes in the European continent.

1.2. How Many Europes?

"Europe is in many ways a profoundly unknown phenomenon", writes Walker (2000). Rumford adds that 'Europe' has become too complex and too large a phenomenon to be grasped in conventional ways: "the transformations which are currently taking place are of nature that cannot be fully comprehended by 'normal social science'" (Rumford, 2008, p. 26). What is meant by this is that the structure of EU's boundaries, social relationships and cleavages is far more complex than that of the nation-state (to the reality of which most of the social science perspectives are fine-tuned). The structure of EUropean interests and EUropean decision making process is likewise infinitely more complex. And so is the European structure of the sources of meaning, as we have learned from Sonntag (2011). It follows from these observations that it would be unwise to expect anything akin to an easy sedimentation of a universally accepted European collective identity in a singular form. On the contrary, according to Eder, "national identity constructions are the last instance of a collective identity with a clear path prescription, the making of nation-states." But, in that case, what kind of form can European identity take?

Now, complexity and uncertainty can only be grasped by employing perspectives that are tolerant of fuzzy phenomena. Because "collective identities vary with the structure of the system of indirect social relations" (Eder, 2009, p. 430) and because the meaning-regulatory powers of the political center are much

weaker in a system like the EU, *European identity is necessarily multiple, fuzzy, complex and reflective of the complex social relations and cleavages that order the European system*. This is a crucial tenet of the research program:

- *European identity is multiple and its origins lie in the social complexity of the European system.*

Eder offers a minimalist definition of identity that fits the objectives of the *European multiplicity* research program: "collective identities emerge in processes of identifying and not identifying, and even anti-identifying, with something that is defined in the course of these processes". But where do these processes of identification *happen*? What constitutes the empirics of the 'European multiplicity' research program? Where does the politics of European identity happen? It is to these questions that we now turn.

1.3. Narratives, Discourses, Imaginaries

What exactly do authors mean when they discuss the "discoursive production of Europe" (Biebuyck, 2009, p. 292)? Let us look at some of the examples given by scholars working in this paradigm. Rumford and Buhari-Gulmez urge a departure from, in their view, a *singular Europe* produced in political science dominated European Integration studies, and embrace what they call the *multiplicity of Europe*. One example given by the authors is the conflict between the narrative of an 'elitist-metacultural Europe' and the narrative of a 'nationalist-populist Europe'. Another example is Biebuyck and Rumford's (2012) description of Europe's multiplicity in terms of the Bourdieun field concept. In their view, different European imageries emanate from the distinct fields of thinking and acting, such as the political science of EU studies, the genre of popular-academic writing on EU politics, and the discourse of popular euro-scepticism. The first field (political science) imagines Europe to be a "bundle of institutions, governance

networks and policy processes subject to the 'gold standards' of theoretical parsimony and falsifiability". The second field - the popular-academic writing on EU - imagines Europe to be a "superior form of politics best adapted to an age of globalized markets, human mobility and soft power". The third field - the eurosceptic discourse of the far-right - imagines the EU to be a "remote bureaucratic and capitalist machine that jeopardizes the existence of normal and traditional European ways of life".

Delanty (2009, p. 41-42) distinguishes between different cultural and geopolitical narrative constructions, such as 'Carolingian Europe', 'Mittleuropa', 'post-Western Europe', etc. Eder (2009) chronicles key European stories, such as the supranational narrative (and what Eder calls "the Jean Monnet success story"), post national narrative ("and they will live in peace together forever"), and transnational narrative ("broker Europe"). Eder (2009) also points to the competing narratives of Social Europe vs Neoliberal Europe, Christian Europe vs Secular Europe, etc.

These are some of the different European narratives which – taken together – constitute a competitive communicative battlefield over European identity. The point, as Biebuyck and Rumborf (2012) make clear, however, is not to categorize all the European narratives: "it is not the proliferation of Europe that requires investigation; rather it is the dynamics of Europe's multiplicity". Eder (2009. p. 430) seconds this point: "It is the variation of identities which requires explanation". An explanatory focus vis-à-vis the dynamics and variation of the multiplicity of European identity will be crucial to our endeavors in this monograph.

But how should we go about making sense of this multiplicity? And are we not in danger here of reaffirming Stråth's (2010, p. 13) pessimistic conclusion that, "as a discourse of identity, Europe is so diluted that it means anything and nothing"? Let us hope not. In Eder (2009) we find clear guidelines on how we should

dissect and order the European narrative network with all its multiplicities and complexities:

The debate on European collective identity so far has not been able to establish a systematic link between the forms of collective identity constructions and the networks of social relations in which this process is embedded.

In other words, narrativistic plurality should be classified, ordered and made sense of by way of referring to the underlying structure of Europe's political and social life. A similar research agenda was put forward by Bostanci (2014, p. 14) who claims that "the Europes spoken of or imagined […] arise from social interaction", and that while "the social and political practices that constitute the Union are studied extensively in the field of European studies […] the same does not apply to the cognitive models or imaginaries of Europe" (Bostanci, 2014, p. 16). Or as Biebuyck (2010, p. 165) put it, each of these imaginaries of Europe "must be seen in relation to the different sets of practices and power dynamics within that field". In different ways, Eder, Bostanci, and Biebuyck are advocating the same research focus: European narratives are to be read and studied as the superstructure of European polity's cleavages. This is one of the implications of what Eder describes as a shift from the psychological to the sociological theory of identity.

Hence we have the second and third tenets of the *Many Europes* research program:

- *European identity is expressed through the multiplicity of European narratives.*
- *The multiplicity of European narratives should be studied in terms of the underlying social relationships and power dynamics of the European polity and its constituent fields.*

To simplify, the sociological theory of European identity uncovers the variety of narratives, but is ultimately interested in the structure behind the variety. This also helps clarify the meaning of the concept of 'European identity politics' as it is used in the research question of this monograph. By linking narrative formations to the power dynamic of the European polity, we can uncover the political dimension of each narrative formation, treating it is a normative identity project which carries in itself a specific project of control, a specific political agenda for Europe.

This means that, in our case study, it will be necessary to expound the variety of Jean Monnet images produced by EU scholars, but only as a prerequisite for a much more important task of uncovering the structure of political conflict which functions as the organizing principle behind the apparent chaos of the variety of Monnet stories. By detecting specific identity projects encapsulated in these stories, we will be able to interpret the scholarly representations of Monnet as a site of European identity politics.

These principles build on the notion of an important qualitative difference between the European narrative multiplicity and strong national narratives. National identities are based on strong, exclusive and hegemonic stories with a clear path prescription, the making and the preservation of nation-states. Historically those hegemonic stories had, and continue to have, the central political backing that is strong enough to pacify different social, cultural and political interests competing in the national arena. In the national context, this conjuncture has typically worked to prevent the rise of powerful alternative narratives which could destabilize the communal system of shared meanings and values.

In the European space, on the other hand, we have a multiplicity of "sites in which stories circulate for hegemony of collective identity construction" (Eder, 2009). In the European context, the opposing networks of peoples, interests and ideologies "no longer coincide as they do in the national situation" (Eder, 2009).

And this is what makes European identity so unique, and the study of European narratives so interesting. Because the system is open and hegemony is up for grabs, European identity is actually a politics of European identity, a political battlefield constituted by multiple mutually competing narratives.[5] This battlefield mirrors the complexity of European politics, expressing the competing visions for European political, social, economic or cultural agendas.

In Eder's terminology, the European narratives are "projects of control of the boundaries of 'Europe'" (Eder, 2009, p. 443), or "contested projects to organize the social relations of the Europeans" (Eder, 2011, p. 41). In the Foucauldian terminology of Biebuyck and Rumford (2012), the European imaginaries are discourses that "produce and restrict the meaning of the political […] sites for constructing identity and ordering social relationships".

Before we go into further detail on how such projects of control should be interpreted in terms of the wider political structure, one further tenet should be established, pertaining to the current state of the European identity.

[5] A look at the American example will help clarify this difference between the European space of communication and the national spaces of communication. Students of American collective memory have produced many works on the changing representations of their political heroes, their Washingtons and their Lincolns. From Basler's "Lincoln Legend" (1935) to Peterson's "Abraham Lincoln in American Memory "(1994), numerous students of the Lincoln myth have found it important to chronicle the varieties of this myth. For instance, Peterson reviews the 138-year series of Lincoln histories, biographies, monuments, shrines and icons, and arrives at five principal hero images: "Savior of the Union", "The Great Emancipator", "Man of the People", "The First American", and "The Self-Made Man". Schwartz (1987) does the same with George Washington, and Wood (2004) with Benjamin Franklin. However, whenever American scholars attempt to explain variation between the ways of representing dead heroes, the focus is almost exclusively diachronic: why do different generations of American intellectuals have different perceptions of Abraham Lincoln, and which historical developments have brought about these intergenerational changes in collective perception (Schwartz, 2005)? A synchronically focused investigation of Lincoln's images would most likely be a futile exercise, because same-generation Americans typically have a relatively uniform collective perception of Lincoln, because that perception is controlled by a central hegemonic narrative of American identity. As it will demonstrated in the following pages of this study, the same does not hold true for the representations of the Founding fathers of the European Union whose reputations are a matter of deep contestation among contemporary authors engaged in historical writing. A synchronically focused investigation of Jean Monnet's images is, therefore, possible, and will be attempted in the last part of this monograph.

1.4. Identity as a Formation in Process

Now, the emphasis on the words 'project', 'formation', and 'processes' - when talking about European identity - is not accidental in this new wave of thinking about the subject. The subject-matter of this research program (and this monograph) is not a European collective identity as a fixed reality, but a European identity as a formation in process. European identity "is a process much more than it is a thing", writes Cerutti (2011, 8). Eder (2006, 39) explains that identity as a formation may result in a "collective identity as a collectively self-identified people". But it also may not. A European demos, or a "self-reflective and politically conscious people with a normative identity of itself as a sovereign," is only a potential and not very realistic outcome of the politics of European identity. But the question whether this outcome is feasible or not is not our primary concern here, nor is it what is most interesting about the European identity. Unlike the psychological theory of identity which is interested in measuring popular 'identifications with Europe', the sociological theory of identity explores the socially embedded narratives that compete over the very definition of Europe.

It matters to study European identity politics irrespectively of whether the European demos will one day emerge, or not. More than that, it is precisely when the feeling of community and cohesion is absent that identity becomes most problematic, interesting, and political. As Stråth (2010, p. 20) has it:

Utopian dreams of community, cohesion and holism which are all contained in the concept of identity are mobilized precisely in situations where there is a lack of such feelings […] This means that a European identity cannot be defined in a unanimous way. In a process marked by conflict, various histories are mobilized in order to legitimatise a European identity, the majority with the pretension to represent the true story.

While Eder (2001) at least conceives of the possibility that these processes could one day conclude in the idea of Europeanness that is common to all Europeans, others see the multiple, competitive and inconclusive nature of European identity formation as constitutive, and even positive, feature of the European project. In the words of Biebuyck and Rumford (2012), "multiplicity in and of itself does not allow for a decentring of Europe; rather, multiplicities can combine in various ways to form a collage of Europeanness". For some, the collage-like nature of European identity was formally affirmed with the selection of the official EU motto, 'unity in diversity'. According to Delanty (2009, p. 40-41), the motto signaled the abandonment of "the theme of the unity of the European heritage and an overarching 'European Identity' that transcends the diversity of cultures". Any investigation of European collective memory, argues Delanty, must be receptive to the notion "that there are different concepts of Europe". Now, diversity also means flexibility. And because the European identity is not a 'blocked phenomenon' in the way that national identities are, it is much more sensitive and reactive to political transformations. Eder (2011, p. 48) articulates this point very clearly:

Whether Turkey becomes part of the EU or not affects the meaning of the story of what happened before. This is different to the modern nation state, which can rely upon a story in which further events will not affect the meaning of what unfolded before.

From these observations, we arrive at the fourth and fifth tenets of the "Many Europes" research program:

- *European identity is understood as a process of becoming, rather than a fixed reality. And the possibility of such a reality is but one of many interests that we have in investigating the European narrative network.*

- *The European narrative network is sensitive and reactive to political change.*[6]

1.5. A Note on the Use of the 'Identity' Concept

In the next part of the monograph I will propose the application of these research tenets to the analysis of EU's origin narratives advanced by EU Studies scholars. Before moving forward, however, I would like to conclude this part of the monograph with a brief clarification of the use of the 'identity' concept in the following pages of this study. Because the new wave of thinking about European identity has ascribed a new meaning to the concept of European identity, there is a risk of conceptual confusion. Eder (2009) deals with this problem head on. To avoid confusion, Eder (2009. p. 435) explains, we need to be careful about keeping an analytical distance between normative and sociological ways of thinking and writing about European identity. Normative discourses on European identity draw moral boundaries regarding what they imagine Europe is or should be like, they are "explicit justifications of the boundaries of a network of social relations" (p. 435). Concurring with Eder, I take normative discourses on European political identity to be part of the phenomenon that needs to be explained from the sociological perspective. The sociological use of the term 'European identity' redefines it as a 'European multiplicity', a political battlefield between various European narratives, including discourses that explicitly draw moral horizons for the collective identity of the European people. To avoid unnecessary confusion, I will preferentially use the term 'European identity' when using it in a sociological fashion, and 'normative identity project' when referring to texts that advance explicitly or implicitly normative agendas for Europe.

In almost all cases, these 'normative identity projects' are projects for European *political* identity. They are political narratives that establish moral horizons for Europe's political organization with varying degrees of support, or opposition,

[6] One of the central themes of this monograph is how the present dynamic of emerging European narratives was shaped by the major political and economic crises that have befallen the European Union in the 2000's and 2010's.

to the institutions of the European Union in that organization. Therefore, in the pages below, I do not differentiate between the concept of 'European identity' and the concept of 'European Union identity'. The analytical difference between these two concepts is rendered redundant by the pluralistic definition of European identity which encompasses a variety of European narratives irrespectively of their political stance towards EU institutions and their workings.

PART II. EUROPEAN IDENTITY: WHAT ROLE FOR THE SCHOLARS?

In the preceding pages, I elaborated on the proposition (*Proposition No. 1*) that European identity is a plural phenomenon *expressed* through European narratives, and *embedded* in the social, political, economic, and cultural complexity of the European polity. The proposition was derived from the sociological wave of thinking about European identity, variously labeled as 'European Multiplicity', 'Many Europes', 'European Imaginaries' and 'Narrative Network'.

Building on this, I will argue that this idea can and should be applied to European narratives produced in the scholarly domain, i.e. the academic field of EU Studies. Here, the second proposition of the monograph emerges: **The academic field of EU Studies is a site of European identity politics.** In other words, I argue that, just like political, public or artistic discourses, the academic discourse can and should be interpreted as an active communicative battlefield between competing and mutually-antithetical political narratives which are reflective of the underlying social relationships and power dynamics of the European political field.

If the defense of this proposition is successful, this would mean a significant contribution to our understanding of the relationship between the academic study of the European Union and the politics of European identity. I would then be able to demonstrate that the 'European multiplicity' thesis sheds more light, when compared to the other two dominant accounts ('Handmaiden' and 'Pure knowledge'), on the relationship between the academic study of the European Union and the political dynamics of the EU.

Here some observant reader could object, however, that other authors have already looked at the academic field of EU studies as a site where a particular

European narrative is produced. Have not we referred, in the preceding pages, to Manners and Whitman (2016) who pointed to the European narrative produced by mainstream EU studies, which defines EU as a neoliberal project and as a state-like system, and which refuses to characterize Europeanization as anything else than a one-way process? Or haven't we referred to Biebuyck and Rumford (2012) who see EU studies as one of the sources of different European imaginaries. In Biebuyck and Rumford's analysis, the academic field of integration/EU studies produces the image of Europe as an unambiguous system of institutions, governance networks and policy processes subject to the methods of social science. According to Biebuyck and Rumford, social scientists see Europe in a strange way which has little resemblance to the Europes imagined in other sites of meaning production. This 'strange way of seeing' that Biebuyck and Rumford describe, is to conceptualize Europe as something that can be broken down into elements or variables whose causal properties can then be tested.

These are examples of the two dominant accounts of the academic field's involvement in the production of European identity: the 'Handmaiden' position (Manners and Whitman), and the 'Pure knowledge' position (Biebuyck and Rumford).[7] Manners and Whitman seem to imply that mainstream EU studies internalized and rendered unquestionable the semi-official premise "that the EU is a neoliberal, state-like political system and that Europeanisation is a one-way process". This contributes to the oft-made critique that EU studies performs a handmaiden role to EU institutions.

Biebuyck and Rumford's argument, on the other hand, is a special case of the "Pure knowledge" position. While they do question the privilege of social scientific knowledge vis-a-vis other forms of thinking, and while they do see the

[7] The two positions were explained in the introduction. The 'Handmaiden' position claims that the field of EU studies performs a handmaiden role to the agendas and identities advanced by EU institutions. The 'Pure knowledge' position divorces the academic field from any role it could possibly play in identity construction or European politics in general.

social scientific definition of Europe as only one among many other possible European imaginaries, Biebuyck and Rumford, nonetheless, subscribe to the notion that the content of EU scholarship is shaped by purely academic concerns. These academic concerns include the quest for 'truth claims' according to disciplinary standards, as well as career questions of "promotion, intellectual visibility and research funding".

To borrow terminology from sociology of science (Barber, 1990 p. 5), Manners and Whitman's argument can be described as *externalist* (scholarly production shaped by extra-academic factors), while Biebuyck and Rumford's argument can be defined as *internalist* (scholarly production defined by factors internal to the academic domain, which also include self-serving career considerations). What is common to both positions is the focus on the unity of EU studies as a site based on singular definitions of Europe. This requires some further clarification. In the preceding chapter, it was argued that Biebuyck and Rumford are scholars supportive of the "Many Europes" research program which explores the multiplicity, rather than the singularity, of European narratives. What is crucial, however, is that their focus is on *interfield* analysis. What this means is that EU Studies is conceived as a field of meaning production that is structurally distinct from other fields, such as the discourse of eurosceptic popular press, to give an example. Variation that is *internal to the field* of EU studies, however, is not accounted for. And this is where the concerns of this monograph come into play.

My objective in this thesis is to employ the tenets of the 'Many Europes' research program in an *intrafield* analysis of the scholarly discourse of EU studies. In practical research terms this means inspecting the field of EU studies for a variety of mutually antithetical European narratives while grounding this variety in the social, political, economic, and cultural complexity of the European political field. This is the meaning behind the claim that **the academic field of EU studies is a site of European identity politics** (Proposition No. II). The validity of

this claim will be put to test in the narrative analysis study conducted in the last part of this monograph. In the next chapter I clarify and specify the central cleavages of the European political field.

PART III. EUROPEAN POLITICAL FIELD: THE FOUR AMBIGUITIES

The contemporary crisis-laden period of EU politics has resulted in a lot of soul-searching among the practitioners of EU Studies (also: European Studies, European integration studies). According to Ian Klinke (2014), two interrelated questions have become central to disciplinary self-reflection (Klinke, 2014, p. 1-3): why was the academic field so poorly prepared to anticipate a series of crises that have beset the European project? And what are the particular mechanics of knowledge production characteristic to European Studies?

Klinke himself has it that the key to both puzzles lies in the critique of European integration studies as EU's soft power tool. In what is a variation of the 'Handmaiden' thesis, Klinke (p. 15-17) suggests that the field's proximity to the world of Brussels elites has prevented scholars in EU Studies from tackling such critical questions like the dynamics of European (and global) crisis capitalism, the theory of crisis politics, and the possibility of European disintegration. In what is an unambiguous attack on the field, Klinke proposes that EU studies is a beast that is afraid to bite the political hand that is feeding it.

While there is merit to Klinke's story, the argument suffers from oversimplification. On the one hand, such arguments run the risk of reducing an entire academic field to the role authority legitimation, which can only be seen as a grotesque misrepresentation of the academy and its culture of dissent. On the other hand, the argument presupposes a possibility of an objective and value-neutral study of the European project, once "European Studies starts to bite the hand that feeds it" (Klinke, 2014. p. 17).

Klinke has put forward a timely question "about the political context in which knowledge on European integration is produced" (p. 15). The answer proposed

by Klinke, however, suffers from a flawed simplification of the European political context. As is typical to the proponents of the 'Handmaiden' interpretation of the scholarly field's role vis-a-vis European identity, Klinke equates the European political context with the "hegemonic discourses" of Brussels policy-makers. Such a conclusion derivers from a mistaken assumption that European polity has a hegemonic discourse to begin with. It is crucial here to reiterate Eder's (2009) point: the structure of the European system is much better understood horizontally and in terms of boundaries and cleavages, rather than vertically and in terms of a top-down influence of a hegemonic centre.

What I intend to show is that **different and mutually-antithetical scholarly accounts of EU's origins reflect the key contemporary conflicts and ambiguities of the European political field: the ambiguity of economic paradigm, the ambiguity of sovereignty, the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity** (Proposition No 3).[8]

The impact of recent political hardships in Europe was not only to encourage belated *critical*, *self-reflective* and *narrativistic* turns in the field of EU studies (Wiener and Diez, 2009; Klinke, 2014; Manners and Whitman, 2016; Gilbert, 2008; Eder, 2009, 2011; Kaiser, 2011, 2015; Kølvraa 2012, 2016;). The crisis of the European project has also accentuated old ideological conflicts concerning the Union's *raison d'être*. I want to look at these conflicts as sources of different identity projects which Eder defines as projects of political control.

The history of European integration is not a history of one political vision put into practice. It's a history of multiple European visions competing against each other, compromising, and adapting to new circumstances. For example, Walter Hallstein's neo-functionalist paradigm for European unification was challenged

[8] The reader is cautioned here that in the following pages I will not be defending this proposition, but rather elaborating on it. This elaboration is necessary to give workable definitions and meanings to the concept of the 'European political field' and the four ambiguities as comprising components of this concept. The defense of the third proposition will rest on the findings of the discourse study undertaken in the last part of the monograph.

by Charles de Gaulle's vision for "Europe des parties" - a Europe of Nations. Similarly, Jacques Delors and Margaret Thatcher represented different European visions which interacted in the European political field to shape the subsequent course of the European polity. And if there ever has been such a thing as a centrally orchestrated grand plan for the Union, the political center has never been strong enough to outweigh competing paradigms. As Mark Gilbert (2008) argues in his article on the pitfalls of narrating contemporary European history, EU should be analyzed as a historical product of whig and tory competition, and not as a whig blueprint gradually imposed on reality.

If today we fail to observe the EU acting decisively and efficiently in the face of great challenges such as the monetary crisis, the refugee crisis or the overarching crisis of legitimacy, it is not because the grand plan for Europe (which is a chimera) suddenly stopped working, but because a delicate structure of compromise between different European visions and interests has crumbled under great external pressures and internal divisions. If there ever was such a thing as a carefully orchestrated grand plan for Europe, it was always counterweighted by alternative European agendas grounded in alternative European interests.

In an earlier part of this monograph, we established that these alternative European agendas also form the base for the emerging multiplicity of European stories which constitute the battlefield for European identity. Following Eder's (2009) research guidelines, we set out to establish a sociological link between the different European narratives and the power dynamics within the European political field. However, to tackle specific scholarly narratives and their embeddedness in political context, it is first necessary to specify the key boundaries and cleavages that are constitutive of the European political field.

In this task we are aided by the British philosopher David Marquand. In his seminal book entitled "The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe" (2011), Marquand interprets the European Union as a quintessentially ambiguous project, beset by conflicting ideas and assumptions. For him, the present situation

of political and economic disorder is useful analytically in the sense that it exposes and brings to light the great ambiguities of European politics. Marquand (2011, p. 25) is not so much interested in policies or institutions, but rather in the dichotomous structure of ideas, paradigms, and assumptions that shape the thinking behind decision-making. His key insight (p. 52) is that the crisis of the European project is grounded in certain ambiguities that have accompanied the European polity from its very inception in the 1950's: without those ambiguities, it would have been impossible to mobilize consensus and support for integration and unification in earlier periods, but now these ambiguities threaten the very existence of the EU. For our purposes, we will focus on four such ambiguities: 1) the ambiguity of economic paradigm 2) the ambiguity of political method 3) the ambiguity of sovereignty 4) the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity.[9]

One example will suffice to introduce the general logic of Marquand's argumentation. For a start, Marquand tells us (p. 63-66) that the founders of Europe's first supranational institutions were groomed in the sociopolitical culture of the two world wars and the interwar period. In their minds, public politics or popular politics were associated with memories of "Hitler's brown shirts and Mussolini's black shirts, or jubilant crowds mobilized by vicious demagogues" (p. 64). What these new leaders, therefore, preferred was the politics of the conference table and *couloir*. While they did seek popular support, they shied away from popular engagement. And this helps understand why the early Commissions embraced the Saint-Simonian ideals of technical rationality and technocracy. It was only natural, however, that demands for greater accountability and concerns over democratic deficit emerged progressively with the Union's greater involvements

[9] Marquand also discusses a fifth ambiguity, one that pertains to the issues of European territory and boundaries. Actually, in the book he speaks of "four great ambiguities" (Marquand, 2011, p. 52). The conflicts over EU's economic paradigm are covered extensively in the book, but Marquand does not place them explicitly under the banner of a separate 'great ambiguity'. Commentators found this to be surprising. In his review of Marquand's work, Glyn Morgan (2011, p. 680) suggested that the ambiguity of economic paradigm "in many respects is the most important of the lot", and thus deserving of an analytical distinction in Marquand's theoretical scheme. I share this assessment, and I choose to discuss the ambiguity of economic paradigm on equal terms with other ambiguities discussed by the British thinker.

in people's lives. And while discussions surrounding the Union's political method remained academic in relatively calmer times, today the pervasive ambivalence over democracy and technocracy threatens the whole European edifice, and corrodes public trust in European institutions.

In a similar vein, David Marquand traces a variety of different ambiguities to the early years of European integration, and dissects each of the ambiguities into dichotomies, or several competing agendas for Europe. While in principle those agendas would often seem irreconcilable, in practice compromises were the only way to move ahead with the European project. For Marquand, today the Union is at the crossroads of history, and the general state of ambiguity is no longer tolerable.

In fact, this quintessentially ambiguous nature of the EU is what Marquand (p. 27-66) thinks got Europe into the mess: the monetary crisis, the mismatch between monetary union and fiscal disunion, the disconnect dividing the peoples of Europe from the European elites, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in French and Dutch referendums (and of the Lisbon treaty in Ireland), the declining turnout in European Parliament elections, the looming specter of renascent nationalism and Eurosceptic populism, the rise of xenophobia, a lack of unity in European foreign policy and a lack of common geopolitical vocation, and migration related cultural turmoil among other issues. In light of the most recent developments, one might add the decision of the British people to leave the European polity altogether, and the failure to act collectively and efficiently in the face of an unprecedented refugee crisis.

For the purposes of this monograph, it is not necessary to account for the political solutions proposed by Marquand[10], nor is it necessary to embrace his general

[10] I use Marquand's work in two different ways. Most crucially, I employ his 'great ambiguities' as an analytical instrument which gives a clear and operational meaning to the concept of European political field. However, it must also be stressed that Marquand himself is an author who offers political-ideological prescriptions on how the Union should overcome the current period of political turmoil. There-

idea that European multiplicity is at fault for EU's institutional paralysis in the face of unprecedented challenges. These are not our questions. What is crucial for our purposes is the structure of dichotomies which Marquand uses to make sense of and give order to the European political field. It is important to remember here what has been established in the theoretical part of the monograph: identity-endowing European narratives and origins myths should be analyzed sociologically in relation to the power dynamic of the European political field. Marquand's *ambiguities* are invoked here to give an operationalized meaning of this power dynamic. What follows are brief accounts of each of the four ambiguities:

3.1. The Ambiguity of Economic Paradigm

This is a conflict between economic Europe and social Europe. On the one hand, European governance was historically grounded in a postwar "blend of social democracy and Christian democracy" (p. 50). From this postwar consensus originated the European social model, and the "Social Europe" paradigm. On the other hand, however, the European Union has been progressively reshaped by neoliberalism, and "the euro was a product of the thinking that led to capitalism's untaming in the 1980's and 1990's" (p. 49).

According to Marquand, one of the consequences of this ambiguity is a dysfunctional state of affairs when "a European Central Bank controls monetary policy, but member governments still control fiscal policy" (p. 23). Social Europe presupposes a European fiscal union. And while European institutions, especially the Commission, are historically receptive to the European social model, the EU's monetary policy is the brainchild of the neoliberal "faith that monetary

fore, it is crucial to keep an analytical distinction between Marquand's analytical scheme and his political narrative. His ambiguities scheme will be employed to analyze and classify the scholarly narratives, whereas Marquand's political narrative and his imaginary of Jean Monnet will be analyzed on the same terms as other scholarly narratives explored in this monograph.

policy, managed by a Central Bank, independent of government, was the only feasible tool of economic management" (p. 49). Social Europe demands positive integration (including the power for EU to raise its own taxes), while Economic Europe is pushing for negative integration (focus on free markets).

3.2. The Ambiguity of Sovereignty

With this ambiguity, Marquand (p. 57-61) refers to an unresolved conflict between federalism and confederalism as a preferable direction for the European polity. The conflict manifests itself in the confusing competition between neofunctionalism, federalism and intergovermentalism as organizing principles of the European political trajectory. Sovereignty is divided between Brussels and the national capitals. But the formula of this division is increasingly obscure and not even the most informed observers can agree on the true extent (if any) to which supranationalism has transcended national sovereignties. Furthermore, the balance between federal and confederal principles plays out differently in the institutional arrangements of the European Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament (p. 60). Marquand holds this ambiguity to be responsible for the impenetrable obscurity of the European project, which has alienated a bemused European public:

"You can't hold institutions you don't understand to account; and it is hard to see how they can represent you. And no one outside a tiny group of Euro-actors and Euro-academics understand how the European Union works" (p. 124).

The share incomprehensibility of the inner workings of the European Union is a byproduct of an uneasy consensus between federalist and confederalist visions that have been pulling the European polity in separate directions for the last sixty years. Is it a union of states (a confederation), or a union of men (a federation)? And in which direction should we develop it? Should more decisions be made

suprantionally? Or should member-states preserve their sovereignty and negotiate common policies in the time-honored Westphalian manner? How should the power be shared between the still-sovereign states and supranational institutions? The failure to answer these questions in a convincing fashion results in the ambiguity of sovereignty.

3.3. The Ambiguity of Political Method

Cutting across the ambiguity of sovereignty is the ambiguity of political method (Marquand, 2011, p. 63-66). The European visions of democratic and technocratic governance cohabitate in an uneasy constellation with offends and irritates the European public. Marquand describes this constellation as "the stulifying compromise between democracy and technocracy" (p. 66). In the interpretation of the British philosopher, these are two grand old visions that are poorly balanced in the current predicament, or at least that balance is poorly communicated to the public.

For Marquand, the much deplored community of European functionaries, bureaucrats, and lobbyists is a legacy of a grand Saint Simonian vision of technocratic governance, embraced by the builders of the Union in order to overcome the irrationalities of political life. Such strives for efficiency and rationality, however, have always been accompanied by public suspicions and accusations of elitism, unaccountability and self-servitude. After Mastricht, demands for more democracy, public engagement and accountability loomed ever larger on the Union as its scope of influence on people's lives widened. To paraphrase Marquand, technocracy may be sufficient in the low politics of coal and steel, but not in the high politics of foreign policy, security policy, and issues of the monetary union.

The issues of high politics demand decisive collective action, but EU leaders cannot act decisively with one voice as long as they "lack the democratic legitimacy to carry their peoples with them" (p. 111). This logic underlies not only much of eurosceptic critique, but also visions of a European democracy with the emergent European public realm, Union-wide referenda on fundamental questions, direct election of European Council President, etc. - a *political Europe*, as Marquand calls it.

3.4. The Ambiguity of Belonging and Ethnicity

This last ambiguity cuts across all the previous ones and pertains to the emotional loyalties and allegiances of the European people (Marquand, p. 52-57). What is the relationship between the European project and different national identities? Marquand describes this relationship as ambiguous. For the postwar generation of leaders in Western Europe ethnic nationalism seemed "archaic, backward-looking, divisive, and above all, *dangerous*" (p. 52). If different nation-states were to share their resources and their burdens, the assumptions underpinning the European project had to be "resolutely non-ethnic and implicitly anti-ethnic" (p. 52). But these assumptions could never be made explicit, because "Why awaken sleeping ethnic dogs"? (p. 54). Ambiguity was a prerequisite for moving forward with the largest support possible.

This ambiguity opened the space for interpretative differences. For some the Community was a harbinger of post-nationalism[11]. Others hoped that some kind of new *euronationalism*[12] would one day displace ethno-cultural nationalisms in

[11] The concept of 'postnationalism' is not scrutinized by Marquand, but it is usually used in reference to European integration as a process by which national, and especially ethnic, identities gradually lose their importance relative to technocratic decision-making on a supranational scale.
[12] While Marquand does not use this specific phrase (his preferred term is Europeanism), he makes an important distinction between "non-ethnic" and "anti-ethnic" approaches to European integration. Postnationalism is associated with the former. Europeanism, or euronationalism, is associated with the latter, meaning that 'euronationalists' envision a gradual displacement of Europe's old national identities by a new European nationalism that progressively attracts the emotional loyalties of the European people.

the same way that national identities had subsumed the local and provincial loyalties of the Middle Ages in the early-modern period. Yet others imagined unity in diversity and saw the Union as an umbrella for diverse national identities.

Despite the material advantages associated with the new model of sober, enlightened, consensual, and peaceful rule, a problem emerged as a result of this ambiguity: there was little popular enthusiasm for Community institutions. To paraphrase Marquand (p. 57), the new model reshaped the European habits of the intellect and of the wallet, but, unlike nationalism, failed to impact the habits of the heart.

The last decade of European politics gave birth to yet another new worldview, that of a renascent nationalism with a distinct anti-European flavour. It was a response to a new situation in Europe: the problems associated with multiculturalism, the accession of new member states and the stereotypes against them, the rising numbers of internal and external migration, and the presently ongoing refugee crisis. Marquand deplores the rise of popular eurosceptic nationalism, but acknowledges that the Union is partly to blame. Locked in the state of ambiguity vis-a-vis the national identities, the European Union always lacked a clear vision whether and how it aimed to attract the emotional loyalties of the Europeans, and what role were the old national identities to play in the European polity.

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In the final chapter of this monograph, the four ambiguities are employed as the basis for the discourse analysis of political narratives recounted by EU Studies scholars. The objective will be to demonstrate that **different and mutually-antithetical scholarly accounts of EU's origins reflect the key contemporary conflicts and ambiguities of the European political field: the ambiguity of economic paradigm, the ambiguity of sovereignty, the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity** (Proposition No 3).

For this I will use a case study. I will focus on the representations of Jean Monnet in the historical narratives of EU Studies scholars. In the next chapter I explain why **the representations of Jean Monnet advanced in the scholarly discourse offer a suitable case for a study of the third proposition** (Proposition No 4).

PART IV. GROUNDING THE CASE STUDY: JEAN MONNET AS A POLITICAL HERO IN THE MAKING

Reviewing the American tradition of the politics of heroes in his seminal article entitled "Emerson, Cooley, and the American Heroic Vision" (1985), Barry Schwartz explained that a dead political hero is no longer a historical figure, but rather a social and representative figure that is consciously and perpetually re-mythologized to reflect the values and needs of the democratic society. Schwartz drew some of his insight from Charles Horton Cooley who has earlier worked out a sociological conception of political heroes and hero worship. "The use we make of the great man far outweighs the virtue of the man himself," writes Cooley thereby determining the political hero's ontological status. Cooley's question to the hero is not the historical "What are you?", but the pragmatic "How far can I use you as a symbol in the development of my instinctive tendency?". Summarizing the pragmatic and democratic interpretation of the hero concept, Cooley writes that:

"*What we need is a good symbol to help us think and feel; and so, starting with an actual personality which more or less meets this need, we gradually improve upon it by a process of unconscious adaptation that omits the inessential and adds whatever is necessary to round out the ideal. Thus the human mind working through tradition is an artist, and creates types which go beyond nature*"

In a similar vein, Schwartz (1985) explains that, in democratic political communities, our intellectual interest in 'Great Men' is always symbolical, rather than historical: we look at them as symbols, rather than sources, of our society's existing tendencies. The ideas of Schwartz and Cooley provide the necessary context behind an intuition that the image of Jean Monnet may also have undergone a similar processes of dehistorization to become a symbolic representation of

our present political tendencies. This intuition is affirmed by Kolvraa (2012b, p. 55) who writes that "it was as a symbol himself rather than as an actor that Jean Monnet came to play a prominent role in the construction of European identity".

Jean Monnet was the primary author of a declaration, which in 1950 set in motion European integration, and from 1950 to 1953 he served as President to Europe's first supranational institution, the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. Jean Monnet is almost universally recognized - by admirers and critics alike - for having played a crucial role in both conceptualizing and putting in action the idea of European integration in the years following WWII. As a recognition of his founding role, in 1976 Monnet became the first Honorary Citizen of Europe, an honour bestowed by the European Council[13]. Another honour conferred on Monnet before his death was the new institution of the Jean Monnet Lecture series at the European University Institute in Florence.

It was after his death in 1979, however, that Monnet's heroic image truly became "a center piece of the EC's ambitions to forge something like a European identity, the central father-figure around which a communal symbolic law was constructed" (Kølvraa, 2012b, p. 84)". It's worth quoting Kolvraa at length here to capture the quick rise of the now deceased hero to symbolic prominence:

"It was not until his death that the European institutions and the actors in and around them, started to wholeheartedly elevate Monnet to the semi-sacred status of founding father. It was only when his personal absence could be trusted to be permanent, that a symbolic presence could be constructed around his name and memory. During the 1980's he would be crafted into the core symbolic figure of the European Communities; his name would emerge as something of a rhetorical trump card with which politicians could berate each other for falling short of the father's vision, and his memory would be secularized and memorialized

[13] The title has only been bestowed on two other people: Helmut Kohl in 1998, and Jacques Delors in 2015

as the lynchpin around which the symbols and narratives of European identity might be constructed" (Kolvraa, 2012b. 67)

Although official EU rhetoric lists a number of historical figures in the European founders pantheon[14], Kolvraa's analysis of this rhetoric demonstrates that Monnet "enjoys a position as the primary paternal figure in the rhetoric of the EU - rivaled only at times by Schuman" (Kolvraa, 2012b, 56). This position is also recognized outside the official discourse of the Union. For example, even an author like Anthony Pagden (2002, p. 25-26), who is skeptical about the possibility of an inspirational European origin myth, acknowledges that Jean Monnet is the closest thing to a "national hero" that the Union has. The Monnet story has also made successful inroads to public discourse. For example, in an attempt to counter rising euroscepticism, in 2011 the BBC aired a romanticized play on Monnet and his accomplishments in founding the EU. In a 2013 piece for La Repppublica's L'Espresso, Umberto Eco proposed a plan to create a popular hero, *un Asterix Europe*, for the Union that would inspire popular enthusiasm for the European project, and one of the few names Eco short-listed for the hero's role was Monnet. This is a good illustration that 'Jean Monnet the hero' has been making successful inroads from official to public European discourse. And this makes a focus on Monnet story all the more relevant, for, as Cooley wrote, the social role of political heroes touches "the very root problem of sociology," namely, "the mutual relations between the individual and the social order" (Schwartz, 1985, p. 116).

This provides the context and the rationale for the narrative analysis of Monnet's representations in the scholarly discourse of EU Studies. The reader here is reminded that this analytical effort is meant to demonstrate that **different and mutually-antithetical scholarly accounts of EU's origins reflect the key contem-**

[14] The official EU website currently lists eleven "Founding Fathers of the EU": Konrad Adenauer, Joseph Bech, Johan Willem Beyen, Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Walter Hallstein, Sicco Mansholt, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, Altiero Spinelli.

porary conflicts and ambiguities of the European political field: the ambiguity of belonging, the ambiguity of sovereignty, the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of economic paradigm. My premise is that scholars are likely to be at their most political when representing a figure as symbolically charged as Monnet, a figure whose central position in EU's origin story is almost beyond debate, whichever way that story is told.

In addition, this premise is also supported by findings of historians and sociologists of science. One of the insights here is that social science practitioners tend to drop their usual standards of objectivity and methodological rigour when narrating the origins of their own disciplines. The scholarly proclivity to mythologize the origins and putative founding fathers was explored by Peter Baehr (2015). Social science may well see itself as the "science of modernity par excellence, the child of Enlightenment secularism and empiricism, the great debunker of tradition", but social science practitioners are nonetheless drawn to origin myths and founding father stories despite clear arguments pointing to the mythological and ahistorical nature of such narrative formations (Baehr, 2016, p. 73). For Baehr the seduction of mythical thinking lies in the concept of collective memory. A scholar may be engaged in serious historical or sociological work only to change his or her attitude completely - *from truth-making to myth-making* - when approaching the subjective-matter of community origins, because what is at stake is the collective memory of a community of which that scholar is also a member. As Baehr (2016, p. 70) put it, "collective memory is not history; it is a way of framing knowledge that invests it with a particular emotional saliency [. . .] selections from the past that help to define who we are."

This is another reason to expect that the image of Jean Monnet may be found useful for scholars invested in political narratives. On the one hand, Jean Monnet is seen as a founder of a political community that is the subject-matter of EU Studies as an academic field. On the other hand, Jean Monnet is also seen as an important figure in the identity of EU studies as a theoretical discipline. It is a

well-known fact that pioneering EI theories of functionalism and neo-functionalism were modeled on Monnet's political methods (Navarri 1996). Another testimony to Monnet's symbolic role in the academic field is the Jean Monnet Programme. In the introduction of this monograph we have characterized EU studies as field (Mudge & Vauchez 2012, p. 456) with high incentives for the production of politically useful knowledge, and described the intersection of the political and scholarly as "the key site of Europe's construction". It may be added here that Jean Monnet occupies an important symbolic role in this authentic European intersection between the political the scholarly.

The arguments of this paragraph have been advanced to defend the fourth proposition of this doctoral monograph. The proposition states that **representations of Jean Monnet advanced in the scholarly discourse offer a suitable case for a study of the embeddedness of EU Studies in the ambiguities of the European political field.** We now move on to the discourse analysis of these representations.

PART V. JEAN MONNET STORIES: RECONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL NARRATIVES IN SCHOLARLY DISCOURSE

Before delving into the representations of Monnet in the scholarly origin narratives of the European Union, it is worth reiterating the research problem and the main thesis of this study:

Research Question:

What is the specific relationship between the contemporary politics of European identity and the scholarly debates over the history and trajectory of the European Union, expressed in competing origin narratives of the European Union?

Thesis:

I argue that different scholarly accounts of EU's origins constitute a battlefield of competing projects for the European identity, and that this battlefield reflects the key contemporary conflicts and ambiguities of the European political field: the ambiguity of economic paradigm, the ambiguity of sovereignty, the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity.

Up to this point a number of objectives have been accomplished. It was proposed that a new sociological understanding of European identity (variously labeled as 'European Multiplicity', 'Many Europes' and 'European Imaginaries') could be applied to the study of scholarly works and their embeddedness in the power dynamics of the European political field. What is of paramount importance in this research agenda is an emphasis on power dynamics, which presupposes a complex and competitive definition of political context, instead of a singular and hegemonic one. In other words, to challenge the 'Handmaiden' interpretation which critically views the field of EU Studies as a handmaiden to the agendas

and identities advanced by EU institutions, I propose to correct the 'politicization' argument by proposing - and testing - a more pluralistic understanding of the political sources of scholarly politicization. To structure and operationalize the complexity of European political life, I invoked David Marquand's 'great ambiguities' which dichotomize and cleave the European political debates into opposing European visions on central political issues: 1) the ambiguity of economic paradigm 2) the ambiguity of political method 3) the ambiguity of sovereignty 4) the ambiguity of ethnicity and belonging.

What follows hereafter is an analysis of Monnet's representations in the scholarly discourse. The fifth proposition of the monograph claims that **historical and theoretical literature on the EU has produced a rich variety of competing and irreconcilable images of Monnet, and the pattern of this variety is shaped by the embeddedness of respective scholarly narratives in the structure of EU's key identity divisions as it was described in the third proposition**.

The final objective is, therefore, to demonstrate that representations of Monnet and respective origin narratives constitute a battlefield between competing projects for European identity, and that this battlefield reflects and reproduces the four ambiguities. These projects are symbolic forms through which a world of political relations is mirrored (Eder, 2009). The reader should be reminded here that this is precisely the research objective that was prioritized by scholars in the emerging school of thought on European identity. For Biebuyck and Rumford, the new burning objectives for European identity studies are, first, to categorize the "proliferation of Europe", and, second, to investigate "the dynamics of Europe's multiplicity". Eder (2009. p. 430) has seconded this point: "It is the variation of identities which requires explanation". It is to these tasks that we now turn, beginning with the ambiguity of economic paradigm.

In terms of methodology, I will investigate the emplotment techniques of authors in the field of EU studies who use Monnet as a key figure in their accounts of the Union's past and present, 'playing' him as the main protagonist in the 'event' (typically, but not necessarily, the Schuman Declaration, the founding of the ECSC, or the Rome Treaty) that transformed the 'prior state' into the 'new state' (the European Union as we know it today). This methodology is guided by Labov's (1997. 2006) concept of *narrative pre-construction* which presupposes a moral destination that guides the emplotment techniques of the narrator. Hence, I aim to uncover how narrators select, arrange and interpret events to arrive at what is usually presented as an impartial evaluation of what the EU is today, and of the direction it is going.

5.1. Jean Monnet and the Ambiguity of Economic Paradigm

Let us set the stage with a narrative advanced by Swedish sociologist Richard Swedberg (2013). In his paper entitled "An Elephant in the Room? Or Can You Create a European Community Through Economic Means?", Swedberg tells a story of a Union in full-fledged crisis and explores the historical roots of the current situation. In this narrative, the 'new state' is a deep crisis that has political, economic and social dimensions. As Nigel Dodd (2015, p. 96) explains in his commentary on Swedberg's thesis, the recent period has exposed Europe's greatest problem, namely "the lack of fit between the Eurozone as a *political* and *social* community, as opposed to an *economic* and *monetary* space".

A series of European crises may have been triggered by the global financial turmoil of 2008, but the root causes of EU's paralysis in the face of this turmoil lie elsewhere.

In this 'new state' the Union is suffering from the monetary crisis that has paralyzed European economies, a deep legitimacy crisis of EU institutions which are increasingly perceived as undemocratic and lacking in transparency, and a deep social degradation that has been further deepened by draconic austerity

measures. Swedberg discusses huge unemployment rates in a number of EU member-states, which are also witnessing higher-than-ever rates of suicides and alcohol-related deaths. The paper offers a thorough economic analysis of the monetary crisis and the management of this crisis, but what is of greater interest to us here is the historical dimension of Swedberg's argument.

Swedberg goes back to the early years of European integration and detects there 'the event' that put Europe on track to the current state of affairs. The root-cause of the Union's problems, for Swedberg, is the general strategy behind European integration, namely the idea "that unification and integration of Europe should primarily be created through economic means". And, in Swedberg's story, it was Jean Monnet who came up with this strategy and who put it in practice in his blueprints for the European Coal and Steel Community, and later the Rome Treaty that has led to the establishment of the European Economic Community.

Swedberg argues that the paradigm of 'Economic Europe' formed the essence of the so-called 'Monnet method', and it set European Integration off on the wrong foot. Monnet is represented here as an intellectual descendent of the doctrine of the *doux-commerce* thesis, an 18th century idea that free commerce between countries encouraged gentle manners and peace. A closer intellectual predecessor was Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) who proposed to unify Europe by promoting and integrating industry, and assigning the political leadership role to the industrialists.[15]

It was Pascal Lemy, *chef de cabinet* of former President of the European Commission Jacques Delors, who first described Monnet as a Saint-Simonian, and the idea was later taken up Delors himself. When you read Saint-Simon on the reorganization of Europe, Delors said, "you think you read Monnet". However, Swedberg's reading of this line of intellectual paternity is rather unusual. When

[15] On Saint-Simon's plan for European unification, see also Swedberg (1994)

the European Union is spoken of as a Saint-Simonian project, this usually implies a socially informed and technocratic approach to economic and social planning. This is how the more traditional argument goes:

"*It is said of Monnet that he envisaged Europe in a "Saint-Simonian" way, favoring a kind of 'benevolent technocracy' over other, more democratic forms of governance. In simple terms, his strategy for post-war Europe mainly focused on the attraction of key economic and political elites, whose problem-solving and welfare-maximizing capacities would lead to measurable success in European integration*" (Diessner, 2015, p. 69)

Swedberg's interpretation is different. And the root of that difference lies in the fact that Swedberg's narrative is pre-constructed as a critique of neoliberalism. Let us inspect how the story is structured.

While perhaps not being aware of this, Jean Monnet revitalizes the forgotten Saint-Simonian idea and develops it. He is convinced that peace and political unification can be brought about by integrating specific economic sectors, which would then lead to the so-called spill-over effect and further integration. For Swedberg, this was Monnet's strategy and the grounding logic underpinning the establishment of both the ECSC and the EEC. What is more, from the very beginning this paradigm of "political integration by economic means" had clear overtones of free-market liberalism (compare this with Diessner (2015, p. 69) who described Monnet's *Saint-Simonianism* in terms of a focus on welfare-maximizing solution). In what is presented by Swedberg as a crucial moment in history, with the Rome Treaty the Community wholeheartedly embraces economic liberalism, and defines the concept of freedom not in social or civic terms, but in terms of free-markets:

"*The Treaty also refers to what in EU-language was to become known as the Four Freedoms. What is noticeable about these freedoms, and how they are related to the primacy of the economy in the creation of EU, comes out very clearly if they are compared to Roosevelt's Four Freedoms of 1941. First of all, the Four Freedoms of the Rome Treaty refer to economic freedoms: the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital. Secondly, they are related to one specific form of the economy: the market and not to human (economic) needs. Roosevelt, in contrast, focused on human non-economic values. He spoke of three non-economic freedoms: the freedom of speech, the freedom of worship, and the freedom from fear. His one economic freedom is freedom from want; and here the reference is to human needs and not the market*"

Swedberg proceeds thereafter to subsequent historical developments, with Monnet's vision looming large on figures as diverse as Thatcher, Delors, Mitterand, Kohl, Merkel and Draghi. Economic Europe – a paradigm that holds political integration can be achieved primarily through economic means – has allegedly provided the underlying rationale for all the key moments of European integration, from the Rome Treaty and the Common Market, to the Single European Act and the European Monetary Union (EMU). But what is so essentially flawed about the Monnet method and the paradigm of Economic Europe? Swedberg attacks the paradigm on a number of different levels.

First, this way of constructing a community is at odds with the idea of democracy: "When politicians want to accomplish one thing, but present it as something else, transparency suffers". In other words, Monnet is presented here as a godfather to the worst traditions of European governance marked be stealth, unaccountability and disregard for public opinion. Monnet's vision is the root-cause behind the fact that EU has become increasingly unpopular among the Europeans. Economism, Swedberg tells us, "does not create much of a civic foundation for a European Community"

Second, and perhaps even more crucially, when economics and politics become inseparable, political leaders use their mandates to effect economic decisions, the implications of which are beyond their scope of understanding: "Saint-Simon, Monnet, and Delors had all been much more interested in the political goal of unifying Europe than in the actual economic consequences of the reforms that they had advocated, in order to reach this goal". For Swedberg, the European Monetary Union is a case in point, a flawed neoliberal project with a flawed economic logic that, among other things, (I) did not empower the European Central Bank to take actions to insure low unemployment, (II) did not allow for the bail out of member countries, (III) deprived the member states of the possibility to devalue.

Third, an implicit argument in Swedberg's account is that, during the course of European integration 'economic means' have always been chosen at the expense of 'social means'. Having defined freedom - under Monnet's guiding influence - in terms of market needs rather than social needs, the Union was found incapable to prevent, or alleviate, growing inequality between and inside member-countries. For some of them the Eurozone "operated more like a "trap", with next to catastrophic developments, in terms of declining GDP, high unemployment, drastic cutbacks in state expenditure".

To sum up, Swedberg's political narrative calls for a European Union that is more democratic and transparent, more engaged in the social dimension, and less so in austerity and neoliberal economic experimentation. In this narrative, Jean Monnet is the villain protagonist who managed to institutionalize a flawed and undemocratic paradigm of building a European polity through economic means. What is crucial to this argument is that Monnet is clearly positioned in the economic right. Swedberg depicts 'Economic Europe' as the hegemonic identity of EU policymakers that needs to be challenged and revised. Jean Monnet is posi-

tioned at the very center of the Union's origin story - it was Monnet who established 'Economic Europe' as the hegemonic discourse that continues to shape EU policy.

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Instead of conforming to the official political line of Brussels, Swedberg advanced a political narrative, and an origin story, that is critical of official policy and what Swedberg holds to be the hegemonic self-understanding paradigm of EU practitioners. However, the critique also comes from a clear political standpoint - let us call it anti-neoliberalism - which can be, and is, challenged in other scholarly narratives. Let us now contrast Swedberg's narrative choices with those of John Gillingham (2003, 2016), the influential Thatcherite historian of European Integration.

The popular version of Gillingham's historical thesis hit Europe's bookstores in the weeks leading up to the British referendum on EU membership. The book was controversially entitled "The EU: An Obituary". However, the central arguments of the 'Obituary' are traceable to the narrative of his much larger history of European integration, published for the first time in 2003 under the title of "European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate Or New Market Economy".

Just like Swedberg, Gillingham discovers the EU in disarray, and, again just like in Swedberg's narrative, 'the event' that set Europe on the wrong tracks is related to Jean Monnet. The 'new state' is described in terms that are similar to the 'new state' in Swedberg's story: a Europe in crisis, a Europe that protects its flawed monetary union at the expense of millions of suffering Europeans, a Europe that is inefficient and undemocratic. Despite these similarities, however, the two narratives are at odds regarding their structural positions in relation to the European political field, and their moral conclusions for Europe.

John Gillingham's historiography can be summarized as a neoliberal case against the European Union. Europe is suffering not because of neoliberalism, but because the EU is an inefficient 'wannabe' welfare super-state that obstructs the neoliberal order and binds free markets in red tape. To understand how this monster came into being, Gillingham goes back in history and discovers the villain, Jean Monnet.

Gillingham's narrative depends on a dichotomy between two modes of European integration: negative integration, and positive integration. Negative integration takes place "through markets or institutions created to make markets operate properly", while positive integration refers to the "organization of Europe by means of bureaucracy and regulation in order to compensate for market failure" (Gillingham, 2003, p. xiii). In terms of economic ideology, negative integration is the typical prerogative of the economic right, while positive integration is the prerogative of the economic left.

Now, for Gillingham, the history of the European project is the history of tension between these two modes of integration. Gillingham uses historical and economic data to illustrate that virtually all the economic gains are attributable to negative integration (free markets), whereas positive integration, or super-state building, has "never succeeded and cannot do so under present circumstances" (Gillingham, 2003, p. xiii).

Having distinguished between successful negative integration and unsuccessful positive integration, Gillingham describes Friedrich Hayek and Jean Monnet as respective symbolic leaders of the two European paradigms. Now, Gillingham is unambiguous in his assessment of Monnet as the key figure in the birth of the European project:

"*Jean Monnet, a master of the interventionist approach, was even a Great Power in his own right. Without this immense standing, which he uniquely possessed,*

the diplomatic breakthrough upon which the subsequent integration of Europe would rest might never have occurred. The breakthrough – the Schuman Plan announcement of 9 May 1950, which led to the founding a year later of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – brought about the reconciliation of France and Germany, the axis of political integration" (Gillingham, 2003, p. 3-4)

And:

"Monnet deserves almost single-handed credit for creating in 1951 the first of Europe's epochal institutions for integration, the European Coal and Steel Community" (Gillingham, 2003, p. 16)

It is not easy to do full justice to Gillingham's complex historical argument, but these, I think, are his main arguments. The ECSC, the brainchild of Jean Monnet, played a positive role in terms of Franco-German reconciliation, and in terms of opening the stage for new projects. Other than that, the institution was a complete failure. This requires some contextual backgrounding. Gillingham tells us that the postwar political consensus in both Europe and the US was located in the economic left: "socialist, quasi-socialist, state corporatist, and organized capitalist systems were in vogue; and planning was *de rigeur"* (Gillingham, 2003, p. 16). Jean Monnet was a firm believer, and a keen practitioner, of technocratic planning. In fact, due to his high-profile involvement in the Victory Program, he was admired on both sides of the Atlantic as the harbinger of this new technocratic order.

Now, for Gillingham, the origins of European integration lie in this intellectual context. The ECSC was an experiment in European *dirigisme.* On paper, the Paris Treaty of 1951 empowered the ECSC High Authority to control "vast and far-reaching levers of intervention: it could regulate prices, direct investment,

break up cartels or other trade-distorting industrial associations, set common external tariffs for heavy industry products, and involve itself in various different ways in issues of taxation, transportation, and labor" (Gillingham, 2003, p. 22). This gave birth to the Monnetist principles of supranationalism, neofunctionalism, and sectorial integration. In Gillingham's view, all of these principles were tied politically to the agenda of positive integration, and super-state planning, the "notion that Europe could only be organized as a political federation headed by a strong supranational directorate".

Throughout his works Gillingham consistently argues, however, that the ECSC was a failure:

[The ECSC] neither reformed prevailing business practices, produced a new relationship between public authority and private power, nor shifted the locus of economic policy, even as regards heavy industry, from national state to supranational agency. The economic impact of the community was slight. Few of its policies had demonstrable effect (Gillingham, 1991: 300).

In practice, supranationalism proved to be "a paper tiger", because the HA lacked the "enforcement machinery" to impose its will on the member states (Gillingham, 2003, p. 32). Gillingham argues that even Monnet himself, while serving as the first president of the ECSC's High Authority, has become frustrated with the impotence of his institution, and "spent as little time as possible there" (p. 27). Monnet's greatest mistake, however, was to draw a wrong conclusion from the shortcoming of the ECSC.

Gillingham tells us that now Monnet wanted more supranationalism, and more super-state planning. And his next initiative was the European Defense Community, and the creation of a European army. Even though that initiative failed, Gillingham is convinced that the Monnetist ideology of super-state building remains alive up this day in the European Commission where Monnet's disciples are acting on his behalf in a manner thought to be consistent with his spirit.

It is worth emphasizing here that, in Richard Swedberg's narrative, the EDC was a political project which went against Monnet's principles of 'Economic Europe', and thus failed. In Gillingham's narrative, the EDC was a Monnetist project of super-state planning. An even deeper difference in historical interpretation, however, manifests itself when we compare how the two authors explain the origins of the Treaty of Rome.

In Gillingham's narrative, the Treaty of Rome redeemed the European project, and redirected European integration in a new and productive direction - toward market liberalization. If Swedberg positioned Monent as the guiding influence behind this treaty and its free-markets agenda, Gillingham takes pains to show how Monent and his *planist* method of sectoral integration have been deliberately ignored during the Messina Conference of 1955 where key decisions regarding the establishment of the European Economic Community were negotiated. Monnet's absence was the key to setting Europe on the tracks of negative integration based in the Hayekian logic of economic growth. As McKay (2005, p. 634) explained, Gillingham demoted "Monnet and like-minded federalists […] from visionary founding fathers to welfare-state planners responsible for the subsequent deadlock of 1966".

However, despite the Messina breakthrough, the Hayekian agenda has not become the only game in town. The EEC may have promoted negative integration, but visions of positive integration have ruled supreme in the Commission that has remained loyal to Monnet's agenda:

"The audacious bid of President Hallstein to turn his little office in Brussels, the Commission, into a kind of capital for Europe antagonized and alienated the EEC member-states" (Gillingham, 2003, p. 5.)

And so, the two principles - positive and negative - have continued to shape the rest of the Union's history. In Gillingham's story, the deadlock was temporarily broken with the rise of Thatcherism and neoliberalism, which reaffirmed the

Hayekian logic of integration "with the avalanche of progress ushered in by the Single European Act of 1986" (Gillingham, 2003, p. 81). Progress was short-lived, however, and the next big thing in European integration - the European Monetary Union in 1992 - was an exercise in misguided superstate building. In 2016, Gillingham reaffirmed this point, claiming that the EMU has become the "master" of the EU, and that "Europe is now run by a bank board".

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Gillingham, an economic historian, and Swedberg, a political sociologist, used the current ailments of the Union as an opportunity to reflect upon the Union's origins and future horizons. Although complex and detailed, their arguments are politically motivated. Theirs are not only stories of Europe, but also identity-endowing narratives for Europe. In Eder's terminology, such narratives are projects of control, definitions of Europe that challenge or reproduce certain social and political relations.

But nothing could be further from truth than saying that these two influential narratives are somehow shaped by *Brussels.* Swedberg attacks the EU from the standpoint of anti-neoliberalism, and blames the EU for its focus on markets at the expense of genuine politics. Gillingham does the opposite and blames the EU for being a political monster that obstructs the neoliberal order of free-markets. In both narratives, Jean Monent plays the role of the original sinner, but there is a disagreement on what Monnet's sin was. For Gillingham, Monnet's vision for Europe expressed the paradigm of left-leaning technocratic super-state building. For Swedberg, Monent's vision for Europe expressed the right-leaning paradigm of Economic Europe.

These positions are echoed by other authors as well. For example, in her investigations of socialist influences on the origins of Euopean integration, Murray (1996, p. 164) describes Monnet as a key figure in the socialist camp: "Monnet for example was a socialist voter and very keen on involving trade unions and

socialist parties in the Action Committee for the United States of Europe and he adopted a dirigiste approach to state control of the economy." On the other hand, in an attempt to reconstruct Jean Monnet's "Grand Design for Europe", Hungdah Su positions Monnet firmly in the economic right. According to Su, "individualism, entrepreneurship, market-oriented economy, and an emphasis upon competition" were crucial components in Monnet's design for Europe (Su, 2009, p.41).

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'Third way' interpretations are also available. One of them is worthy of a more detailed consideration. In a 2013 study entitled "A Political Theory of Identity in European integration: Memory and Policies", Catherine Guisan develops a normative identity project. She makes explicit the political motives of her study. For Guisan (2012), it is important to tell the stories of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, because "founding stories help ground the political community" (Guisan, 2012, p. 2) and "storytelling is one form of thinking that does not trump acting" (p. 13). By revitalizing the story of the founders, "the lost treasure of European integration", the author aims to challenge growing euroscpeticism, tackle the resurgent nationalism, and show other world regions the benefits of integration (Guisan, 2012. p. 1-21).

Her political narrative is informed by a notion that "on balance and so far European integration's positive outcomes outweigh the negative ones" (p. 1). Guisan is of the opinion that, in face of political crisis and resurgent nationalism, there is a need for a stronger European Union and a stronger effort to foster "political European identity(ies), because a political project needs the underpinning of shared self-understandings" (p. 1). In this political narrative, the 'prior state' is the European hell of pre-community times, and the 'new state' is a peaceful and prosperous European community established by the founding fathers in the post-war period. By revisiting the community's origin story, Guisan aims to inspire

Europe to withstand and fight off the eurosceptic demons released by the recent period of economic and political crisis.

Jean Monnet plays a pivotal role in Guisan's origin story. 'The event' that shaped Europe's fate was made possible by Monnet's heroic role during the negotiations behind the Treaty of Paris (1951) which established the European Coal and Steel Community. In Guisan's analysis, Monnet's stance during these negotiations was nothing short of miraculous. First, in relation to Monnet's role in devising the Schuman plan and hereby preventing future wars, Guisan writes that "if political forgiveness is about giving up revenge and daring to propose an action in concert with former enemies [...] then the French proposal for ECSC can be interpreted as emblematic of this human capacity" (p. 29). Second, Guisan credits Monnet for breaking away with the principle of national sovereignty and introducing genuine federalism to European politics. In what is presented as an epoch-making event, Guisan recalls an episode in the negotiations when Monnet starts to disagree publicly with other members of the French delegation, thereby putting the 'European interest' ahead of the national French interest for the first time in European history. As Max Kohnstamm, the Dutch representative in the negotiations, would recall this event, "Mr. Monnet broke habits and there something started which was not a negotiation, but truly a common search for solutions" (Melchionni and Ducci, 2007).

Having established Monnet's central role in the European narrative, Guisan proceeds with explaining Monnet's economic paradigm. A unified European economy was to be guided by a communitarian approach, which represented a third way between socialism and unrestrained capitalism. Guisan deems it crucial that Europeans learn this story, because this story explains what we actually mean when we call Europe a 'community':

"*Neither has there been enough attention paid to how European founders understood community, a word laden with emotional and affective connotations,*

and which they chose very deliberately to name their highly technocratic enterprise" (Guisan, 2012, p. 2)

Communitarianism, Guisan tells us, came to Monnet through a French law professor by the name of Paul Reuter. Reuter served as Monnet's right-hand man during the conception of the ECSC's founding treaties. As we learn from Alessandro Isoni (2010), Reuter's political thinking was shaped by the *Non-conformistes* movement of interwar France, which sought "a 'third way' other than socialism or capitalism, individualism or collectivism," and drew inspiration from the tradition of "Saint-Simon and Comte-style technocracy which, unlike the American version, considered the support of adequate public institutions as essential" (Isoni, 2010, p. 274). Searching for a way to humanize capitalism, Reuter saw the trusts as a symbol of the gigantic and depersonalized economy, which he looked to counter with a philosophy of *humanisme communautaire.* It is argued that Monnet's thinking may have been guided by these ideas when he convinced Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, to commence European integration in the sectors of coal and steel, "the sectors in which the tendency to create monopolies and cartels had been most manifest" (Isoni, 2010, p. 276), whereas the ECSC High Authority embodied Reuter's third-way principles of planism and enlightened technocracy.

For Guisan (2012, p. 65), this story explains the name chosen for the first supranational organization, *Community*, a term which, she notes, "came to Monnet through Paul Reuter". The concept of Community embodied a third-way approach, and was meant as an alternative to socialism, liberalism, and capitalism—an alternative that was "impossible in a national framework" (2013, p. 65). This origin story should be read against the background of Guisan's appraisal of EU's role as a beacon of communitarian values in today's global world. Guisan writes that the "ideological narrative of global Europa" implies, among other things, attempts to avoid the "extremes of capitalism". Implicit to Guisan's nar-

rative is an idea that Monnet's communitarianism must be seen as a both a historical source, and especially as a source of inspiration, for Europe's unique social model. To go back to Schwartz (1985), in the enterprise of hero-worship, historical memory is subordinated to the use of the hero as a symbol of our present tendencies.

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In this monograph European identity is thought of in terms of European multiplicity, as a battlefield between different European narratives which articulate the identity projects that correspond to different political standpoints vis-a-vis the great questions of European political life. As we have learned from David Marquand, one of those great questions is an ambiguity surrounding Europe's economic paradigm. In this section, I have demonstrated that EU scholarship can function as a dynamic field that produces divergent stories of communal origins with moral conclusions that correspond to competing economic paradigms. Depending on the author's structural position in the debate, the Union's origin story can depict Jean Monnet as:

- A heroic communitarian federalist that paved the way for the European social model;

- A misguided founding father who ignored the social and democratic dimensions of integration and who played the role of a villain in paving the way for an Economic Europe with a neoliberal agenda;

- A misguided founding father who gave birth to a dysfunctional vision of a technocratic European super-state, a vision that continues to obstruct the fluent Hayekian workings of the European market

In proposing a new research agenda for European identity studies, Klaus Eder (2009) pointed out that "the debate on European collective identity so far has not

been able to establish a systematic link between the forms of collective identity constructions and the networks of social relations in which this process is embedded". I have attempted to address this question by linking the identity constructions (founding stories) to the positions of academic authors in the larger political battle over the "good" economic paradigm for the EU. We now turn to the second ambiguity that cleaves the European political field, the ambiguity of sovereignty.

5.2. Jean Monnet and the Ambiguity of Sovereignty

While traditionally sovereignty has been described as a claim to ultimate authority within a certain body politic, the EU is often described as an authentic case of shared, divided, split or partial sovereignty. What this means is that ultimate authority is somehow divided between the capitals of EU member-states and the central supranational institutions. The exact formula of this division, however, is tainted by "impenetrable obscurity" (Marquand, 2011, p. 61). This obscurity contributes to the alienation of a bemused European public. The people don't understand how the EU works, and euroscepticism of all sorts is given a free pass to demonize and exaggerate the influence of Brussels simply because it is very difficult to contradict such claims. For Marquand, the ambiguity of sovereignty, or of governance, is extremely damaging for the European project, not least because it is simply very hard to sympathize with something you don't even know what it is.

From the very beginning, Marquand tells us, the ambiguity was shaped by competing visions: those of a federation and a confederation. From the very inception of the European project, federalism, neofunctionalism, and intergovernmentalism have been competing as organizing principles for, as well as theoretical accounts of, the workings of the Communities, and later the Union. To simplify

matters, it may be stated here that federalists sought an immediate political union and a federal constitution, neo-functionalists sought integration in specific sectors of the economy which, by way of the spill-over effect, would necessitate integration in other sectors, and intergovernmentalists have always considered national governments to be the main actors in the integration process which is advanced, or stalled, as a result of inter-state bargaining (Tömmel, 2014, p. 10-32).

European integration theory was tasked to settle the confusion and explain how the Community functions in reality. Different theoretical approaches were found to be better equipped to account for different periods of European integration. Also, as many have observed, the fate of competing theories was closely linked to integration processes and political demands—the divisions of politics were reflected in the divisions of theory. As Wallace (1990, p. 61) explains, "theories of political integration . . .developed alongside political strategies of integration, feeding on one another as they grew."

Now, a comprehensive overview of the EI theoretical universe is beyond the scope of this monograph, nor is it necessary. What I am aiming for is to demonstrate how EU Studies scholars employ stories of communal origins to legitimize certain visions for Europe. What is particular to this chapter, however, is that stories that tackle the ambiguity of sovereignty often function as legitimations for both political visions, and theoretical camps.

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Jean Monnet was not a scholar. He has never attended an institution of higher education. He was not a keen reader. Monnet was a cognac salesman, an international troubleshooter and a political entrepreneur who mistrusted theoretical scholarship (Duchene, 1994, p. 19-64). According to Francois Fontaine, the ghostwriter of Monnet's memoirs, "he would have been astonished to hear one

talk of his political philosophy, and of his method's general principle" (Fontaine, 1991, p. 17). And yet Monnet's name looms large on European integration theory. In fact, Monnet is often described as a founder not only of the European polity, but also of EU scholarship. Niemann's (2006, p. 12) description of Monnet as a "precursor to neofunctionalist theory" could hardly be said to be an unconventional proposition. As John Gillingham (2003, p. 17) made clear, the key terms of EU scholarship - such as supranationalism, sectoral integration, functionalism - were coined, or popularized, in Monnet's immediate environment. Gillingham went as far as to suggest that up to this day the Monnet myth continues to inspire and motivate EU Studies scholars: "The myth nonetheless survived in scholarship and would continue to provide a context for integration studies and the essential vocabulary for the subject" (Gillingham, 2003, p. 72)

This is only partially true. While Gillingham ascribes a very specific meaning to the Monnetist way of thinking, I argue that the very definition of the Monnetist logic is a site of contention for EU Studies scholars. In other words, Gillingham's claim regarding Monnet's symbolic role in scholarly discourse reproduces the 'Handmaiden' thesis which reduces academic stories of Monnet to hagiographical extensions of EU's official policy. What I seek to uncover is variation and interpretative conflict.

We may begin with the familiar story. It is a well established fact that both David Mitrany and Ernst Haas have used accounts of Monnet's political practice to model their respective theories of functionalism, and neo-functionalism. Mitrany drew ideas for his model of functional integration from the functional organization of the joint war boards on which Monnet served as a technocrat during both world wars (Navari, 1996, p. 71). Similarly, Ernst Haas was inspired by Monnet's organizational innovations and saw the European Coal and Steel Community as "a testing ground for Deutschian ideas of growing international linkages,

emerging international interest formation and (resultant) communal development" (Navari, 1996, p. 77).

These stories have provided a lasting source of legitimation for the (neo)functionalist logic of European integration because this logic was consistent with the thinking of the 'Father' who was himself 'one of them,' and who "made no attempt to hide his contempt for what he called intergovernmental cooperation" (Marjolin, 1991, p. 177). As the popular story goes, Monnet became a symbol of neofunctionalism for both theoreticians, and the political actors in the early Commissions who saw themselves as guardians of the neo-functionalist logic of European integration (Chryssochoou *et al*, 2003)

However, the heyday of neofunctionalism has begun to fade when Charles de Gaulle put a break on any possible spill-overs of integration from 'low politics' to 'high politics' (Wunderlich, 2007, p. 15). Progressively neofunctionalism has lost much of its credibility as the universal theory of European integration, and in 1975 Ernst Haas himself decreed the theory obsolete (Leonardi, 1995, p. 268).

So, while contemporary academic literature is abound with references to Monnet's pioneering role in the theory and practice of (neo-)functionalism, it is much more interesting to see how Jean Monnet is represented in political narratives supportive of political theories that have since grown in prominence: namely intergovernmentalism and federalism.

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Let us first go to 1996 paper by Martin Holland, a political scientist who, at the time of writing, holds New Zealand's only Jean Monnet chair. Writing in the aftermath of the creation of the Single Market, Holland encouraged reappraising Monnet's heritage as a way to understand this new stage of integration, as well as to evaluate the theories dealing with the new situation in Europe. In this nar-

rative, the ‘new state’ is the rise of intergovernmentalism as the hegemonic governance principle of the European project, as has been evidenced by the political processes leading up to Maastricht.

The paper appraises Monnet’s role in establishing the ECSC, his “guiding influence” on the Treaty of Rome, and his continued impact on European integration via his Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Holland characterizes Monnet as a pragmatist and a political opportunist who “was never restricted by the purity of theory” (Holland, 1996, p. 106) and would, in his inspired quest for a peaceful supranational Europe, be sufficiently flexible on general principles in order “to appeal to a broad political spectrum from cautious intergovernmentalists to unabashed federalists” (p. 98). What follows this hagiographical summary of Monnet’s achievements, however, is a surprising and unsubstantiated description of Monnet as “unquestionably the EUs most original and important thinker” (p. 101).

From here Holland moves on with an evaluation of different EI theories and their conformance with the ideas of that pioneer ‘thinker’. Holland has it that the functionalism of Mitrany and the neo-functionalism of Haas have failed the test of history, and the most accurate account of integration processes leading up to the Single European Act (SEA) and the Single Market has been offered by the intergovernmentalist theory of Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann. According to Holland, this theory correctly emphasizes the primacy of politics, and the role of intergovernmental bargaining between member-states as a key prerequisite for a spillover effect. Whatever it was in the beginning, today the EU is guided by self-interested nation-states who reach compromises on furthering integration only when, and as long as, integration is perceived to be beneficial to their national interests.

What follows thereafter is a narrative move which is clearly informed by the presentist way in which Holland’s narrative is pre-constructed (Labov, 2006). In

an unconventional interpretation, Holland questions the consensus affirming the conformance between Monnetism and the two brands of functionalism. Mitrany, unlike Monnet, incorrectly emphasized popular acclamation as a prerequisite for the development of Community institutions, whereas Haas, unlike Monnet, ignored the political context of the spillover processes. Instead, Holland pairs Monnetism with the 'winner', concluding that Monnet, just like Keohane and Hoffmann, "recognized the primacy of intergovernmental bargains" (p. 105). In other words, Holland discards Monnet's conventional representation as a (neo-)functionalist, and labours to reinterpret him as a forerunner of contemporary intergovernmentalism, as both a practice and a theory. Such a move reinforces the legitimacy "of a present point of view by claiming for it a putative founder" (Stocking, 1965) and—vice versa, it reconstitutes the lasting relevance of the pioneer figure. Lepenies and Weingart (1983, p. xvii) refer to such historiographical maneuvers as powerful ways of granting historical legitimacy to present theories and visions by extending "what is to become the future as far as possible in to the past, thereby constructing an image of continuity, consistency and determinacy". In other words, in Holland's political narrative, 'the event' that transformed a dark pre-community past into the 'new state' was Monnet's political project that was at least partly informed by an intergovernmantalist logic of integration.

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In a more recent work of political science, Trygve Ugland (2011, p. 30) quotes Holland's reference to Monnet as "EU's most original and important thinker," but ascribes to him a different, although equally central, role. Ugland's study entitled "Jean Monnet and Canada: Early Travels and the Idea of European Unity" defends an original thesis - namely, that "Monnet's trip to Canada in 1907 formed the quintessential core of the inspiration for his lifelong fixation on European supranational unity" (p. 10). Explaining the relevance of such a thesis,

Ugland asserts that the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) "was in large part due to Jean Monnet's ability to identify and exploit available spaces for institutional design" (p. 13), and that "the creation of the ECSC in 1951 should be situated in a sequence of events in a slow-moving causal process stretching over extended periods of Jean Monnet's life." In other words, the EU as we know it today would have been impossible without Monnet, and Monnet's European agenda would not have been the same without his Canadian experience: hence, the political scientist's interest in Monnet's experiences in Canada as a young cognac salesman working for his father's company.

Ugland is also explicit about his political standpoints. His narrative is guided by his general admiration of Monnet and the EU, which Ugland regards as "the most remarkable international political integration project the world has ever known" (p. 83). But this admiration is also informed by a particular vision of European integration, federalism. Throughout the book Ugland makes implicit and explicit references to what he thinks is so 'remarkable' about the EU. Such references include the restriction of national sovereignties, the pooling of sovereignty in common institutions, and a federated Europe as the preferred destination for the EU.

In other words, Ugland's narrative is pre-constructed with a federalist, if not yet federal, Europe as the 'new state'. The 'prior state' in this narrative is the belligerent Europe which was shaped by the principle of unrestricted national sovereignty. The 'event' that transformed Europe was the Schumann Plan which embodied Monnet's federalist theory.

Contrary to Holland, Ugland does attempt to explain how a political actor with a pronounced dislike for theory can be considered a theoretical equal to proper EI theorists. Referring to Sheldon Wolin's ideas on the relationship between traveling and theory, Ugland focuses on Monnet's business trip across Canada as a young cognac merchant. Drawing a parallel between Monnet's travels and

Alexis de Tocqueville's famous journey, Ugland discusses the method by which Monnet's "new theory for Europe" was constructed:

"*A theorist relies on the method of comparison and seeks to draw lessons from the similarities and differences observed*" (Ugland, 2011, p. 11)

So although "theory, in an academic sense, was of little concern to Jean Monnet" (p. 8), during his travels he compared, just like Tocqueville, the New World with the Old World. Having defined theory in these loose terms, Ugland makes a case that "Monnet's 'theory' emerged from Canada, where his early observations and experiences were transformed into an epiphany for the future of Europe" (p. 8).

What Monnet saw in Canada was, first and foremost, a politically and economically successful transition from a confederation to a federation with a constitution that "shared power effectively between the national capital ant the provinces" (Morgan, 2011, p. xi). In the early twentieth century, Canada was a young and booming polity based on federalist principles and committed to economic planning. "Devoid of the emotive nationalist sentiment burgeoning in Europe prior to the First World War," Canada's 1867 constitutional arrangement—the British North America Act—read much like a commercial contract — requiring, for instance, the dominions to build intercolonial railroad lines within six months of the union's formation (pp. 33-34). As one reads this description, the ECSC immediately pops to mind - or at least this is the analogy that Ugland is making. After witnessing the success of the Canadian model, Monnet presumably invoked the model in his federalist programme for Europe, based on a businesslike approach to political issues and a functionalist emphasis on sectorial integration.

Against this background, Ugland explains what he holds to be Monnet's theoretical innovation (p. 31). Before Monnet's intervention, Ugland explains, the European movement was divided into two main camps:

"*There was little agreement on the principles on which future European cooperation and unity should be based. A clear split could be observed between the*

'unionist' and the more radical 'federalist' positions. While unionists promoted a limited and cautious form of European integration, based on intergovernmental principles and national sovereignty, federalists favored supranational cooperation and the establishment of a constitution for a 'Untied States of Europe'" (Ugland, 2011, p. 26-27)

Monnet judged both approaches to be unproductive. For him, the idea that multiple sovereign nations will co-operate effectively was an illusion, while the constitutional path of classical federalism was a non-starter for Europe because of "intense and widespread nationalism and patriotism" (p. 29). In Monnet's vision, European federation was the end goal of European integration, but the means to get there must be economic, functional, and technocratic: "functional integration - close cooperation between countries in specific economic sectors - held the key to a future European federation and a prosperous Europe, devoid of its habitual conflict" (p. 27). Europe should be built incrementally, without calling national sovereignty directly into question. This logic is also traceable in text of the Schumann declaration which explicitly calls for 'European Federation', but cautions that "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will build through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity".

Ugland goes as far as to suggest that Monnet pioniered the theory of 'federalist functionalism'. The Frenchman is credited for having provided "the analytical link between what was often considered to be opposing doctrines: functionalism and federalism" (p. 31). Only by focusing on economic cooperation, incrementalism, and functional links, Europe can arrive at political federation in the long run (instead of promoting an immediate constitutional shift of political power to the European level). Similarly to Holland, Ugland (2011, p. 31) also argues that Monnet's theoretical innovation of fusing federalism with functionalism was later built upon and substantiated by authors in the field of EI theory, such as Navari (1996).

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In this chapter I analyzed several scholarly representations of Monnet across the spectrum of standpoints regarding the ambiguity of sovereignty. I have demonstrated, that depending on the narrator's standpoint, Monnet can be construed not only as a functionalist, but also a federalist, or even as an intergovernmentalist. What is more, these narratives essentially transform Monnet, the practitioner, into Monnet, the theorist. Both Holland and Ugland pronounce him to be "EU's most original and important thinker". In these and similar narratives, Monnet is credited for having laid down the 'first principles' for both theory and practice, and is often described as the founder of different EI theories.

The mere fact that a scholarly field would consider a non-academic, political actor as a symbolic forerunner is a testimony to the structural proximity of that scholarly field to the field of practical politics. An analogy may come in handy here. Monnet's redefinition as a pioneer theoretician of European integration can be compared to recent developments in the discipline of sociology, where the rise of a more socially engaged, 'public' sociology has also inspired a revision of the discipline's origin story. Michael Burawoy, the leading voice behind the public sociology movement, has argued forcefully that British social reformer Robert Owen (1771-1858) should be considered as the actual begetter of sociology (Burawoy, 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007). Just like Monnet, Owen was a man of affairs with no academic education, and with little to offer in terms of groundbreaking social theory. Rather, it was the success of Owen's socially enlightened management schemes at the New Lanark cotton mills that better explains Burawoy's admiration for the British social reformer. Hence, the so-called father of socialism was transformed into the father of sociology, for Owen's practical engagements offer a good symbolic fit with Burawoy's agenda for a practically engaged social science[16]. Similarly, in this section we have discussed how the

[16] For disputes over Owen's role in the history of sociology, see Pūras (2014)

so-called father of European integration has been transformed into the father of European integration theory.

What was crucial in terms of this monograph's main argument, however, was to show that the field of EU studies is producing conflicting narratives about Monnet that reproduce and legitimate different political projects for European identity relative to the questions of sovereignty and power sharing in the European polity. We now turn to another ambiguity that continues to divide the European house, namely: the ambiguity of political method.

5.3. Jean Monnet and the Ambiguity of Political Method

When discussing Monnet's representations in relation to EU's economic paradigm and EU's sovereignty issues, we have already touched upon democracy and technocracy as alternative political methods for making decisions in the European polity. For instance, Ugland and Guisan described in positive terms the technocratic overtones of Monnet's vision for Europe. Swedberg speculated that democratic deficit may be understood as a byproduct of the strategy that puts economic means at the forefront of the economic agenda. Gillingham emphasized the technocratic nature of Monnet's super-state vision, etc.

But now we turn to authors who deal with this ambiguity head on: authors who tackle the question of European democracy, European technocracy, their merits and possible ways of coexistence. Of course, as Wendy Brown's (2012) famous quote goes, "we are all democrats now". Hence, the debate is usually not whether Europe should be governed technoratically, or democratically, but rather whether EU's technocratic institutions do serve, or can be made to serve, democratically determined agendas. According to David Marquand, ambiguity over the order of subordination between democratic and technocratic principles risks

paralyzing the potential of the Union to act decisively in the realm of high politics. The EU Studies has, of course, devoted a great deal of attention to this problem, most of in under the banner of the so called 'democratic deficit' thesis.

When investigation into the order of subordination between democracy and technocracy in the EU takes a historical perspective, authors usually employ one of the two narrative compositions. Depending on the political pre-construction of the narrative (Labov, 2006), authors typically either take a linear approach to show how an early undemocratic seed has incrementally developed into unaccountable political monster, or they can take a periodization approach to explain how an earlier technocratic period has paved the way for a later democratic period in the history of the European project.

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An example of the first strategy if Giandomenico Majone's (2009) influential historical work on European integration. Now, although Monnet's political style is typically described in technocratic and elitist terms, this reputation can be employed to construct different European narratives. In this regard, Majone's representation of Monnet is perhaps one the most unfavorable.

Majone's narrative proceeds politically from, and historically arrives to, the 'new state' of the European polity which Majone describes as a project that is crippled by inflexible, inefficient, and uncountable governance, a project that is paralyzed by a dysfunctional monetary union, a project that is misguided by elitist federalist visions which have little regard for the democratic will of the European populations. To explain the current predicament, Majone goes back to the early years of European integration. It was in that early period, Majone tells us, that the operational code of the EU was put in place, and the seed of the

democratic deficit problem planted. Only by unraveling the logic, and the etiology, of this 'operational code' we can understand the current predicament of the European project, namely "the EU's legitimacy crisis and the growing alienation of the citizens from the European institutions" (Majone, 2009. p. 1).

For Majone, the key moment in the history of European integration was the failed attempt to establish, in the early 1950's, the European Defense Community and the European Political Community, which were crafted as bold and ambitious integration schemes to follow up on the early breakthrough achieved with the European Coal and Steel Community. Majone describes these federalist schemes as extremely aggressive vis-a-vis the principle of national sovereignty:

"The EPC was meant to provide a common institutional framework for both the ECSC and the European Defence Community (EDC). It would have had extensive competences in defence and foreign policy, as well as in economic and social policy, its own armed forces, and own resources provided by direct taxation of the citizens of the Community. In the EPC the supranational parliament – rather than the national governments meeting in the Council, as in the present EU – would be the ultimate decision-maker" (Majone, 2009, p. 51-52)

The mere fact that these projects were seriously considered in the national parliaments of the six member-states of the ECSC proves to Majone that the early 1950's was the golden age of European federalism. That age ended in 1954 when the French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC treaty. For the Italian scholar of political science, the debacle of these federalist projects demonstrated the persistency of sovereign nation states and the depth of popular attachment to the national institutions. However - and this argument is fundamental to the message of Majone's political narrative - the debacle of these openly federalist projects has also paved the way for 'the event' that continues to haunt the European Union up to this day.

The figure responsible for 'the event' was Jean Monnet. Majone tells the reader how Monnet, reacting to the failures of classical federalist approach to European integration, realized that nation-states were not willing to support "a constitution dividing the powers of government between a federal Europe and its member states with democratic institutions at each level" (Majone, 2009. p. 72). The conclusion that Monnet allegedly derived from this reality of national resistance to any loss of sovereignty was to employ "the method of integration by stealth" (p. 72).

Majone describes Monnet as both an actual and a symbolic leader of cryptofederalists, a political group that set in motion a process of integration by stealth, wherein political integration proceeds "under the guise of economic integration," (p. 72) without telling the European people what is actually going on. These cryptofederalists would describe policy in technical jargon, and promote integration only in specific economic sectors, thereby circumventing public deliberation and democracy itself. Unlike classical European federalism *a la* Altiero Spinelli, cryptofederalism is aggressively antidemocratic.

The true intention of Monnet's technocratic endeavors was the multiplication of new European institutions: integration in one sector was meant to upset the equilibrium of the rest of the economy, and new European institutions would then be called for to secure integration in these other sectors. These self-serving institutionalist intentions, however, must always remain hidden from the people: "Since the people aren't ready to agree to integration, you have to get on without telling them too much about what is happening".

According to Majone, this was the way in which Monnet, the godfather to the cryptofederalists, set in place an operational code which has rendered democracy irrelevant and granted key decisions to unaccountable technocratic elites. Ma-

jone (p. 75) labels this strategy of integration synonymously as either the 'Monnet method' or as "the strategy of *fait accompli* – the accomplished fact which makes opposition and public debate useless" (p. 1)

What is especially unusual about Majone's narrative is that he describes Monnet's technocracy and institutionalism as self-serving goals, rather than as a means to achieve a political goal. In a symbolic attack, Majone claims that Monnet was not a neo-functionalist. For all their elitism and disregard for democracy, "the neo-functionalists a la Ernst Haas . . . were interested in 'final goals'; according to them, the integration process must move towards the establishment of a central political authority" (p. 74-75).[17] Monnet, on the other hand, was arrogantly disinterested in ultimate ends: "What mattered was the movement, the process— especially the creation of European institutions." (p. 73)

Majone cautions the reader not to be misled by the expression 'United States of Europe' which Monnet typically used to speak about his vision. This expression should be understood as a rhetorical tool, and as a tribute to the USA, but not as an ideological commitment to the establishment of a democratic federation. Majone is convinced that Monnet's loyalties were not with the European people, but with fellow cryptoferderalists. And all that mattered to the cryptofederalists was experimentation with economic integration with the hope of necessitating new supranational institutions. Democracy and long term political vision were irrelevant:

"Whether such institutions would eventually merge into a central political authority was not a question that particularly concerned either Monnet or his followers" (Majone, 2009, p. 75)

[17] Su (2009, p. 35) invokes the Pleven Plan and Monnet's advocacy of the European Defence Community (EDC) to argue a case opposite to that of Majone: "Though Monnet preferred to begin integration in the economic field, he seized any opportunity to leap on political unification without waiting for the mature development of economic integration as Haas proposed."

"The sacrifice of democracy in favour of European integration was of course acceptable to Jean Monnet – no great admirer of majoritarian politics – and to his cryptofederalist followers, determined to expand supranational competences by all possible means" (p. 162)

Majone's political narrative traces the origins of the current EU legitimacy crisis and the democratic deficit problem to the self-serving and undemocratic paradigm of technocratic institutionalism that was, allegedly, put into practice by Jean Monnet, whose name and ideals continue to command the fascination of elitist minded federalists in both the EU institutions, and the academy.

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In the beginning of this chapter I introduced two alternative narrative compositions that are used to account for the order of subordination between the principles of democracy and technocracy in EU politics. Majone's narrative is linear: while acknowledging the steady extension of the powers of the European Parliament, Majone nonetheless argues that the underlying logic of EU governance is still grounded in Monnetist logic. In other words, the history of the EU can be summarized as the history of cryptofederalism applied to larger and larger spheres of Europe's political life, as illustrated, for example, by the Maastricht Treaty which made the European Central Bank independent from parliamentary control (Majone, 2009, p. 162).

The alternative narrative composition employs a historiographical technique of periodization. We have already observed this in Marquand when he discussed the Union's transition from 'low politics' to 'high politics': technocracy worked fine in an earlier era, but the growing involvement of the EU in high politics now calls for the subordination of European technocracy to the democratic will of the European people. Another variation of this narrative composition is Luciano Levi's (1990. p. 12) assignment of world-historical roles to Monnet "in staring

the unifying process", and Spinelli "in seeking to conclude it". What this means is that, historically, a Monnetist technocratic era functioned as an incubatory period for a Spinellian democratic era of Europe's federalization and constitutionalization. For some observers, the shift happened with the so-called 'constitutional decade' of EU politics: the period between the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). Whether implicitly or explicitly, such political narratives challenge Majone's description of Monnet as a technocratic enemy of democracy without any long-term political vision for the European project.

Holland (1996), for example, emphasizes that Monnet's elitist strategy was tied up with a vigorous advocacy for a "democratic Community," as an end, if not as a method. Ugland (2011) made a similar point when presenting Monnet's theoretical innovation of linking functionalist means to federalist ends. A more elaborate version of this narrative composition is found in the influential historical narrative of Michael Burgess (2000, 2004). Burgess invokes Monnet's memoirs to illustrate Monnet's dedication to the democratic handling of the supranational institutions and, at an unspecified date in the future, to "a federation validated by the people's vote". Monnet is presented as a federalist democrat in principle, but a cautious functionalist in practice, who believed that a democratic federation could only emerge organically, "by forging specific functional links between states in a way that did not directly challenge national sovereignty" (2000, p. 200). Burgess explains that the essence of the 'Monnet method' lies in the assumption that a political Europe, or a European democracy, would be the culminating point of a gradual process. Writing during the heyday of European constitutionalism, Burgess seems to have believed that this culminating point in history has arrived, and that the time was no due for "the shift from Monnet's functionalism to Spinelli's constitutionalism" (Burgess, 2004, p. 38), a shift that was actually foreseen by Monnet in his original plan.

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Periodization schemes may also be employed in narratives that are less enthusiastic about the European Union's democratization, and which are also less skeptical of elitist politics. Writing in 2014, Wolfgang Wessels, a German political scientist who is also a holder of the Jean Monnet Chair, argued that the Spinellian way of doing things in Europe was over with the financial crisis of 2008, and the Monnetist way of doing things was back: "the economic and financial crisis since 2008 and the sovereign crisis since 2010 have led to a revival of the Monnet Method" (Wessels, 2014, p. 57-58)

Wessels describes the key tenets of the Monnet method: the using of economic instruments to initiate political integration ("in contrast to the federalist strategy promoted by Spinelli"), a focus on limited but real transfer of national sovereignty to the European level, a technocratic preference for non-majoritarian institutions ("The 'High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community' and the 'European Central Bank' are examples of such an approach"), and a focus on elite decisions taken by consensus behind closed doors ("Election and referenda do not fit the Monnet Method").

These principles, Wessels informs us, have once again become crucial to the Union's political methods:

"*In reaction to needs to fight the external schools and internal turbulences, national leaders in the European Council have adopted integration steps of major importance behind closed doors. They created a differentiated set of economic measures. Especially with the 'European Stability Mechanism' (ESM), ant the 'Treaty of Stabilization, Coordination and Governances' (TSCG), they transferred limited, but real competences to the European level. To manage these new functions, the Heads of State of Government created institutional arrangements,*

specifically the Euro summit and its political and administrative infrastructure." (Wessels, 2014, p. 58)

Wessels does acknowledge that the Monnetist way of doing European politics is susceptible to criticism that it is lacking in democracy, accountability and transparency. However, the German political scientist also sees a lot of positives in Europe's return to Monnetist ways. What Wessels (2014, p. 59) says in this respect is that public and democratic deliberation on Europe's federal constitutionalization (the Spinellian way) uncovers "deep cleavages and controversies inside the EU" and increases "skepticism towards 'more Europe'". When Spinellianism gives way to Monnetism, however, the European Council begins to function as an efficient "engine for more integration" (p. 59), and behind closed doors decisions are made that result in real shifts of sovereignty to the European level in the economic sectors where integration is most needed, and new supranational and technocratic institutions are then called for an efficient management of those sectors. Weissels concludes his paper with this remark:

"*The Monnet Method thus remains of high scientific and political salience interest. Thinking of it as an out-dated method would be a mistake*" (p. 59)

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In our earlier discussion of Marquand's ambiguity of political method, we described a conflict between different political visions: critical voices may attack the EU as undemocratic and, therefore, illegitimate and irredeemable; friendlier voices may be calling for a gradual democratization of the EU; while others may actually defend the efficiency of EU's technocratic and elitist ways without, of course, challenging democratic values directly.

In this section of the monograph we have chronicled several Jean Monnet stories that function as symbolic forms through which a world of preferred European

political identity is mirrored. These symbolic forms represent Monnet in different ways:

- Jean Monnet as an undemocratic cryptofederalist who used stealth and treachery to advance European integration along the technocratic path;
- Jean Monnet as the great visionary who used technocratic means to prepare the ground for the democratic federalization of the European project at a later stage in history;
- Jean Monnet as a pioneer of European integration whose elitist and technocratic methods continue to bring efficiency and decisiveness to European decision-making.

5.4. Jean Monnet and the Ambiguity of Belonging and Ethnicity

The last ambiguity of the European project to be discussed in this monograph is the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity. It could have been as well labeled the 'ambiguity of identities'. I decided, however, to label it 'the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity' to avoid confusion which would have resulted from the usage of too many different meanings for the term 'Identity'.

This potential confusion was addressed by Klaus Eder who explained that normative claims about what European identity is or should be in relation to national identities are "part of the phenomenon that needs an explanation" (Eder, 2009, p. 435), they are part of European identity politics understood sociologically as a multiplicity of stories imbedded in the structure of the European political field.

What I am interested in this section, therefore, are scholarly works that make claims about the nature, roots, and evolution of EU's relationship to national

identities and ethnicities, and the agenda - if any - regarding their potential displacement. I will first chronicle a number of divergent claims about where Jean Monnet stood on the issue of nationalism and euronationalism. We will see that this question divided even Monnet's closest associates.

Then I will demonstrate how these divergent claims are employed by scholars in the business of writing grand narratives of European integration.

Now, as a way to start, we may return to David Marquand. Aside from putting forward a theory of Europe's 'great ambiguities', the British political philosopher also offered his own views on where Jean Monnet, whom Marquand described as "the most important of the Union's founding fathers" (Marquand, 2011, 43), stood on some of these ambiguities. In respect to the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity, Marquand associates Monnet's plan for European integration with an anti-ethnic position. For Marquand, Monnet was a visionary of a pan-European identity that would one day displace national identities as the main source of self-identification and a reference of political belonging for the European people. In an attempt to give historical background to such a vision, Marquand explains that in the post-war period the prevailing teleological understanding of modernity dictated that smaller units necessarily give way to larger, more efficient ones. Just as the Westphalian nation-state had subsumed smaller units, so there was every reason to expect "a wider European entity to subsume the Westphalian states that made it up" (p. 53). A new identity formation would then follow suit. According to Marquand, this was Monnet's vision: ethno-cultural identities would continue to exist only as residuals of an earlier state of history only to be gradually displaced by Europeanism.

While Monnet's awareness of the dangers of nationalism is well documented, Marquand's representation of Monnet as a euronationalist visionary is not without alternatives. To give an example, Marquand's representation is directly contradicted by Holland's (1996, p. 98) reading of Monnet's vision: "He [Monnet]

was opposed to the substitution of nationalism at the state level by a new nationalism at the European level." Holland explains that the key for Monnet was to destroy the "spirit of domination" associated with nationalism rather than to embrace that very same spirit on a new political level.

Whether or not Monnet was on a mission to create a new 'European man' is an issue that divided even his closest associates. Fontaine (1991), the ghostwriter of Monnet's memoirs, explained that Monnet respected the continent's cultural diversity and saw in the quest for a European identity a great risk of a new nationalism with the same deadly tendencies of the old one. Fontaine stresses the point that, while Monnet is best known for his role in European integration, he was, first and foremost, a French patriot who saw in the diversity of national identities a source of European strength. It is worth quoting Fontaine at length here:

"*Being a moderate federalist, unlike some of his associates, he did not dream of a European state, or a new European man. Our old continent was rich in its diversity, and it was this that perhaps distinguished it most clearly from the others. What was the point of calling for a European identity that risked being only the nationalism one wanted to destroy, on a different scale?*" (Fontaine, 1991. p. 55)

Fontaine's representation of Monnet, however, was directly challenged by Robert Marjolin (1991), a French economist who played a key role in the formation of the European Economic Community and a longtime acquaintance of Monnet. Marjolin describes Monnet as an almost utopian visionary of a European superstate, which would one day dismantle national sovereignties and attract the emotional loyalties of its citizens away from their nation-states. Marjolin explains that Monnet's neo-functionalist creed was proven wrong by history, and the spillovers have not resulted in nothing that would resemble a "United States of Europe", or a European identity. European identity, or 'European sensibility' as

Marjolin prefers to call it, could not emerge because Monnet's vision was simply not adjusted to the historical realities of national identities which, Marjolin tells us, have prevented Europe's evolution into the 'United States of Europe' in the federal example of the United States of America. Marjolin articulates the flaws in what he held to be Monnet's utopian pan-european vision, by way of comparing European project with the American case:

"*What could there possibly be in common between the British establishments of the Atlantic coast in 1789 or thereabout, which were less than a century old, which shared the same language, the same law, and essentially, the same institutions, which had never fought one another, and the old states of Europe - France, Britain, Germany, Italy - some of which, admittedly, had unified only in the nineteenth century, but which all had national traditions going back to the Middle ages? Because the term 'United States of Europe' creates illusions in minds that are ignorant of history, I have always refused to use it*" (Marjolin, 1991, p. 175)

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The living memory of Monnet's outlooks regarding national identities and their possible displacement by a European we-feeling shows remarkable flexibility. This flexibility can be exploited in larger European narratives which construe Monnet's agenda as constitutive of 'the event' which transformed the political community into a 'new state'. To demonstrate how the ambiguity of belonging extends to narrativistic competition over EU's origin story, I will now compare and analyze the roles in which Monnet is cast in Christopher Booker and Richard North's (2005) *The Great Deception*, and Alan S. Milward's (2000) *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*.

The Great Deception, a historical study by two British intellectuals, can be described as the definitive eurosceptic narrative of European integration. When

published, it was praised by eurosceptics in different countries "as the most significant book ever written on the European Union" (Tunkrova, 2006). *The Great Deception* was republished in 2016 as a special 'EU referendum edition', and was referred to extensively by the LEAVE campaigners in the run up to the June 24th referendum.

Written during the climax of Europe's constitutional moment, the historical study is an attempt to explain how Europe got into this situation, into the 'new state' which is described by the authors in exclusively pejorative terms. For Booker and North, the whole project of European integration has, since its early days, had the secret objective of creating a political union - a Untied States of Europe - which would do away with national sovereignty and national identities. This supranational state would be "beyond the control of national governments, politicians or electorates" (Booker and North, 2005, p. 1). Completely lacking in regard for sovereign national democracies, the European project has never had any democratic basis. Therefore, its leaders have used stealth and treachery to keep the true objectives of European integration hidden from the public eye. And only now, when European leaders are drawing up a constitution, the hidden agenda cannot be kept secret anymore.

The Constitutional Treaty, "the crowning event in the creation of a new state" (p. 2), is by Booker and North described as a regrettable outcome of a process begotten by Jean Monnet, whose role in this narrative could be characterized as that of an 'evil genius'. To add dark colors to Monnet's image, narrators put a strong emphasis on the controversial aspects of his biography. They hint, for example, at Monnet's allegedly illegal activities while serving as a cognac salesman in Canada for his father's company:

"*One of Monnet's chief pre-war customers had been the Hudson Bay Company of Canada, which bought large quantities of brandy from him, much of which was then sold on to the native Indians, a trade prohibited by law. Monnet was*

grateful for this, since he found it hard to compete in the legal market with better-known firms such as Hennessy" (Booker and North, 2004, p. 14)

The construction of Monnet's character also draws from the existing image of him as an anti-nationalist visionary of a supranational Europe. For instance, Booker and North's story portrays Monnet to have been theorizing – along with Arthur Salter[18] and as early as early as 1930s – on schemes to "erode nationalism" by splitting Europe's nation-states into regions (Booker and North, 2004, p. 17). The whole Eurosceptic narrative is centered around the image of Monnet as a deceitful visionary of a supranational Europe deprived of national sentiments.

Although Monnet hit upon the idea of supranational governance in the 1920's, only a unique postwar constellation could provide the Frenchman with an opportunity to set his project on its way, but he had to be careful not to reveal the true purpose of his vision:

"*His ultimate goal could only be achieved if it was worked for by stealth, step by step, over many years, until enough of the machinery of the new form of government was in place for its purpose to be brought into the open*" (p. 2)

[18] Arthur Salter (1881-1975) was a British civil engineer, whom Monnet collaborated with at the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council during World War I and at the League of Nations afterwards. While he is rarely mentioned in influential accounts of EU origins, Booker and North attribute crucial historical significance to Salter in the birth of the European polity. According to the British authors, the contemporary EU is the fruition of a supranational idea conceived together by Monnet and Salter during the Great War, which they developed during the interwar period. A couple of observations are in order. First, it may well be speculated that Salter's inclusion in the EU pantheon could be read as an attempt on the part of the authors to make the European story friendlier for British audiences. Second, such an attempt builds on Monnet's reputation as a networker *par excellence*. Monnet is traditionally perceived as a kind of human hub of high-level international relationships and political influences (Chira-Pascanut, 2014) and this image is often exploited by authors for their own agendas by singling out one particular thread in Monnet's web of connections and influences. This historiographical technique is not uncommon in the historiography of Monnet. The reader is reminded here how Catherine Guisan has used Paul Reuter's putative influence on Monnet to advance a communitarian, third-way interpretation of the Union's political identity.

'The event' happened in 1950. At that time, Jean Monnet was in charge of France's Planning Commissariat which had been tasked with the implementation of Monnet's four-year plan for the modernization of France. At that time, the great political question of the day was the contested fate of German coal and steel industries in the Ruhr. When the USA threatened to impose its own will on the situation if France could not offer a good solution, Jean Monnet sensed an opportunity for which he had been waiting. He proposed to Robert Schuman that the coal and steel industries of France, Germany and other European countries should be placed under the direction of a supranational authority. And the rest is history. Without making his intentions explicit, Monnet started a "silent revolution" (p. 51). In his grand and secretive vision, the Schumann declaration and the European Coal and Steel Community were just first steps towards the 'United States of Europe' that would emerge one day at the expense of national governments and national loyalties.

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But now compare this story, that depicts Monnet as a visionary of a postnational order, with Alan S. Milward's (2000) narrative in his seminal study entitled "The European Rescue of The Nation-State". It can be stated from the outset that Monnet's representation as both a fundamental player and a *supra-*, or *Euro-nationalist* could not have worked well with Milward's general thesis.

This thesis argues that self-interested European nation states have been both the primary movers and the primary beneficiaries of European integration, and that integration has actually strengthened the *national* allegiances of European peoples. To simplify Milward's argument to its basic message, it can be said that the 'new state' in Milward's narrative is a prosperous confederation of European nation-states which have used European integration as a way to re-assert themselves during Cold War after a period of state weakness in the 'prior state' of the interwar period. Integration of European markets has allowed the nation-states

to finance their welfare systems, which has also contributed to the strengthening of the national sentiment, while "the conversion away from a primary national allegiance, for which European federalists hoped, has not taken place" (Milwad, 2000, p. 19).

I argue that Milward's representation of Monnet derives from this thesis. This requires some contextual backgrounding because my interpretation challenges the mainstream view on Milward's historiography. As the traditional story goes, Milward was deeply critical of what is often derisively called the *hagiographical* approach to EU history. The so-called European hagiographies are focused on the heroic roles of Monnet, Spaak, Spinelli, Adenauer, Schuman, and de Gasperi. Such uncritical narratives were all about championing "the miraculous doings of these European saints" (Milward, 2000, p. 318). This line of historical research was criticized by Milward for naively assigning a role too important for a handful of individuals, at the expense of the structural dynamics of politics and economics (Bailey, 2013, p.8)

Milward, an economic historian, has become associated with the type of 'realist' historiography that downplays the role of putative heroes in order to deal with history in its 'realist' complexity. He became known as the great debunker of the founding fathers myth (Kolvraa, 2010, 2023b). In fact, most contemporary attempts to reappraise the role of key individuals—like Monnet— in the European integration process begin with a line of defense against Milward's "historical realism" (Burgess, 2000; Loth, 2008; Knudsen and Gram-Skjoldager, 2010).

This is just one side of the story, however. If one reads Milward carefully, it is clear than his objective is not so much to destroy the EU's mythical founding story, but rather to transform its content and its key message, and its moral conclusion for the European community. The Founding fathers were not "harbingers of a new order in which the nation no longer had a place", writes Milward (2000,

p. 318). He tells us that the founding of the first European institutions in the 1950 - 'the event' - was informed by a different vision. In Milward's take on integration history, Monnet, Spaak, Schuman, Adenauer, and De Gasperi are carefully redefined as enlightened statesmen in the national tradition:

"*Far from renouncing the nation-state as the foundation of a better European order, they achieved prominence and success because they were among those who developed an accurate perception of the positive role it would play in the post-war order and who also recognized or stumbled upon the need for those limited surrenders of national sovereignty through which the nation-state and western Europe were jointly strengthened*" (2000, p. 319).

What this means is that Milward rewriters the founding story by casting the same heroes in new roles. The 'founding fathers' are used as symbolic forms through which Milward mirrors his grand political idea, namely 'the European rescue of the nation-state'. As for Monnet specifically, I argue that Milward is drawn to the very myth he is trying to debunk and that he puts effort to reshape that myth in the image of his general thesis. On the one hand, Milward writes derisively about the 'Monnet cult' among the Community's supporters who decorate their tables with "cheap coloured reproductions of the arch-saint Monnet". Again, however, Milward's problem is not with the Monnet myth *per se*, but rather with the message of the myth. Instead of debunking the Monnet myth altogether, Milward chooses to rework its core message.

What emerges from Milward's historiographical labours is a new hero: Jean Monnet the French patriot, whose primary mission was to rebuild the economy of post-war France. Milward takes pains to stress Monnet's role in preparing France's Plan of Modernization and Equipment (known as the 'Monnet Plan') while at the helm of France's Planning Commissariat immediately after World War II. In this line of interpretation, working with the French nation-state's post-

war resurgence as his top priority, Monnet starts pondering Western European integration only as late as April 1948[19], and only when information flowing from his American connections convinced him that integration in the coal and steel sectors would provide "access to German resources and German markets for French reconstruction" (2000, p. 336). In other words, the European Schuman Plan is reinterpreted by Milward as a mere instrument of France's Monnet Plan.

Instead of rejecting the centrality of Monnet altogether, Milward reshapes the historical picture of the illustrious Frenchman into a fitting historical icon for his own thesis. Just as European integration is construed as an instrument of the nation-state, Monnet is reinterpreted as a prominent French statesman who summons the ECSC to further France's national interests. Milward's Monnet bears no resemblance to Catherine Guisan's (2012) Monnet who was described as a federalist saint who created the European miracle by openly challenging his own country's national interests.

In Milward's interpretation, the narrative of the founding fathers as anti-nationalist builders of the Euro-national order is turned on its head. Jean Monnet, a French statesman and patriot, advocates European integration to advance the material interests of France, and this proves to be the constant meaning of European integration throughout its history up to the present point in time: the thrust behind integration is to empower the nation state by European means, and not to undermine it.

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The ambiguity of ethnicity and belonging is at the roots of most of Europe's contemporary challenges. New waves of euroscepticism are fueled by what is

[19] Compare this factual observation with Booker and North's (2005) claim that Jean Monnet had specific plans for European integration as early as the years of the Great War, and was guided by these plans ever since.

perceived as EU's agenda to undo the national identities of the European peoples, while calls for a stronger European identity are also ever-present because decisive collective action on a European scale is thought by many to be impossible without the "we feeling" holding that collective together. Searching for a middle ground, confederalists of all sorts are at odds with both of these positions, and they see the European house as a fortress of the nation-state and diverse national identities. Against this background, Monnet's representations chronicled in this section should be seen as symbolic forms that mirror these different political world-views or European political identities:

- Jean Monnet, the wise founding father who sought to diminish and pacify destructive ethno-cultural nationalisms by establishing a peaceful supranational European state grounded in Pan-European sentiments;

- Jean Monnet, the stealthy and corrupt founding father who set up a vision to establish a United States of Europe, an unaccountable political monster which seeks to destroy Europe's national and cultural diversity;

- Jean Monnet, a French patriot who saw in European integration a great opportunity to advance the French interest.

CONCLUSION

In the pages above we have encountered many different heroes and villains who all go by the name of Jean Monnet. And yet, all of these heroes and villains are somehow the same man. So, who was this man, after all? If this was our question, we would be in serious trouble. Aside from testifying to Monnet's status as an important actor in history, the encountered stories simply do not help with this question. The uncovered variety of Monnet's images conforms to the key insight of metabiography (Shapin, 2005), namely that heroes of science and politics live many lives after death.

But a simple chronicle of Monnet's radically varying identities was not our objective. We were not simply interested in discovering the different types of Jean Monnet roaming the pages of academic books and articles. The objective was to understand why these particular types have come into being. Following Eder's (2009, p. 443) instruction, I interpreted the different representations of Monnet as specific identity carriers and established systematic links between these representations and the social-political structure in which they are grounded.

In the final part of this study it was demonstrated that the historical and theoretical literature on the EU has produced a rich variety of competing and irreconcilable images of Jean Monnet, and that the pattern of the variety of these images is shaped by the embeddedness of respective scholarly narratives in the structure of the key divisions of European political field, namely (1) the ambiguity of economic paradigm, (2) the ambiguity of sovereignty, (3) the ambiguity of political method, and (4) the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity.

The Function of the Hero

One of the conclusions of this monograph regards to the function of Jean Monnet in academic storytelling on the European Union. For most of the authors considered, Jean Monnet was not so much a complex historical question to be resolved so much as he was a symbolic answer to the most important political dilemmas of European political life. Each of the four ambiguities covered in the pages above revolves around the questions 'What is Europe?' and 'Where should Europe go?'.

To attempt an answer to these questions means an attempt to give a fixed identity to 'Europe'. Establishing a fixed identity means establishing continuity over time, determining some key elements that have remained constant, or 'identical,' amidst the turbulence of passing time. This explains why claims about community origins and references to the 'vision,' 'intention,' 'firsts principles' and 'methods' of Jean Monnet are so prominent in academic evaluations of EU's present-day reality: because it is a way of establishing an image of stability and continuity from the times of Monnet, as the Union's founder, all the way through to our own time. It is a way of saying that *my* answer to the great political dilemmas of the day is not only rational, but it is almost logically *necessary*, because it is emerging through the flow time in the sense of being consistent with the logic of historical development and the 'original plan'.

By way of establishing a fixed political identity of the founder of the community, an author attempts to impose, through storytelling, a fixed political identity on the community in the present time. Therefore, in academic storytelling, Jean Monnet functions as a symbolic vessel to be filled with whatever authors hold to be fundamentally right or wrong about the European Union in its present condition.

Knowledge for the Sake of What?

It is precisely because communal origin stories and founding myths are so fundamental to advancing normative identity projects, that a case study of Monnet's representations was selected, and undertaken, with broader objectives in mind. The reader will remember that the discourse analysis of Monnet's representations in the academic literature on the EU was employed as a case study that was meant to shed light on the more general questions pertaining to the nature of the relationship between the contemporary politics of European identity and the scholarly origin narratives of the European Union.

The key accomplishment of this monograph was, therefore, to demonstrate that *different scholarly accounts of EU's origins constitute a battlefield of competing projects for European identity, and that this battlefield reflects the key contemporary conflicts and ambiguities of the European political field: the ambiguity of economic paradigm, the ambiguity of sovereignty, the ambiguity of political method, and the ambiguity of belonging and ethnicity* (thesis).

This thesis was put forward as an alternative to the "Pure knowledge" and "Handmaiden" ways of thinking about the academy's involvement (if any) in the politics of European identity. Therefore, before drawing the broader implications of the thesis, it is important to offer concluding reflections on the validity of these other positions, and on their limitations.

Contrary to what is argued by the 'Pure Knowledge' position, the field of EU Studies is clearly receptive to the influences emanating from the world of European politics. The fact that esteemed EU Studies scholars show irreconcilable differences when it comes to describing the key facts of Monnet's life and the key tenets of his political programme means either that most of these authors are

poorly familiarized with their subject-matter, or that their descriptions are informed by political standpoints vis-à-vis the great political questions of the day. I think it is safe to establish that the latter is true. Any talk of 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge' must be treated with suspicion in the case of EU Studies, because the very existence of this academic field is inseparable from the motive of 'knowledge for the sake of politics'.

If it established that the literature under consideration is politicized in the sense of producing politically useful knowledge, the next order of business is to answer the question 'Useful for Whom?'. The 'Handmaiden' position, which is central to most critical reflections on the quality of EU Studies' scholarly output, holds that the field is politicized in the sense of performing a handmaiden role to the agenda advanced by central EU institutions, or 'Brussels'.

Without questioning the potential of the 'Handmaiden' position to account for other types of academic production, I believe it was clearly demonstrated that the 'Handmaiden' position is unfit to account for the scholarly battles over Jean Monnet's image and reputation. While these interpretative battles are clearly politicized, the emerging variation of Monnet stories mirrors the division-based structure of European political field, rather than the singular influence of EU's official policy line stemming from 'Brussels'.

To be sure, as we have discussed in part four of this study, the European Commission and the European Parliament played a big hand in the promotion of Jean Monnet as EU's definitive political hero, and the official efforts to construct a popular European hero may well have contributed to the overall attraction of Monnet as a symbol for academic authors. However, the stories these scholars tell about Monnet can in no way be read as legitimations or reproductions of EU's official discourse. On the contrary, many of these stories have been shown

to be informed by deeply critical outlooks of the narrators towards what they consider to be EU's main political line.

To sum up, the type of knowledge produced in scholarly origin narratives is guided neither by the quest for pure knowledge, nor by the will to serve the power of Brussels. Instead this type of scholarly production was found to be shaped by the conflict-ridden politics of European identity.

Open System of Communication

The diverse variety of Monnet narratives was made sense of by referring to the great divisions of the European political debate that were so well captured by David Marquand: the conflict between 'Social Europe' and 'Economic Europe' as competing economic paradigms, the conflict between federalism and confederalism as competing principles of political organization, the conflict between the ideals of European technocracy and European democracy, and the conflict over the role and fate of national identities in the larger European polity. The contemporary politics of European identity revolves around these competing grand visions for Europe, all of which have been advocated with new vigour on Europe's crisis-ridden political scene during the last decade or so. These persistent dividing lines of European political life are imported into the academy where they are reproduced in the form of narratives that serve as carriers of competing political world-views and competing normative projects for European identity.

Monnet, the enemy of national identities and the builder of a new European man, is set against Monnet, the patriotic guardian of France's national interests. Monnet, the visionary pioneer of (neo)functionalism, is set against Monnet, the prudent intergovernmentalist. Monnet, the treacherous technocrat and the hateful enemy of democracy, is set against Monnet, the prudent builder of structures for

a future European democracy. Monnet, the harbinger of a European neoliberal order, is set against Monnet, the Saint-Simonian super-state planner of a socialist persuasion. These are just some of the images observed in the literature of EU Studies, and all of them carry in themselves specific normative projects for European identity.

In this monograph, the cacophony of mutually contradictory stories told by EU scholars was classified and made sense by referring to the sociological theory of European identity. For example, redefining *politicization* in plural and conflictual terms conforms to Sonntag's (2011) key insight that, unlike most national systems which have been consolidated by way of powerful political centers operating as hegemonic 'regulators of meaning', the EU is a system where the center is but one among a plurality of competing 'regulators of meaning'.

In other words, the cacophony of EU origin stories was explained by reference to Europe as a quintessentially open system of communication. Characterized by an intensely complex and divided structure of economic interests, cultural traditions and historical experiences, and lacking a powerful political center (and an education system) to impose a hegemonic collective understanding of itself, Europe is a quintessentially open system of communication that allows an unrestrained proliferation of identity projects (including those that threaten to destroy the Union) on top of its structure of unresolved ambiguities.

Critical Insights

By referring to the specific complexities and ambiguities of the European political system, we have given a sociological explanation for the structural tendency among EU Studies authors to produce highly divergent origin narratives of the European Union. However, a sociological explanation of the field's structural

tendencies must not be confused with a justification of individual scholarly output.

While this was not a direct concern of this monograph, I think it is important, even necessary from a moral perspective, to draw some critical conclusions regarding the state of EU historiography, and the role EU historiography should be expected to play in the larger European debate, especially given the current uncertainties over the very future existence of the Union.

First and foremost, coming to terms with the impossibility of 'pure historical knowledge' should not be accepted as an excuse for 'anything goes' approach to history writing. The undisputable reality that scholars are "conditioned in a thousand subtle ways by the present in which they write" (Stocking, 1965), does not justify crude political presentism as a primary motive for one's academic interest in political history.

An understanding of the past for the sake of the past remains a noble ideal of the historical craft that may be impossible to attain in full, but it is an ideal worth striving for nevertheless. In the words of George Stocking (1965), an understanding of the past for the sake of the past "exists only as a kind of Holy Grail – never to be found by sinful man, but enlightening the scholar who dedicates himself to the search". By committing to this Holy Grail of history writing, a scholar commits to being self-reflective and conscious about keeping his or her present political predispositions in check, about suspending his or her judgement as to the past's present utility.

It is my impression that this noble historiographical ideal is, unfortunately, very much lacking in the contemporary academic debate over the origins and history of the European Union. Too many authors are approaching the European past

simply for the sake of legitimizing their academic-political views on the European present. Too many authors decide to take on the origins of the EU with the primary motive of making a political comment on the present political condition. And by translating the needs and conflicts of the present into claims about history and communal origins, scholars run a very dangerous risk of muddying our understanding of postwar European history instead of making it clearer.

Historical writing of a presentist persuasion produces symbolic political simplifications – e.g. "Monnet the evil socialist", "Monnet the federalist saint", or "Monnet the treacherous technocrat" - that can be useful for political parties with sectarian political interests and sectarian identity projects, but they are not useful for the European people, European students and European decision-makers who seek historical clarity, and who expect professional academic historiography to be as unbiased and as historically accurate as it is possible.

Of course, this is not to say that all scholarly narratives covered in this study are historically inaccurate or biased to the point of being unreliable. Such a claim would be absurd. We should leave it to professional historians to set the score straight and determine which representations of Monnet are historically accurate, which are a bit far-fetched, and which are completely inaccurate. However, when looked at as a whole, the level of heterogeneity among these mutually-antithetical narratives demonstrates convincingly that, at least for some of the narratives investigated, motives of political utility were far important than historical accuracy. And this is deeply troubling. Because what the current European political debate needs most from historical thinking is accuracy and clarity; not political pseudohistory which is but a sophisticated version of 'fake news'.

My primary objective in this monograph was to conceptualize diverging scholarly accounts of EU's origins as a battlefield for competing projects of European identity, and to explain the battle lines by reference to the key contemporary

conflicts and ambiguities of the European political field. Therefore, this monograph should, first and foremost, be regarded as a work in the sociology of knowledge tradition, and as an attempted contribution to the sociological theory of European identity. However, aside from solving an academic puzzle and reinforcing a particular theoretical view of European identity, this study also advances a critique of the type of crudely presentist and utilitarian style characteristic to much of the historical writing in EU Studies.

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